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Abstract 
The overall purpose of this thesis is to examine the models for effective compliance, and 
those currently adopted in practice within the financial service sector. The need for 
financial service organisations to maintain a robust compliance function has developed 
due to ever increasing regulatory demands following the most recent global financial crisis, 
alongside concerns over compliance culture within financial service organisations. An 
overarching research question exists of why the compliance function is often viewed as 
business inhibiting within practice. 
This research engaged with practitioners with experience of working in financial service 
organisations and regulatory bodies. Repertory grid interviews (a technique stemming from 
Personal Construct Theory) explored practitioners’ personal worldviews of what comprises 
effective compliance via consideration of experiences ranging from ‘worst’ to ‘aspirational’ 
compliance.  
Practitioners do not align perceptions of benefits and costs of compliance in a linear 
fashion, when comparing worst and aspirational compliance experiences, which 
challenges the traditional models presented within academic literature. Barriers to 
regulatory compliance were highlighted, when exploring personal constructs with recurring 
themes of culture (management buy in) and also judgement (spirit, as opposed to, letter of 
the law). Compliance officer are highly aware of the importance of relationships with the 
regulator, and remain proactive in prioritising workload around the regulatory approach. 
An alternative model for compliance is presented in the form of the ‘Compliance Trust’. 
The model results in a compliance community which would operate independently from the 
financial service firms that they serve, and differs from traditional commercial consultancy 
or outsourcing with the emphasis on societal contribution and integrity, rather than 
economic motivations. The compliance trust would benefit organisations, via rotation of 
experience and knowledge sharing. This research provokes reflection on current practice 
in comparison to existing academic theories, and seeks to identify whether alternative 
models are viable for the future of compliance approaches within financial service practice. 
Keywords: Compliance, financial services, regulation, shared service and outsourcing  
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Glossary 
Category 
The word category is used to describe the collective grouping of data during the content 
analysis phase of research. This is consistent with the terminology applied within personal 
construct studies employing Honey’s content analysis (see below). 
Concept 
Concepts within this thesis are informed from the literature and knowledge gained from 
prior work experience. Specifically, the underlying questions which directed the course of 
this thesis (through the research flow discussed in Section 1.2) include a number of 
concepts. These have been contextualised within the introduction, in order to provide 
definitions of how these concepts have been interpreted and used within this research. 
Construct 
This is a personal construct theory term. Constructs represent the personal thoughts and 
beliefs of individuals (descriptors for their personal experiences), and these form the major 
portion of data elicited from participants within this thesis.  
Corollary 
Personal construct theory (see below) is underpinned by a number of corollary in order to 
analyse how individuals’ understand, interpret and act (anticipate) based upon their 
experiences. These are presented in Appendix 3, as discussed in Kelly’s original 
theoretical work, and how they have been adapted within this thesis. 
Elements 
This is a personal construct theory term. In this thesis, elements represent the individual 
experiences explored with practitioners, ranging from worst compliance experience to their 
viewpoint of aspirational compliance experience.  
Eyeball analysis 
This terminology is used with respect to repertory grid analysis, and represents the first 
stage within the analysis process. This includes the first look, and interpretation of the grid 
data formed during interview. This is introduced in further detail in Section 6.6.1. 
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Honey’s content analysis 
This terminology is used with respect to repertory grid analysis, and represents a specific 
phase in the analysis process, to collectively group the constructs elicited during interviews 
with the group of participants into categories. This is introduced in further detail in Section 
6.6.2. This technique is an adaptation of content analysis specific to repertory grid 
analysis. 
Personal construct theory/psychology 
This theory stems from the psychology literature base and was developed by George Kelly 
(1955). The theory argues that a person’s actions are informed by the way in which they 
anticipate events through their personal construct system. This is discussed in further 
detail in Section 6.1. 
Supposition 
The word supposition is used to set out presumptions made by the researcher following 
the review of the literature, which have been explored specifically during the analysis of 
data in Chapter 7. 
Theme  
The word theme is used to describe the collective grouping of data during the eyeball 
analysis phase of research, and also during the analysis of interview transcripts. This is 
consistent with the nature of analysis performed by the individual researcher, and the 
resulting discussion of themes within Chapter 7.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction and context 
“Scandal has been the agent for change in the growth of the new regulatory state” 
(Moran, 2000, p. 9)  
“A more permanent solution to the prevention of future financial crises should 
combine enhancements in the risk management and governance practices 
implemented by financial institutions and their regulators, together with 
mechanisms that support cultural change” (Ashby, Peters, and Devlin, 2013, p. 
2682) 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the rationale for this study which focuses on 
regulatory compliance in the financial service sector, alongside an introduction to the 
specific research aims and objectives. Thereafter, key compliance concepts are 
introduced, which are embedded within the research design. The chapter concludes with 
an overview of the thesis. 
1.0 Motivations for compliance research 
Following the most recent global financial crises of 2008-09, there has been significant 
commentary and calls for regulatory reform within academic literature (and the wider 
media). Entire books consider “Who is to blame?” (Davies, 2010). Others discuss 
contributory factors to the crises including the greed of various actors (Mason, 2009). 
However, financial crises and financial folly have reoccurred with regular frequencies 
throughout history across the globe (Reinhoff and Rogoff, 2009), with questions raised on 
each occurrence on “what needs to be done differently” (see Table 1, for a summary of 
crises). Posner (2009), whilst contributing to this literature from a US perspective, critiques 
both journalistic and academic discussions following the crisis, stating that many of the 
authors simply had “an axe to grind, or are too technical for non-specialist to understand 
[…], or at the other extreme are superficial” (2009, p. xiv). 
The British Banking Association (BBA) have issued self-congratulatory press (BBA, 2013) 
since the financial crisis, regarding “sweeping changes” which have resulted in a “much 
safer financial system”, summarising changes to standards and regulatory changes within 
the sector (BBA, 2013). This self-congratulation conflicts with more recent empirical 
evidence from the sector, presented within survey research, where “33% of financial 
services professionals feel the industry hasn’t changed for the better since the financial 
crisis” (Tenbrunsel and Thomas, 2015, p. 3). 
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Table 1 Summary of crises over last century (summarised from reference to Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, 
pp. 15-20) 
Crisis Why different – thinking 
of the time 
Onset of Crisis 
Market default 1930s (The 
Great Depression) 
There will not be other 
world wars – sustainability 
through greater political 
stability and global growth. 
1929 global stock market 
crash. 
Debt Crisis 1980s Commodity prices strong, 
interest rates low. Bank 
loans issued instead of 
bond loans - As individual 
banks taking up the loans 
incentives for information 
gathering and monitoring. 
High interest rates and 
commodity price crash, 
precipitating defaults in 
developing countries. 
Debt Crisis 1990s Asia Asian region had 
conservative fiscal policy 
and stability – no recent 
evidence of financial crisis. 
Foreign exchange rate 
losses precipitated IMF 
bailouts and resulting 
recessions. 
Debt crisis 1990s-2000s 
Latin America 
Bond debts as opposed to 
bank debts (perception at 
time of safety in bond debt), 
therefore, limitations for 
renegotiation and defaults. 
A series of financial crisis – 
Mexico 1994 collapse, 
Argentina’s $95 billion 
default, Uruguay’s 2002 
default and Brazil’s 1998-
2002 crises. 
US lead up to global 
financial crisis 2008-09 
Globalisation, technology 
boom, sophisticated 
financial systems and 
understanding of monetary 
policy – “everything is fine”. 
US Subprime meltdown – 
global crisis and recession. 
 
This thesis considers the context of the financial crisis from another angle; whether it is 
possible to ‘fix’ the problem of cyclical financial crises through regulation and compliance, 
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when there is an environment of “regulatory flux”1. The historical response to crises has 
been to introduce new regulation. However, the ideal would be to proactively prevent the 
continuous cycle of financial crisis, in order to avoid the environment of regulatory flux. UK 
financial institutions, whilst adhering to generally accepted corporate governance codes 
already had “codes of conduct and ethics training in place” (Llewellyn, Steare and 
Trevellick, 2014, p. 13) which did not prevent or detect the underlying issues leading to the 
most recent financial crisis (Graafland and Bert, 2014) This indicates that (corporate 
governance) regulations did not proactively prevent the most recent crisis.  
Incentives behind exploring the (global) phenomena of regulatory compliance are 
encompassed in the following extract that is part of a resignation email (from the AML 
director), which was uncovered as part of a (US) subcommittee investigation into failings 
within the HSBC (US) compliance function. This quotation provides an example of a 
prominent organisation disregarding the importance of regulatory compliance (in terms of 
authority and resource requirements), which ultimately leads to deterioration in the 
relationship with regulators: 
“Until we appoint senior compliance management that have the requisite 
knowledge and skills in these areas, reduce our current reliance on consultants to 
fill our knowledge gap, and provide the AML Director appropriate authority, we will 
continue to have limited credibility with the regulators.” (US Senate, 2012, p. 24) 
Alongside public enquiries into specific compliance issues, there is also limited evidence of 
public trust in the financial markets due to ongoing scandals within the media (mis-selling, 
interest rate rigging and continued ‘fat cat’ bonuses2). Proposals by Sir Richard Lambert 
called for an independent body acting as a “champion for better banking standards” (BBC, 
2014) which suggests a lack of confidence in the current regulatory bodies. However, the 
                                               
1 Regulatory flux is used in this context as an alternative description to the deregulation, crisis, re-regulation 
cycle, a term also used by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), and Parker (2013). See also Section 3.3.1. 
2 Examples of  media coverage:  
Mis-selling: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/08/29/uk-britain-banks-misselling-
idUKKBN0GT0ZD20140829, Libor/Interest Rate: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/327edfb6-1879-11e4-a51a-
00144feabdc0,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2F32
7edfb6-1879-11e4-a51a-
00144feabdc0.html%3Fsiteedition%3Duk&siteedition=uk&_i_referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fin
depth%2Flibor-scandal#axzz3EPWg1Sd4, UK Banker Bonuses: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/622344e2-2f5c-
11e4-83e4-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3EPWg1Sd4 All accessed July 2014. 
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emphasis on new regulation and supervision standards may not be the solution to restore 
public trust.  
The idea of over regulating (and over auditing) resonates with the concepts of the “audit 
society” of the late 1980s onwards, which may be applied to any sort of “monitoring 
activity” discussed by Power (2000, p. 114). However, questions arise to whether there are 
feasible alternatives, from the societal perspectives when trust is lacking. 
“We audit, and we regulate, when we cease to trust” (Moran, 2000, p. 10) 
The evolution of regulation (and deregulation) and compliance therewith, can be closely 
coupled to the theoretical development of both regulatory economic theory and principal-
agent theory. Therefore, economic theory including the regulatory cycle acts as a 
theoretical base reference point through the course of the research project. Institutional 
theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) is also considered a useful lens to review the 
literature; from both the perspective of regulatory-setting agencies and political influence 
(Clark, Jr. and Demirag, 2006), and also from the perspective of firms or management 
complying with the resulting regulation. Moral development theory (Kohlberg) is also a 
common theory used to explain management decision making processes (Crane and 
Matten, 2010), and so links were explored from this theoretical perspective through the 
course of the literature review, to consider the motivations for management to comply.  
At an early stage within the research a summary to link the theoretical references 
considered during the course of this thesis was developed including: Jackman’s values 
and culture/ethical framework of compliance; moral development theory; Ayres and 
Braithwaite’s Enforcement Pyramid; and institutional theory (this early thought experiment 
is included for reference in Table 2). Each of these models and theories are discussed 
further within the review of the literature (for specific discussion of underpinning theory in 
reference to motivations to comply, see Section 2.4). Jackman’s model was chosen 
purposely as this was published during 2001 and 2002 from practitioner/regulator (the 
Financial Services Authority, FSA) viewpoints prior to the most recent financial crisis 
(whilst Jackman was Head of Ethics at the FSA). This model expressed the importance of 
ethical banking, which aligns to more recent calls for virtue and a Hippocratic Oath by 
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bankers3. Therefore, it is relevant to revisit these models, and consider from a current 
perspective by exploring practitioners’ constructs of compliance4, with an emphasis on the 
challenges faced within the industry. Recent studies have also revisited ethics within 
banking, including a mass survey of over 1,200 financial service professionals which 
indicated some disturbing perceptions within the industry: 
“Nearly one in five respondents feel financial services professionals must at least 
sometimes engage in illegal or unethical activity to be successful” (Tenbrunsel and 
Thomas, 2015, p. 3) 
Therefore, it is within this environment of personal gain, relative to personal morality 
concerns that the insights of compliance officers are explored within this thesis. 
1.1 Research aim and objectives 
“these developments [regulatory capitalism5] create a practical and theoretical 
demand for at least two types of social science research on regulatory compliance: 
research aimed at understanding how people conceptualize and socially construct 
compliance; and research that seeks to explain the causes and effects of 
compliance” (Parker and Nielson, 2009, p. 47) 
Prior to commencing this thesis, the author worked in an accounting role within a 
multinational manufacturing company. During the period of employment with this company 
(2002-2012) the methods adopted by the compliance managers had evolved and 
changed. These changes included going through the pain of complying with the US 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX), to delisting (from the US) and modifying the compliance 
approach to risk-management, and self-assessment of controls6. Therefore, at the start of 
this research, personal thoughts and existing knowledge of compliance were dominated by 
questions around the practical implications of how to improve compliance.  
                                               
3 Calls for a Hippocratic Oath by bankers http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/banking-reform-
bankers-hippocratic-oath-report; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-28535001. Media coverage following 
the issue of the ‘Virtuous Banking’ report (Llewellyn et al., 2014). Oaths have also been considered by Bruin 
(2014) and related to ‘enhancing compliance’. 
4 The concept of ethical compliance continues to be an area for publication within the media, but receives less 
attention from academics – see Section 4.3 and also: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/david-jackman-business-wont-be-ethical-until-it-shares-
societys-values-again-7965044.html accessed January 2015. 
5 Regulatory capitalism in this article is defined as ‘the proliferation of both market and state and non-state 
attempts to regulate the markets and business conduct’ (Parker and Nielson, 2009, p. 45). 
6 The company adopted the principles of the COSO framework. See the latest guidance on Internal Control – 
Integrated Framework at http://www.coso.org/IC.htm accessed July 2015. 
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Within this research thesis the theories surrounding compliance function methodology, 
have been explored through a review of the existing literature base (see Chapters 3 to 5). 
On reflection, my personal knowledge relating to financial service compliance has 
expanded enormously during the course of this doctoral study from a very naive ‘tick box’ 
attitude, towards an expanded knowledge incorporating ethics and culture within 
compliance approaches. 
The specific aim of this research project is to explore whether it is possible to identify a 
best practice model of compliance for the banking sector, in light of the changing 
regulatory cycle (or “regulatory flux”). 
The underlying research objectives7 to achieve the overall research aim are: 
1. To understand the motives for regulatory compliance by banks in the UK 
2. To explore the different structures of regulatory compliance in operation 
3. To investigate the circumstances under which different approaches to compliance 
would be adopted 
A pragmatic approach has been adopted to explore these objectives. Reference should be 
made to Table 8 within the methodology chapter for a mapping between outlined research 
objectives, literature, and specific research questions with proposed methodology. The 
research design is presented in Section 1.2.8 following a discussion of the key concepts 
driving the research flow of this study. 
1.2 Setting the context within the research flow 
There are a number of key concepts embedded within the research aim and objectives. In 
order to set the context for the remaining chapters, it is appropriate to define the 
underlying assumptions, and the linkage between these concepts. These concepts follow 
a natural flow which has directed the course of this thesis, and the commitment is to 
contribute to knowledge through this research flow. The research flow (see Figure 1) starts 
with an overriding question of; why is a compliance officer/function necessary, and what 
are the firms complying with. This leads to an exploration of regulation. This advances to 
an examination of how firms can comply with the regulation, exploring compliance models. 
Finally, this then considers; what is seen to be best practice, and why do firms choose 
                                               
7 Note that the research objectives are linked to underlying literature in each of the literature chapters, where 
specific research questions are formed. There is a further summary to map research objectives, to literature, to 
specific research questions (and adopted methodology) in Table 8. 
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certain strategies to comply with regulations. Underlying these specific questions, there is 
recognition of the importance of practitioner feedback throughout the course of the data 
collection, where compliance is variously described as ‘costly’, ‘business inhibiting’ 
ultimately a ‘nuisance’. Uncertainty remains as to whether there are potential alternatives 
to the current approach that firms are taking within both the financial service sector, and 
more widely across the corporate world. 
Each of the questions, and the associated concepts will now be discussed in turn in 
Sections 1.2.1 through to Sections 1.2.7. The impact on research design is then presented 
in Section 1.2.8. 
Figure 1 Development of research flow 
 
1.2.1 Why are compliance functions necessary? Regulation in the context of 
financial regulation and compliance 
Regulation in the financial services industry continues to be an area of interest and 
concern for both academics, and the broader public. As stated by Alexander (2006), 
financial regulation is necessary because of the multiplier effect that banking activities 
have on the rest of the economy, something which was witnessed in the most recent 
worldwide financial crises and resulting worldwide recession. The ultimate cost of the US 
real estate crisis (2007), the systematic meltdown in global financial markets (2008-2009) 
and the sovereign debt crisis (2010-2012) is inevitably borne by tax payers and broader 
society (Omarova, 2012). The magnitude of the societal impact demands attention from 
academics (Arnold, 2009). Despite regulatory failures being blamed by a wide audience for 
the financial crisis (Davies, 2010; Turner, 2009), we must also consider the role of 
compliance officers in the lead up to the crisis and their relationship with the regulators. 
Why are 
compliance 
functions 
necessary? 
Regulation 
How does the 
compliance 
function 
operate? 
Compliance 
models and 
norms. 
What is 'best 
practice'? What 
are the motives 
to comply? 
 What are the 
alternatives? 
Shared 
service, 
outsource, 
use 
consultants... 
Overarching question: Why is compliance viewed as business inhibiting? 
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Following earlier crises and the implementation of Sarbanes Oxley8, in house legal and 
compliance departments (risk management or any such variant) within the financial service 
firms “were large and visible” at the time of the most recent financial crisis (Langevoort, 
2012, p. 497). Consequently, the role of compliance officers and governance within these 
organisations must then be considered. It may be questioned whether the compliance 
functions were working effectively, despite the occurrence of the crisis. The initial 
assumption might be ‘No’. However, it is perhaps unfair to scapegoat9 the compliance 
officers for the global failings of the industry. 
1.2.2 How does the compliance function operate? Defining compliance 
norms 
Compliance is defined (Oxford Dictionary, 2015) as the action or fact of meeting rules or 
standards. Regulatory compliance can consequently be described as the act of meeting 
regulation and legislation set out by the state or appointed regulator. As mentioned, the 
initial interest in this topic results from the author’s personal experience of working in a 
compliance role, albeit in a different business sector. In this environment, compliance was 
often viewed as a barrier or an annoyance to the business, whilst requiring significant 
investment of resource (for example staff time, system cost, consulting costs)10.  
The compliance function representatives have significant roles in a relational, and 
communication capacity within organisations. Parker (2002, pp. 132-133) discusses the 
task of compliance professionals in “translating broader social and legal values into the 
particular and plural worlds of their organisations”, or in layman’s terms acting as a 
middleman: 
“To harmonize business and regulatory goals and, therefore, assist good 
companies to be good citizens through their own two way role in regulatory effort 
as compliance professionals” (Parker, 2002, p. 133) 
                                               
8 The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 was introduced in the United States, in an attempt to reform accountability 
within the corporate sector, and audit independence, in order to protect investors from fraudulent activities (as 
evidenced in the case of Enron). See also https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf accessed November 
2015. 
9
 A prominent example of scapegoating would be that of HSBC’s Chief Compliance Officer (Mr Bagley) 
resigning following appearance at US Senate Hearing.in 2012 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5267a2ce-d02b-
11e1-99a8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3kaiah0VO accessed June 2015. 
10 Compliance became an additional role to existing duties as the author’s career progressed. From a personal 
perspective this became an ever expanding role year on year due to increasing regulatory and organisational 
demands. 
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The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005) stated: 
“Compliance starts at the top […] it concerns everyone within the bank and should 
be viewed as an integral part of the banks’ business activities” (p. 7) 
Compliance risk is defined as the risk of legal or regulatory sanctions, material financial 
loss or loss to reputation that a bank may suffer as a result of failure to comply with 
applicable laws, regulations, rules, related self-regulatory organisation standards, and 
codes of conducts (BASEL, 2005). This report stressed the need for the compliance 
function to be independent and sufficiently resourced, with clearly specified roles and 
activities, subject to review by internal audit. 
1.2.3 How does the compliance function operate? The concept of compliance 
culture 
“Implementing the right culture in a firm means changing its values, attitudes and 
beliefs so that they accommodate unequivocally the broad principles driving 
financial regulation” (Newton, 2001, p. 16) 
“the cornerstone to starting and maintaining an ethics and compliance culture is a 
shared set of values and standards – a shared understanding that it applies to all 
employees regardless of their level in the organisation” (Barry, 2002, p. 39) 
Academic and practitioner literature has focused on the concept of compliance culture 
being embedded within the firm (Newton, 2001). Culture may be considered to be 
embedded within an “organization’s objects, systems and structures”, which are in effect 
owned in practice by management (Smith, 2000, p. 154). However, this literature does not 
account for the turmoil in the compliance function that was brought about by the most 
recent financial crisis. Compliance culture remains an area of concern for the regulator, on 
which they have clearly reacted to violations in the form of sanctions, and issue of policy 
guidelines. The regulator has issued discussion papers related to culture both pre- and 
post-crisis (FSA, 2007, reissued 2013 by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA); and 
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), 2014). Despite publically issued statements and 
documents (and announcements of sanctions) the sector continues to be plagued by 
compliance violations. More recently the regulator issued significant fines (£284 million) to 
Barclays in response to the FOREX failings, whilst blaming culture (FCA, 2015a). Quoting 
Georgina Philippou (the FCA’s acting director of enforcement and market oversight): 
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“Instead of addressing the obvious risks associated with its business Barclays 
allowed a culture to develop which put the firm’s interests ahead of those of its 
clients and which undermined the reputation and integrity of the UK financial 
system. Firms should scrutinise their own systems and cultures to ensure that they 
make good on their promises to deliver change” (FCA, 2015a, p. 1) 
Irrespective of education and training provided to practitioners, implementation of an 
appropriate compliance culture includes inherent difficulties in changing an individual’s 
personal moral compass. Despite expanded personal awareness of ethical models gained 
during the completion of this thesis, a psychometric analysis11 undertaken by the 
researcher in January 2015 still indicates tendencies of tick box mentality as an “enforcer” 
(suggesting disregard of the principles, and instead following the letter of the law). The 
same test performed on over 2000 bankers indicates a higher level of “virtue” within the 
banking community in comparison to the general population (Llewellyn et al., 2014). This 
perhaps demonstrates the impact (and heavy focus) of education and training, including 
focus on compliance culture within the industry12. However, recent scandals as discussed 
above appear to contradict the high virtue findings of this survey13. 
More recent literature on culture appears to be focused on the regulators ’ response 
(O’Brien, Gilligan and Miller, 2014; Ring, Bryce, McKinney and Webb, 2014), rather than 
positioned from the compliance officers’ viewpoint, which is the focus of this study. 
1.2.4 What is best practice?  
Best practice is a term that seems to have an unambiguous meaning to most practitioners, 
and business manager are encouraged to strive for this within their teams, irrespective of 
their operational function. Academic literature does not ignore this phenomenon. Strategic 
management literature provides a theoretical background to the difficulties in achieving 
best practice, with blame on “motivational factors” and “barriers to internal knowledge 
transfer” (Szulanski, 1996). Policy options for regulators, suggested by Michael, Falzo and 
Shamadasi (2015), include reference to “government sponsored exchanges of compliance 
best practice”.  
                                               
11
 See http://moraldna.org/ accessed January 2015. 
12 An example would be the introduction of compliance training partnership between Barclays and Cambridge 
in light of recent scandals:  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/10944916/Barclays-and-Cambridge-
University-set-up-compliance-school.html accessed November 2014. 
13 Refer also to Footnote 1. 
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However, a crucial difficulty in this research is exploring whether organisations and 
individuals are motivated to strive for best practice, and for whose interest best practice 
should be considered. Individual and organisational psychology (and motivations), 
undoubtedly vary within the financial service industry. In recent scandals there has been a 
public outcry14, with an apparent disregard for best practice. However, it may be argued 
within the media that financial institutions were engineering best practice towards 
themselves as individual institutions, or their major customers, with limited regard for 
societal impacts of their actions. This discussion can also be widened in to a consideration 
of how best practice is viewed in terms by stakeholder groups. There have been criticisms 
of the financial service sector with respect to “inadequate consideration of stakeholders” 
(Cuganesan and Khan, 2008, p. 86). 
1.2.5 What are the motives to comply?  
However, what are the reasons (motives) for managers choosing best practice (or 
alternatives). Decision making (the action or process of reaching important decisions) has 
been explored widely within business research literature. Cyert and March (1963) 
“behavioural theory of the firm” is widely cited within organisational studies literature, with 
regard to decision making. This theory moved away from viewing firms as profit 
maximizing entities, and alternatively viewing firms as a “coalition of participants” with 
many conflicting goals and objectives, to which firms will respond by using standardised 
decision rules. However, business ethicists are “largely concerned with obligations that go 
above and beyond what is required by law (that is with justifying beyond compliance 
obligations)” (Norman, 2011, p. 43).  
When considering these motivations for “beyond compliance” (Norman, 2011), or 
alternatives, during compliance decision making, a wider discussion of stakeholders may 
also be relevant. 
                                               
14 Any number of media articles could be considered to demonstrate this point. However, the recent media 
attention towards HSBC tax evasion scandal has been selected (see webpages below). Events from 2005-2007 
were brought to the attention of the public by the media in February 2015. However, regulators and officials 
in a number of jurisdictions were aware of the issues at much earlier date (email from whistle blower was 
reported to have been sent March 2008). This does not represent best practice or transparency by either the 
regulator (HMRC, from a UK perspective), and the organisation itself (HSBC). The question could be raised 
as to whose interest was burying this information best served.  
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/feb/11/hmrc-official-mps-hsbc-pull-out-edward-troup 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-31450005 accessed February 2015. 
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“That is, who (or what) are the stakeholders of the firm? And to whom (or what) do 
managers pay attention?” (Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997, p. 853) 
This is a peculiar complication within this study that focuses on compliance professionals 
worldviews. Traditionally they hold positions within, and are paid by the financial service 
organisations that they serve, acting as the middleman between the regulators and these 
organisations. Therefore, the consideration of stakeholders from the worldview of the 
compliance officer is of direct relevance when considering the motivations during decision 
making. There may be difficulties in determining which stakeholders the compliance 
officers pay attention too. 
1.2.6 What are the alternatives? Shared service/outsourcing/consulting 
During the course of this thesis the generally accepted models of compliance (from a 
practical perspective) are that of the in-house compliance function and the ‘alternatives’ 
including: use of compliance consultants; shared services; and outsourcing. The generally 
accepted motivation for outsourcing is to reduce cost or to transfer risk. Shared service 
may be considered a ‘within the firm’ form of outsourcing. Ulbrich (2010), in his case study 
of shared services within a public sector organisation, summarises that the essential 
principles behind shared service are: 
“to make better use of internal resources by eliminating costly duplication of staff 
functions in decentralised organisations and concentrating subsets of existing 
business functions into one or a small number of new, semi-autonomous business 
units –the shared services” p. 251 
Originally, an element of personal bias exists within this thesis, in order to explore the 
reasons why firms pay high fees to consultants in relation to compliance, when it is seen 
by many practitioners as a business inhibiting function. However, during interviews with 
practitioners, and also whilst obtaining feedback on the resulting model of this study, 
consultants were an area of interest for practitioners, with significant discussions arising on 
their role (this is revisited in Chapter 8). Therefore, the inclusion of consulting would seem 
inevitable in a study such as this. 
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1.2.7 Overarching question (and central argument): Why is compliance 
viewed as business inhibiting?  
During introductory discussions with prospective participants for this study, comments 
were made that compliance was a ‘nuisance/business inhibiting/a barrier or a hurdle’ for 
the business to overcome. This reoccurred on a number of occasions during interviews 
and so this is an important mindset to introduce within the context of this research. This 
results from the hurdles that compliance place in the form of processes and monitoring 
within financial service firms, ultimately to adhere to regulation. So compliance acts as the 
middleman between the regulators and the business. However, risk taking and failures 
within the regulatory structure are seen as root causes influencing the most recent 
financial crisis (see Section 3.4). Therefore, the necessity for this compliance barrier for 
social purpose is clear (and inevitable). There are already calls in the existing literature for 
a movement in attitude towards compliance: 
 “Cultural change should be both organization wide and function specific, 
particularly in relation to moving the attitudes of risk functions away from 
compliance and towards a more business-like orientation where risk management 
staff and risk reports are used to support strategic decision-making” (Ashby et al., 
2013, p. 2682) 
This question acts as the central argument within this thesis. Why is compliance seen as 
business inhibiting, and are there alternative routes to regulatory compliance within the 
financial service sector? 
A more worrying question within the (global) media and political arena is the apparent 
disregard of some banking organisations to regulation. Quoting Congresswoman Maxine 
Waters, a discussion is highlighted around the apparent disdain of some organisations to 
the significant fines issued by regulators in the US (an argument which has been echoed 
across global jurisdictions). 
“the banks in question accounted for 25 percent of the $500 billion-a-day dollars-to-
euros spot market, meaning this so-called ‘record fine’ is literally a drop in the 
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bucket […] Banks that are merely fined for their criminal activity and suffer no 
material impact simply view such penalties as the cost of doing business.”15 
Again this discussion raises questions over the barriers facing compliance professionals in 
this global industry which has a poor public persona, whereby the expectation is that 
banks will continue to break regulatory codes and simply accept this as a cost of business. 
This concept (and central argument) is revisited in light of the findings of this study in 
Chapter 8 (when formulating and reflecting on feedback on the conceptual model), when 
considering the achievement of research objectives, and the implications on theory and 
practice. 
1.2.8 Research Design 
Following, identification of the research objectives in Section 1.1 and the development of 
the research flow (and associated concepts) in the preceding sections, the design for this 
study is presented in Figure 2. This diagram represents the (stepped) framework that has 
been followed in order to complete this research.  
The first stage was to define the problem, which involved a broad review of the literature 
(which is presented in Chapters 3 to 5). The next phase was to develop the method 
(utilising repertory grid interview), which involved review of prior studies and completion of 
a pilot study. Following the pilot study, there were iterations to the method (as a result of 
problems identified at the pilot stage, and also due to discussions with more experienced 
researcher including the Personal Construct Psychology (PCP) group). A final session 
plan was developed which is included in Table 9. Following the finalisation of the 
methodology, data was collated from practitioners. The data was then analysed in three 
stages (described in Section 6.6) and presented in Chapter 7. Through triangulation of the 
literature and the data collated in this study, a conceptual model was then developed 
which is presented in Chapter 8. Feedback on the conceptual model was then sought from 
both practitioners and other academics. Following completion of the research, reflections 
were then made on the contribution (which is presented in Chapter 8). 
   
                                               
15 This quote originates from a statement released 20 May 2015. See webpage: 
http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/news/email/show.aspx?ID=WSRLNK55XFK2M accessed June 
2015. 
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Figure 2 Research design 
 
 
Defining the problem 
Exploring key concepts in the form 
of a literature review  which covered 
the broad domains of regulation, 
compliance and alternatives 
(Chapters 3 to 5) 
 
 
Method development 
Review of previous studies 
Consideration of purpose of the 
research to explore issues from 
compliance perspective 
Review of literature on Personal 
Construct Pyschology/repertory grid 
 
 
Pilot study 
Review of repertory grid studies to 
prepare interview design 
Repertory grid used to interogate 
data both quantitatively and 
qualitatively 
(Section 6.4) 
 
Iterations to method 
Responding to issues encountered in 
pilot studies. Attending York PCP 
(Personal Construct Pyschology) 
group for views on method/analysis 
Final session plan presented in Table 
9 
Live sample 
Twelve participants impacted by 
compliance from the financial 
service industry 
(Section 6.4.6) 
Analysis of data 
3 stages 
(Section 6.6, Figure 22) 
Development of conceptual 
model 
Triangulation of literature and data 
in response to research objectives to 
form 'Compliance Trust Model' 
(Chapter 8, see also Figure 51) 
Feedback on conceptual model 
Adaptation of Delphi method to 
explore theory compared to practice 
(Section 8.3) 
Final reflections 
Summary of original contributions 
of this study, and the implications on 
theory and practice 
  
(Section 8.5) 
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1.3 Context of tacit, implicit and explicit knowledge 
To achieve the objectives of this research it was essential to develop an understanding of 
issues surrounding the relationship and communication of knowledge between compliance 
professionals, regulators and third parties such as consultants, outsourcing (and even 
internal shared services). An exploration of managers’ behaviours and how decisions are 
reached (sense making) is undertaken within this study. 
Due to the exploratory nature of the research objectives, the research design must capture 
how practitioners make sense of the issues. There is a close link to tacit, implicit and 
explicit knowledge within organisations and individuals, so this consideration of ‘knowledge 
transfer’ has resulted in the chosen methodology of repertory grid (which is discussed in 
depth in the Methodology, Chapter 6). Under the philosophy of constructive alternativism 
(Section 6.1), each individual invents or constructs a way of construing and interpreting our 
experiences (of surroundings and events). Therefore, understanding tacit knowledge and 
knowledge transfer is fundamentally important to this research thesis: 
“The concept of knowledge creation is fundamental to organizational knowledge 
creation theory and important to organization science, because it explains how new 
ideas come forth in innovation, not only how individuals tap into rich practices and 
acquire the tacit knowledge of these practices” Nonaka and von Krogh (2009, p. 
645) 
The initial link within this piece of research to knowledge exchange (and related theories of 
“organizational knowledge creation theory” and the concept of “knowledge conversion”), 
was made during attendance at a research seminar, which has since been published 
(Brennan, Kirwan and Redmond, 2015). One of the main advantages of the repertory grid 
technique (the method of data capture employed within this thesis) is to explore and 
uncover tacit knowledge. However, continuing debate, and calls for further research exist 
amongst academics with regard to knowledge transfer. Questions are raised as to whether 
it possible to convert explicit knowledge to tacit knowledge and vice versa (Smith, 2001, p. 
316; Nonaka, 2009, p. 638).  
Nonaka and von Krogh (2009) define tacit knowledge as “knowledge tied to the senses, 
tactile experiences, movement skills, intuition, unarticulated mental models, or implicit 
rules of thumb” (p. 636). Referring to Polanyi’s earlier 1967 work, tacit knowledge is 
likened to skills such as “riding a bike” or “knowing more than we can tell” (Smith, 2001, p. 
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314). Explicit knowledge conversely is knowledge which can be written down, or set out as 
procedures within organisations. 
A major obstacle exists in transferring tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge within 
organisations. Smith (2001) comments on a number of strategies for knowledge transfer 
and learning by observation including; “knowledge warehouses”, “communities of 
practice”, or “best practice repositories”. However, difficulties remain in documenting tacit 
knowledge as this involved “expressing the inexpressible” (Smith, 2001, p. 36). To a 
certain extent this can be seen within the banking community in organisations such as the 
British Banking Association (BBA), as a means of communities of practice. However, there 
is always the complication of trust (and self-preservation) between individuals and 
organisations participating in such groups. Nonaka and von Krogh (2009) refer to the “tacit 
explicit knowledge continuum” as a process of “expressing certain aspects of tacit 
knowledge” and documenting this as explicit knowledge within (or even between) 
organisations (p. 642). 
Nonaka and von Krogh (2009) expand the discussion much further on knowledge transfer 
and discuss the alignment of pragmatist philosophy to organisation knowledge creation, 
whereby “pragmatists adopt various solutions to explain how ‘reality’ interacts with an 
individual knowledge” (p. 639). This also aligns to the direction of this research thesis, 
whereby the researcher is seeking to understand how the knowledge and experiences of 
individual financial service practitioners may influences the decision making over 
compliance approaches. 
1.4 Contribution and central argument 
This thesis makes a number of contributions to existing academic literatures (which are 
discussed further in Section 8.5). This thesis challenges and extends existing literature on 
regulatory and compliance approaches, in comparison to practitioners’ views. In addition, 
this thesis demonstrates the application of a lesser used methodological tool of repertory 
grid, within compliance business research (see Section 6.4, and Appendix 4 for 
discussion). 
Hopwood (2007) commented on the “detachment” between practice and academia. Berry, 
Coad, Harris, Otley and Stringer (2009) also commented that “control research needs to 
build a new knowledge production process to enable better and more fruitful links between 
practice and theory”. The intention, through this research topic and methodology to collect 
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data from practitioners, is to help close the compliance practitioner/academia gap and 
contribute to theoretical knowledge, in light of both the current extensive regulation 
requirements and also new legislation and regulation requirements, in the financial service 
industry. This goal has been partially achieved through disseminating and receiving 
feedback to a broader audience of experts (through wider distribution of the resulting 
conceptual model, see Section 8.3). This demonstrates how research can be “relevant and 
rigorous, to serve the scientific enterprise even while doing work that informs policy and 
practice” (Pfeffer, 2007, p. 1342) 
The timing of the data collection of this research (during 2013-2014) coincided with an 
extremely difficult period in the regulatory cycle for both regulators and the practitioners, 
who continue to face significant changes and disruption following the aftermath of the 
2007-2009 financial crisis. The changes to the UK regulatory regime following the 
Financial Services Act of 2012 are discussed in Chapter 2. 
The findings offer a link between existing models of regulatory compliance within the 
literature, with the major (current) concerns of compliance professionals. Through analysis 
of the data collated the significant drivers and barriers for compliance have been identified 
and compared to existing models. Existing literature promotes a variety of drivers for 
compliance, however, the findings of this study indicate instead that more focus is required 
on the barriers to compliance. Based on the review of the literature and the analysis of the 
findings a conceptual model has been presented to practitioners for comments (see 
Section 8.3) on potential alternatives to current practice. 
1.5 Overview of the thesis 
“One has to train oneself constantly to write and speak in a clear and simple 
language. Every thought should be formulated as clearly and simply as possible” 
(Popper, 1976, p. 292)16 
The above quote, despite its positivist routes, has been an important mindset whilst writing 
this thesis which is broadly qualitative in design. In order to facilitate this, mind maps and 
visual representation have been used throughout. A summary of each of the chapter is set 
out in Sections 1.5.1 through to 1.5.5. 
                                               
16 This ‘post positivist’ quote is referenced in Silverman’s 2013 guide to ‘qualitative research’ as part of his 
‘anti bullshit agenda’. 
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Figure 3 summarises the underpinning theoretical inputs, key models reviewed in this 
study, and the extremes of potential compliance outcomes. The main drivers of 
compliance are presupposed from a normative viewpoint as meeting regulation and 
meeting expectations of stakeholders, which drives the organisation’s compliance strategy. 
There are external factors which can be used to greater or lesser extent to drive strategy 
such as tooling and use of consultants. Ultimately (and simplistically17) this will lead to two 
extremes of compliance in the form of “active” or “passive” compliance (Crump, 2007). 
Figure 3 Author developed theoretical inputs and outputs map to summarise an organisation’s 
compliance strategy 
 
A number of theories were considered to align to the principles set out within Jackman’s 
model (which is discussed further in Section 4.3). Table 2 was developed to summarise 
thoughts on this broad alignment. The linear scale of Jackman’s model is seen to have a 
direct and inverse alignment to the enforcement pyramid set out by Ayres and Braithwaite 
(1992). However, similarities may also be considered with linear extremes of Kohlberg’s 
moral reasoning, and to a lesser extent to institutional theory. Kohlberg’s theory is relevant 
                                               
17 Of course this is a simplistic process map which does not fully consider the implications of ethics and 
culture which was explored in more depth following the review of the literature. The main drivers (personal 
constructs) have been analysed and incorporated in the model through the discussion in Chapter 8. 
Underpinning theory 
and models  
• Institutional theory (banks' 
perspective) 
•Moral development 
(compliance officers' 
perpective) 
•Stakeholder theory 
(stakeholders' expectations) 
•Section 2.4 
Organisational 
regulatory 
compliance 
Key academic models  
• Jackman's model 
• Ayres and Braithwaite's 
enforcement pyramid 
Compliance 
outcomes 
• Minimal/cosmetic/passive 
compliance 
• Ethical/active/beyond 
compliance 
External drivers: consultants/IT 
tooling 
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from the personal nature of this research which focus on the compliance officer’s role 
within the organisations they serve (and hence personal morality issues arise). Institutional 
theory applies, due to the nature of compliance which is viewed at an organisational level 
by regulators and wider society. However, it should be noted that institutional theory is not 
without its critics, due to the perception that institutional theory overlooks “the role of the 
manager, thereby falsely assuming that organizations are passive entities whose course is 
shaped by institutional context” (Fashola, 2014 p. 3, quoting Bada et al., 2004). Within this 
thesis, there is a contribution to the literature using the personal constructs of managers, 
which impacts at the organisation level through compliance (which acknowledges the 
institutional context). The Literature and Conclusion Chapters reviews alignment to these 
theories in further detail (specifically Section 2.4, and Section 8.5). 
A summary of each of the chapter is set out in Sections 1.5.1 through to 1.5.5. 
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Table 2 Initial integration of Jackman's ethical framework, Kohlberg's moral reasoning, Ayres and Braithwaites’ responsive regulation and institutional 
theory (discussed further in Section 2.4, and the literature chapters) 
Jackman’s Model:  
Culture, the FSA’s role and the 
Firm’s value and culture (2001)* 
Kohlberg’s Six stages of moral 
reasoning (1958, 1977) 
(Perspective of the individual) 
Ayres and Braithwaites’ 
Enforcement Pyramid 
(1992) 
(Perspective of the Regulator) 
Institutional theory 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983) 
(Perspective of the firm) 
    
Minimum standards: 
FSA’s role, Policing. 
Firm’s values, 
Unthinking/mechanical compliance. 
Pre Conventional Stage 1 - 
Punishment and obedience, 
and Stage 2 - Instrumental 
purpose and exchange (self-
interest). 
Command Regulation: 
Sanctioning, 
Insistent Strategy, 
Broadly Accommodative. 
Coercive 
Aspirational Culture: 
FSA’s role, Persuading/Educating. 
Firm’s values, 
Sound intentions and approach. 
Conventional  
 Stage 3 - Interpersonal 
conformity 
 Stage 4 - 
 Social accord and system 
maintenance. 
Persuasive Strategic 
Accommodative, 
Education, 
Advice, 
Persuasion 
Mimetic 
 
Ethical Culture: 
FSA’s role. Educating/Consulting. 
Firm’s values, Competence and 
ethical framework.  
Post Conventional  Stage 5 – 
 Social contract and individual 
rights. 
Enforced Self-Regulation 
Supervisory Role 
Normative 
Sustainable Regulation: 
FSA’s role, Mature Relationship. 
Firms’s values, Internalise ethos of 
statutory objective. 
Post conventional  Stage 6 – 
Universal ethical principles. 
(no mapping made) (no mapping made) 
    
*Note that the direction of arrows indicates positive movements in behaviours, from the perspective of individuals, the regulator and the firms. 
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1.5.1 Chapter 2 Boundaries of this research – background to the UK 
regulatory framework 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide some context to this study, in terms of the 
different approaches to regulation that are adopted in the UK (and the impact of global 
regulation). This study is limited to a sample of data collated from participants working 
within the UK. However, due to the globalisation of the banking industries there is often 
overlap between the literature, and indeed to the personal viewpoints of participants 
(when considering UK, European and global reaches of regulation, and compliance 
thereon). 
1.5.2 Chapters 3, 4 and 5 Literature – regulation, compliance and 
alternatives 
“In what circumstance and for what reasons are businesses most likely to 
comply with different types of regulation? And, when businesses do comply, 
does their compliance behaviour achieve the public policy goals that motivated 
the regulation in the first place?” (Parker and Nielson, 2009, p. 49) 
The quote above holds close alignment to the direction the literature review has taken 
through the course of completion of this thesis. The literature was explored initially 
under the concept of ‘read, read and read a bit more’ which certainly would not be 
classified as a systematic approach to reviewing the literature. The advantage of this 
approach has been the breadth, and cross discipline contribution within the literature 
review. 
The literature has been reviewed18 (and split into distinct chapters) under the broad 
areas of regulation literature, compliance literature and shared service/outsourcing. 
Within the regulatory literature a central model which has directed this study is that of 
responsive regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992), which is discussed in Chapter 3. 
An inverse relationship between the “responsive regulation” model and a practitioner 
model proposed by Jackman in 2002 is explored (see Section 4.3). Although other 
models have been proposed within the literature, responsive regulation is widely cited 
within the literature even up to 2014. Jackman’s model is less widely cited, and the 
probable cause for this is the distinct lack of academic research in the financial service 
compliance sector. However, the concept of ethical compliance on which this model is 
based is broadly accepted within practice, so this model has been used to bridge the 
academic/practice divide. To explore possible alternatives to existing compliance 
                                               
18 This was achieved through a manual process of sorting and linking key concepts from reviewed 
articles, via summary tables (in word) and mind maps. 
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models, the shared service and outsourcing literature has also been reviewed in order 
to understand the motivations for compliance managers adopting alternate compliance 
approaches. 
A gap analysis of the literature is presented at the end of each chapter to summarise 
and align the literature review to the resulting research questions, and remaining gaps. 
1.5.3 Chapter 6 Methodology 
The initial research proposal identified a mixed methods approached. Through 
reflection of the overall aim of the research, an exploratory research design was 
developed, utilising repertory grid tooling within interviews with practitioners.  
The preparation of this chapter derived the greatest sense of achievement during 
completion of this thesis. The wide variety of research methods and alignment to 
personal philosophy was (an enjoyable!) journey of discovery during this doctoral 
study. A great affection for Personal Construct Psychology/Theory has developed. The 
opportunity to explore tacit knowledge through story telling within the grid interviews 
(Gray, 2007), directed this study from a very early stage within the research project.  
Engagement with more experienced academics was essential for development of this 
section. Colleagues within the Business School, and the Northern PCP (Personal 
Construct Psychology) offered sage advice towards the individual choices made within 
this chapter. This also exposed the researcher to a variety of research disciplines and 
worldviews. Ultimately the methodological tool of repertory grid and analysis thereof 
became a very individual interpretation of personal construct theory (as endorsed by 
Northern PCP group) underpinned by prior academic research, which aligns closely to 
the pragmatic philosophy adopted within this thesis. 
1.5.4 Chapter 7 Findings and analysis 
This chapter reflects on the data collection process. Data has been analysed in a 
number of ways reflecting the pragmatic use of the output of repertory grid interviews. 
The data collected during interview included both the personal constructs expressed by 
practitioners during the formation of their grids, and also the interview transcripts which 
acts as “story telling” (Gray, 2007) of the practitioners when forming their grids. This 
results in three distinct explorations of the data, firstly under “eyeball analysis” 
(Jankowicz, 2004), followed by interrogation of the constructs using “Honey’s content 
analysis” (1979), and finally thematic analysis of interview transcripts. 
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Agreement and reliability of the content analysis performed is also considered, with a 
discussion of inter judge/rater reliability using both Cohen’s Kappa and Krippendorff’s 
alpha. The importance of assessing this agreement was highlighted in the first iteration 
of coding which had poor alignment between coders. This led to further refinement of 
the coding templates, which also aided underlying theorising throughout analysis. 
The data analysis is presented and aligned to the research questions presented in the 
methodology, alongside four main supposition statements. The results of the category 
formations and analysis of interview data is summarised (in terms of ‘fact’) and taken 
forward into the Chapter 8, to consider whether any steps may be taken by regulators 
or practitioners to overcome the issues surrounding regulatory compliance (in terms of 
‘interpretation’). 
1.5.5 Chapter 8 Discussion – The compliance trust19 
Within this chapter the analysis and findings are revisited with reference to each of the 
research objectives. The data collated from practicing compliance and risk managers is 
triangulated with the literature in order to develop a conceptual model. 
The ‘compliance trust’ model is presented in order to contribute to existing academic 
literature and provide an alternative model to current practice. Following synthesis of 
this model, the principles of the Delphi method were adopted (see Section 8.3) 
whereby feedback was sought from both practitioners and academics on the theoretical 
rational, as opposed to the practical implications. A number of interesting feedback 
avenues are then developed further in order to strengthen this model. The resulting 
model may be presented in future research to assess the adequacy of the model for 
practical implementation within the financial service sector. 
The proposed alternative model results in a compliance community which would 
operate independently from the financial service firms that they serve. This model 
differs from traditional commercial consultancy or outsourcing. Budgets would be 
controlled through a trust structure, following the principles of a cost controlled service 
centre serving all of its stakeholders, rather than a profit making entity. Decision 
making on operations and appointments would remain within the trust structure based 
on open communication and dialogue with a range of stakeholder including regulators 
and international industry leadership i.e. G30, and the multiple financial service firms 
that the trust would serve. This model will also differ from banking forum groups which 
                                               
19 Note that the word trust is not used here in its traditional ‘inter relationship’ sense, but rather  to 
describe the organisational structure of a trust, whereby the compliance officers within the trust will 
manage strategic and operations decisions based on the inputs of the major stakeholders. 
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are already in existence (such as the BBA) as the compliance officers community 
would be fully independent from the banking organisation that they would serve (and 
hence issues surrounding confidentiality/trust would exist within the resulting 
compliance community, rather than the individual banking organisations). The 
compliance trust would also benefit organisations they serve, via rotation of experience 
and knowledge sharing between organisations. 
There is also a final discussion of the original contributions of this study, the 
implications on theory and practice, the limitations of this study and plans for future 
research in Section 8.5. The central argument of this thesis (that compliance officers 
often face barriers to compliance, and are often viewed as a business inhibiting 
function) is revisited. Further research is called for in this area (based on both 
continued gaps within the literature, and also to move the conceptual model presented 
in this study forward). A major conclusion of this study if that the academic/practitioner 
divide is perhaps inhibiting progress towards regulatory compliance. In order to 
address the ongoing issues facing the ‘compliance professional’ in financial service 
practice further study of the obstacles to compliance must be actioned. 
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Chapter 2 Background to the regulatory framework in the UK 
banking sector 
“We have a proportionate approach, prioritising our work on the areas and firms 
that pose a higher risk to our objectives.” FCA20 
“The PRA does not seek to operate a “zero-failure” regime. Rather, it seeks to 
ensure that a financial firm which fails does so in a way that avoids significant 
disruption to the supply of critical financial services” PRA21 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the regulatory framework in 
which this study is positioned. Whilst the data collated within this study focuses on the 
perspectives of UK participants, there will be some inevitable overlap with the literature 
on European and Global regulatory compliance (due to the International nature of the 
banking industry in which the participants have worked over the course of their 
careers). The UK political background to regulation (from the 1980s) is presented in 
Section 2.1, followed by a discussion of the evolution of deregulation in Section 2.2, 
which leads into an examination of the current regulatory structure in Section 2.3. The 
linkage to theoretical underpinnings is then presented in Section 2.4. Finally in Section 
2.5 this chapter is summarised, in anticipation of the following literature chapters. 
2.1 Regulation approaches – the UK political background  
The current regulatory structure of the UK financial services industry is underpinned by 
historic legislation. The legislation setting out the structure of the Bank of England and 
the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) includes22: the Bank of England Act 1694; 
the Bank Charter Act 1844; the Bank of England Act 1946; the Financial Service and 
Markets Act 2000; the Banking Act of 2009; and the Financial Service Act of 2010 and 
2012 (Bank of England, 2015, p. 3). Following nationalisation in the 1946 Act, the Bank 
of England exercised supervisory powers in “informal ways” up to the implementation 
of the Banking Act 1979 (Daripa, Kapur and Wright, 2013, p. 3). Out of these 
supervisory powers, the role of compliance officers evolved, with the Bank of England 
able to “request information” and make “recommendations to bankers”, with legal 
powers to sanction banks (Daripa, Kapur, and Wright, 2013, p. 6). 
                                               
20 Extracted from FCA website http://www.fca.org.uk/about/what/regulating, Our approach to regulation 
(accessed July 2015). 
21 Extracted from PRA website http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/about/default.aspx (accessed 
July 2015), which sets out the approach to regulation around three characteristics: Judgement based, 
Forward looking, and Focussed  
22 More detail (and listing of legislation) can be seen via 
 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/documents/legislation/1998act.pdf (accessed December 2015). 
All of the listed Acts can be accessed at http://www.legislation.gov.uk (accessed December 2015). 
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However, to provide some context to the regulatory literature, the political background 
for the UK and its impact on the current state of regulation should also be considered. 
In the mid-1980s, Britain was subject to waves of deregulatory initiatives under 
Thatcher’s Conservative government (1979-1990), which were concerned with the cost 
of compliance and overregulation of firms (Hutter, 2005). Financial service firms were 
seen to operate under self-regulation within the scope of the Financial Services Act 
1986 (Black, 2001). Deregulation in practice aligned to neo liberal ideals of “freer 
markets” under this historical political backdrop of “privatisation, deregulation and 
nurturing of markets” (Parker and Nielson, 2009, p. 47). However, not all commentators 
agree that this was indeed deregulation but rather a stepped adjustment from private 
regulation23. Nevertheless, there is acknowledgement of the significant changes to 
regulatory design during the Thatcher regime: 
“Two trends define the Thatcher period. The first is the restriction or abolition of 
regulatory institutions that evolved within the market. This was not deregulation 
but the prohibition of market-led regulation. Secondly, there was a huge 
expansion of financial regulation to fields it had hardly touched.” (Booth, 2015, 
p. 1) 
The Banking Act of 1987 further enhanced the supervisory powers of the Bank of 
England (Daripa, Kapur, and Wright, 2013, p. 6). The huge expansion in regulatory 
scope impacted the role of compliance officers which is discussed further in Section 4.1 
and 4.2. 
In 1997, the Labour government (under both Blair and subsequently Brown) developed 
the Better Regulation Task Force (Better Regulation Task Force, 2003). This 
programme continued under the coalition government (2010-2015), and the coalitions’ 
strategy was set out on the Department for Business, Innovations and Skills web 
page24, to: 
 “Remove or simplify existing regulations that unnecessarily impede growth 
 Reduce the overall volume of new regulation by introducing regulation only as a 
last resort 
 Improve the quality of any remaining new regulation 
                                               
23 A recent publication (May 2015) from the Institute of Economic Affairs discusses this “myth” of 
deregulation. http://www.iea.org.uk/publications/research/thatcher-the-myth-of-deregulation accessed 
June 2015.  
24 Accessed in 2012 via https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-business-
innovation-skills, representing the 2010-2015 policies of the coalition government as per 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-business-regulation 
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 Move to a less onerous and less bureaucratic enforcement regime where 
inspections are targeted and risk based.” 
 
In 1997, the government also announced the decision to merge banking supervision 
and investment services regulation into the Financial Services Authority (FSA). The 
Financial Services and Market Act 200025, was implemented in 2001 and transferred 
responsibility of several other organisations to the FSA:  
 Building Societies Commission (BSC) 
 Friendly Societies Commission (FSC) 
 Investment Management Regulatory Organisation (IMRO) 
 Personal Investment Authority (PIA) 
 Register of Friendly Societies (RFS) 
 Securities and Futures Authority (SFA) 
This transfer of responsibility was also noted by Taylor (2005), marking the formation of 
the FSA as “an end to the alphabet soup” of regulatory bodies that had existed up to 
that point. The FSA were an independent body, who received no government funding – 
they were funded by the firms that they regulated. However, they were accountable to 
Treasury, and through them, Parliament. The statutory objectives, outlined by the 
Financial Services Market Act 2000, were set out on the FSA website26: 
 “market confidence – maintaining confidence in the UK financial system;  
 financial stability - contributing to the protection and enhancement of 
stability of the UK financial system  
 consumer protection - securing the appropriate degree of protection for 
consumers; and  
 the reduction of financial crime - reducing the extent to which it is 
possible for a regulated business to be used for a purpose connected 
with financial crime.” 
The Better Regulation Executive issued a report in 2010, which set out a diagram of 
alternatives to command and control regulation, including self-regulation and co 
regulation, information and education, and economic instruments. These practical 
proposals can be linked to theories of responsive regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite, 
                                               
25 Available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/8 accessed December 2015. 
26 See http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/about/aims/statutory/index.shtml, accessed initially during 2012 at 
commencement of research, and still available at December 2015. 
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1992), which is discussed further in Section 3.3.1. There is specific reference to the 
Hampton Report (2006), which outlined the principles for a “risk based approach” to 
regulation. This provides examples of best practice from each of the regulatory bodies 
at that point in time (however, it should be noted that this was pre financial crisis).  
Clark Jr. and Demirag (2006) reviewed deregulation through the lens of institutional 
theory, and discuss the causes of institutional pressures on regulatory bodies to 
deregulate, and then reregulation following financial scandal (using Enron and the 
Californian energy crisis as an example). Therefore, institutional theory is proposed as 
a suitable framework to explore questions of why regulatory bodies adopt certain 
procedures/policies/rules and systems due to external pressures and influences (see 
also Section 2.4). This is of particular relevance to this study in light of the global 
financial crisis, where there has been a similar scenario evidenced in the UK financial 
regulatory regime (see Section 2.3).  
2.1.1 Criticisms of deregulation, and calls for reform via a macro view 
These political publications indicate the on-going support for deregulation and the use 
of risk based approach by government over general regulatory structures. However, 
following the crisis there has been specific criticism of the regulation of the financial 
service sector by the FSA and the Bank of England. Buller and Lindstrom (2013) 
discuss the “market shaping coalition” of France and Germany (with key values of 
financial stability and consumer protection through prescriptive rule based regulatory 
style). This is contrasted (and with specific criticism) to the “market making” coalition in 
the UK which emphasised competition and market efficiency through light touch, 
principle based regulation (Buller and Lindstrom, 2013, p. 394). 
The Turner Review (2009) indicated there was a need to move to a system wide macro 
prudential27 perspective. In addition to make the regulatory structure effective the report 
proposed that the relationship between the regulator (which was then the FSA) and the 
Bank of England must work effectively, particularly in respect to the macro prudential 
analysis and use of macro prudential tools. The International Monetary Fund (IMF, 
2010) discussed the apparent differences in supervisory response to the financial 
crisis, and called for change to allow both “the ability” (legal authority, adequate 
resources etc.) and “the will” (realistic objectives, independence, accountability etc.) for 
supervisors to act. Despite the efforts of the Financial Sector Assessment Program 
                                               
27 A later report (Tucker 2013), argued that the “creation of a macro prudential authority at the Bank of 
England, the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) was an essential element of the reforms to UK financial 
regulation architecture. Macro prudential financial regulation within this thesis is defined as the approach 
to regulation with the objectives of mitigating and minimizing systemic risks to the sector as a whole.  
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(FSAP) involving peer review between countries against the global standards, failings 
were evident in the most recent financial crisis. 
“while most countries have the necessary legislation, regulation and supervisory 
guidance appropriate to their national systems a significant proportion of those 
do not do as well when it comes to the nuts and bolts of supervision across the 
different sectors” (IMF, 2010, p. 9) 
The scope of this study is restricted to the UK regulatory compliance perspective (due 
to geographic cost limitations of the chosen method of personal interview). However, 
due to the international nature of the banking industry, there is an expectation that 
there is overlap with the international regulatory issues discussed in Section 2.3.1, as 
the practitioners involved in data collation have extensive experience working across a 
range of (multinational) organisations in the sector. 
2.2 The UK regulatory framework 
Deregulation was a feature of the UK banking industry from the late 1980’s up until the 
financial crisis in 2007/8 (Wilson, Casu, Girardone and Molyneux, 2010; Beck, Levine 
and Levkov, 2010). Since the most recent financial crisis there were calls for changes 
in regulation surrounding the financial services industry. In response to heavy criticism 
of the role of the FSA in the financial crisis, the Government reacted (under the 
Financial Services Act of 201228) by setting up two separate regulatory bodies the 
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).  
The political stance is now clear on regulation of the complex financial service sector. 
However, questions remain as to whether these changes make the compliance officers 
and risk managers’ jobs in financial service any easier or more effective. To understand 
compliance it is essential to underpin knowledge with the regulatory principles: 
“It is very easy to become enmeshed in the mechanisms and processes of 
compliance without developing a grasp of the principles underlying regulation” 
(Jackman, 2004, p. 106) 
As the split of regulatory body in the UK was only in its infancy at commencement of 
this study, this research could only look to historical approaches; or towards other 
industries to see if there are any alternatives which could be applied to financial service 
regulation. Engagement with compliance officers at this critical period of change is 
                                               
28 See also http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/about/default.aspx accessed November 2015. 
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important to understand the difficulties faced in operating in such a fast moving 
regulatory environment. 
Since its inception, the FCA have been active and vocal within the media, issuing direct 
sanctions against instances of non-compliance and misconduct, with a specific focus 
on compliance culture (see Section 1.2.3). The financial regulator has issued 
discussion papers both pre and post crisis, in relation to culture (FSA, 2007, reissued 
2013 by FCA; PRA, 2014). This demonstrates a policy of “visible deterrence”, which 
has traditionally been associated with the rule based/deterrence based systems 
adopted in the US (Gunningham and Kagan, 2005; Baldwin and Black, 2010). 
However, despite publically issued statements and documents such as these, the 
sector continues to be plagued by compliance violations. The continued concerns of 
the regulator regarding culture, and continued scandals in the sector are evidenced in 
the quote below, from Tracey McDermott (Director of Enforcement and Financial 
Crime, FCA): 
“The misconduct in relation to LIBOR has cast a shadow over the financial 
service industry. The findings we publish today illustrate, once again, individuals 
within the industry acting with a cavalier disregard both for regulatory obligation 
and the interests of the markets. [Bank X]’s significant failings in culture and 
controls allowed that misconduct to flourish and fell far short of our 
expectations” (FCA, 2013, p. 1) 
The exploratory nature of this research does not allow for generalisability of results so 
a full exploration of the culture issues within the industry has not been attempted within 
this thesis. However, it must be acknowledged that the principles of compliance culture 
(see also Section 1.2.3) is of interest to both academics and practitioners, who are 
studying regulatory compliance and, consequently, remains a theme of discussion 
throughout this thesis. 
Within the academic literature the FSA has been categorised as a “principle based 
regulator” (Ford, 2008), or a “process orientated regulator” (Gilad, 2010). Ford (2008) 
likened the setup of the British Columbia Model to the FSA’s approach, and 
commented that proponents of the approach argue that the output is more effective 
and less costly regulation. Within the case study performed (Ford, 2008) it was found 
that in case of mandated review, those firms also had parallel internal supervisory 
systems on which they relied for internal review. It commented that “the need to 
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conduct the mandated reviews drained resources from the more effective internal 
system” (p. 11). 
2.3 The current scenario – the split of the FSA 
In June 2010 the government announced new regulatory arrangements in the future, 
as a result of concerns for consumers and as a result of the financial crises. This 
involved implementing a new model of financial regulation that would separate the 
prudential and conduct supervision of firms (Wheatley, 2012). The newly formed 
supervisory authorities Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential 
Regulation Authority (PRA) published separate handbooks during the course of 2013 
(see Figure 4 for a summary of the new regulatory structure).  
Figure 4 The new “Regulatory Architecture” adapted from FSA report June 2011 
 
The PRA is responsible for supervision of insurance firms and deposit takers (as well 
as a small number of investment firms). This means that the PRA are responsible for 
the prudential supervision of over 2,000 firms (FSA, 2011a). The PRA released a 
document in conjunction with the Bank of England which described the new regulatory 
approach. One of the central messages was that the PRA would adopt a supervisory 
role which is “judgement based”, which would be “commensurate with level of risk”, 
“focused on big picture”, “will be forward looking”, and “will take supervisory action at 
early stage to reduce the probability of disorderly failure” (FSA, 2011a, p. 4). This 
change in approach was required as a result of “lessons from previous regulatory 
failure” (FSA, 2011a, p. 5). The report labelled the FSA’s supervisory approach prior to 
the 2007 Financial Crisis as inadequate, as the supervisory approach was designed 
  
49 
 
and built around the premise that regulators should only intervene following observable 
failings relative to a set of rules rather than seek to prevent potential failures in future 
(FSA, 2011a). 
The FCA is responsible for regulating conduct in retail and wholesale markets, 
supervising the trading infrastructure that supports those markets and for the prudential 
regulation of firms not prudentially regulated by the PRA (FSA, 2011b). This means 
that the FCA regulate the conduct of around 27,000 firms which carry out a very wide 
range of business (retail and wholesale banking, investment, securities and insurance), 
and will also be responsible for the prudential supervision of around 24,500 of these 
firms (FSA, 2011b). The FCA approach was expected to differ to the FSA’s approach, 
both analytically and culturally, in order for a sound economic understanding of the way 
relevant markets operate in order that regulatory interventions promote competition and 
effectively address problems identified. However, it was not expected that the FCA will 
have a statutory responsibility to be an economic regulator, such as Ofcom or other 
utility regulators (FSA, 2011b). The FCA is expected to intervene earlier and more 
strongly than in the past, further enhancing the credible deterrence agenda which the 
FSA had implement since the crisis (FSA, 2011b). The FSA’s improved credible 
deterrence approach was evidenced within the June 2011 report, with statistics “that 
since 2007 the FSA had issued fines in excess of £150 million and prohibited over 200 
individuals from the financial services industry” (FSA, 2011b, p. 26). 
During a speech delivered in July 2012, the (then) CEO of the FCA reiterated the key 
messages as to the purpose and approach of the FCA: 
 “The FCA’s core purpose is to make sure markets work well so consumers get 
a fair deal – to do that we will have not only new powers, but a new supervisory 
approach and a new culture. 
 Key to the success of this approach is ensuring that good consumer outcomes 
are built into the business model of the firms we regulate. 
 While much of what we do is changing out enforcement approach and credible 
deterrence agenda is here to stay.” (Wheatley, 2012, Closing Remarks) 
KPMG (2012) summarise the main changes, and considers the opportunities of “more 
proactive regulation to prevent issues”. The split into the PRA and FCA ultimately 
allows for an improved understanding of the risks to the stability of the financial system 
as a whole (by the PRA), whilst also focussing separately on product lifecycles, and 
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investing time on robust approval processes and monitoring (via the FCA). In terms of 
compliance officers role this will then focus the concept of “documented risk based 
decision making” in line with the PRA’s risk assessment framework (KPMG, 2012, pp. 
6). In addition, compliance officers will conduct “Business Model and Strategy Analysis” 
(BMSA) to evidence analysis of conduct risk management for the FCA (KPMG, 2012, 
p. 9). 
Ryder (2013) questioned the lack of accountability for the “immoral and unethical 
conduct” of bankers, and welcomed the reforms of the Financial Services (Banking 
Reform) Bill 2013-14. The regulators have since jointly issued the “Senior Managers’ 
Regime” (Ernst and Young, 2014), which promotes accountability of senior 
management (at the top of organisation) for regulatory compliance (replacing the 
Approved Persons Regime). This requires for the firms to have ‘Responsibility Maps’ 
allocating governance and management responsibility. In addition any employee within 
organisations with responsibilities relating to regulated activities, must also engage in 
the ‘Certification Regime’. The purpose of these requirements is to impact on culture 
(Ernst and Young, 2014).  
The FCA set out the principles for good regulation, and also their expectation of 
principles within the organisations, including: integrity; skills, care and diligence; 
management and control; financial prudence; appropriate standards of market conduct; 
due regard for customer interests; management of conflicts of interest; relationship of 
trust with customers; protection of client assets; and, and open and cooperative 
relationship with regulators29. Haynes (2014) contends that despite the changes to the 
regulator and the “changing set of rule books” that desired changes may not be 
realised if the regulator continue to have “little appetite” to ensure responsibility within 
the banks. The impact of these recent publications from the regulator, in relation to 
accountability is considered further in comparison to the findings of this study in 
Section 8.3.4. 
2.3.1 Recent changes to legislation impacting on compliance officers 
It should also be noted at this point that the UK is not alone in changes to the 
regulatory structure and legislation following the 2007-2009 crisis. 
The US Dodd Frank Act (Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
2010) has been referenced by a number of scholars in their discussion on regulation 
                                               
29 For expanded definition see FCA webpage, http://www.fca.org.uk/about/operate/principles, accessed 
December 2015. 
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approaches (Ford, 2011; Levine 2012; Omarova; 2012; Coates and John, 2014). The 
Act was signed into Federal Law in 2010 by President Obama. The impact of this act is 
the implementation of over 200 rules and, update of many existing rules (Coates and 
John, 2014) Although this is relevant for overall understanding of the evolution of 
regulation, this is seen to be outside the scope of this research topic as US based, and 
so will not be included in the full literary review. Haynes (2015, p. 125) discusses the 
difference between the “old US Glass Stegall Act” and Dodd Frank, and the differences 
in proposals in new UK legislation (Financial Service Banking Reform Act 2013). This 
highlights the difficulties and complexities faced by multinational dealing with cross 
jurisdiction legislation (and compliance thereon).  
Arora (2010) examined the roles and work of some of the existing international 
regulatory bodies post crisis including: (the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP); the role of the Bank of International 
Settlement (BIS), the work of forums such as the Committee on the Global Financial 
System (CGFS), the BASEL Committee; and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB) promoting information exchange and international 
cooperation in supervision, and finally the International Organisation of Securities 
Commission (IOSCO)). Within this scenario of “multiple standard setting agencies”, the 
author concludes an overall inefficiency and unwarranted complexity of the system 
(Arora, 2010), with much work to be done to form a more coherent system. A further 
review of the proposed European framework (including the findings of the Larosiere 
report regarding the macro prudential oversight of the European Systemic Risk Board 
(ESRB) and micro prudential supervision via the independent, supranational European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs)), concluded that the global financial markets cannot 
continue under the current scenario of “partial regulation” (Arora, 2010), with continued 
reform essential. 
BASEL III is currently under development with phasing in of changes to capital 
requirements between 2013 and 2019, and new regulatory requirements relating to 
bank leverage and liquidity will be phased in during 2011-2018. Again this will be an 
area of interest for scholarly review, but will not be included in the scope of this 
research topic. 
The European Commission have also set up the new European System of Financial 
Supervisors (ESFS) following the financial crisis, in attempt to restructure the system of 
financial sector oversight. The changes to the supervisory structure are in their infancy 
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(operating from 2011 onwards), which is similar to the changes in the FSA, and so 
there has been limited academic focus to this new architecture to date. 
The discussion above represents only a summary of issues around regulatory 
amendment within the sector, however, these provide some context to the major 
change facing compliance professionals at the current time. Data on cost of 
compliance has been presented by Thomson Reuters annually, which represents the 
views (through survey research) of 500+ global compliance professionals (English and 
Hammond, 2012; English and Hammond, 2015).  
In the most recent survey (2015) the main findings included the “regulatory fatigue” of 
compliance professionals with over "seventy per cent of firms" expecting increasing 
levels of regulatory publications within the next year (English and Hammond, 2015). 
One specific question asked in the surveys is to identify those areas which “pose the 
greatest challenges in coming year", and this has been presented in both the 2012 and 
2015 reports (English and Hammond, 2012, p. 6; English and Hammond, 2015, p. 17). 
As this is a global survey the issues identified by compliance professionals include 
international pieces of regulations, and these are summarised in Table 3.  
One area to note from this summary table is that certain pieces of legislation remain 
the focus of compliance officer's attention despite the 3 year gap within the surveys (for 
example FATCA, Solvency II, BASEL III, MIFID to highlight a few, which are discussed 
in further detail in Table 4), which reflects the lifespan of implementation of new pieces 
of legislation. Although the results from these surveys represents a global view (and, 
thus, international pieces of legislation), it is clear that the list of concerns of 
compliance officers around regulations has increased (with new pieces of legislation 
adding to the existing concerns of compliance officers). 
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Table 3 Summary of compliance officers' regulatory concerns in 2012, and 2015 respectively 
(sourced from English and Hammond, 2012/2015) 
2012 Survey – List of regulations 
posing greatest challenge (English and 
Hammond, 2012, p. 6) 
2015 Survey – List of regulations 
posing greatest challenge (English and 
Hammond, 2015, p. 17) 
• Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act • 
Markets in Financial Instruments 
Regulation and Directive II • Anti-money 
laundering • UK Retail Distribution Review 
• Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act • Basel III • 
Sanctions • Solvency II • Data protection • 
Undertakings for Collective Investments in 
Transferable Securities IV Directive • 
European Market Infrastructure 
Regulation • Remuneration • Conflicts of 
interest • Suitability • Alternative 
Investment Fund Managers Directive • 
Bribery and corruption 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
Directive (AIFMD), Europe • Basel III, 
international • Capital Requirements 
Directive IV (CRD IV), Europe • Data 
Protection Directive, Europe • Directive on 
Undertakings for Collective Investment in 
Transferable Securities (UCITS V), 
Europe • Dodd-Frank, United States • 
European Market Infrastructure 
Regulation (EMIR), Europe • Financial 
transaction tax (FTT), Europe • Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), 
United States • Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, United States • Fourth Money 
Laundering Directive, Europe • Future of 
Financial Advice (FoFA), Australia • 
Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act, United States • Market 
Abuse Directive (MAD 2), Europe • 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
II and Markets in Financial Instruments 
Regulation (MiFID 2/R), Europe • Payment 
Services Directive II (PSD2), Europe • 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, United States • 
Senior Managers Regime, UK • Solvency 
II, Europe • TILA-RESPA Integrated 
Disclosure rule implementation, CFPB, 
United States • Volcker Rule, United 
States 
 
In order to set context for this study (which explores the viewpoints of UK based 
compliance officers), Table 4 represents some of the major pieces of 
legislation/regulation impacting the UK sector at this time. It should be noted that this 
list is far from exhaustive, but represents the diversity of regulations that compliance 
officers face in everyday practice. 
Certain pieces of legislation will only apply to more complex organisations, being 
dependent on specific type of banking institution. It should also be considered that the 
roles of compliance officers vary across organisations. In some organisations there will 
  
54 
 
be compliance officers devoted to specific pieces of legislation (for example, specific 
roles focussed on areas such as anti-money laundering). However, in other 
organisations, the compliance officer’s role may require engagement with numerous 
pieces of legislation. However, irrespective of the organisational structure, there is an 
expectation from the regulator that the compliance personnel within the financial 
service organisations are competent and able to navigate, and interpret, the provided 
regulatory guidelines, whilst also being “on the alert at all times” (Gelemerova, 2009, p. 
40). 
A conscious decision was made early within the research process, that no specific 
piece of legislation30 would be explored during the literature review, or later during data 
collection with participants. The reasons behind this were that a focus on one piece of 
regulation would not reflect the practical realities of most individual participant’s work 
environment (as compliance is a wide ranging role within a organisation covering a 
broad range of country, region and international regulation in practice31, which is 
discussed further in Sections 4.1 and 4.2). Instead the focus is on the experiences of 
compliance officers when facing their roles within the organisations they serve. 
 
                                               
30 An initial interest in FATCA (Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act) promoted the early direction of 
the literature search, and considerations of ‘how’ to comply. This was then reconsidered in light of the 
extensive range of new country specific and international regulation facing the sector (on further review 
of the literature).  
31 Another example of cross border legislation would be that of Suspicious Activity Reporting, which 
would form one of the duties of compliance within an organisation. 
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Table 4 Summary of some significant pieces of legislation/directives impacting UK financial services 
Legislation Requirements/Compliance impact Overall summary of changes 
Financial Services 
Banking Reform Act 
2013
32
 
Meaning of “compliance failure” defined in Section 71, with 
directions to comply in Section 54, and requirements in Section 
55 and 56. 
Including ring fencing, and the framework for communication 
between the Bank of England, the PRA, and the FCA in relation 
to payment systems (Edmonds, 2013; Haynes 2015). 
The Money Laundering 
(Amendment) 
Regulations 2012
33
 
No specific reference to compliance in amendments.  
Money Laundering Regulations 2007
34
 set out requirements 
within Part 4, and enforcement activities in Part 5. With specific 
reference to compliance duties for due diligence (Section 
13.2.b.ii), and policies and procedures (Section 20.1.f). 
Amendments to Money Laundering regulation (alongside 
updates in 2015 ongoing to the original 2007 regulations). Ryder 
(2008) discussed the risk based approach adopted by the FSA, 
which has continued under the FCA
35
 (primarily through internal 
monitoring policies and procedures, and submissions of 
suspicious activity reports). 
Financial Services Act 
2012 
36
- 
Directions of Financial Policy Committee set out in Section 9H, 
and compliance thereon set out in Section 9I. Rule-making 
powers set our within Section 24. 
Including the changes to regulatory body (Murphy and Senior, 
2013). 
Capital Requirement 
Directive IV
37
 
This falls under the scope of BASEL III
38
, with minimum capital 
requirements including quality and level of common equity, a 
capital conservation buffer (common equity of 2.5% of risk 
weighted assets, and total common equity standard of 7%), 
and a countercyclical  buffer ranging from 0-2.5% of common 
equity. 
Representing implementation of capital requirements of BASEL 
III. 
BASEL III is not legislation but rather a set of standards 
developed by supervisors/central banks, which is transposed 
within EU law. 
Solvency II
39
 Falls under scope of the Financial Services and Markets (The 
Solvency 2) Regulations 2015
40
. 
Impacting UK Insurance Industry, and aligned to the three pillars 
of BASEL III, to develop consumer solvency protection with 
                                               
32 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/33/contents accessed October 2015. 
33 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2012/2298/contents/made accessed October 2015. 
34 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007/2157/pdfs/uksi_20072157_en.pdf accessed November 2015 
35 See http://www.fca.org.uk/about/what/enforcing/money-laundering/approach accessed November 2015. 
36 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/21/contents/enacted accessed October 2015. 
37 See http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/crdiv/default.aspx accessed October 2015. 
38 See summary at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3summarytable.pdf access November 2015 
39 See http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/solvency2/default.aspx accessed October 2015. 
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Legislation Requirements/Compliance impact Overall summary of changes 
minimum capital requirements, and solvency capital 
requirements (Doff, 2008; Eling, Schmeiser and Schmit, 2007). 
FATCA
41
 Foreign financial institutions (FFIs) to provide annual reports to 
IRS on US clients. Non-compliance results in 30% withholding 
tax on all US sourced payments i.e. dividends/interest 
(Brodska, 2013). An intergovernmental approach is now to be 
adopted. 
Enacted as part of the US Hiring Incentives to Restore 
Employment (HIRE) Act 2010, in order to target those evading 
US taxes (Brodzka, 2013). This is discussed in further detail in 
Section 5.1. 
Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive II
42
 
A consultation on the transposition of the MiFID II is 
underway
43
. Transposed in FSMA 2000 in “Part 4 (now Part 
4A) authorisation for investment firms, Part 18 recognition for 
regulated markets and Schedule 3 for EU passporting of 
investment services and activities” (HM Treasury, 2015, p. 3). 
Aim is to strengthen investor protection framework, and increase 
competition. 
Central Security Deposits 
Regulation
44
 (CSDR) 
EU legislation
45
, which is under consultation. Involving mandatory securities settlement discipline, including 
mandatory buying-in and mandatory cash penalties for failed 
settlements. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
40 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2015/575/pdfs/uksi_20150575_en.pdf accessed November 2015. 
41 See http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/being-regulated/meeting-your-obligations/firm-guides/systems/fatca accessed October 2015.  
42 See http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/markets/international-markets/mifid-ii accessed October 2015. 
43 See https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/transposition-of-the-markets-in-financial-instruments-directive-ii accessed November 2015. 
44 See http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/being-regulated/meeting-your-obligations/firm-guides/csdr accessed October 2015. 
45 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0909&from=EN accessed November 2015. 
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2.4 Underpinning theories – why comply? 
There are fundamental questions over why management comply with regulation (May, 
2004), when the costs of compliance are seen to be so high (see Section 3.5). The 
theories and empirical studies reviewing this area of the literature are discussed in 
Section 4.4.  
2.4.1 Institutional considerations – the banks 
As discussed in the Introduction (Chapter 1), the literature review has been performed 
under the lens of institutional theory. Under this premise, organisations find social 
reward in legitimacy, resources, and survival, subject to acceptance of coercive, 
normative, and mimetic institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Under 
institutional theory, rational firms may be seen to act in a similar manner to other firms 
under the three isomorphic processes - coercive (formal and informal pressures 
exerted by other organisations), mimetic (firms modelling themselves on other 
organisations) and normative (resulting primarily from professionalisation). Putting this 
into the context of compliance in the banking sector: 
“Organizations are prone to yielding to coercive and normative pressures 
arising from their institutional context (for example banks adhering to capital 
base requirements or to a corporate governance code) as these are likely to 
confer social privileges from their stakeholders” (Fashola, 2014, p. 2)  
Interligi (2010) proposed a conceptual framework which links (Neo) institutional theory 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and the competing value model (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 
1983), which is used as a model for measuring culture. The framework introduces core 
dimensions of legitimacy (organisations response to stakeholder expectations), 
permeability (openness to stakeholder influences) and control style (the way in which 
stakeholders expectations are implemented) (Interligi, 2010, p. 243). The justification 
for this model was to combine the strengths of institutional theory and competing value 
model to explain “culture, organisational performance and regulatory compliance” 
(Interligi, 2010, p. 246) to inform “policy makers, regulators and compliance 
practitioners” on how cultural change can impact compliance performance. These 
concepts can be linked to the evolution of the compliance function that has been 
discussed during the literature review (see Section 4.1 and 4.2). Compliance is now 
viewed in practice as a “core function within organisations” (Perezts and Picard, 2014), 
hence, the association with institutional theory for the purpose of the literature review.  
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2.4.2 Personal ethics – the compliance officers 
However, the literature may also be linked to the theory of moral reasoning, as 
regulation and compliance is “actually performed by someone” (Perezts and Picard, 
2014). Moral reasoning relates to the process in which an individual applies moral 
principles to determine a course of action (Myyry, Siponen, Pahnila, Vartiainen and 
Vance, 2009). Kohlberg‘s model, based on three broad levels of moral development 
(Pre conventional, Conventional, and Post Conventional), was first developed in a non-
business environment (research was developed in a study of young American males). 
Many academics have developed the theory further and applied this across a range of 
business disciplines. The literature related to this theory is discussed further in Section 
4.4.2.1. 
Whilst exploring the issue of the global financial crisis, other studies have considered 
wider ethical theories such as virtue theory (Graafland and Ven, 2011; Racelis, 2014). 
These studies extend beyond personal (morality) perspectives and regard banking as a 
collective, with virtues communicated and evidenced within “codes of conduct” 
(Graafland and Ven, 2011). Others have argued evidence of personal ethics through 
signing of “oaths” may also “enhance” compliance (de Bruin, 2014). However, there is 
limited empirical research as yet relating to oaths, so the impact of these mechanisms 
(as opposed to codes of conducts) is viewed as uncertain (de Bruin, 2014).  
Overall, the focus of these ethics studies indicate that there is a public expectation for 
further “professionalization of those who work in the financial sector” (Graafland and 
Ven, 2011), with clear evidence46 of ethical banking required to restore public trust. 
Consequently, this provides the overlap between ethical theories which are studied in 
the literature review, with the wider exploration of institutional theory, as it is argued 
that the “conduct of the individual is strongly influenced by their immediate 
environment” (Graafland and Ven, 2011, p. 606).  
Posner (2009, p. 284) argued that “capitalism is Darwinian”, and stated that it would be 
“as unfair” to blame47 financiers for their actions in the build-up and during the crisis, as 
to blame lions for eating zebras (indicating a complete disregard for personal ethics). 
This also disregards the issue of accountability within the sector (which was discussed 
in relation to UK Banking Reform Bill in Section 2.3, and also revisited in Section 8.3.4). 
                                               
46 Through oaths (de Bruin, 2014), ethical code adherence and competence testing (Graafland and Ven, 
2011), a reassessment of virtues of the profession (Racelis, 2014) 
47 Although Posner (2009) does acknowledge that financiers had “primary responsibility” for the crisis, 
they could not be blamed. 
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This underpins the importance of encompassing ethical theories within this thesis 
through the review of the literature, and the resulting analysis of data. 
2.4.3 Stakeholder considerations – the regulator and wider society 
When discussing the motivations for compliance, the relationship with stakeholders 
may also be considered. Freeman’s 1984 work is most often used to define 
stakeholders within the literature (Mitchell et al., 1997; Cuganesan and Khan, 2008). 
However, it is acknowledged that managers will have varying levels of consideration for 
different stakeholder group, across different industry groups, and jurisdictions. Mitchell 
et al. (1997) developed the stakeholder salience model to theorise this phenomenon. In 
this model stakeholders may be positioned by organisations, in accordance with factors 
of power, legitimacy and urgency, which are described as: 
“(1) the stakeholder's power to influence the firm, (2) the legitimacy of the 
stakeholder's relationship with the firm, and (3) the urgency of the stakeholder's 
claim on the firm” (p. 854) 
The reason behind theorising the model was a criticism of existing stakeholder 
literature and theories, where the authors contended: 
“Among the various ways of identifying stakeholders, as well as in the agency, 
behavioural, ecological, institutional, resource dependence, and transaction 
cost theories of the firm, we have found no single attribute within a given theory 
that can guide us reliably on these issues” (Mitchell et al., 1997 p. 854) 
This same criticism may apply within this study of compliance in the financial service 
sector, in that grand theories are too abstract to reliably guide us on models for 
compliance (which will be developed further in Chapters 8). 
Cuganesan and Khan (2008) consider the stakeholder salience model in a review of 
the banking industry in Australia. They also consider Clarkson’s 1995 (pp. 106-7) 
discussion of primary and secondary stakeholders, where primary stakeholders’ 
participation is considered essential to maintain the organisation as a going concern, 
and the secondary group wield considerable influence, whilst not being directly 
engaged in the transactions of the firm (Cuganesan and Khan, p. 87). They contribute 
to the literature by performing content analysis on Australian banking organisations 
annual reports, and websites. The study specifically discusses the relationship with the 
regulator, whereby the findings of the study indicated and 11% contribution of “total 
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non-financial KPIs reported”. From these findings the authors concluded that there 
was:  
“…a strong focus on regulatory compliance and cost efficiency. Concurrently, 
the absence of reporting of the contribution of regulators to organisational wants 
and needs limits the reporting to this stakeholder group” (p. 97) 
So although the regulators are considered to be an important stakeholder they are not 
acknowledged to have primacy (in terms of disclosures provided by banking 
organisations), where customers and shareholders were considered to hold most 
importance. Cuganesan and Khan’s 2008 study was not focused specifically on the 
compliance function itself. However, this does provide some context to this thesis when 
considering motivations of compliance officers towards stakeholders. In addition, the 
authors themselves acknowledged limitations in the study, contending that further 
research was required to assess the differences in “stakeholder measurement and 
management practice” across the industry, to include “community banking 
organisations” (p. 98).  
Other authors review the issue of primacy from other angles. Although not explicitly 
focused on the role of the compliance officer, Fashola (2014) offers a conceptual 
framework in the form of the “customer legitimacy model”, in response to discussion on 
“strategic choice, institutional theory and legitimacy” when considering the banking 
sector. In this model they contend that primacy should be given to the customer in the 
relationship between the regulator and the banks (which although not explicitly stated 
in the article, may be seen as the compliance officer in practice due to their 
intermediary role between the regulators and the banks).  
Using these theories (i.e. institutional theory, Kohlberg’s moral reasoning (with overlap 
to wider ethics literature base), and stakeholder salience), the focus during the 
literature review has been that of relational issues between the role of the regulators 
and the role of the compliance officers. This study explores experiences of compliance 
personnel whilst facing new regulation, hence the overlap between the different 
theories covering personal ethics (the compliance officers), institutional impact (the 
banks), and stakeholder relations (the regulator, and wider society). Institutional theory 
may be used to frame decision making within the banking organisations; Kohlberg’s 
moral reasoning to frame the personal motivations (of the individual compliance 
officers); and finally, stakeholder salience to consider the relational issues between the 
regulator and the individual firms.  
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2.5 Chapter summary 
The purpose of this short chapter was to provide background to the UK regulatory 
environment in which this study has been undertaken. In addition, underpinning 
theories around motivations for compliance have been discussed, in order to set the 
scene for the following literature review. In the following chapters, the regulatory 
compliance literature is presented, which has been written across a range of disciplines 
and geographic perspectives.  
As discussed in Section 2.3.1, this thesis has not focused on any single piece of 
legislation. Instead, there has been an exploration of the issues faced by practicing 
compliance officers in their everyday roles within the financial service industry, whereby 
the compliance officer’s role within the organization may cover a diverse, and ever 
changing regulatory environment.  
Therefore, this sets up the framework for the literature review, where a number of 
theoretical and practical perspectives are considered in Chapters 3 through to 5. The 
literature in the area of regulation and compliance is wide and involves cross over 
between disciplines of political economists, legal scholars, finance theorists and social 
scientists. Therefore, the focus of the literature review has been to broadly consider 
models of compliance, whilst addressing a more specific question of: What are firms 
complying with and why do firms comply? Coupled with this overriding question, is the 
exploration of whether there are credible alternatives to the current broadly accepted 
best practice models. This follows on from the context that has been set out within this 
chapter, which has discussed the historical and current UK regulatory environment. 
This literature will then be contrasted to the findings of this UK study in Chapter 8. A 
summary of legislation impacting compliance officer (from both an International and UK 
perspective) is provided in Section 2.3.  
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Chapter 3 Literature review – Regulation: What are we 
complying with? 
“More than a sword is needed to achieve the objectives of the ruling classes of 
regulatory capitalism. Both the regulators and the regulatees who command the 
economy need civility that is not dependent on iterated encounters, yet that is 
secured by smoke curling from a benign gun.” Braithwaite and Hong (2015) 
3.0 Introduction 
As will be seen in the following chapters the literature has been reviewed in three broad 
areas of regulation, compliance and shared service/outsourcing. In Figure 5 the overlap 
between the literature domains is summarised and the positioning of the research 
objectives are proposed. 
Figure 5 Summary of literature review topics with links to research objectives 
 
3.1 Literature review framework 
As illustrated in Figure 5, the academic literature reviewed during the course of the 
research project can be categorised into topic areas of regulation (with what do officers 
comply); compliance (models and motivations); and shared services. Norman (2011, p. 
44) commented that “it may be helpful to look at the realm of beyond compliance 
obligations through the lens of regulation or self-regulation”, and this supported the 
initial direction of the literature review. 
Therefore, this review has taken distinct lines which feed into the overall knowledge of 
models of compliance: 
 Chapter 3: Regulation literature – including a review of regulatory theory 
literature, academic literature pre and post crisis, and literature reviewing costs 
of regulation and compliance therewith; 
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 Chapter 4: Compliance literature – including a review of the history or 
compliance, a review of qualified officers and responsibilities of compliance 
officers, and compliance models and approaches, including compliance tooling; 
and in the final section ‘Why management comply’ which explores the literature 
reviewing the motivation of managers towards compliance; 
 Chapter 5: Exploring Alternatives - The first two section reviews the limited 
literature which is available regarding the relationship of the compliance 
function with consultants, and how the compliance function deals with new 
mandatory items of regulation; and the remaining sections review the concepts 
of outsourcing, looking at the literature relating to shared services and 
outsourcing, which may be considered an alternative to in house compliance. 
Further background on aspects of the UK regulatory environment, and underpinning 
theories on motivations for compliance, was included in the previous chapter. 
3.2 A history of regulation 
Under a capitalist system, the banking sector is subject to inherent financial instability 
with “financial crises” plaguing “our history” (Minsky, 1976, p. 1). Regulation is 
necessary to “establish reasonable constraints” over the banking industry (Minsky, 
1976, p. 11). There is a wealth of literature available relating to regulation. A smaller 
proportion of the literature is directed specifically to banking or financial service 
regulation48, which provides an indication of the broad discussion and application of 
regulatory theories by academics. Figure 6 was developed by the author during the 
literature review to summarise the theories and models feeding into regulation 
literature, and this mind map forms the outline for the content of the literature review of 
regulation. There are three main sections to the mind map which summarises the 
concepts discussed in the following literature review: the underpinning theory, pre and 
post crisis critique of regulatory models, and finally an overriding concern of cost 
benefit analysis. 
Underpinning regulatory theory is discussed in Section 3.3. Since the most recent 
financial crisis there is a renewed interest in the area of regulation amongst academics. 
Some key literature has been categorised as pre/post crisis within Section 3.4 with a 
review of new academic models, updated theory and critical review of the regulatory 
structure post crisis. An area of continued focus by academics (and indeed 
                                               
48 A Google Scholar search on “regulation” indicated approximately 1.8 million results. When this was 
specified to “banking regulation” this decreased to approximately 28,000 results, and if the search term 
“financial service regulation” was used this reduced down to 186 results (as at June 2015). 
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practitioners) is that of cost benefit analysis, and the literature reviewed in this area is 
discussed in Section 3.5.  
Figure 6 Author developed mind map of regulatory literature 
Underpinning Theories and Models Post Crisis Critique 
 
Microeconomic Theory 
- public choice 
- Regulatory capture (Stigler, Baker, 
Omarova) 
- Agency theory (Ross, Fullenkamp & 
Sharma, Alexander) 
- Rent Seeking (Krueger, Krawiec) 
 
New Academic Models 
- Regulatory Academy (Fullenkamp and 
Sharma) 
- Complement vs. substitution theory 
(Becher and Fyre) 
- updated PIG model (Omarova) 
- ’Sentinel’ (Levine) 
- Regulatory Ambassadors (Braithwaite 
and Hong) 
 
Macroeconomic Theory 
- avoid market failure (Keynes) 
- macroprudential policy (Galati & 
Moessner) 
 
Updated Theory 
- Updated responsive regulation 
(Braithwaite) 
- ‘embedded’ self-regulation (Omarova) 
- Meta regulation (Gilad) 
- Technological (Ford) vs. Relational 
(Braithwaite) 
 
Models 
- Responsive regulation (Ayres and 
Braithwaite) 
- enforcement pyramid, tripartism and 
PIGs 
- Command and control regulation 
- Outcome orientated regulation 
- Process orientated regulation 
(Stefanadis – self regulation, Coglianese 
and Lazer – management based) 
- Open Corporation (Parker) 
 
Critical Academic Review 
- Crotty (NFA and VAR) 
- Jameson (VAR) 
- Wilson  (lit. review) 
- Ford (lit. review) 
- Bartle (RIA) 
- Baker and Young (Regulatory 
Capture) 
- Trust and Ethics (Davies, Llewellyn 
et al.) 
 
Cost Benefit Analysis 
(Included for context in literature review, however not forming part of research 
questions) 
 
3.3 Regulatory theory 
The rationale for regulation under economic theory is the desire to avoid monopoly 
inefficiencies (Baldwin and Cave, 1999). However, from a societal (public) viewpoint 
the objective of regulation is to protect the consumer from monopoly exploitation (Crew 
and Kleindorfer, 2002).  
Some significant economic literature was developed by academics during the 1970s 
(regulatory capture theory, Stigler, 1971, Posner, 1974; agency theory, Ross, 1973; 
rent seeking behaviour, Krueger, 1974) which has shaped today’s regulatory 
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landscapes. Microeconomic theory developed from the end of 1970s is thought to have 
supported deregulation during the latter part of the 20 th Century (Crew and Kleindorfer, 
2002; Winston, 1993). Posner (1974) argued that there were two broad streams to the 
economic regulation literature at the time: the first “public interest” theory, and the 
second stream exploring “capture” theory.  
Public interest theory encompasses “what motivates policy makers”, and in contrast 
capture theory discusses regulatory actors with “narrow, self-interested goals” (Levine 
and Forrence, 1990, pp. 168-169). Under public interest theory (Keynesian 
macroeconomic theory) regulators were required to correct for market failure, however, 
from 1960s onwards public interest theory was subject to increasing criticism, as the 
regulation had not brought about the “desired” stability (Crew and Parker, 2006). 
Academics sought explanations and reasons for regulatory failure, and so public choice 
and the theory of regulation was developed further.  
Regulatory capture theory was developed by George Stigler (1971), and this 
mechanism has been cited by some authors as one of the main causal factors of the 
most recent financial crisis of 2007-2009 (Baker, 2010; Omarova, 2012). However, due 
to the complexity of the financial sector there is a strong reliance by the supervisors 
and regulators on the industry itself, due to the industry’s superior technical expertise 
and resources, so regulatory capture is considered an on-going issue. 
Other authors have considered the self-regulatory mechanisms within the markets. 
Mayer (2008) discusses the evolution of financial markets in “an absence of formal 
systems of regulation” where reliance was place on “informal relations of trust”:  
“There comes a point at which trust mechanisms appear to break down and 
more formal investor protection is required. Is regulation then inevitable?” 
(Mayer 2008, p. 631) 
This point supports earlier discussion of “regulatory creep”, whereby there is a “trade-
off between trust and confidence on one hand, and regulation on the other” (Llewellyn, 
2005). This concept of trust and self-regulation, contrasted with formal regulation can 
be linked back to the theories around agency. Ross developed the economic theory of 
agency (1973) which has been extended further by numerous authors under the 
heading of principal agent theory. Fullenkamp and Sharma (2012) refer to this “current” 
issue whereby “regulators are sandwiched between politicians to whom they are 
agents responsible for rulemaking and law, and the financial sector, to which they are 
principals in charge of regulation and supervision” (p. 4).  
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The investment of resources in attempts to divert income from other people through the 
political and regulatory process was termed “rent seeking” by Krueger in 1974 (Crew 
and Parker, 2006). Krawiec (2005) suggested that rent seeking behaviour of powerful 
interest groups, may have influenced the development of the US legal system towards 
a compliance based regime. She suggested that legal compliance professionals such 
as lawyers, compliance and ethics consultants, and in-house compliance, all have a 
stake in, and benefit from, internal compliance based liability regimes. Krawiec went on 
to suggest that there is also an over reliance on agency cost explanations for 
organisational misconduct by legal academics and legal decision makers. 
Much of the regulatory compliance literature also broadly refers to the concept of 
culture. However, Meidinger (1987) criticises this phenomenon whereby: 
“One important reason for the rise in discussions of regulatory culture seems to 
be the inability of scholars to comprehend large parts of regulatory activity 
without reference to such a construct” (p. 356) 
The concept of the “regulatory community” is introduced, and linked to the concept of 
culture. It is argued that in order to action change, the “developed culture of regulation” 
requires adjustment (p. 372). This has relevance to the context of this study, in that 
alongside the regulatory communities, compliance communities may also co-exist. 
More recently specific research on culture has been performed from the regulatory 
viewpoint (O’Brien et al., 2014; Ring et al., 2014). O’Brien et al. (2014) contend that 
“open, ongoing dialogue” is essential to maintain sustainability within the market via 
mechanisms of co-regulation. This is essential in order for understanding and 
evaluation of the “calculative, social and normative reasons” governing behaviours 
within the market (p. 122). 
Empirical data is presented by Ring et al. (2014) in the form of a qualitative review of 
regulatory announcements (from the FSA/FCA). The authors contend that there needs 
to be clearer signposting by the regulator with regards to culture issues in order for 
“lessons” to be taken on board by firms in the market (p. 20). 
Therefore, there appears an obvious interest in the subject of culture from both an 
academic and practice based viewpoint. A discussion now follows of the mechanisms 
and models within the literature, for regulators to respond to regulatory issues. 
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3.3.1 Responsive regulation and “the enforcement pyramid” 
Ayres and Braithwaite summarised models of regulation in their 1992 publication 
“Responsive Regulation”. This publication is widely cited in academic literature (most 
notably under the legal discipline) and underpins further research and resulting models 
to regulatory approaches (which will be reviewed in the following section). Indeed, an 
entire special edition was devoted to the topic of “Responsive Regulation” (Regulation 
and Governance, 2013). Ayres (2013) commented on the phenomena of citations 
steadily increasing year on year (between the years 1993 to 2011) for responsive 
regulation and the “pyramid of enforcement” (see Figure 7). Under the notion of 
responsive regulation, it is argued that rather than the period (i.e. 1980s onwards to 
point of publication) being viewed as an era of vast deregulation, it should be viewed as 
“regulatory flux”.  
Figure 7 Pyramid of enforcement (summarised from Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992 and Hutter, 1997) 
 
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) revisited concepts of ‘deterrence’ versus ‘compliance’ 
models of regulation (terms coined by Reiss, 1980) and introduced the theory of the 
“enforcement pyramid” (Figure 7). The theory states that the successful pursuit of 
cooperative regulation is predicted by “tit for tat strategy”, use of sanctions and 
interventions (under hierarchical range). Following the 1992 publication, the financial 
service sector has witnessed the “deregulation-crisis-reregulation” cycle around the 
2007-09 Global Financial Crisis (Parker, 2013). Many academics have focussed on the 
concept of the enforcement pyramid (Parker, 2013, p. 4). Some academics have 
characterised the regulatory response to the latest Global Financial Crisis as a 
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“Minsky” moment (Kregel, 2010), to correct the instability caused by weak regulation in 
the markets in the build up to the financial crisis (Crotty, 2011). 
Within the responsive regulation model it is considered that regulatory bodies would be 
able to concentrate their efforts and resources on the riskier firms. Ultimately, this 
would align to the goal of compliance with law/policy/regulation whilst minimising 
compliance costs of regulatory bodies (efficiency/cost reduction). Gossum, Arts and 
Verheyen (2010) specifically comment that the “main advantage of compliance specific 
response is the reduction in the regulators compliance cost”, through a varied approach 
of persuasion through to interventionist and enforcement (p. 248).  
The theory of tripartism, and the ideas of public interest groups (PIGs) becoming fully 
fledged players in the regulatory game between the regulatory agencies and the firm to 
deter regulatory capture, were also proposed by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992). 
Responsive regulation was developed during a time of focus on national regulation, 
and of course regulation (and associated problems) has increasingly shifted towards a 
transnational level (Abbott and Snidal, 2013). Responsive regulation has been 
developed further in more recent publications (Omarova, 2011), which will be discuss 
further under Section 3.4.3.  
3.3.2 Self-regulation and responsive regulation critique 
Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) originally discussed the idea of enforced self-regulation, 
as a form of subcontracting regulatory function to private actors. They linked the idea of 
self-regulation, to earlier theory developed by Ronald Coase in 1937 (whereby firms 
would be organised to produce goods and services when internal production was 
cheaper than external market transactions). They distinguished this from “co-
regulation” which they stated to mean “industry association self-regulation with some 
oversight and/or ratification by government”, and under which they considered the 
contemporary British system for regulating financial services to sit under49. 
In summary the strengths of enforced self-regulation stated by Ayres and Braithwaite 
(1992) include: flexibility of rules/regulation to changing business environment; 
commitment to rules (due to participation in setting rules, and bearing costs of own 
regulation); focusing on offenders (resulting in higher disciplining rate). Overall this 
route would result in compliance becoming “the path of least corporate resistance”. 
                                               
49 Please refer to Section 2.1 for the history of the UK regulatory regime. 
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The concepts of deregulation in the form of self-regulation reflect neoliberal ideology, 
which was supported by advocates such as Alan Greenspan50 (Mason, 2009). 
However, following the crisis in 2008, Greenspan “admitted a flaw” in the (neoliberal) 
worldview that he had been practicing for 40 years (Mason, 2009, p. 118). Pre- and 
post-crisis, a number of authors have explored the ideas of enforced self-regulation 
further (Stefanadis, 2003; Coglianese and Lazer, 2003; Ford, 2008 and 2011; Gilad, 
2010), whose work is discussed further below under Section 3.4. Also, following the 
crisis Braithwaite has proposed a “clarification” and evolution to the original theories set 
out in their 1992 founding work (see Section 3.4.3, reviewing evolution of regulatory 
theory). Although the literature presents a “black and white picture of competing 
models of regulation” of command and control and self-regulation (Sinclair, 1997, p. 
531) this is not realistic in practice, and policy makers may choose to cherry pick the 
best elements of regulation models. Baldwin and Cave (1999) provides a summary of 
the different regulatory strategies i.e. command and control, self-regulation, incentives, 
market harnessing controls, disclosure, direct action, rights and liabilities law and public 
compensation, with exemplars from industry, including a critique of strengths and 
weaknesses of each strategy.  
Nevertheless, barriers still remain to develop the ideal model or system of regulation in 
the complex and rapidly changing world of financial services. Norman (2011) discusses 
self-regulation, in relation to business ethics, specifically commenting on compliance 
whereby “the most powerful way to have historically made corporations more socially 
responsible, or better corporate citizens, is through state regulation (including the 
pervasive threat of tort law)” (p. 48). Braithwaite’s (2002) earlier discussion of 
reward/punishment would apply in this instance. Whilst promoting “persuasion” 
reinforced with “punishment”, Braithwaite contends that to “manifest a desired 
behaviour” reward is a more successful strategy than punishment. This is difficult to 
apply to the financial service industry as how can we measure reward in an 
(historically) profit driven market. The reward in this instance may be considered then 
to be promotion of reputation or “informal praise” (Braithwaite, 2002, p. 24). 
Although many authors have discussed Ayres and Braithwaite’s responsive regulation 
model, there seems to be limited empirical evidence regarding the model. Nielson 
(2006, 2009) discusses the lack of empirical evidence, and offers an empirical analysis 
of regulatory inspectors’ actions (and how responsively they react) across four 
regulatory areas. Few authors have empirically tested responsive regulation due to the 
                                               
50 Chairman of the US Federal Reserve from 1987-2006. 
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“complex, ambiguous and all encompassing” mix of strategies upon which there are 
inherent difficulties to form hypotheses (Nielson and Parker, 2009; Parker, 2013, p. 3). 
Nielson and Parker (2009, p. 377) empirically tested “tit for tat” responsive regulation 
and “restorative justice” responsive regulation. The findings are “not consistent” and 
they call for further research stating: 
“If a responsive regulatory strategy is the most effective strategy, a future 
research question is: How do we design regulatory agencies that promote such 
behaviour?” (Nielson, 2009, p. 413) 
Parker (2006) specifically reviewed responsive regulation ‘in action’ within the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). This is a development on 
her earlier work in the book “The Open Corporation” (Parker, 2002), in which a wide 
scale empirical study (unstructured interviews) of regulators and self-regulation 
profession was undertaken. Parker (2006) suggests that there are inherent pitfalls 
faced by regulators in the form of the “deterrence trap” and the “compliance trap”. The 
deterrence trap (where penalties are not sufficient to deter misconduct) is considered 
manageable through “skilful” use of responsive regulation (Parker, 2006, p. 593). 
However, the inherent issues of the compliance trap (whereby political support for the 
“moral seriousness” of law enforcement is lacking) are only resolved via political action: 
“This is the heart of the compliance trap dilemma. In the absence of 
authoritative, broader political and cultural support for the regulator’s view of the 
law the regulator is trapped. There is no technique, style, or approach the 
regulator can utilise to improve compliance where the meaning of compliance is 
politically contested” (Parker, 2006, p. 611) 
Other academics contend that responsive regulation is not suitable in instances where 
the regulator does not have sufficient resources to detect non-compliance, as a 
relationship between the regulators and the regulated becomes impossible (Smith, 
2011). The Australian financial service sector is used as an example to demonstrate 
where the regulator cannot “escalate” through the pyramid effectively. Criticism is 
directed at the regulator when reactive “compulsory investigative powers” are 
employed (which is implicated as a resourcing issue), as this sets the context of the 
relationship as “adversarial” (Smith, 2011 p. 722). This contrasts to the context of a 
persuasive strategy that could be adopted in the case of more regular and proactive 
monitoring/surveillance. 
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Since the latest crises there has been a returned focus by governments, regulators and 
academics to macroeconomic theory, with some commentators linking the latest 
financial crisis to macro imbalances within certain economies (FSA, Turner Report, 
2009, p. 13), and calling for a “macro prudential” focus to be applied by regulators 
(IMF, 2010). The regulatory approaches pre-crisis were largely based on the 
intellectual assumption of theories of efficient and rational market (FSA, Turner Report, 
2009), and the report contends that there needs to be critical reflection on these 
theories in the wake of the crisis. Within the UK, the Financial Policy Committee was 
created in interim form in 2011 (and statutory form in 2013) in order to address macro 
prudential regulation, with responsibilities of “identifying, monitoring and taking action to 
remove or reduce systemic risks” with the UK financial system (Murphy and Senior, 
2013). 
There have also been calls for further research in the area of macro prudential policy in 
academic literature (Galati and Moessner, 2010). They concluded that the current drive 
for decisions on macro prudential policy has occurred “against a background of limited 
research, and analytical tools and data available so far that could inform these policy 
decisions in a meaningful way” (p. 25). Baker (2010) also argues for the case of macro 
prudential regulation, and states this philosophy leads to intellectual independence 
from industry. In their review of macroeconomic literature, Galati and Moessner (2010) 
consider that more research is required on effectiveness of macro prudential tools. 
They also conclude that there needs to be further study on how monetary policy and 
macro prudential policy should be coordinated. This proposal does not form an area of 
research in this thesis, however, this provides meaningful context to the continuing 
changes within UK financial service regulation. 
3.4 Academic literature pre- and post-crisis 
There is a divide in the direction and commentary of academic research relating to 
regulatory approaches, pre- and post 2007-2009 financial crisis. There appeared to be 
support of deregulation and the self-regulating profession pre-crisis. However, post 
crisis there has been criticism by some authors of the regulatory approach, and use of 
risk based approaches to regulation. 
For example, pre-crisis, Stefanadis (2003) illustrated some of the benefits of self-
regulation, although it was not implied that formal regulation should be abandoned. The 
author considered the main advantages to self-regulation to be faster access to 
information about new, efficient technologies and their adoption in the financial sector. 
Coglianese and Lazer (2003) discuss the ideas of management based regulation (a 
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form of process orientated regulation). This approach seeks to take advantage of 
private sector understanding, compelling regulated parties to conduct their own 
evaluation, find their own control solutions and document all the steps they take. They 
argue that management based regulation gives firms flexibility to develop their own 
approach, and the underlying assumption is that effective management based 
regulation is also relatively cost effective as management plan around the lowest costs 
solutions available.  
Hutter (2005, p. 4) in her research based on agency websites of regulatory initiatives, 
discusses the Financial Services Authority’s “self-consciously signalled approach” to 
risk based regulation, and links this into the British Government’s “adoption of risk 
management”. Hutter calls for further research to understand how different 
organisations (regulators, domains and countries) understand risk, and also to 
investigate further the extent to which rhetoric and ideas of risk based approaches 
translate into action. Alexander (2006) argued that regulators are uniquely positioned to 
balance the relevant stakeholder interests in devising governance standards for 
financial institutions, whilst achieving economic development objectives and minimizing 
the externalities of systematic risk. Alexander considers that regulators and supervisors 
are acting as agents on behalf of broader stakeholder interests in the economy, and 
regulation is necessary to align incentives of all parties. They consider a proactive 
approach is necessary by regulators, due to the “special risk that bank and financial 
firms pose to the broader economy” (p. 34), a statement clearly demonstrated during 
the financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
In the “immediate aftermath” of the crisis Ashby et al. (2013) collected data via semi 
structured interviews with 20 risk management and financial service professionals. The 
interviews were held in July/August 2009 and focussed on: the cause of the financial 
crisis; the role of risk management and its implementation; and how organisational 
factors (culture and governance) contributed to the crisis. This qualitative analysis 
provided rich insights into the perceived “conflict between risk management and other 
business functions” (Ashby et. al, 2013, p. 6). In conclusion the authors comment that 
despite the multiple causes of the financial crisis, that there were key factors which 
explain the actions of certain institutions choosing high risk approach: 
 “human and cultural weaknesses at the institutional, industry or society levels; 
 Communication weaknesses within some financial institutions, where boards 
and senior managers either did not receive …. or failed to understand this 
information; 
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 Weaknesses in the prudential regime for banks and the investment firms 
coupled with flawed supervision.” (Ashby et. al, 2013, p. 11) 
Post crisis there is critical assessment of the regulatory approach “New Financial 
Architecture” (NFA) by Crotty (2009). Crotty describes NFA as “light regulation on 
commercial banks, even lighter regulation of investment banks and little, if any, 
regulation of the shadow banking system” (p. 564). The author contends that regulation 
of the financial markets will not be effective unless it “substantially reduces the 
perverse incentives that pervade the system” (p. 566). The article continues to criticize 
tools employed by regulators/financial institutions including VaR (value at risk), which is 
described as “one of many possible examples of totally ineffective regulatory processes 
with the NFA” (p. 572). Value at Risk is a statistical measure which was widely used to 
assess levels of risk within firms/investment portfolios, and represents maximum loss 
not exceeded with a given probability, over a defined period of time. There are various 
assumptions and variations in application, but the most common assumption used is 
that historical market data is the best predictor of future change, maximum loss not 
exceeded with a given probability defined as the confidence level, over a given period 
of time. Jameson (2008) also discussed the failures of VaR, and comments that “the 
choice of methodology, underlying statistical data, and the modeller’s implementation 
skills are all extremely important in determining whether the resulting VaR numbers are 
useful or misleading” (p. 9). Perignon and Smith (2010) performed a quantitative study 
which reviewed both the level of VaR disclosure and the accuracy of the figures 
provided over the period 1996-2005. They argued that historical simulation was the 
most popular method, whilst noting that this method had limitation in forecasting the 
volatility of future trading revenues. They concluded whilst the quantity of VaR 
disclosure had increased over time, the actual quality of reported figures had not 
improved, whilst commenting that VaR’s are “excessively conservative” and that there 
was a “disconnect between historical simulation VaR and future volatility” (p. 29).  
Bartle (2008) discusses the models of risk regulation and governance and describes 
two models, of a “scientific technocratic” approach and a “social political” approach. 
The conclusion on the two models is that there appears to be an emphasis on 
quantitative techniques at the expense of qualitative techniques. This has specific 
ramification in the use of Regulatory Impact Assessment, which at that time focused 
more on quantitative techniques. There was also criticism levelled specifically at the 
FSA, who had “pursued quantitative techniques more than most regulators, but had 
been forced to admit that it had made significant mistakes in risk assessment over the 
problems of the bank Northern Rock” (Bartle, 2008, p. 15). 
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Some academics have summarised the literature following the crisis, for example, 
Wilson et al. (2010) comments on the increased focus on regulators and calls for 
improvements in regulation. They conclude that further research was necessary to 
investigate the overall impact of securitisation and other risk management practices on 
financial sector efficiency, and on allocation of risks, in order to propose and design 
“the most appropriate regulatory blueprint” (p. 33). Ford (2011) also discusses the 
literature post crisis, and argues that enforced self-regulation and other process based 
regulatory approaches would benefit from greater attention to both macro forces 
(background influences of power) and micro forces (such as form, natures and drivers 
of incremental changes). The article goes on to discuss the work of other scholars in 
development of meta-regulation theory (Gilad, 2010), and updates to responsive 
regulation theory (Braithwaite, 2010) discussed under Section 3.4.3. A number of 
reasons for regulatory failure during the crisis are discussed, including the comment 
that “the SEC and the FSA arguably embraced innovation to such a degree that 
industry innovation utterly outstripped regulators ability to stay abreast of developments 
within their remit” (Ford, 2011, p. 623). The article concludes that responsive regulation 
is now built on mechanisms of learning through experience, and so has evolved into a 
meta-regulatory approach (see also Section 3.4.3). 
However, despite the criticisms of ‘light touch’ regulation within the literature there are 
still some authors who still promote models of self-regulation. Omarova (2011) provides 
a “thought experiment” of the merits of a new model of “embedded self-regulation” 
within the financial sector, focusing on systemic risk prevention and “imposing the 
responsibility of protecting the public from the financial crisis directly on the financial 
service industry” (p. 438). However, in comparison with the current financial regulatory 
structure, to the successful self-regulatory systems in nuclear and chemicals industry, 
the article argues that under the current structure the financial industry “lacks 
meaningful incentives to develop this new type of more publicly minded and socially 
responsible self-regulation” (p. 413). Omarova (2011) suggests that one of the most 
important obstacles to self-regulation in financial industry is the lack of a “community of 
fate” mentality, due to the security of “public safety net and the near certainty of 
government bailouts” (p. 420). The article also concludes that financial institutions, 
whose profitability depends on the acquisition and application of information not 
available to competitors, would find difficulties in cooperation and sharing of knowledge 
with their peers in the industry. Norman (2011) supports this discussion in relation to 
business ethics commenting on a lack of: 
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“principle based guidance for when exactly firms in competitive markets must 
constrain themselves from pursuing profitable opportunities […] that are legal 
but possibly unethical or irresponsible” (p. 47).  
Other contemporary models are discussed further under Section 3.4.3. 
3.4.1 Critique of “regulatory capture” 
“is regulation simply an arena in which special interests contend for the right to 
use government power for narrow advantage?” (Levine and Forrence, 1990) 
A number of articles post crisis have explored the ideas of regulatory capture, and its 
impact within the context of the regulatory crisis. In case of regulatory capture, it is 
observed that regulations evolve which meet the needs of groups (including the 
regulated parties) rather than that of public interest (Etzioni, 2009). Yackee (2012) 
contends that such groups highly influence the “pre-proposal stage” of regulations. 
Baker (2010) also discussed the four mechanisms of regulatory capture: lobbying, 
degree of political salience, institutional design/revolving door and intellectual capture 
and then comments on the pro-cyclicality of regulatory capture, and how capture is 
“relatively easy during boom periods, but becomes much harder when regulation is re 
politicized in the context of a crisis” (p. 652). Young (2012) has a counter argument to 
scholars who rely on the concept of regulatory capture to explain regulatory oversight, 
and regulatory failures. Within his research article he demonstrates that despite 
extensive lobbying efforts, the private sector influence did not always manage to 
weaken regulatory standards (utilizing methods of process tracing analysis for three 
case studies). After providing a number of specific arguments in his article, he 
concludes: 
“the line between public and private was drawn with the word discretion: 
regulators had discretion to choose unpopular decisions; discretion to say no 
to bankers demands; discretion to pick and choose which information to utilize 
from private sector groups and which to reject” (p. 20) 
Young calls for a change in focus towards research on regulatory capture, to pursue an 
approach to investigate the conditions under which private sector groups are 
successful in their lobbying effort and those where they are not successful.  
Further empirical evidence is provided by Harvey and Bosworth (2013), which supports 
the concept of a “captured model of regulation” within the UK. Through a review of FSA 
data on fines, they contend that “sanction avoiding compliance” is in place, with a 
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tendency of box ticking culture rather than a focus on unearthing the underlying 
compliance (and criminal) issue (p. 9). In conclusion they point to the regulators’ 
tendency towards “maintaining public confidence” and compliance officers over 
consideration of “commercial sensitivities” in exposing non-compliance/criminal 
activities. 
In response to academics criticising regimes for light touch regulation (which Davies 
(2010) contends is a phrase almost never used by the regulators themselves), and 
citing “risk based approach” and “regulatory capture” as significant factors impacting on 
the most recent financial crisis; new models have been proposed by academics to 
avoid the pitfalls encountered in the past. The concepts around regulatory capture 
within the literature reviewed here may indeed have implications for this study into 
compliance. If these powerful groups could be used and harnessed by compliance 
officers with the emphasis on “discretion” as highlighted by Young (2012), then useful 
knowledge transfer may be possible between these groups, compliance officers and 
the regulators. Yackee (2006, p. 728) commented (pre-crisis) on the advantages on 
use of such groups by agency officials, due to the variety of “tools and resources” that 
they offer.  
3.4.2 Models of risk regulation and governance 
There have been a number of studies focussing on the relationship between risk 
regulation and governance. Fullenkamp and Sharma (2012) argue that policy makers 
seem to lack an awareness of how earlier crises were resolved and the most effective 
strategies to deal with the crisis. They propose a model for “regulatory academies” 
whereby policy makers could access an archive of the evolution of rules and 
regulations, historical information on regulatory and legal failures, financial scandals 
and systematic crisis. They consider that by making regulatory agencies both 
financially and intellectually independent this would transform the regulatory cycle, and 
improving the quality of supervision, regulation and enforcement. 
Helleiner and Pagliari (2011) comment on the interaction between each of the policy 
arenas, interstate, domestic and transnational following the financial crisis, and 
propose that academic researchers may now need to consider reanalysis of the 
previous concept of strengthening of official international standards, towards a 
weakening in the post crisis world. A counter “global” view is suggested by Moshirian 
(2011), who called for a “new global framework that should create an independence 
and partnership between international institutions and national authorities” (p. 511). 
These ideas were developed further in Moshirian (2012) in which the paper concluded 
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that the “gradual emergence” of a world central bank could result in “less regulatory 
arbitrage, more successful implementation of international rules and agreements and a 
more stable global financial system in the future” (p. 2679). The author comments on 
the emergence of the European Central Bank, which has theoretically reduced the 
burden of national regulation and allowed for more efficient and stable economic 
activities (whilst recognising the current financial turmoil). Therefore, questions appear 
to remain over the influence such ‘macro’ communities have towards regulatory 
compliance. 
Another view of governance is offered by Becher and Frye (2011), who performed 
multivariate statistical analysis, providing empirical evidence to review the relationship 
between regulation and governance. Within their review of literature they comment on 
the concentration by academics on the “notion of substitution of regulation for 
governance” (p. 26) (substitution theory), despite mixed empirical evidence. They test 
various hypotheses with regard to substitution theory, and conclude instead that 
regulated firms do not have significantly lower monitoring, and following periods of 
deregulation firms appear to decrease monitoring. They suggest the notion that 
regulatory pressure may encourage greater monitoring. They state that their findings 
support the hypothesis that regulation and governance are compliments, and may work 
together to ensure an effective governance structure. 
3.4.3 Contemporary models/Evolution of regulatory theory 
Given the enormity of events of the most recent financial crisis, academics and 
practitioners have questioned the validity of concepts and models pre-crisis. Arnold 
(2009) reviews the role of accounting research in the most recent global financial crisis. 
On review of the publication record of the “premier” accounting journals both pre crisis 
and post in relation to discussion of structured investment vehicles (SIVs), including 
special purpose entities (SPEs), and qualified special purpose entities (QSPEs), 
securitisation and off balance sheet entities (mortgage bank securities – MBSs, and 
collateralised debt obligations – CDOs), Arnold (2009) argues that the dangers of such 
practices were not highlighted until the credit crisis was already underway. Haynes 
(2015) concludes that new UK legislation (the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 
2013), and the separation of retail and investment banking, would have been unlikely to 
prevent the crisis. 
However, given the global nature of the crisis, it appears unclear how to explore the 
phenomena, and which criteria to use to measure success or failure. Davies (2010), 
commented that only two countries (Canada and Australia) appeared to fair well during 
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the crisis. A number of academic articles following the crisis highlighted the apparent 
lack of understanding of the dynamics of systematic risk accumulation, by both the 
regulators and the firms themselves (Omarova, 2012; Galati and Moessner, 2010; 
Arora, 2010). Langevoort (2012) contends that “sophisticated financial actors from both 
buy and sell side” continued to transact despite the awareness of risks within the 
portfolios – “a manifestation of agency cost and moral hazard” (p. 498). There is also 
now a spotlight in accounting research on the financial reporting rules over off balance 
sheet structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and the consulting services offered by 
some of the international accounting firms in the lead up to the crisis (Arnold, 2009). 
These discussions of ‘lack of understanding’ correlate with the issue of how financial 
service firms should implement effective compliance strategies to deal with new and 
improved regulation that is being proposed following the crisis. 
Following the financial crisis, Braithwaite (2010) revisited his founding work (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992). He summarised and reformulated the model under nine principles. 
He commented on reactions to responsive regulation approaches whereby some 
criticism on its complexity had been levelled from some scholars, and counter argued 
that the principles of responsive regulation should be likened to “good parenting” 
describing responsive regulation as a “natural social process”. To summarise, the nine 
principles under responsive regulation were re-clarified as: “Think in context; Listen 
actively; Engage those who resist fairness (whilst showing respect); Praise those who 
show commitment; Signal preference to achieve outcomes via support and education, 
to build capacity; Signal (but not threaten) a range of sanctions which you can escalate; 
Network pyramidal governance by engaging wider networks of partners (as you move 
up the pyramid); Elicit active responsibility; Learn, and communicate lessons learned.” 
(p. 476). This work reinforces the importance of the relational elements and 
communication, between regulator and the regulated. 
As discussed earlier in Section 3.3, the responsive regulation model is widely cited and 
there is ongoing critique within the literature between Ford (2013) who calls for 
technological strategies, and Braithwaite (2013) who calls for relational strategies to 
resolve “scalability challenges”51 in regulation (Braithwaite and Hong, 2015, p. 25). An 
                                               
51 Whereby, effectiveness of regulation and monitoring are impacted by size and complexity of the 
industry i.e. relationships between the regulator and the regulated become more difficult with size. Ford 
(2013) defines scalability as a “measure of whether and how well a regulatory strategy operates in 
environments characterized by greater levels of logistical complexity, workload, and scope” (Ford, 2013, 
p. 17). 
  
79 
 
alternative suggestion of “regulatory ambassadors” is offered, in which the relationship 
between ambassadors and the firm is likened to “meeting diplomats”.  
Omarova (2012) introduced a new model of the “Public Interest Council” which draws 
on the ideas of tripartism from the original Ayres and Braithwaite models for regulation 
(and the ideas of Public Interest Groups, or PIGs). The ideas were set out for the US, 
but the theory was considered transferable to other financial service regimes. The 
Public Interest Council’s main function would be to impose structural checks on 
regulatory capture and to diffuse the industries power to control the regulatory agenda 
by maintaining constant and intense public scrutiny (Omarova, 2012). The author was 
critical of the Dodd Frank Act (see also Section 2.3), and stated “the act does not 
directly address the issue of regulatory capture and agencies failure to act in a 
publically minded manner” (p. 631). This work echoes ideas put forward by Levine 
(2012), who calls for a “Sentinel”, an institution which would be politically independent 
and independent of the financial markets. The Sentinel would need to be expertly 
staffed with a “coordinated team of well-informed financial economists, lawyers, 
accountants, regulators and individuals with private sector experience” (p. 41). 
Omarova refers to Levine’s proposed solution of the Sentinel, and considers that this 
falls short of a “truly tripartite approach”, and the “mission of guarding the public 
interest against captured or corrupt regulatory agencies would become entrusted to yet 
another agency” (p. 638). 
Although not related specifically to the financial crisis, one area of concern for 
practitioners globally is that of Suspicious Activity Reporting. The normative and ethical 
approach to regulation is considered by Ryder and Turksen (2014) in relation to 
regulatory response following the terrorist attacks in the US in 2001. They discuss that 
whilst ethical approaches to regulation may not be seen as “salient to some”, the 
importance of “enlightened moral judgements” is essential to support “sustainable, 
legitimate and ultimately effective counter terrorism strategy” (p. 6). Ryder and Turksen 
(2014) argue that despite changes to legislation, there is limited evidence “that the 
‘international’ response to 9/11 is working” (p. 43). The additional burden52 of such 
regulation (and the knee-jerk reactions of policy makers and regulators to crisis) 
impacts the compliance officer’s role directly. The same argument could be applied to 
new legislation (and whether it is ‘working’) following the most recent financial crisis, 
                                               
52 In an earlier paper, Ryder (2008) highlighted the British Banking Associations claim of AML 
compliance costs approximating to £250 million each year. 
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and whether anything has been achieved by new regulatory requirements and banking 
reform. 
Other authors also try to develop existing regulatory models further, following the crisis. 
Baldwin and Black (2008) comment on a number of the academic models of regulation: 
responsive regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992), smart regulation (Gunningham, 
Grabosky and Sinclair, 1998) and risk based regulation (Hampton’s 2005 Report). The 
authors offer criticism of these models (notably on the practical problems faced by 
regulators i.e. resource constraint, unclear objectives, changes in regulatory 
landscape), and suggest an alternative “really responsive regulation” which they apply 
to the UK Environmental and Fisheries control. Under a really responsive framework 
the regulators are: 
“to be really responsive regulators have to be responsive not only to the 
compliance performance of the regulatee, but in five further ways: to the firm’s 
own operating and cognitive frameworks (their attitudinal settings); to the 
broader institutional environment of the regulatory regime; to the different logics 
of regulatory tools and strategies; to the regime’s own performance; and finally 
to changes in each of these elements” (p. 61) 
Trying to draw the literature together, Gilad (2010) discusses regulatory approaches 
that she considered to be “one family of process orientated regulation” (p. 485), and 
which had been labelled separately by various scholars in recent literature “system 
based regulation”, “enforced self-regulation” (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992), 
“management based regulation” (Coglianese and Lazer, 2003), “principle based 
regulation” (Ford, 2008) and “meta regulation (Parker, 2002)” (p. 488). Meta regulation 
is an approach proposed to hold the regulatee and regulator accountable for 
continuous improvements in regulation, and compliance, through a learning orientated 
approach to regulation. A useful comparison of meta-regulation (as a subset of process 
orientated regulation) is made with prescriptive regulation and also outcome orientated 
regulation, and is provided in tabular form. An important observation is made that “real 
life regulatory regimes” are likely to combine more than one regulatory model in their 
approach, and provided the example of the British financial regulation regime whereby 
“outcome orientated regulation stipulates firms to provide retail customers with suitable 
investment advice, while prescriptive rules detail the type of information and documents 
that firms should provide to clients” (Gilad, 2010, p. 489). In a review of the literature, 
and empirical examples provided the conclusion as drawn that “current research, 
although limited and inconclusive, indicates that process orientated regulation 
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institutions tend to have a positive, albeit highly varied, impact on the fulfilment of 
regulatory objectives” (Gilad, 2010, p. 502). There are calls for further research to 
investigate whether meta regulatory approach can support organisation capacity 
building.  
There has also been some empirical research performed to support new models. 
Klomp and Haan (2012) applied principal component analysis to examine the impact of 
bank regulation and supervision on bank fragility. They comment that prior research 
had provided mixed results on effectiveness of bank regulation and supervision in 
reducing banking risk. They concluded that supervisory control, capital regulation and 
market entry regulation had significant effects on capital and asset risk. Further, they 
found supervisory control on activity restrictions, private monitoring, market entry 
restrictions and liquidity had a significant effect on liquidity and market risk. 
Using research questions of why did nobody notice the financial crisis, and what were 
the causes? Cabral (2012) proposes a quantitative model, based on the development 
of an “Industrial Organisation” type banking model. The paper concludes that as a 
result of the combined changes to the regulatory framework for capital requirements 
(Dodd Frank Act, Basel III, and existing policy of the FDIC Improvement Act) that the 
US regulatory framework will be more robust than imposing BASEL III alone. 
Therefore, this paper is limited due to its focus towards the US market and the impacts 
thereon, rather than considering the effects of international regulatory requirements (or 
indeed, the impact of the focus of this study, UK compliance officers facing these 
international standards). 
Ongoing empirical evidence into trust in financial services is presented by Devlin 
(2014), with data collection on a six monthly cycle from 2009 onwards. Measures on 
trust are presented in a series of waves, with indications of improved overall “trust 
ratings” since 2013. The author contends that “fading memories” of the financial crisis 
account for the results. However, this evidence contrasts with evidence provided in 
publications issued by the FCA relating to ongoing scandals relating to culture within 
the sector (FCA, 2013; FCA, 2014). 
As can be seen from these papers there is wide commentary on the broad regulatory 
initiatives in place by national and international regulatory bodies (from both an 
academic and practical literature base). However, Llewellyn et al. (2014) contend that 
trust is still lacking, despite the ongoing focus on regulatory and prudential reforms in 
response to the crisis. To counter the lack of trust, the banking sector needs to fulfil the 
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distinctive needs of customers. Reference to virtue theory53 and “advocating more 
virtue” within the sector is proposed (p. 6) to ensure the “long term prosperity of 
customers”. The authors contend through improvements to internal governance 
(professionalism and ethics), competition (customer led and directed), and market 
diversity (through range of business models), the banking sector may become more 
“virtuous”. Racelis (2014, p. 29) adds to this argument, with survey research indicating 
attributes of; honest and competence, kind-heartedness, self-confidence, 
innovativeness, ambition and security as essential virtues for the financial service 
sector to move forward following the crisis. However, compliance officers may argue 
that they have been working towards this virtuous purpose previously, and ultimately 
they are inhibited by conflicting motivations to comply i.e. economic, in competition with 
normative aspects within the firms they serve. Graafland and Ven (2011) earlier 
commented on this whereby: 
“a renewed sense of virtues in the financial sector alone will not be sufficient to 
restore the internal goods in financial sector. Institutional changes will also be 
needed to allow banks to put their mission into practice” (p. 616) 
A further discussion of motivations for compliance and compliance culture is presented 
in Section 4.3.1. 
Given the evident interest in the regulatory cycle within the academic literature and the 
regulatory body’s commissioned reports both preceding and following the financial 
crisis, this highlights a potential research question with regard to compliance functions 
within financial service sector. In an environment where “regulatory structures have 
been flexed and reformed with little rationale for one method or another” (Harvey and 
Bosworth, 2013, p. 2), it is unclear how compliance officers are supposed to make 
strategic decisions over compliance approaches. It is not obvious whether compliance 
officers and management would proactively monitor the regulatory cycle when 
strategizing compliance functionality within the organisation. Research objective 
1/research question 1 emerged from this discussion. The identified gap is summarised 
in Table 5 at the end of this Chapter. 
 
                                               
53 An interrogation of Google Scholar (under search terms “virtue theory" and "regulation" and "financial 
services") indicated only a limited number of other authors have considered this topic under the lens of 
virtue theory (82 references as at 28 July 2015). More general discussion of ethics has been applied by 
other academics as discussed in Section 4.3.1. 
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Objective 1 -To understand the motives for regulatory compliance by banks 
RQ1 To what extent does the regulatory cycle influence managements’ decision 
making over compliance approach 
Although there is an abundance of academic critiques and ‘solutions’ in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis, there seems to be little empirical evidence for alternative 
approaches to regulation.  
3.5 Cost benefit analysis (CBA) and cost of compliance reviews 
A review of the literature around regulation and compliance would not be complete, 
without due consideration of the costs and benefits of regulatory compliance. Despite a 
wealth of general commentary on cost of regulation and compliance by scholars, there 
appears to be limited empirical evidence within academic literature available on cost 
benefit analysis in relation to financial service regulation and compliance. Attempts 
have been made more recently in the US literature to reopen cost benefit arguments 
(Sunstein, 2015; Coates and John, 2014), with a critique that case study research 
“show that precise, reliable, quantified CBA remains unfeasible” (Coates and John, 
2014). The lack of empirical evidence may indicate the complexity in measuring both 
the costs of regulation and compliance, and the benefits of regulation. There is also on-
going criticism of the cost of regulation and compliance in more commercial literature. 
For example Green (2005) commented that the “immeasurable costs are the 
opportunities that are lost because management is worrying about compliance and not 
running the business” (p. 41). Therefore, regardless of its complexities, this appears to 
be an area meriting future academic research, due to the ever present interest by 
practitioners in cost analysis. 
3.5.1 Cost benefit analysis  
Using “cost benefit analysis” and “financial services” and “compliance” as keywords 
yields many potential articles within broader literature searches54. However, on further 
review, many of these articles are not related to financial services, or have not been 
subject to peer review. There are two older academic articles which specifically review 
cost benefit analysis in relation to UK financial services. Alfon and Andrews (1993) 
consider cost benefit analysis (CBA) essential to review whether the benefits of 
regulation are proportionate to their burden, and that regulation does not undermine 
innovation and impede competition unnecessarily. They conclude that the main 
                                               
54 As an example 6,390 plus recorded in Google Scholar in June 2015. 
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problem with CBA is lack of data, which is partly as a result of difficulties in 
identification of incremental compliance costs. 
Franks, Schaefer and Staunton (1998) review costs in their study (via mixed method 
analysis) and concluded that the direct cost of regulation were substantially higher than 
predicted at the time of the Financial Services Act. However, they also concluded that 
direct costs of regulation for the “securities and derivative trading and broking sectors 
are substantially lower for the UK, than the US and France” (p. 1547). They also 
commented on the “dearth of studies” which reviewed the benefits of regulation, in light 
of the significant costs imposed by regulation in the financial service sector.  
More recently, Coates and John (2014) and Sunstein (2015) have reopened arguments 
in the academics literature on financial services regulation (from a US perspective). 
Coates and John (2014) reviews a number of cases (including Sarbanes Oxley, SEC 
reforms and BASEL III impacts) and argues that:  
“the capacity of anyone – including financial regulatory agencies, OIRA, 
academic researchers, CBA/FR proponents, litigators or courts – to conduct 
quantified CBA/FR with any real precision or confidence does not exist for 
important representative types of financial regulation” (Coates and John, 2014, 
p. 89)   
This indicates that ‘guesstimated’ CBA is performed, and this is not a desirable 
underpinning to policy setting. Whilst arguments are provided as to why cost benefit 
analysis is complex (including the macro impacts on the economy and the “non 
stationary” relationships in the sector), Coates and John (2014) does not offer solutions 
to the issue. Sunstein (2015) critiques the review by Coates and John, and argue that 
despite “knowledge problems” within the domain, that there is no reason that CBA 
should be dismissed or ignored within financial service regulation. Instead the financial 
regulators are encouraged to perform and publish CBA with caveats, and in the 
absence of important information breakeven analysis should be performed (Sunstein, 
2015, p. 279).  
3.5.2 Compliance costs 
Irrespective of CBA performed at governmental level, prior to implementation of new 
regulation, the majority of organisations are more interested in understanding the costs 
to their own business of complying with regulation. Therefore, this area of research 
provides a stream of academic research which has direct links to practitioners’ 
immediate concerns to understand the cost of compliance. Elliehausen (1998) 
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reviewed a number of studies on cost of regulation in banking. The article concluded 
that the majority of costs are related to labour i.e. the amount of time spent by bank 
officers and managers on compliance related activities. This is supported by other 
academics (Bamberger, 2010). The observation was made that small banks have cost 
disadvantages compared to larger banks, and this may discourage market entry of new 
firms into the banking sector. In addition the article concluded that “frequent minor 
revisions to regulation might be more costly to banks than making infrequent major 
revisions” (p. 452). Garcia (2004) discussed IT spending and challenges faced by 
financial institutions to comply with regulations. The author contended that an analysis 
of total IT spending on compliance is not a “tangible or purposeful metric” for strategic 
planning, and those executives should take the opportunity to strike a balance between 
immediate tactical results of compliance and longer term strategic values of business 
improvement. The attitude of some executives of “close your eyes and pay up” without 
giving thought to the longer term strategic values and opportunities to create business 
value is criticised (Garcia, 2004). Krause (2008) also discuss the issues faced by global 
business in light of a “bewildering tide of new regulation”. They argue, however, that in 
choosing the right management software, management can benefit from improved 
performance throughout the organisation. This of course requires careful balance of 
strategic vision and cost awareness. 
Interview data has been presented as empirical data within a number of papers. A 
mixture of representatives from the FSA and the banking sector discussed the “cost of 
compliance” (Goodhart, 2004). There was some apparent difference in opinion even 
within this small group over the question of whether it is possible for firms to benefit 
significantly from being able to demonstrate compliance excellence. Comments from 
the participants ranged from “if you’re above the minimum standard, I don’t believe it 
makes much difference at the moment” to “questions do get asked about compliance 
and customers take a lot of comfort form knowing that you have a robust compliance 
system” (Goodhart, 2004, p. 30). 
The method of interviewing compliance staff and the regulatory body was also adopted 
by Harvey (2004), who defined costs of compliance as the “tangible operational costs 
that relate to investments that institutions make in the form of physical and human 
capital required to perform the compliance function” (p. 335). The benefits of 
compliance were defined as costs that are otherwise avoided, so avoidance of 
penalties imposed by regulators for non-compliance, and the intangible benefits to 
reputation (loss of reputation results in direct costs via loss of income, indirect costs via 
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loss of custom, or legal costs, and opportunity costs via foregone opportunities). This 
study reviewed and commented on the views of costs and benefits of compliance 
within UK financial institutions (focused on money laundering compliance costs). In 
conclusion the author called for further research, and proposed a full cost benefit study. 
A case study approach (using methodology of analogy cost estimation) was adopted by 
Sathye (2008) to estimate costs of compliance for AMLCTF Regulation (Anti Money 
Laundering and Counter Terrorism Funding) in Australian financial institutions. The 
author compared the results to other studies, and concluded that the cost of 
compliance “per capita” was significant, and could affect the overall competitiveness of 
Australian institutions due to the small size of the economy in terms of population. The 
author considered their methodology to be transferable to other jurisdictions. 
3.5.3 Commercial research 
In addition to academic research in the area of compliance costs, there has also been 
specific research performed by ‘commercial’ researchers (which has been directed 
specifically at an audience of practitioners). This research contributes to the overall 
literature (as although not specifically academic within the articles that follow, the 
methods employed have been justified in the same way that one would expect from 
academic research). In addition, these reports have been commissioned and paid for 
by the industry, which reflects the ongoing concern of this topic to practitioners. 
The FSA released a briefing note in 2006 announcing the release of the “Cost of 
regulation report” undertaken by Deloitte, and “The benefits of regulation” report 
undertaken by Oxera Consulting. The purpose of the Deloitte report was to examine 
the incremental costs attributable to individual FSA rules by firms over three sectors.  A 
major conclusion of the report was highlighted as “much of what regulation requires is 
in fact regarded by firms as good business practice” (p. 1), whilst the highest 
incremental costs were the direct fees collected by the FSA. The purpose of the Oxera 
report was to set out a framework for identifying and measuring the benefits of 
regulation. 
The Deloitte (2006) report explains the sampling and methodology employed very 
clearly, whilst highlighting the difficulties in the review. This method could be adapted 
and employed in future similar studies by academics. One of the major findings was 
that across all three sectors the direct FSMA related fees, collected by the FSA 
(comprising levies funding the FSA, the Financial Ombudsman services and the 
Financial Services Compensation Scheme), were the highest incremental cost. The 
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report was clear that the estimated incremental costs of regulation differed markedly 
between firms (even within the same sector) and the report attributed this to different 
views of firms about what activities are deemed to be incremental, and also the 
different view of firms as to what constitutes acceptable compliance. 
The Oxera report (2006, p. 1) sought a framework to establish “What to measure?” and 
“How to measure?” when assessing the benefits of financial regulation. The report 
commented that although there was a significant body of literature on regulatory impact 
assessment and cost benefit analysis available for review, the existing studies did not 
provide “a comprehensive overview of the dimensions of benefits that regulation may 
be delivering, or contain little discussion of how different types of potential benefits can 
be measured” (p. 1). The report provides a number of diagrammatic summaries of 
concepts, including a summary of relevant measures for each dimension of market 
outcomes that should be examined in the measurement exercise, as well as the main 
empirical approaches available for quantifying impact of the regulation. The 
observation was made that “benefit measurement should aim to directly quantify 
improvements in market outcomes that flow from regulation or specific rules” (p. 30). 
The report also recognised the difficulty in practice of direct measurement, and, 
consequently, sometimes indirect measurement (benefits evaluated indirectly by 
identifying and measuring suitable proxies) are a necessary alternative. 
As discussed earlier in Section 2.3.1, Thomson Reuters has also recently undertaken 
survey research on costs of compliance (English and Hammond, 2012; English and 
Hammond, 2015). The results of these publications highlight “red flags for the future of 
regulated firms, and their compliance officer” (English and Hammond, 2015, p. 19). The 
most recent survey concluded that there appears to be a gap between the “current 
compliance challenges” and the “compliance budgets and availability of skilled 
resources” (English and Hammond, 2015, p. 19).  
Whilst a dearth of academic literature exists around this topic (perhaps due to access 
issues to data), the area of cost/benefit continues to be an area of concern for 
practitioners. More recently in the media, practitioners have raised concerns on the 
rising costs of regulation (in light of a six per cent increase in fees by FCA during 
2015). Quoting Mr Richards of the Personal Finance Society: 
“Regulatory fines were originally intended to influence behaviours and ultimately 
help fund regulation. They should also be providing a dividend for the most 
compliant, who should pay the least.” (Fantano, 2015) 
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This statement raises a number of questions, including the difficulties in measurement 
(and rewarding) compliant behaviour (which is discussed further in Section 4.3.2). 
A potential area to research further would be the extent to which internal compliance 
officers monitor cost of complying with regulation, and whether there is any adoption of 
cost benefit analysis internally when assessing compliance strategy to emerging 
regulation. As costs of compliance are generally considered to be difficult to quantify, 
this would form an area for future research following completion of this thesis, as this 
question falls outside the overall research objectives. 
3.6 Chapter summary 
As evidenced within this element of the literature review, a diverse range of scholars 
contribute to the regulatory literature. However, much of this literature has been written 
from the perspective of the regulators themselves, and from the perspectives of 
societal need, rather than the implications on those trying to comply. Much of the 
literature is fairly conceptual, with only limited empirical evidence offered to support 
regulatory models. This is most likely a reflection of the diversity in regulatory fields and 
regimes across different jurisdictions. 
It should be noted that the literature on cost/benefit has also been included in this 
review, although this does not then lead to any specific research questions for this 
thesis. The reason for inclusion is to acknowledge the wide range of literature in this 
domain, and also to link into practitioner concerns over compliance costs during the 
resulting interviews (discussed in the Methodology, Chapter 6). Indeed the overarching 
supplied construct that was discussed with participants when considering their 
compliance experiences, was whether ‘cost or benefits’ were incurred (when 
comparing personal constructs around the participants experiences). 
An initial summary of the regulatory literature gap is summarised in Table 5. Further 
discussion of the specific gaps, and links to the research objectives and questions is 
presented in Section 5.4.    
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Table 5 Summary of regulatory literature review and associated gap, with link to research objective and research question 
Literature review Section Discussed Authors calls/criticisms Remaining gap Research objective Research 
question/Potential 
future RQ 
Regulation Section 3.3/Section 
3.4.3 Contemporary 
models/Evolution of 
regulatory theories 
Proposals for alternative 
regulatory structure: 
coherence (Arora, 2010); 
responsive 
regulation/enforced self-
regulation/meta regulation 
(Ford, 2011; Braithwaite, 
2010, Gilad, 2010); Public 
interest council/Sentinel 
(Omarova, 2012; Levine, 
2012). 
Limited empirical 
evidence/research 
performed to test 
regulatory models. 
No research to review 
‘compliance strategy’ 
to deal with regulatory 
cycle. 
Objective 1: To 
understand the 
motives for regulatory 
compliance by retail 
banks. 
RQ 1: To what extent 
does the regulatory 
cycle influence 
management decision 
making over compliance 
approach? 
Compliance costs Section 3.5 Cost 
benefit analysis and 
cost of compliance 
reviews 
Empirical academic 
reviews 1993/1998/2008. 
Empirical practice based 
reviews 2006. 
Limited recent 
empirical research 
over compliance 
costs. 
Outside the research 
objectives of this 
thesis. 
Future RQ
55
: To what 
extent do compliance 
officers monitor cost of 
compliance? (Future 
research as ultimately 
cannot be answered in 
timeframe/methodology 
chosen). 
 
 
                                               
55 For clarity, although this area is seen as a gap within the literature, this research question will be reserved for future research into the topic. This is seen to as a question that sits 
outside the overall objectives of this thesis and cannot be explored under the chosen research method. 
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Chapter 4 Literature review – What is compliance? 
The use of the word compliance in academic literature is widespread. However, the 
concept of the compliance function receives more limited attention by academics. 
During the course of the literature review it became clear that the compliance function 
has a number of input factors, namely regulations (to which it must comply), 
compliance tools, and theoretical and practical models (of how to comply). The outputs 
(and effectiveness) of the compliance function are viewed (from a personal and 
practical perspective) to be influenced by the organisational factors including attributes 
of compliance staffing; culture, governance and relationships; and ultimately the 
amounts that management are willing to invest within the compliance function. A mind 
map to summarise the related compliance literature is presented in Figure 8. 
Figure 8 Author developed mind map of compliance literature 
Practicalities of 
compliance 
(new regulations, and 
role attributes) 
Compliance models and 
IT tooling 
 
Outputs of compliance 
(compliance culture and 
effectiveness) 
 
Regulations 
FSMA 
Basel II/III 
MiFID 
Proposed FATCA 
- Impact of new regulation 
(Gebhardt and Novotny-
Farkas, Hussein and 
Hussan) 
- Regulatory approaches 
(Hutter) 
 
Models 
- Jackman (value and 
culture, compliance 
competence model) 
- Woods (partnership/ethics 
framework) 
- Edwards and Wolfe 
(combined partnership and 
culture model) 
- Malloy (deterrence and 
normative model) 
- Crump (active and 
passive compliance) 
- Calcott (cosmetic 
compliance) 
- Rossi (centralised model) 
- Carter (CSA) 
- Barraquier’s ethical vs 
perceived profitability 
 
Culture and Governance 
and Relationship 
- management tone 
- Relationship with 
auditors, 
- Relationship with 
regulators 
- Relationship with 
consultants 
 
Compliance Officer 
Attributes 
-skill set 
-authority 
-independence 
(Taylor, Stoneman, Gable, 
Somerville, SEC 
Commissioner speech) 
 
Key Outputs (SIA Report) 
-advisory, policy and 
procedures, education, 
monitoring and 
surveillance, licensing, 
culture 
 
Tools 
- Mainelli and Yeandle 
(pilot Phophezy) 
- Doyle 
- Bamberger 
 
Effectiveness 
- Edwards and Wolfe 
- Demirgic-Kunt & 
Detragiache 
 
Compliance cost and benefit literature (outside scope of research questions) 
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In Section 4.1, the history of how the compliance function has developed in recent 
years is reviewed. This is further developed in Section 4.2 where the attributes of 
compliance officers and the role of chief compliance officers are discussed. In Section 
4.3 the literature relating to compliance models, measuring compliance effectiveness, 
compliance approaches to new regulation, and compliance tooling is reviewed. Finally 
consideration of ‘why management comply’ is presented in Section 4.4. 
4.1 The role of compliance 
Hutter (1997) considered that compliance with regulatory legislation should be 
regarded as a much as process as an event. As regulation has evolved in practice, and 
has become more complex, so too has compliance and thus the role of the compliance 
officer. Parker (2000) discusses the growth in employment of “specialist compliance 
professionals”, to advise organisations on regulatory and ethics programs. Edwards 
and Wolfe (2005), state that “compliance is core to the operation and wellbeing of the 
financial service sector and the consumer” (p. 49). This supports, Barry’s (2002) earlier 
argument in that an essential attribute to maintaining an ethics and compliance culture 
is “a shared set of values and standards” (p. 39). Therefore, the central role of 
compliance and the importance of ethics were apparent within the literature prior to the 
financial crisis. Hardouin (2011), comment that dimensions of “regulatory quality and 
government effectiveness are also critical to the quality of compliance” (p. 152). 
A discussion document by the Securities Industry Association (SIA, 2005) also looks at 
the role of compliance in organisations, and consider the primary role of the 
compliance function is to; identify problems, deter misconduct, and potentially reduce 
penalties and liabilities in the event that wrongdoing has occurred. They recognise 
whilst ultimate responsibility remains with management to comply with laws and 
regulation; there is a reliance on the compliance function to play an “integral support 
role in helping management to address the problems and develop remediation plans” 
(p. 9). The report proposes a comprehensive listing of typical compliance activities, 
which is fairly generic, including: advisory capacity; policy and procedures; 
education/training; monitoring and surveillance; business unit compliance reviews; 
centralised compliance function (control room function/anti money laundering 
programme function); licensing, registration and employment related functions; internal 
inquiries and investigation; regulatory examinations, reporting and investigation; 
fostering regulatory relationships; promoting a culture of compliance; programme 
assessment; chaperoning (SIA, 2005, Section B, p. 6). The core compliance tasks are 
also confirmed by Taylor (2005) who reviewed the evolution of compliance, and 
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comments on the increasing cost of compliance, due to extension of regulations such 
as MiFID (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive). These papers act as a 
background summary to the concepts of compliance within an organisation. However, 
they are not ‘traditional’ academic articles and as such this is representative of wider 
issues within the compliance literature.  
Much of the literature is practitioner focused, indicating a lack of academic influence or 
specific empirical research into the compliance function. This may well be due to the 
difficulties in accessing compliance functions (a phenomena which has been 
experienced during the course of completing this thesis); or indeed it may indicate a 
lack of generalisability which is possible across different compliance sectors (due to 
complexities in individual regulated sectors). 
4.2 Qualified officers and the responsibilities of the chief compliance 
officer 
“Good self-regulation professionals should see themselves both as citizens of 
the corporation and as citizens of a broader ethical community of compliance 
professionals, regulators and stakeholder” (Parker, 2002, p. 195) 
The role of compliance officers has become more prominent in recent years, with 
attractive benefit packages being provided by employers. This means that compliance 
officers can be recruited direct from university, or recruited from other professions such 
as legal or accounting (Taylor, 2005; Stoneman, 2005). However, there does not 
appear to be a clearly recognised professional body56 for compliance officers at present 
(in the UK) and no specific examinations need to be taken to act as a compliance 
officer (Taylor, 2005). Nevertheless, there are a number of organisations which bring 
professional compliance officers together and advise on suitable learning and 
networking opportunities (for example Professional Risk Managers International 
Association – PRMIA, the International Compliance Association – ICA, and the 
Chartered Institute for Securities and Investment - CISI). In a recent 
regulators/governments report, they also discuss this issue of “financial market 
qualification”57 with a comparison to the US examination and CPD requirements (HM 
Treasury, Bank of England, FCA, 2015, p. 68). However, the comment of the report 
(which is specific to the Fixed Income, Currency and Commodities (FICC) markets) is 
that: 
                                               
56 Although there are ‘trade bodies’ of compliance consultants which are endorsed by the FCA (for 
example, the APCC, see http://www.apcc.org.uk), these are pre-dominantly directed towards compliance 
officers providing consulting services. 
57 Note the proposals for qualification were not compliance specific. 
  
93 
 
“One option is for regulatory authorities to impose training and qualification 
requirements on FICC market participants, as is currently the case for certain 
retail market activities. However, the diversity of FICC markets means it would 
be challenging for a regulator to apply and maintain a qualifications framework 
that was appropriately calibrated to the range of different roles that FICC market 
participants perform.” (HM Treasury, Bank of England, FCA, 2015, p. 67) 
This quote represents the difficulties in application and maintenance of examination 
and CPD requirements from a regulatory viewpoint. Therefore, this would stress the 
need for this oversight to remain at a professional body/or community of practice level 
(similar to the way in which chartered accountants are regulated via the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW), or equivalent professional 
membership, under the umbrella of the regulator the Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC)). 
There are also other resources available to compliance officers. A simple interrogation 
of the internet, found the “Compliance Exchange” website58 which was started in 1995 
and is edited and compiled by an individual, to provide an online research facility for 
compliance officers, directors and those who study, service or regulate financial 
services in the UK. However, it must be noted that this website is offered by those with 
a vested interest in consulting. Another similar website is the “Compliance 
Consortium”59 website which brings together consultants with financial service industry 
experience, offering advice on ‘compliance headaches’. This service promotes itself as 
being members of the Association of Professional Compliance Consultants (as a 
professional body recognised by the FCA) and “The Compliance Institute”. Again this 
service is provided by consultants, and it could be argued that these sites are primarily 
to market their own expertise and services. 
The literature acknowledges the broad skill base required by compliance officers 
(Taylor, 2005; Stoneman, 2005, Gable, 2005). Taylor (2005) reviewed the roles and 
responsibilities of compliance officers and commented that “mere technical knowledge 
is not sufficient in a modern compliance role” (p. 56). Stoneman (2005) discusses the 
“modern compliance officer” in a more commercial article, but makes some 
fundamental points including the difficulties that bankers now face in light of the “torrent 
of information” that is available from regulators. The observation is made that due to 
                                               
58 See http://www.compliance-exchange.com/ accessed initially during 2012, and available December 
2015. 
59 See http://www.complianceconsortium.co.uk/ accessed initially during 2012, and available December 
2015. 
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the apparent increase in regulation, management are led to rely on compliance 
consultants who are “typically former bankers or former examiners”, to aid them with 
interpreting regulation, writing and developing policies and procedures, and then 
following the established procedures. 
Compliance officers often have a diverse background (Gable, 2005). Compliance 
officers tend to be recruited from the legal and accounting communities, although 
specialist education in compliance and compliance qualification is emerging given the 
specialist nature of the role of compliance officers. Haynes (2005) is critical of the 
overlaps of roles in some organisations, arguing that roles of “risk management” and 
“risk based compliance” (and other control functions) should not be blurred (p. 150). 
Langevoort (2012) broadly discusses the role of in house lawyers and their relationship 
to chief compliance and chief ethics officers, within financial service organisations. The 
difficulties of knowledge management, where complex information is too “diffused 
throughout the organisation” (p. 508) adds increased complexities to these roles. 
Questions are raised within the article over the complex issues faced by these roles, 
asking for further research into the career progression of chief legal officers and their 
suitability to combine roles of ethics and compliance (p. 518).  
The focus and links between ethics and compliance is not a new phenomenon. Within 
her 2002 speech, the then SEC Commissioner Cynthia Glassman suggested that 
although not specifically required, she thought it was essential nonetheless: 
“A company should have an officer with ownership of corporate compliance 
and ethics issues” (SEC, 2002) 
The speech clearly states the importance of the Chief Compliance Officers whilst also 
highlighting the importance of: sufficient seniority and authority; full support of CEO, 
ability to report directly to the board, and sufficient time and resource to implements 
corporate responsibility programme. Haynes (2005) also argues these points, claiming 
that “the compliance function can only operate effectively” if compliance personnel are 
suitably senior; can act independently; and have access to senior management (p. 
154). There are also links to be made between the roles of compliance officers with the 
recent focus on accountability by the regulator (which is discussed further in Section 
8.3.4). 
Despite a number of blogs and commercial articles on the roles and responsibilities of 
Chief Compliance Officers (Volkov, 2012; Reichert, 2011; Somerville, 2010; Stoneman, 
2005), there appears to be a dearth of academic literature in this area. Somerville 
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(2010) comments on the “origin” of the chief compliance officer, as fuelled by the 
savings and loans crisis of the 1980s, and also attributes management buy in to 
compliance with reference to comments on the speech by the SEC commissioner in 
2002. An astute comment is made in this short article of “the CCO has to come to the 
position with knowledge acquired performing senior roles within the industry. You have 
to know what the secrets are before looking for where they are buried” (Somerville, 
2010, p. 1). This endorses the theoretical model of seniority and authority required by 
the role. Hoffman (2010), in a short article, also comments on the “great strides” in 
business ethics in recent history, whilst also reviewing the limitations. This article 
comments specifically on the “Corporate Ethics Officer” role (and the restrictions of the 
role), whilst also likening this to the role of the chief compliance officer in mutual funds 
in the US. The role of a corporate ethics officer is not well advertised in the UK, so the 
argument can be made that this also falls under the remit of the chief compliance 
officer (supporting the model proposed by Jackman in 2001 and 2002 which is 
discussed in the following Section 4.3.1). 
Given the broad roles and responsibilities a number of questions arise over what 
constitutes the most effective qualified officers for compliance: academic background 
(legal, finance or other) and whether this role should be professionalised. There 
appears a gap in the literature reviewing this area. As a result, it would be interesting to 
review a sample of job specifications and CVs of compliance officers to see how these 
vary across a nature of financial institutions, to conclude if there are any patterns or 
models to be seen (although, this will be restricted to future research as this falls 
outside the scope of the research objectives). 
4.3 Compliance approaches, methods and tools 
The challenges which face those with research interests in regulatory compliance are 
highlighted by Parker and Nielson (2009). They contend that there are two streams of 
research performed in the area. The first stream focuses on social construction, to 
“create understanding of compliance, and on the power relations between the actors 
involved” (p. 50). The second stream uses “predefined” understandings of compliance 
and purports to “explain what causes compliance (as predefined), or what effect 
compliance (as predefined) has” (p. 50). Irrespective of which ‘stream’ the research is 
categorised60, it is argued that the ultimate purpose of such research is to enable an 
                                               
60 As elaborated within the research methodology and analysis developed in the following chapters, it 
may be argued that this thesis is actually a blend of these two streams. The focus within the resulting 
conceptual model is around relational element (or power relations between actors), whilst also 
contributing to the discussion of what causes (or creates barriers) to compliance. 
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evaluation of whether individuals or organisations are complying with the regulation, 
and if this then leads to the “substantive goals” of regulation  (Parker and Nielson, 
2009, p. 57). 
4.3.1 Compliance Models 
There is a large body of commercial literature available regarding compliance 
methodology and IT tools, on which practitioners rely to develop their compliance 
approaches. However, there has been thoughtful development of models of 
compliance prepared which would be of benefit to practitioners (Jackman, 2001; 
Parker, 2000; Woods, 2002; Edwards and Wolfe, 2004/5). 
Jackman (2001) raised the question of: Why comply? He discussed the idea of “getting 
by”, and “keeping the regulators happy” proposing that regulators needed to bear some 
responsibility to discourage the “tick box approach”. He contended that as ethical 
behaviour develops, less regulation is required. This supports Parker’s (2000) 
argument that good compliance involves engagement and persuasion within the 
organisation so that the “ethically and legally responsible action is consistent with 
business goals” (p. 345). Jackman (2001) also proposed that regulation is most 
effective when individuals and firms buy into the principles, and, therefore, would be 
committed to delivering good quality service and advice. In order for this to be achieved 
he commented on a commitment to simplicity:  
“It is likely that five rules that matter (and can be understood and 
remembered) are more effective than 50 that confuse” (p. 215) 
This supports earlier statements of Newton (1998, p. xv) who argued that those 
connecting ethics to compliance find this a “substantially more useful guide than a four-
inch-thick rulebook” when applying professional judgement. However, awareness of 
compliance culture is not considered sufficient. Compliance culture may indicate 
adherence with letter of the law rather than the spirit, and, therefore, this would not 
prevent individuals behaving in a manner which avoids the principles of regulations 
(Newton 1998). 
Under Jackman’s model the commitment to training is also vital; with an emphasis on 
ensuring people understand what is expected of them, rather than compliance out of a 
sense of fear or a need to tick boxes. This concept of competence is supported by 
Edwards (2003). The emphasis of working in partnership was highlighted (using the 
FSA as an exemplar, and portrayed within Figure 9).  
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Jackman’s model has limited citations within academic literature, however, it should be 
noted that the model was also discussed within FSA publications due to the relevance 
to practitioners relationship with the regulator (and thus impact is difficult to measure). 
The linear nature of Jackman’s model (describing the relationship and actions of the 
regulator and the firms) has clear links to responsive regulation and Ayres and 
Braithwaite’s (1992) enforcement pyramid (Figure 7). 
Figure 9 A summary of Jackman's model (adapted from Jackman, 2001, p. 213) 
 
Jackman revisits this model in a later paper published by the FSA, to discuss “where 
ethics and regulation meet” (FSA, 2002, p. 8). The author offered the model as a 
framework for the development of values and culture within individual firms, or the 
sector as a whole. The author encouraged individual firms to think proactively about 
“an ethical framework” within the compliance function. The discussion paper sets out a 
number of everyday questions and scenarios to provoke a wider discussion of ethical 
behaviour within financial service firms. Jackman’s model assumed that the concepts 
of business ethics were already embedded within the financial service sector. However, 
many would contend that given the events and causes around the most recent financial 
crisis, that there is still a huge progress to be made in relation to business ethics within 
financial services. The “ethics – free zone business schools” were critiqued following 
the crisis (Davies, 2010, p. 34). Brenkert (2010) also reviewed the progress of business 
ethics and contended: 
“Even if we are certain we know what they should be doing, unless we can 
relate this to how businesses can come to operate in those ways, the 
normative arguments lack power, persuasiveness and effectiveness.” (p. 
709) 
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The support for high ethical standards has more recently been promoted by Mark 
Carney, Governor of the Bank of England (BBC, 2014a). Links to virtue theory61 have 
been made by Llewellyn et al. (2014) reemphasising the ability to understand the spirit 
and not the letter of the law. 
Edwards and Wolfe (2005) refer to the Jackman’s model in their review of compliance. 
They consider the ideas of developing compliance competence and “an appropriate 
ethical culture in partnership between the regulator and the regulated” (p. 52). They 
liken the shift of an over regulatory approach to the more relaxed regulatory style since 
the inception of the FSA to the “regulatory pendulum”, a term attributed to Sparrow 
(2000). They also consider that the regulators need to align their approach to ideas of 
responsive regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992, discussed under Section 3.3.1), 
and mirror the regulatory approach to the specific circumstances of the regulatory issue 
under consideration. Calcott (2010) also reviews the concept of induced self-regulation, 
arguing that firms may implement compliance in a “perfunctory or cosmetic fashion”. 
However, the advantages of firms choosing their own approach is also recognised, 
whereby they can draw on their own experience and reflect on individual circumstances 
to approach compliance.  
Other academics have studied compliance models in relation to organisational 
structure and strategy within the firm. Rossi (2010) looked at the merits of self-
regulation and how the concepts could be embedded within an organisation. The paper 
contends that the value of compliance analysis ex post to implementation of regulation 
is limited, and that compliance should be used to shape strategy (which links back to 
the cost benefit arguments, with concepts presented by Garcia, 2004 presented under 
Section 3.5.2). Prorokowski and Prorokowski (2014), performed semi structured 
interviews in order to explore best practice in the rapidly changing compliance 
landscape, contending that clear structures of accountability within risk ownership 
should be measured against strategy (p. 76). However, these findings also promoted 
the concept of “clear lines of communication” with regulator to avoid sanction, within is 
in line with other studies (which are discussed further in Section 4.4.1). 
The link to an ethical framework put forward by Jackman (2001) and Edwards and 
Wolfe (2005) are echoed in more commercial papers. Duska (2011) discusses the 
conflicts of ethical as opposed to compliant behaviour, and contends that being ethical 
                                               
61 See also previous Section 2.4.2, for a discussion of underpinning theories around personal ethics. 
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and following the law are not the same. Duska quotes Richard Breeden (Chairman of 
SEC) who stated: 
“It is not an adequate ethical standard to aspire to get through the day without 
being indicted” (Duska, 2011; p. 22) 
Harvey and Bosworth-Davies (2013) review the relationship of regulation and ethics in 
their empirical study of regulatory intervention by the FSA. The authors describe 
Jackman’s model as “paternalistic” whereby “guidelines become redundant, as the 
ethics of compliance is embedded within the moral fabric of the regulated organisation” 
(p. 5). Based on their review of cases of regulatory intervention, the authors conclude 
that the “high pressured culture” within the financial sector, produces a “captured model 
of regulatory compliance” where deviant behaviour is often overlooked by both internal 
audit/compliance and regulators, who “steer clear of criminalising fellow employees” 
and inflicting disrepute on the financial service sector (p. 14). In such an environment 
Jackman’s model would fail to offer an appropriate regulatory solution, where 
compliance is seen as a box ticking exercise and a barrier to operations (rather than 
the proposed ethical framework). 
However, other authors concentrate on economic factors, in contrast with normative 
factors to understand compliance models. Checkel suggests the literature is divided 
into two distinct lines: 
“Rationalists emphasize coercion, cost/benefit calculations and material 
incentives, whereas constructivists emphasize social learning, socialization and 
social norms” Checkel (2001) 
Malloy (2003) describes two visions of firms; one of a rational profit maximisers, 
obeying laws and regulations, only when it is in the firms best economic interest, and 
the second where the firm is a law abiding actor who complies in good faith despite 
struggling with increasingly complicated and contradictory laws and regulation. This 
view is supported by Gilad (2011) who contends managers analyse “regulation via a 
prism of costs and gains” whilst appreciating the “commercial and reputational gains 
that can be extracted from effective compliance systems” (p. 310). Gelemerova (2009, 
p. 53) comments on compliance with money laundering regulations, and the difficulties 
in practice of “how to strike a balance between the profit-orientated nature of reporting 
institutions, the need to keep the financial system clean, and the fear of being punished 
by regulators”. Malloy (2003) goes on to discuss models of compliance including the 
deterrence model, and the firm as a rational actor, and the normative model, with the 
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firm as a good faith actor. The article recognises the limitation of the normative model 
and states: 
“proponents of the normative model pay little attention to the role that 
compliance costs play in causing violations…if the costs of complying with 
social norms are greater than the costs of violating, the individual will ignore 
the norm…even a manager driven primarily by normative concerns, will make 
compliance decisions by engaging in instrumental decision making akin to that 
assumed by the deterrence model” (p. 471) 
Malloy’s article, therefore, highlights the importance of cost of compliance in 
consideration of management strategies to compliance. May (2004) presents a similar 
concept in the form of “affirmative motivations” (good intentions and a sense of 
obligation to comply) and “negative motivations” (fear of consequences) when 
reviewing empirical data of compliance with social and environmental regulations. 
Nielsen and Parker (2012) also build on Malloy’s concepts (in an empirical study 
focused on business experience of Australian TPA law). Whilst reviewing the theories 
behind compliance motives they argue that the compliance literature instead identifies 
three “interests of commitments” which motivate compliance behaviour; Economic 
(maximising economic utility), Social (earning approval and respect) and Normative 
(doing the right thing). Nielson and Parker (2012) suggest that each business would be 
holding a “plural of motives” along this basis.  
This develops earlier considerations of “states of compliance culture” summarised as 
“non-compliance, negative or anti compliance, and positive or pro compliance” 
(Jenkinson, 1996, p. 42). Whilst links to normative model and culture can be made (in 
terms of the “law abiding actor”) the complexity of compliance culture is clear. The 
variables of “values, attitude and behaviour” are cited (Jenkinson, 1996). Compliance 
culture reflects the individual firm’s approach to regulation (Alfon, 1996, p. 20), and is 
clearly linked to the strategy and goals of the firms in terms of a positive (best practice) 
or negative “management of regulatory risk” approach. The complexity of the firm’s 
structure is also important with choices of ‘top down’ or ‘bottom up’ to consider 
(Jenkinson, 1996). Morton (2005), comments on the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) emphasis on “culture of compliance”. The observation that 
compliance culture cannot be bought “or taught by a high priced management 
consultant” (p. 60) confirms the complexity of the concept. In addition the difficulties in 
measuring compliance culture are also apparent – despite the provision of the culture 
framework by the SEC, this model clearly failed in the most recent financial crisis. 
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Compliance competence is inextricably linked to culture and a commitment to 
partnership with the regulators (Edwards, 2003). Carretta, Farina and Schwizer (2005) 
contend that language used in documentation can be used to observe and measure 
cultural implications (whilst referencing Schein’s (1985) and DiMaggio’s (1997) 
identification of language as an “artefact” of corporate culture, whereby analysis of 
text/documentation can yield an understanding of culture). Utilising text analysis they 
reviewed “culture compliance” within Italian banking sector and identify significant 
cultural gaps between banks and supervisors, which although pre crisis, also supports 
the importance of alignment between banks and regulators.  
More recently, Kenny (2014) offers qualitative empirical evidence to examine the issue 
of “dependence corruption” within the financial service sectors. Data is presented to 
explore the phenomenon of why societal impact, and “rules and regulation were 
compromised” during the most recent financial crisis. The struggle of compliance 
officers facing dependence corruption (when dealing with regulator and within their own 
firms) conflicts with the literature on partnership models with the regulator (Wood, 
2002; Jackman, 2001). The dependence corruption and relationship models could be 
linked via literature on barriers to compliance, for example, the conflicting balance of 
economic, social and normative aspects discussed by Nielson and Parker (2012). 
There is a range of more practical literature on compliance, which provides linear 
models of minimal, to beyond compliance scales (which echo the linear models set out 
by Jackman/Edwards and Wolfe). Crump (2007) refers to the concept of “passive and 
active” compliance approaches. Passive compliance is considered to be auditor driven, 
reactive to requirements with purpose to seek minimal compliance at minimal expense, 
with no improvement of conduct of business. Active compliance allows for “business 
promotion and transparency, and is intervention focussed, enabling companies to 
remove defects in processes and install automated controls for compliance” (p. 46). 
Links back to the literature discussed under Section 4.2 regarding responsibilities of the 
Chief Compliance Officer can be made, whereby essential to active compliance is 
review of abnormal transactions by an individual “who cares and is held accountable 
for the conduct of business and the success of transactions” (p. 48). This indicates 
rather than a tick box process to resourcing compliance, the staffing and attitudes of 
the compliance function staff outweigh the importance of any model and tools 
available.  
Control Self-Assessment (CSA) techniques are promoted by Carter (2007). Whilst 
commenting on the increasing costs of compliance, he suggests: 
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“Costs associated with internal auditing, external auditing, management, staff 
employees and outside consultants have increased significantly since SOX 
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act) became law62. According to a 2006 study by law firm 
Foley and Lardner LLP, the costs of being a US listed public company with 
annual revenue under US $1 billion increased 174% from fiscal years 2001 
to 2005” (p. 70) 
Key elements of CSA are; CSA planning, management buy in, auditor buy in, training, 
testing, and execution of workshops and results evaluation (Carter, 2007). The article 
concludes “a well-planned carefully implemented CSA programme ultimately helps 
shape compliance work into an effort that all stakeholders can agree is truly value 
added” (p. 72). 
However, “compliance theorists” have received criticism for the “multiple frameworks 
and models” offering only partial theory of increasing complexity, with incompatible 
assumptions due to the multiple motivations for compliance (Etienne, 2011, p. 306). 
Instead, Lindenberg’s “goal framing” approach was instead proposed to explore 
compliance based on the three broad categories of: hedonic goal (to feel good); gain 
goal (to preserve or increase resources); and normative goal (to do the right thing) 
(Etienee, 2011, p. 311). This ‘goal’ approach bears similarities and consistencies to 
Malloy’s 2003 deterrence as opposed to normative discussions, May’s 2004, affirmative 
contrasted with negative discussion, and supports Nielson and Parker’s 2012 
economic, social and normative discussion.  
An important point for this study is the concept of a ‘lack of attention’ to certain goals, 
and the ultimate dominance of certain goals (to the detriment of other goals), and thus 
the resulting impact on compliance. This is linked to the financial service sector during 
the most recent crisis, whereby the dominance of the ‘gain’ goal for salaries/bonuses 
outweighed other goals of normative/social acceptance which resulted in non-desirable 
behaviour of individuals (Etienne, 2011, p. 312). The difficulties in interpreting 
compliance models and data sets are clear for both academics and practitioners 
studying financial service compliance. This supports Checkel’s earlier argument that: 
“Empirically, can one disentangle compliance driven by persuasion and social 
learning from that driven by calculating self-interested strategic adaptation or 
that driven by passive, cognitively simplifying imitation” (Checkel, 2001, p. 566) 
                                               
62 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in 2002. See www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf (accessed 
December 2015), and earlier Footnote 8. 
  
103 
 
One of the main issues, therefore, in both the literature and in practice, is how 
compliance effectiveness may be measured, and how well compliance officers deal 
with new regulations when different goals exist. An issue in measuring effectiveness 
would arise when assessing compliance officers’ actions in the cases of sanctions 
issued by the regulator i.e. the sanction may cost the business less than the act of 
modifying systems and processes to comply. Difficulties in ‘quantifying’ communication 
effectiveness (and to whose benefit) would also be a problem. For example, there 
would be problems measuring compliance officers’ effectiveness in dealing and 
communicating issues to the regulators i.e. if they communicate effectively this may be 
to the detriment of the business, but the benefit of wider society. Some academics 
have attempted to quantify compliance effectiveness which is discussed further in 
Section 4.3.2. 
4.3.2 Measuring compliance effectiveness – empirical studies on 
compliance approach and tooling63 in dealing with new regulation 
In instance of good compliance the regulators may adjust their response to the firms 
they regulate (as discussed in Chapter 3). Parker (2002, p. 241) discusses the issue of 
“liability incentives” including sentencing incentives, reactive liability, corporate 
probation and regulatory incentives (i.e. forms of responsive regulation), however, this 
does not fully reflect how good compliance is measured in the first place. 
Edwards and Wolfe (2004) considered that the success of a compliance function can 
be measured by its ability to minimise or eliminate: a bank’s exposure to legal or 
regulatory sanctions; negative impacts on the banks reputation; and, financial loss; 
incidences of detection of non-compliance. There are a limited number of other studies 
attempting to measure compliance effectiveness utilising a range of methodologies. 
A case study approach was adopted by Edwards and Wolfe (2007) providing a detailed 
account of evaluating compliance competence. Template analysis was used within the 
organisation to demonstrate to regulators and stakeholders that; analysis has been 
performed, highlight current strengths and weakness, and provide a basis for future 
development and improvement in compliance competence and ethics within the 
organisation. The authors adopt the practical internal compliance competence model 
proposed by Jackman (2001), and the ethical framework for financial services 
proposed by Wood (2002), as a basis for their template development.  
                                               
63 ‘Tooling’ is used here in reference to IT software used to enhance compliance within organisations. An 
example would be to facilitate interrogation of large volumes of data, to highlight anomalies in routine 
transactions. 
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A significant element of a compliance officer role will be to embed new regulation. 
Although, there appears to be limited number of studies in how the compliance function 
specifically prepare strategies for changes to regulation; the literature does offer some 
high level studies on the impacts of new regulation on organisations. Hussein and 
Hussan (2008) commented on the limited number of empirical studies undertaken by 
academics about the application of BASEL II, which may indicate the difficulty that 
academics often encounter when trying to collate data on compliance. Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache (2011) performed a quantitative review of bank Z scores to see if 
there was an association between compliance with global standards (specifically 
BASEL Core Principles - BCP) and bank soundness. The authors concluded (with a 
number of caveats) that there was no support for the hypothesis that better compliance 
with BCPs resulted in sounder banks as measured by Z score. 
A questionnaire based study (restricted geographically to UAE) was performed by 
Hussein and Hussan (2008). They concluded that UAE banks were ready for the 
implementation of BASEL II. The findings were supported by the level of capital 
resources required for implementation for BASEL II, and the importance of training and 
education on BASEL II. Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas (2011) statistically reviewed the 
impact of mandatory IFRS adoption (IAS39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement) on European banks. They concluded that tighter rulings of IAS39 
significantly reduced discretionary behaviour. They also found that the effect of the 
IFRS ruling was less apparent in stricter supervisory regimes, and in countries with 
more dispersed ownership of banks (as the principles of the ruling were already being 
applied in these scenarios). This finding was evidence in cross listed banks, who 
appeared to have “smoothed their income” to lesser extent prior to the IFRS ruling.  
Other studies have focused more on the tooling involved in dealing with new regulation. 
Mainelli and Yeandle (2006) reviewed the results of a pilot of a specific application 
(Phophezy, a commercial application of a support vector machine) which was 
introduced to deal with new regulatory initiatives of MiFID, and utilised an automated 
process to identify a set of anomalous trades for individual reviews. The authors 
concluded that the future of risk based compliance may be to develop an acceptable 
framework process of “sift and investigate”. They called for further (specific) research 
on SVM/DAPR64 applications to provide practical approaches to compliance models.  
                                               
64 To clarify SVM represents, support vector programme (statistical and information technology 
approach) and DAPR represents, dynamic anomaly and pattern response, which are evident in such 
applications to assist with monitoring. 
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In depth interviews were performed by Doyle (2007) to investigate tools and methods 
used to manage compliance, and indicated a general conclusion that respondents were 
concerned about the lack of systems to proactively manage compliance. This seems to 
counter results of other academic reviews, whereby results have shown that there has 
been successful implementation of compliance tools and methodology incorporated 
within organisations. However, the author did recognise limitation in the research 
methodology of semi structured interviews, with potential for interviewers attributes to 
influence respondents replies. The article also reviewed the influence of European 
Information centres, via survey method, and considered the benefits to be opportunities 
for the sharing and adoption of best practice (which is considered to link to the 
literature on shared services). Bamberger (2010) performed a more general review of 
the use of technology within compliance, and points out the benefits and pitfalls of a 
reliance on technology. He quoted that in 2008 the total market for governance, risk 
and compliance software systems and services was estimated at $52 billion. The 
article recognises the consultancy angle whereby major players such as Deloitte and 
IBM have documented studies showing the economies gained by automating risk 
management controls. However, there is a clear message that traditional methodology, 
with “reliance on manual controls and stove piped compliance responses cannot keep 
pace with the increasing complexity of compliance burdens and evolving levels of risk” 
(p. 685). 
It is not clear within the literature to what extent organisations apply the theories of 
‘assessing effectiveness’ of compliance in practice, especially when combined with 
theories proposed regarding organisations’ choice of tools and methodology within the 
compliance functions. Therefore, this research may bridge this gap within the literature, 
as the methodological tool chosen of repertory grid (see methodology chapter), will 
explore practitioners’ views on a range of compliance scenarios from ‘worst compliance 
experience’, to their views on ‘aspirational compliance’. The constructs explored with 
practitioners will provide empirical evidence to add to this gap within the literature, and 
will address objective 2, research question 2a and 2b. This gap in the literature is 
summarised in Table 6. 
Objective 2- To explore the different structures of regulatory compliance in operation 
RQ2a What are the key constructs that influence managers’ decisions over the 
compliance function approach? 
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RQ2b How do compliance officer’s personal constructs align to academic models of 
compliance? 
4.4 Why management comply? Theoretical and empirical Studies 
As can be concluded from the literature review on regulation, there are a number of 
theoretical approaches to regulation. As such the reaction of an organisation and the 
compliance officer will ultimately depend on the approach of the regulatory body, in the 
relevant jurisdiction they are serving. Interactions with stakeholders and regulators are 
discussed further under Section 4.4.1. 
Following earlier discussions (including underpinning theories), of ‘why firms comply?’ 
(Section 2.4), the literature exploring the relationships between compliance officers and 
the regulator, and the firms that they serve will now be studied, alongside 
considerations of motivations for compliance. 
4.4.1 Relationship with regulator and other control functions 
In a review based on the former regulatory regime, Thomas (1997) provides a 
viewpoint of a compliance officer in their dealings with the regulatory body PIA 
(Personal Investment Authority). The article discusses the costs of compliance in 
relation to training and disclosure compliance, and comments that costs have to be 
balanced against the benefits achieved. The article is critical of the contemporary 
feedback received from regulators, and concluded that lessons can be learned from 
both the regulators and the compliance officers: “compliance officers can learn on an 
on-going basis from the PIA, but equally there are learning points for the PIA from the 
practices which the compliance officers have put in place in their own companies” (p. 
241). 
These concepts are developed further in a model based on commitment and 
partnership (Wood, 2002). Although based specifically on corporate Australia and a 
means of enabling “inherent ethical” behaviour within organisations, the concept is 
considered transferable to other domains. The partnership model must be mutually 
beneficial to all parties and society, otherwise a contest of wills develops between 
government and corporation which costs society as a whole. The ideas of “tone at the 
top” are considered, and the observation is made that ethical behaviour should be 
pursued for “the altruistic desire to be ethical, and not for the mercenary desire to profit 
from the latest strategic initiative” (Wood, 2002, p. 63). The concept of the model and 
the interrelationship between compliance, regulator and ethical behaviour is 
summarised below in Figure 10. 
  
107 
 
Edwards and Wolfe supported Wood’s partnership model and linked this to Jackman’s 
model, whereby the partnership approach should incorporate the development of the 
organisations values and culture. The approach is considered essential to achieving a 
viable and meaningful compliance function (Edwards and Wolfe, 2004, Carretta, Farina 
and Schwizer 2010a). 
Figure 10 Summary of Wood's partnership model (summarised by Edwards and Wolfe, 2004) 
 
It should also be recognised the importance of the partnership approach to avoid 
excess compliance requirements, due to the negative correlation of shareholder returns 
to increasing compliance function costs (Edwards and Wolfe, 2004). Carretta et al. 
(2010a) provide some empirical evidence to support the concepts of the partnership 
model in their research (utilising text analysis and development of a cultural survey). 
They argue in the changing pattern of supervision solutions, with more and more 
orientated towards self-regulation mechanisms, this determines the need for an 
increasing degree of cooperation between supervisory authorities and banks. 
Moreover, they consider that the new relationship models between supervisors and 
banks need to be supported by organisational tools which enable sharing of information 
between parties, to promote the advisory function of supervisors. 
Case study research is presented by Weaver, 2013 to discuss barriers to compliant 
behaviour including: perceived incentives to comply (incentives and sanctions, 
monitoring problems, and enforcement problems); willingness to comply (information 
and cognition problems, attitude and belief problems and peer effects); and capacity to 
comply (including resource and autonomy problems). Although this study is not specific 
to financial service compliance, the concepts presented are transferable. The 
willingness to comply may be embedded within organisation culture. The capacity to 
comply may be associated with the cost and benefit arguments for compliance. The 
link to relationship and partnership with the regulator will be made through incentives to 
comply and willingness to comply. Recent empirical evidence suggests, however, that 
Good Compliance 
Practice 
Positive Regulator 
Relationship 
Good Ethical 
Practice 
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a culture of “dishonesty” within the banking sector in comparison to other industries 
(Cohn, Fehr and Marechal, 2014) which further complicates the relationship of capacity 
and willingness to comply. 
The relationship and willingness to comply may also be related to the concept of 
negative media publicity and enforcement action by regulators. This has been linked 
empirically to positive adjustment to corporate compliance (Yeung, 2002; Zubic and 
Sims, 2011). Although not directly connected to the compliance function or financial 
services sector, Fearnly, Hines, McBride and Brandt (2002), reviewed the impact of the 
Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) on auditors (via interview technique). 
Analysis of her findings supported the use of legitimacy theory whereby “personal 
embarrassment, possible career damage and risk of ICAEW disciplinary inquiry” (p. 
109) were major sources of concern for audit partners. The similarity in professional 
standing of auditors and bankers could indicate that these concepts of embarrassment, 
career damage and disciplinary inquiry will also impact bankers’ relationship and 
actions of compliance to regulation in the same way. Although the compliance officers 
may not be subject to ‘discipline’ via a specific compliance professional body (as 
discussed under Section 4.2), they may be subject to disciplinary/career damage as 
discussed by Fearnly, Hines, McBride and Brandt (2002) if their background stems 
from professions such as an accountant, lawyer or police/law enforcement (and they 
still form part of a membership of a regulated body, for example the ICAEW). 
There is also necessity for coordination between the compliance function and other 
control functions of risk, internal audit and legal (Securities Industry Association, 2005). 
Within academic literature there appears to be a general consensus that the 
relationship of compliance function with top management and the board is vital, and the 
compliance function needs to act independently with clear communication channels to 
the board. Doyle (2007) through interview techniques concluded that there was a “lack 
of faith” felt by top management in compliance management within organisations, due 
to the inability to provide reliable and comprehensive overviews of compliance risks. 
This was felt to be due to systems lacking capability to pro-actively manage 
compliance, allowing organisations to deepen and sustain their competitive positioning. 
 A number of studies have reviewed management approaches to overall governance 
and compliance with mixed findings. The methodology and findings are varied in this 
area; however, in general the main conclusions of academics support the theory that 
improved governance approach by management may result in lower risk ratings for 
audit, reduced audit fees, and improved financial reporting. Hanson and Stephens 
  
109 
 
(2009) performed a review of internal auditors’ views, via surveys, and concluded that 
internal auditors are aware of their ability to influence the tone of the organisation, and 
appear to be working toward improvements of tone at the top. Altamuro and Beatty 
(2010) concluded that improvements to the internal control monitoring and reporting, 
led to improvements in the quality of financial reporting in the banking industry. 
However, internal control regulations results in both direct and indirect costs, and 
measuring of indirect costs is especially difficult (Altamuro and Beatty, 2010), which 
supports the view of other academics in their review of compliance cost measurement 
(discussed under Section 3.5). However, these costs of compliance may also result in 
offset benefit of reduced audit fees when a company discloses relatively high levels of 
compliance risk management (Knechels and Willekens, 2006). 
4.4.2 Management tone and governance – empirical evidence within the 
literature 
There has been a general movement by practitioners to improve management tone at 
the top and governance structures within firms since earlier crisis of Enron, WorldCom, 
and Arthur Andersen at the start of the millennium. Various academics have reviewed 
the implementation of effective management governance and control structures and 
tried to correlate this to firms’ valuations to provide evidence for the motivation behind 
practitioners’ actions. Academics often refer to concepts of ‘legitimacy’ and 
‘improvements to reputation’. Therefore, the author has explored the literature under 
the lens of institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), as discussed in Section 
2.4.1. 
The impact of reputation gains is explored quantitatively by some authors. Hendricks 
and Singhal (1996) performed event study methodology research to review the impact 
of quality awards on firms’ market values, and found a positive correlation between 
stock market reactions and announcements of firms winning quality awards. Akhigbe 
and Martin (2006) also performed a quantitative study to review the valuation effects of 
implementation of Sarbanes Oxley in financial service industry firms, and found positive 
benefits to adoption and compliance (with the exception of securities firms). Henry 
(2008) performed a similar analysis in Australia, using sampling and statistical 
modelling to review whether a firm’s adoption of corporate governance structuring 
impacted the valuation of firms. The study concluded that voluntary adoption of 
corporate governance structures was found to “significantly, both in statistical and 
economic terms, enhance firm valuation outcomes” (p. 938). Adams, Mansi and 
NishiKawa (2009) provided quantitative evidence linking board characteristics and 
performance. The study reviewed the relationship between boards of directors and 
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shareholders though examination of a sample of mutual index funds, using three 
benchmarks to measure the index fund performance (expense ratio, return differential 
and alpha). The authors found an inverse relation between board size and fund 
performance. However, they commented that “there may not be a single optimal 
structure that is applicable to all funds” (p. 1261). These studies all focussed 
quantitatively on the impacts of compliance decisions, and ignore how the compliance 
function has evolved, and reacted to regulatory change over time (Michael, Falzo and 
Shamdasani, 2015, p. 8). 
The concepts of over-complying to gain reputation, has been suggested by a number 
of authors, although not specific to the compliance domain (Arora and Gangopadhyay, 
1995; Oliveria, Rodrigues and Craig, 2011). Companies may include voluntary risk 
reporting disclosures (RRD) which is evidence of “over complying”, however, public 
visibility is a crucial factor in promoting legitimacy strategies through RRD (Oliveria et 
al., 2011). However, Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995), provide a different perspective 
in their review of the environmental industry regulation and compliance. They 
considered that “over-meeting” the regulation requirements is intentional and not 
incidental, and could serve as a signal to policy makers to tighten restrictions for the 
industry as a whole (thus, influencing policy makers regulatory formation). Shimshack 
and Ward (2008) also reviewed relationship of the environmental industry regulation 
and over compliance, with an alternative focus on enforcement. They concluded that 
credible enforcement significantly increases statutory over-compliance with regulation, 
noting that enforcement not only improves behaviour of non-compliant plants, but also 
provokes typically over-compliant plants to reduce discharges further below permitted 
levels. This literature has been written from the perspective of other sectors 
(environmental industry). Although this literature base offers concepts around 
motivations for compliance or over compliance (and reporting thereon), the incentives 
for regulatory compliance within these industries will be different to those within the 
financial sector. 
There are some alternative views on management approaches to governance within 
the literature. Kempf Jr (2008) comments that management push forward with 
“proposals advance in the name of good corporate governance” (p. 130) without 
reviewing whether the proposals are really sound. The article provides some specific 
examples and criticises academic review stating “because the results of these studies 
don’t fit with the views of the players, they have been ignored by them” (p. 118). The 
article is not criticising the principles of good governance, but rather suggesting that 
  
111 
 
management and academic take a step back and consider the effectiveness of certain 
governance techniques and strategies. Others have related governance more generally 
as a “bundle of practice” (Filatotchev and Nakajima, 2010, p. 598), arguing that best 
practice should be viewed in terms of “combination of practices rather than as 
individual good corporate governance drivers”. 
In addition the image of good governance is often misleading (Laufer, 2006). In a study 
employing a method of policy analysis on regulatory reforms Laufer commented that 
despite “images of firms committed to doing the right thing in spite of lost profits, and 
choosing the path of compliance for reasons of integrity, not risk management, conveys 
a strong message of ethical self-regulation” (p. 246), that these images are “all too 
often illusionary”. Laufer also comments on the difficulties in assessing the actual effect 
of corporate compliance programmes on firm behaviour, and how this “adds to the 
sceptics and pessimists account”. These concepts are supported by Carretta, Farina 
and Schwizer (2010b), in their literature review of the roles and effectiveness of boards 
and directors. Their review included consideration of directors’ self-evaluation, with the 
advantage of devoting time to looking at “routines of behaviour” which they do not 
normally stop to examine. The argument against self-evaluation, and internal 
assessment was stated in the lack of transparency and capability. They concluded that 
a “one size fits all” approach to board evaluation does not apply, and so it is necessary 
to establish adaptable assessment procedures. 
This view on self-evaluation is not supported by Nijhof, Cludts, Fisscher and Laan 
(2003). They reviewed the implementation of code of conduct within four case studies, 
utilising an assessment method based on EFQM (European Foundation of Quality 
Management) model, intended to support the implementation (with the review more 
focussed on the implementation process rather than the outcome of the code 
implementation). The research involved management self-evaluation of the process, 
and the different participants in the research project concluded that following the 
process approach provided, the indicators formed a “coherent and comprehensive set 
to measure to what extent a code of conduct is embedded within a company” (p. 76). 
4.4.2.1 Managements’ moral and value development 
Moral development was first defined by Piaget, and then further refined by Kohlberg, 
and represents the “transformations” which occur in an individual’s structure of thought 
(Kohlberg and Hersch, 1977). In a review of the theory (and application to practice of 
teaching) Kohlberg stated: 
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“other variables come into play such as emotion, and a general sense of will, 
purpose of ego strength. Moral judgement is the only distinctive moral factor in 
moral behaviour, but not the only factor in such behaviour…” (p. 58) 
Although there were no studies found which related specifically to financial service 
compliance and Kohlberg’s moral development65, it is considered that the concepts 
introduced in other (non-compliance specific) studies may be transferable to the 
compliance domain. In terms of methodology development, Weber (1991) adapted 
Kohlberg’s moral judgement interview and scoring, and applied this to a study of 
managers’ moral reasoning. The purpose of Weber’s study was to enable future 
researchers to apply an adapted methodology to measure and understand moral 
reasoning within management decision making processes. 
Abdolmohammadi and Baker (2006) reviewed the relationships between accountants’ 
personal values and moral reasoning. In this study the authors introduced the theory 
developed by Rokeach (the influence of values on behaviour) and linked this to moral 
reasoning. The study combined the methodology of the ‘Rokeach Value Survey’ (RVS) 
and the popular instrument to measure moral development of ‘Defining Issues Test’ 
(DIT). Given the professional status of many compliance officers (and thus similarity to 
accountants in this study) this methodology is considered transferable to compliance 
literature. Myyry et al. (2009) again integrated moral reasoning and values within their 
study, but used an alternative motivational type of value model proposed by Schwartz 
(1992). This study reviewed the association between moral reasoning and 
compliance/adherence to information security policies. 
Combining a number of ethics related theories (i.e. Kohlberg/Rest/Trevino), and 
empirical data from interviews with compliance professionals, Barraquier (2011) 
proposes a conceptual model to explore levels of compliance contrasted against 
perceived profitability of business transaction. The proposed model considered the 
strategic implications of compliance decision making, and contends that all 
organisation will operate in each of the four quadrants in the model (see Figure 11). 
Although this model is based on empirical data from the fragrance and flavouring 
sector, it may be considered in other compliance settings. However, this model has 
received only a limited number of citations to date66. When considered in relation to 
financial services one may consider the most recent financial crisis. Under correlation 
                                               
65 Using search terms “financial service compliance” and “Kohlberg” yielded no results in Google 
Scholar. 
66 As an example Google Scholar, indicates only 24 citations at November 2014. 
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within this model, instances of behaviour where levels of compliance may have been 
consider low, and perceived profitability were high, this would fall under the fraud 
quadrant. Compliance professionals in the financial service sector may not appreciate 
this categorisation; however, the model does attempt to correlate managers’ behaviour 
and decision making, compared to competitive environment (Barraquier, 2011). The 
relation to ethics in this model echoes earlier models discussed under Section 4.3. 
Acknowledgement is made that compliance decision making is made across the entire 
grid.  
Figure 11 A model of ethical behaviour, decision outcomes and associated emotions (Barraquier, 
2011, p. 39) 
 
The context of Barraquier’s model to this study is revisited in Section 8.1.1., where 
there is further discussion of the opposing behavioural motivations of profitability, as 
opposed to compliant behaviour (given the high profitability of the sector, compared to 
fines issued by the regulator). 
4.5 Chapter summary 
The compliance literature is often written from a practical perspective, although there 
are clear links made to underpinning theories in terms of motivations to comply. As 
evidenced in the review of the regulatory literature there is limited recent empirical 
evidence in place to support models of compliance. Given the restricted number of 
studies, and lack of empirical data focussed on compliance this may indicate issues 
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obtaining access67 to compliance professionals for this type of empirical research. 
There is significant correlation to ethics and culture presented in the literature (albeit in 
a rather abstract way, which has been criticised by Meidinger (1987), from a regulatory 
perspective). 
In the preceding chapters, the regulatory literature and the compliance literature 
domains have been explored in order to review questions around what compliance 
officers are complying with, and how, and why compliance officers may achieve 
regulatory compliance. The next chapter explores the literature which offers potential 
alternatives to the traditional in house compliance functions (in order to add to the how 
to comply discussions). 
Further discussion of the specific gaps, and links to the research objectives and 
questions is presented in Section 5.4. A summary of the compliance literature gap is 
presented in Table 6. 
 
                                               
67 Pérezts and Picard, 2014 comment on difficulties obtaining access with ‘months of negotiation and 
exploitation of interpersonal networks to succeed’. This has also been a difficulty in this study as 
discussed in Section 6.4.6 and Section 6.5.1. 
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Table 6 Summary of compliance literature review and associated gap, with link to research objective and research question 
Literature review Section discussed Authors calls/criticisms Remaining gap Research objective Research 
question/Potential 
future RQ 
 Compliance roles Section 4.2 Qualified 
officers and the 
responsibilities of the 
chief compliance 
officers 
Roles and 
responsibilities/modern 
compliance officers/risk 
managers/legal counsel 
(Taylor, 2005; Stoneman, 
2005; Gable 2005; 
Langevoort, 2012). 
Limited empirical 
research.  
Outside the research 
objectives of this 
thesis. 
Future RQ: What are the 
educational and career 
attributes of financial 
service chief 
compliance/risk 
managers? (Future 
research as ultimately 
cannot be answered in 
timeframe/methodology 
chosen). 
Compliance models Section 4.3.1 
Compliance models, 
Section 4.3.2 
Measuring compliance 
effectiveness 
Jackman’s value and 
culture model, passive as 
opposed to active 
compliance, cosmetic 
compliance.  
Limited empirical 
research on 
measuring 
effectiveness/benefits 
of one approach 
above another. 
Objective 2: To 
explore the different 
structures of regulatory 
compliance in 
operation. 
RQ 2b: How do 
compliance officers’ 
personal constructs align 
to academic models of 
compliance? 
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Chapter 5 Literature review – The alternatives: consulting, 
outsourcing and shared services 
“You can't delegate the responsibility for compliance to another party, but you 
can get help to ensure your controls are appropriate” FCA68 
5.0 Compliance relationship with consultants 
The purpose of this short chapter is to explore the alternative ways in which the firms, 
and the compliance officers may choose to achieve regulatory compliance. The chapter 
has been split into four main sections. The first section discusses the literature around 
relationships with consultants, and how compliance officers deal with new regulation. 
The second section looks at the concept of shared services. In the third section 
outsourcing is considered. In the final section the outcome of the literature review is 
summarised (including the review of the regulation, and compliance literature in 
Chapters 3 and 4). 
Based on the commercial and academic literature available on compliance tooling69 it 
can be deduced that the market for compliance consultancy is very lucrative. Arnold 
(2009) highlights the “thriving” consultancy trade in the major accountancy firms 
(despite the restrictions of SOX and the independence rules), and this is seen by the 
author to be an area for future empirical research.  
One could question the over reliance on consultants by organisations, and whether 
consultants feed off regulatory and compliance uncertainty, given recent events in the 
financial crisis. Gable (2005) comments on the fact that certain white papers and 
presentations are produced by those with a vested interest in selling compliance 
related products and services. This concern is echoed in an online press article 
following the governance scandals by Gullapalli (2005). This looked specifically at the 
auditing profession and the data available on the increase in audit fees and other 
services, following the collapse of WorldCom Inc., Enron Corp., and Arthur Andersen. 
Whilst commenting on the “avalanche of work” generated by the Sarbanes Oxley 
corporate governance bill it was noted that “there is no shortage of work for the 
accounting profession as it tries to fix a tarnished reputation” (p. 1). Krawiec (2005) 
                                               
68 Extract from the FCA website http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/being-regulated/meeting-your-
obligations/using-external-support/compliance-consultants, accessed July 2015. 
69 In the context that a large professional literature base exists (in the form of magazine articles and 
webpages) devoted to discussions of compliance processes, and IT software as tooling, to enhance 
compliance within organisations.  
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also comments on the rent seeking70 behaviour of some professionals in relation to 
regulation setting, and consulting thereon. The benefits to be gained, both financially 
and through improved status and reputation, are seen to be enormous.  
The motives of individuals procuring such services are also to be explored. It may be 
queried whether such services are procured to transfer accountability, or whether it is 
simply an issue of resourcing effectively within organisations. Michael, Falzon and 
Shamdasani (2015) model the way in which consultants improve a financial firm’s 
profitability, and comment on how “few economists have studied this segment of the 
larger market for professional services” (p. 4). However, this quantitative paper is 
driven from an econometric literature base which does not fully explore individual 
decision making within organisations. 
5.1 Compliance function strategies to deal with new regulations 
On review of literature there does not seem to be any recent empirical research in the 
area of use of consultants (specific to financial services)71, and so this is seen as area 
where this research project can contribute to knowledge. 
At the inception of this research project in 2012, Alkan (2012) discussed the 
implications of FATCA (Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act) in Economia72. The 
article indicated that many companies were hiring accounting and law firms to help 
ensure compliance with FATCA, due to “weariness” of implementing new regulations. 
Via website review, it was found that each of the Big 4 accounting firms had dedicated 
pages for FATCA (along with a plethora of other consulting firms). This phenomenon of 
consulting firms advertising their products and services to deal with emerging 
regulation is not new. The interest in this specific piece of legislation continued within 
the media73. Therefore, the literature review on consulting followed this specific piece of 
legislation, as an illustration of new regulation that is under development at the same 
time as this thesis is completed. 
Due to the ongoing development of the intergovernmental approach for FATCA, the 
value of the contributions that consultants can offer to compliance officers is subject to 
                                               
70 See earlier definition as per Krueger (1974) in Section 3.3, whereby, rent seeking relates to the 
investment of resources in attempts to divert income from other people through the political and 
regulatory process. 
71 Google Scholar search March 2015 revealed 12 hits under search terms "compliance consultant" and 
"financial service". 
72 A publication issued by Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales for its members. 
73 Ongoing interest in this piece of legislation has been demonstrated in Economia, for example 2012  
http://economia.icaew.com/technical-update/tax/fatca-attack, and 2014 
http://economia.icaew.com/news/november-2014/fatca-costs-on-the-rise accessed December 2014. 
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question. Therefore, the topic of how compliance officers intend to deal with the 
requirements of FATCA, including their relationship with consultants is seen to be an 
interesting area to focus the research project, with respect to RQ 3.  
There appears to be limited academic literature in relation to the topic of FATCA, which 
may be due to the ongoing implementation of the legislation. However, this appears to 
be a controversial item of legislation in practice, given the continued media scrutiny. An 
earlier article by Dizdarevic (2011) highlighted how FATCA reporting and withholding 
provisions depart from the norm of using withholding as a tax enforcement mechanism, 
and instead use it as a coercive compliance measure. The tax withheld is not for the 
purpose of securing payment of the taxpayer’s liability, but rather a penalty for failing to 
report. The issue of fairness was also highlighted in this article, due to the allocation of 
burdens, whereby FATCA imposes a great burden on foreign financial institutions 
(FFIs) who do not necessarily assist the tax payer from evading US tax. Whilst 
acknowledging that there are “few carrots, mostly sticks” in the FATCA regulation, 
Dhanawade (2014) argues that it is unfair to discuss the flaws in the legislation without 
“crediting the law for its innovative push towards increased transparency in 
international tax reporting and information exchange” (p. 157). 
Wise and Baker (2012) reviewed the proposed regulation, and discussed the 
intergovernmental framework, in which they raised the question of how FFIs should be 
proceeding to prepare for FATCA: 
“Should they ignore FATCA and wait for the intergovernmental agreement with 
their home country? Or should they be ready to comply with FATCA in case 
the framework falls apart?” (p. 38) 
There seems to be a high level of criticism of FATCA, within the limited literature which 
is available (Dizdarevic, 2011; Wise and Baker, 2012; Morse, 2012; Brodska, 2013). 
Morse (2012) contends that the introduction of FATCA “cannot solve the problem of US 
taxpayers’ offshore accounts without the cooperation of non US governments” (p. 529). 
The difficulties in enforcement are also highlighted whereby local audit firms will be 
allocated responsibility for ensuring that FATCA requirements are met – but of course 
the US does not generally exercise any control over these agents. In conclusion, the 
authors indicates that the US administrators of FATCA may be required to use “tactics 
based on simplicity, reciprocity and side payments” to encourage support for FATCA by 
non US governments (Morse, 2012, p. 550). Brodska (2013) highlights that the main 
criticisms around the legislation revolve around costs, and implications on existing data 
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protection legislation in certain jurisdictions. Behrens (2013) also adds to the criticism 
of FATCA stating “the cost of compliance imposed on private parties simply outweighs 
the benefits” (p. 217). The author contends that the predicted revenues of FATCA at 
$800 million annually, are dwarfed by the estimated costs of approximately $5-10 
million per FFI, which amounts to $1-2 trillion globally (p. 223). The three choices 
proposed for FFI are: firstly, to disclose required information to the IRS (or follow 
intergovernmental reporting requirements); secondly, to impose the thirty per cent 
withholding tax related to US/non US payments; or thirdly, to completely avoid US 
investments and client (p. 208).  
Snyder (2015), comments on the wider effort of the US “crackdown on tax evasion”. In 
cases of non-cooperation/compliance, there has been successful prosecution. Snyder 
(2015) presents the high profile case of the US Department of Justice against Credit 
Suisse, in which Credit Suisse submitted a guilty plea, resulting in a settlement of 
approximately $2.6 billion. However, Snyder (2015) also argues that some 
institutions74, who had previously cooperated with legislation, are adopting a more 
confrontational stance and withdrawing, indicating: 
“withdrawing FFIs may have concluded that there was no tax violation to 
disclose, or that the enormous costs of investigation and disclosure simply 
outweigh the risks of prosecution” (Snyder, 2015, p. 603) 
This may suggest that financial institutions consider that costs of compliance exceed 
the benefits of compliance, and the threats of prosecution are viewed as a business 
risk, or cost to the business operations. 
As indicated in the discussions above, there were unanswered questions for 
compliance officers when approaching the legislation (specifically echoing Wise and 
Baker, 2012). Compliance officers were encouraged by commercial and consultant 
based literature to drive forward to comply with FATCA. However, a large amount of 
uncertainty remained on the direction of FATCA in the UK due to the intergovernmental 
approach. This problem could be linked into objective 2 and objective 3/research 
questions 2a and 3 to review how managers should approach new regulation, which 
models and strategies to adopt, and whether use of consultants is inevitable. This gap 
in the literature is highlighted and linked to the objectives in Table 7.  
                                               
74 This study was focussed on Swiss based entities. 
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Objective 3 - To investigate the circumstances under which different approaches to 
compliance would be adopted. 
RQ3 In cases of new regulation, how do compliance functions rely on external 
expertise (consultants) or is there proactive promotion of in house knowledge and 
expertise? 
5.2 Use of shared service arrangements 
There also appears to be limited academic literature linking financial services to shared 
service arrangements. Of the shared service literature that is available, many of the 
authors focus on the ‘motives and drivers’ of shared service or outsourcing 
arrangement, rather than providing empirical evidence, or insights into how 
management can actually implement and manage the arrangement in their 
organisation (McIvor, McCraken and McHugh; 2011). For example Marshall (2001) 
discussed the Bank of America shared service arrangement with Exult, with a focus on 
the motivating factors of “cutting costs”, and making “technology spending more 
efficient”, and, reduction in headcount.  
Previous studies have involved review of other administrative functions such as 
finance, and human resources. In addition, the methodology employed has generally 
been of a qualitative nature, with many academics choosing to study via case study of 
specific organisations and functions (Herbert and Seal, 2012; McIvor et al., 2011). 
Lindvall (2011) followed the case of Ericsson’s transformation of their decentralised 
global finance and accounting function to a global network of shared service centres. 
Recent studies have also focussed on the concept of “offshoring” (outsourcing outside 
UK) (Evans, 2005; Clark and Monk, 2013), and an alternative concept (mainly used 
relation to global IT outsourcing industry) of “knowledge process outsourcing” (Currie, 
Michell and Abanishe, 2008).  
The traditional head office and shared service approach is compared by Herbert and 
Seal (2009). The article briefly discusses the corporate restructuring phases of 
centralisation (1950 to mid-1980s), decentralisation (1980 to end of 1990s) and shared 
service centres (SSCs - mid 1980s to end of last century). They comment that for 
SSCs to be successful and add value to an organisation management should not view 
them as “back door centralisation or a milestone on the road to outsourcing” (p. 46). 
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Figure 12 Comparison of traditional head office and shared service centre (SSC) summarised from 
Herbert and Seal (2009, p. 45) 
 Traditional Head Office Shared Service Centre 
Output Focus Self-serving  
(top management) 
Customer centred 
 (business divisions) 
Input Focus Functional 
(role focused) 
Process centred 
(centres of excellence) 
Location Within HO Physically remote  
(separate site) 
Governance Hierarchical Arm’s length 
(quasi market) 
Objectives Coordination and control Process efficiency 
Divisional focus on core 
activities 
Cost recharge Central cost 
apportionment 
Units charged per 
activity/output or traceable 
captive resources 
Information Technology/ 
Information Systems 
Main focus consolidation Enterprise wide (ERP), 
Standardisation of processes 
 
Schulz and Brenner (2010) perform a literature review to try to determine a common 
understanding of the basic terms and definitions of “shared service centres” used by 
authors. They provide a useful insight on the background of the authors which they 
reviewed during their study of shared service literature. They comment that earlier 
papers were written by authors with a professional background, however, in more 
recent years there has been increased interest in the topic of shared service centres by 
“scientist/academics”. 
Whilst recognising that definitions vary across the literature, Ulbrich (2006) contended 
that there was common idea that shared services are a “way of optimising corporate 
resources and processes in a new organisational entity” (p. 196). The author 
summarised the goals of shared service as: 
 “cost reduction through providing services to a diverse set of business units; 
 An accumulation of intellectual and capital assets; 
 A centre of excellence providing services with customer and process focus; and  
 A place to deploy new technology” (p. 200) 
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Problems usually encountered when implementing shared services are recognised as 
“business relations, interfaces and location” (Ulbrich, 2006). The author, whilst 
recognising the limitation of the research, recommended complementary research 
utilising in depth case studies. Lindvall (2011, p. 286) supports the Ulbrich’s argument 
of these goals, through their case study of Ericsson commenting on vision of global 
shared service organisation around the “four C’s”; Cost, Control, Consistency and 
Competency. 
Contributing to calls for “case led” research into shared services, Herbert and Seal 
(2012) performed a qualitative case study on shared service organisations (SSO). 
Consultants claim that SSO can reduce costs and improve service quality, and this 
research investigated these claims from a management accounting perspective. They 
called for further research on the SSO model, to survey the views of internal customers 
of the SSO model. They also called for research on the implications of the SSO model 
in terms of threats and opportunity for individual accountants and their professional 
bodies. This could be viewed as an avenue for new research in relation to the 
compliance function in financial service institutions. McIvor et al. (2011) also review the 
concept of outsourcing (from the perspective of the public sector) via a longitudinal 
case study methodology. During the course of a 3 year review they performed semi 
structured interviews, and commented that the strength of this approach was the ability 
to “triangulate data from multiple informants” (p. 451) to analyse the key lessons from 
the outsourcing experience. 
However, other methodologies have also contributed to the shared 
services/outsourcing literature. Spekle, Van Elton and Kruis (2007) modify an earlier 
study using transaction cost economics by Widener and Selto (1999), to review why 
firms outsource internal audit activities. The authors found their modified study in the 
Netherlands were supportive of the earlier study by Widener and Selto (which was 
based in the US). The findings indicated that asset specificity and frequency were 
strongly linked to sourcing decisions. The transferability of the questionnaire design 
between regions may also indicate a possibility of methodological transfer to other 
function sourcing decisions such as compliance. Lindvall (2011) although not 
referencing to “transaction cost economics”, makes the same links to the advantages of 
efficiencies of shared service function over transactional work which is “standardised, 
less complex, and consisting of frequent work with high volumes” (Lindvall, 2011, p. 
282). 
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5.3 Outsourcing75 within financial services 
The former UK regulator, the FSA provided some guidance on outsourcing of 
compliance, and maintained links with the Association of Professional Compliance 
Consultants. An important message was that whilst it may be appropriate for firms to 
outsource compliance they stress that firms “cannot outsource that responsibility” 
(FSA, 2008, p. 13). The regulator acknowledged working with organisations 
responsible for compliance consultancy, but clearly stated that “we do not regulate 
them and it would not be appropriate for us to list or approve firms we don’t regulate” 
(p. 13).  
 
Specific to financial service sector, Evans (2005) provides a practical guide to 
outsourcing in the context of MiFID and the contemporary guidance from the UK’s 
regulator. This article was focussed heavily towards the practitioner, discussing 
compliance with regulation, rather than development of academic theory. Musile Tanzi, 
Gabbi, Previati and Schwizer (2013) also review the compliance function following 
MiFID, and provide empirical evidence including: the positioning of the compliance 
function; the roles attributed; the methodologies applied within the function; and the 
interaction with the rest of the organisation (p. 51). However, Musile et al. (2013) study 
does not address the gap/link to outsourcing/shared services literature. 
An earlier case study highlighted the “mixed results” achieved by outsourcing, 
highlighting the importance of performance management monitoring (McIvor, 
Humphreys, McKittrick and Wall, 2009). The authors contend that organisations often 
assume that using external service providers will result in lower costs, at higher 
performance levels than internal functions (McIvor et al., 2009, p. 1027). Measures are 
often set concentrating on cost, whilst ignoring the importance of other dimensions 
such as “quality, flexibility and service” (McIvor et al., 2009, p. 1027). This importance 
of cost factors relates to Coase76’s theory of the firm (in sourcing, as opposed to 
outsourcing and ‘make or buy’) and is discussed in depth in a more recent study by 
Clark and Monk (2013), with direct reference to financial service firms. The issue in 
financial service firms is the embodiment of assets is largely the knowledge, talents 
and expertise of employees (Clark and Monk, 2013, p. 283). Thus, by outsourcing of 
such talent, the firm’s assets are depleted. The relationship of offshoring, and the 
                                               
75 Guidance on outsourcing is provided in SYSC8 of the FCA handbook, available at  
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/SYSC/8/ accessed December 2015. 
76 Also discussed earlier in Section 3.3.2 with reference to self-regulation, whereby, firms would be 
organised to produce goods and services when internal production was cheaper than external market 
transactions. 
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“global hierarchy of financial centres”, is also considered to be intrinsically linked (Clark 
and Monk, 2013, p. 295). Currie et al. (2008) contend that the option of knowledge 
process outsourcing (KPO) is attractive to firms who “do not possess all the capabilities 
and skills in house”, with the KPO industry reliant on the “demand for business 
intelligence and expertise” (pp. 94-96). This results in organisations potentially paying 
premium wages in order to capture the services and intellectual decision making of the 
highly skilled workforce offered by these service providers. However, understanding 
“current performance and the degree to which sustainable superior performance in a 
process can be maintained” is necessary in order to align the outsourcing process (and 
decision) to the overall organisation strategy (McIvor et. al, 2009, p. 1045). 
It should also be considered at this point that Rossi (2010) concluded that “the 
compliance function should ideally not be decentralised, at least on initial inception” (p. 
826). In earlier literature, Haynes (2005, p. 160) expressed no preference for 
centralised/decentralised as long as the “responsibilities of the compliance function are 
clearly defined” and it is “independent”. No empirical evidence has been provided to 
date (as far as this author is aware) to analyse the advantages or disadvantages of 
shared services for financial service compliance. Therefore, one could question 
whether the theory of centralisation of compliance proposed by Rossi, and the counter 
findings of Herbert and Seal regarding shared service organisation could be combined 
and developed for further in academic review of the compliance function. This can be 
linked to objective 3/research question 3. This gap is highlighted in Table 7. 
Objective 3 - To investigate the circumstances under which different approaches would 
be adopted 
RQ3 In cases of new regulation, how do compliance functions rely on external 
expertise (consultants) or is there proactive promotion of in house knowledge and 
expertise? 
5.4 Summary of overall literature review - gap analysis 
Under each area of the literature review (regulation, compliance and shared services), 
links have been made to the research objective and research questions, within the 
narrative (see Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7). This section summarises the identified 
gaps and the link to the research objective and research question in tabular format. 
The main gap is considered to be the lack of recent empirical evidence within the 
compliance literature. This seems indicative of wider issues of engaging with financial 
service compliance professionals, given the resulting access issues that have been 
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encountered during the course of this thesis. Figure 13 summarises the information 
presented by each literature area in Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7, to indicate the gap 
between the streams of literature studied in this review. 
Figure 13 Theoretical positioning within literature, and research gap/overlap 
 
Chapter 6, which follows, sets out the approach to data collection to meet these gaps 
and to answer the specific research questions. However, it must be noted alongside 
the specific research questions that are set out in Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7 
respectively, that there were overarching themes of discussion with participants during 
interview (as a result of the literature reviews). These are referred to further in Chapter 
6 (specifically Section 6.2) and are summarised below: 
• What are the effects of changing regulation? (this question theme stems from 
the literature review in Chapter 3 and 4) 
• When/How are consultants used? (stems from literature review in Chapter 5) 
• When/How are outsourcing/shared service options considered? (stems from the 
literature review in Chapter 5) 
Following data collection, the literature is revisited and triangulated to the findings of 
this study in Chapter 8. 
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Table 7 Summary of alternatives literature and associated gap, with link to research objective and research question 
Literature review Section discussed Authors calls/criticisms Remaining gap Research objective Research 
question/Potential 
future RQ 
Compliance/new 
regulation 
Section 5.1 Compliance 
function strategies to 
deal with new 
regulation 
FATCA (Dizdarevic, 2011; 
Wise and Baker, 2012) 
Limited academic 
case study of 
practitioners’ 
strategies to deal with 
new regulation 
Objective 2: To 
explore the different 
structures of regulatory 
compliance in 
operation 
Objective 3: To 
investigate the 
circumstance under 
which different 
approaches would be 
adopted 
RQ 2a: What are the key 
constructs that influence 
manager’s decision over 
the compliance function 
approach? 
RQ 3: In cases of new 
regulation, how do 
compliance functions 
rely on external 
expertise (consultants) 
or is there proactive 
promotion of in house 
knowledge and 
expertise? 
Shared service Section 5.2/5.3 Motives and drivers of 
shared 
services/outsourcing 
(Marshall, 2001; Herbert 
and Seal, 2009; Ulbrich, 
2010; McIvor et al., 2011; 
Schulz and Brenner, 2010; 
Lindvall, 2011; Clark and 
Monk, 2013): transaction 
cost economics (Widener 
and Selto, 1999; Spekle et 
al., 2007): case study 
research (McIvor et al., 
2009) 
Calls for further 
research on Shared 
service organisations 
(SSO) (Herbert and 
Seal, 2012) 
Gap between the 
compliance function 
and the 
outsourcing/shared 
service literature 
Objective 3: To 
investigate the 
circumstances under 
which different 
approaches would be 
adopted 
RQ3: In case of new 
regulation how do 
compliance functions 
rely on external 
expertise (consultants) 
or is there proactive 
promotion of in house 
knowledge and 
expertise? 
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Chapter 6 Methodology  
“Choice of method is not a stand-alone decision reached at an early stage in 
the research process but evolves as a project unfolds, as the researcher’s 
understanding of the issues and also of the organizational research setting 
develops.” (Buchanan and Bryman, 2007, p. 496) 
6.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the development of the research design 
around the research objectives. Epistemological and ontological considerations are 
discussed in Section 6.1. This leads to the second discussion, where the adoption of 
repertory grid and ethical considerations are summarised (Section 6.2 to Section 6.3). 
A technical discussion of use of repertory grid technique is then presented (Sections 
6.4 to Section 6.6). These sections detail the adaptation of research method design 
from pilot stages through to final data collection, reflections on the data collection, and 
finally the analysis of data. In Section 6.7, reflections on the limitations of the 
methodology are made, with discussion of problems encountered (and resolved) during 
the course of the thesis.  
Systematically, the methodology chapter addresses the overall aim of this thesis which 
is to explore whether it is possible to identify a best practice model of compliance within 
the banking sector (given ongoing changes to regulatory design). The development of 
research objectives and questions to address this overall aim, are detailed within Table 
8. 
6.1 Philosophical considerations and research design - The author’s 
personal ontological and epistemological orientation 
“The field [Organisational Research] is fragmented, with no central core of 
traditions, frameworks and concepts, no unified theoretical or practical 
proposal” (Buchanan, and Bryman, 2007, p. 487) 
A personal affinity toward general science and mathematical topics in earlier academic 
studies, led to initial considerations of positivist research design. However, the focus of 
research questions around decision making in compliance approaches, aligns with the 
concepts of inductive research and constructed knowledge embedded within humans. 
Humans learn, and develop (construct knowledge) through experience so this directly 
impacts on their strategic approach for compliance to regulation. Therefore, a 
pragmatic approach has been adopted. Specifically, this thesis is centred on the 
fundamental concept of constructive alternativism underpinning Personal Construct 
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Theory (Kelly, 1955), utilising the methodological tool Repertory Grid. Personal 
construct theory, and the repertory grid technique originates from the field of 
psychology, and is discussed in depth in Section 6.4 
A crucial part of development as a researcher is the ability to defend the terms of 
analysis and justify the steps taken “to a sceptical friend or questioning colleague” 
(Krippendorff, 2004, p. xxi). This scepticism towards the research methodology has 
been experienced whilst at conferences and research seminars. In certain cases, 
advice/feedback received involved simply “setting up a huge questionnaire, and mail off 
to a list of compliance officers”77. However, it was considered that this method would 
not provide the depth of data required to meet the objectives of understanding and 
exploring compliance officers’ selection of compliance approaches78. The discussion, 
which follows in Section 6.2 through to Section 6.4, will justify the chosen method of 
repertory grid, to gain insight on the tacit knowledge of participants, in order to meet the 
research aim and objectives. 
Kelly (1963) indicates that constructive alternativism does not fit in either the 
objectivism or constructionism domains. Due to the emphasis on ‘testing’ of constructs, 
links to positivism/objectivism are apparent. However, the reliance on man’s approach 
to the world through construing falls back to links with “rationalistic thought”, and 
through the ability to construct “alternative approaches to reality” which then conflicts 
with traditional realism (Kelly, 1963, p. 17). This has been translated within this thesis 
as man learning on a continuous basis, and adapting their approach, through 
interpretation of individual experiences (under a pragmatic logic). 
McWilliams (2004, p. 291) succinctly describes his own draw to Kelly’s philosophy as 
“coming home to a well-articulated perspective” which aligns to a uniformed way of 
thinking about human interaction. McWilliams (2004) discussed the concept of 
“accumulative fragmentation” with knowledge progression through additional “pieces of 
truth to the puzzle”; whereby, once we verify our conclusions there is “no point” in 
further exploration of the truth. This is in direct contrast to Kelly’s concept of 
constructive alternativism, which contends knowledge/truths are invented from 
alternate interpretations of the same events. Under constructive alternativism, we also 
revise and replace our knowledge in light of future interpretation of events – and hence 
there is no final truth. This strongly correlates to the chosen research topic of 
                                               
77 Comment from a session chair at the BAFA Doctoral Conference 2013. 
78 In terms of choices to adopt strict adherence to letter of the law, or more ethical approaches. See 
Section 4.3 for discussion of compliance approaches. 
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compliance, given the current flux within the regulatory framework within financial 
service.  
Constructive alternativism strives for individuals to “take personal responsibility for 
creating meaning” (McWilliams, 2004 p. 291). This philosophy links seamlessly into a 
personal desire for contribution to practitioners’ knowledge creation, where there is a 
constant ambition using buzzwords to ‘improve, become more efficient, transfer 
knowledge and expertise’.  
As discussed within the Introduction, Chapter 1, this is a complex topic which has been 
scrutinised in depth79 by academics and practitioners alike, and ‘an answer’ may not 
exist to rectify the problem. Crisis research, or studies of “extreme events” (Buchanan 
and Denyer, 2013) often involves the application of case study design. Within the 
literature review, there has been a variety of “authoritative accounts” produced with the 
aim of silencing alternative and critical perspectives of crises (Buchanan and Denyer, 
2013). Therefore, this research has been designed to enable a new data set (from the 
compliance officers’ viewpoint) to be explored to contribute to academic theory (see 
Section 6.6 for analysis of grid/interview data). 
A summary of the ontological and epistemological underpinnings, and how they have 
been defined and applied in this thesis, is summarised in Figure 14. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
79 The literature has been covered in depth from a regulator’s viewpoint, but less so from a compliance 
officer’s perspective. 
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Figure 14 Summary of ontological and epistemological underpinnings, related to methods 
employed 
 Application in this research 
Ontology The nature of 
reality  
Pragmatism/Relativism - there are many truths, facts 
depend on viewpoint of observer 
Epistemology The nature of 
knowledge 
  
Humans learn and develop (construct knowledge) 
through experience so this directly impacts on their 
strategic approach when deciding on compliance 
approaches 
Methodology The nature of 
research 
design and 
methods 
Qualitative - Inductive and exploratory discourse, 
during personal, repertory grid. Qualitative and 
quantitative analysis on constructs through content 
analysis.  
Methods The means of 
collecting 
data 
Repertory grid/unstructured interviews 
Personal construct analysis 
Interview transcription analysis (Story telling) 
 
A summary of the iterations in the research methodology design is set out in  
Figure 15 from the proposal stage of the project, through to the pilot stage of the 
project, and then to the final research design adopted in this thesis. This provides some 
context to the explanation of methodology set out from Section 6.2 onwards. 
Figure 15 Iterations of research methodology design 
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6.2 Summary of methodology  
The final methodology has been designed to explore objective compliance models 
within the literature using subjective data sought from the individuals at the ‘front line’ 
dealing with financial service regulation – the compliance officers and risk managers 
themselves. Under this context, the research questions have been refined to the final 
version that is presented within Table 8. 
To explore the research questions (Table 8), the repertory grid tool (see details in 
Section 6.4) has been used to facilitate sessions with individuals impacted by 
compliance within financial service organisations (an overview of participants can be 
seen in Table 11). Unlike traditional interviews a major part of the session with the 
participants involves preparation of a grid which is used to compare and contrast 
experiences. This then facilitates ‘story telling’ by participants which draws on tacit 
knowledge. At the end of the session a mixture of unstructured, open and closed 
questions were explored (depending on remaining interview time) to discuss individual 
views that emerged during the repertory grid session. Despite the unstructured nature 
of discussions, three main themes reviewed during the literature search (new 
regulation, consulting and alternative options – see Literature Framework, Section 3.1) 
were always discussed to some extent with individuals, using the following broad 
questions: 
 What are the effects of changing regulation? 
 When/How are consultants used? 
 When/How are outsourcing/shared service options considered? 
This deliberate direction of open discussion of themed topic areas was to allow for 
thematic analysis of individual interviews. The intention of questioning themed topic 
area at a broad level is to avoid the issue of interviewer bias. The method of personal 
interview has limitations, and significant issues obtaining access to staff were 
encountered (at the appropriate level, for an appropriate amount of time) to explore the 
research questions fully. In addition the aspect of interviewer bias/influence was 
considered carefully during the course of the research project. There are also concerns 
that “underlying reality” is not always accessed during the course of depth interviews 
(Rogers and Ryals, 2007), whereby participants provide the answer they believe the 
researcher wants, rather than “admitting reality”. Ultimately these concerns led to the 
decision to employed repertory grid technique (discussed further below under Section 
6.4). Feedback from the pilot interview stage has been applied as necessary, to 
change and clarify the interviews applied to the larger sample (see Section 6.4.4). 
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Table 8 A summary of research questions, related literature and adopted methodology 
Overall aim and research objective Related literature  RQ and adopted methodology 
 
Aim - In light of changing regulatory cycles to explore whether it is possible to identify a best practice model of compliance for the banking sector. 
 
Objective 1 -To understand the motives for 
regulatory compliance by banks 
 
(See also discussion of concepts in Sections 
1.2.1 and 1.2.5) 
Microeconomic Theory/Macroeconomic Theory – 
Regulatory capture (Stigler, 1971; Baker, 2010; 
Omarova, 2011/2012; Young, 2012); Agency Theory 
(Ross, 1973; Fullenkamp & Sharma; 2012; Alexander; 
2006); Rent Seeking (Krueger, 1974; Krawiec; 2005), 
Avoiding market failure (Keynes – Crotty, 2011) 
Models – Responsive Regulation (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992) Self-Regulation/Management based 
regulation (Stefanadis, 2003; Coglianese and Lazer, 
2003), Meta regulation (Gilad, 2010) 
RQ1 To what extent does the regulatory 
cycle influence managements’ decision 
making over compliance approach? 
Repertory Grid completion – open 
questions to discuss new regulation 
Objective 2- To explore the different structures 
of regulatory compliance in operation 
 
(See also discussion of concepts in Sections 
1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, and 1.2.5) 
Value culture, compliance competence (Jackman, 
2001), Partnership and ethical framework (Edwards and 
Wolfe, 2004/2004/2007; Barraquier, 2011), Deterrence 
and normative model (Malloy, 2003), Active and 
passive compliance/Cosmetic compliance (Crump, 
2007) 
RQ2a What are the key constructs that 
influence a managers’ decision over the 
compliance function approach? 
RQ2b How do compliance officers’ 
personal constructs align to academic 
models of compliance? 
Repertory Grid completion – exploring 
compliance officers personal and 
collective constructs 
Objective 3 - To investigate the circumstances 
under which different approaches would be 
adopted 
 
(See also discussion of concepts in Section 
1.2.6) 
Shared Services and Outsourcing (Herbert and Seal, 
2009; McIvor et al., 2009; Marshall, 2001); Transaction 
Cost Economics/Outsourcing (Spekle et al., 2007); 
Using Consultants (Gable, 2005; Gullapalli, 2005; 
Krawiec, 2005) 
RQ3 In cases of new regulation, how do 
compliance functions rely on external 
expertise (consultants) or is there 
proactive promotion of in house knowledge 
and expertise? 
Repertory Grid completion – open 
questions to discuss alternative 
approaches i.e. using consultants/shared 
services/outsourcing 
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6.3 Ethical considerations 
The importance of informed consent and clear communication of the purpose of the 
research has been a vital ethical consideration within the data collection stage (Bryman 
and Bell, 2011; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson, 2012). In addition, where 
requested by individual participants the collective (anonymised) results of data 
collection were made available to individual participants to promote research relevance 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2012, p. 157). 
The University and the Business School set out clear guidelines (via Ethics and 
Governance Handbook80) with regard to ethical approval of research. Ethical approval 
was initialised shortly after project approval. The results of Northumbria’s online ethics 
tool indicated an ‘Amber’ rating for the project. This was due to the involvement of 
people and organisations within the data collection phase of the project. Ethical 
approval was granted by the Newcastle Business School’s Research and Ethics 
Committee following the submission of the organisational and individual consent forms. 
However, one organisation also requested completion of a non-disclosure agreement 
(NDA) in addition to the organisational consent/informed consent forms. Although the 
confidentiality and anonymity of all participants was relevant through the design of the 
data collection, this was an additional step in the process for this organisation when 
considering future publication from this thesis. The requirement to complete the NDA 
caused significant delays within the research process, with communication between the 
respective compliance teams at the university and the organisation being very slow 
(spanning a period from June 2013 to December 2013), delaying data collection. 
6.4 The repertory grid technique  
The rationale for use of repertory grid technique within this research was to explore 
compliance officers’ tacit knowledge. The completion of the grid facilitated discussions 
to compare and contrast compliance officers’ personal experiences, ranging from worst 
compliance experience through to their viewpoint of aspirational compliance. The 
following sections summarise the underlying principles of personal construct theory 
(Section 6.4.1), and justify the specific techniques involved in administration of a 
repertory grid session (Sections 6.4.2 to 6.5).  
Prior to these more technical discussions, a simple example is presented to try to 
explain, and simplify the jargon that exists within the academic literature base. Figure 
                                               
80 Information on Northumbria University’s policies is publically available at 
https://www.northumbria.ac.uk/research/ethics-and-governance/ accessed November 2015. 
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16 was used during doctoral conferences to explain the methodology selected within 
this research, by providing a straightforward example of the interviewing technique (in 
non-technical language). There are various techniques to elicit personal constructs 
proposed by the literature. However, the most common technique (and the technique 
used in this study) appears to be that of triadic elicitation. This technique employs 
selection of three elements (in the example Mum, Dad and Barack Obama) and asking 
the participant to describe “which two of these are the same in some way, and different 
from the third?” (Jankowicz, 2004, p. 24), and noting down the ‘thing’ that the two have 
in common, and the ‘reason’ the third differs81. Questions to explore similarities and 
differences between the three people would be discussed with the participant during 
sessions (which is termed laddering within the literature), to try to draw out tacit 
knowledge about the overall topic. 
The same technique to explore similarities and differences in compliance experiences 
has been applied in this thesis. During repertory grid sessions, the compliance officers 
were asked to compare and contrast their experiences of compliance, ranging from 
their viewpoint of worst compliance, to their viewpoint of aspirational compliance. 
Figure 16 A simple example of triadic elicitation, which is used to explore experiences within 
repertory grid sessions 
 
6.4.1 Personal construct theory  
The repertory grid technique is grounded by personal construct theory proposed by 
Kelly in 1955 (Bell and Banister, 2004). The technique is used to identify the way in 
which research participants interpret their experience of the world. Duberley, Johnson, 
                                               
81 An example of a response may be to consider gender issue in that Dad and Barack Obama are both 
male, and mum is differentiated as a female. A second example may focus on the relationship issue with 
mum and dad grouped together as close members of family, and Barack Obama differentiated as being 
known only due his ‘celebrity’ status. 
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Catherine and Close (2000) describe how the technique acts as an enabler for the 
identification of these constructs “which may be difficult to articulate since they are 
based on tacit knowledge” (p. 430). Jankowicz (2004) provides a brief list of 
applications of repertory grid. These include the occupational application for 
“knowledge capture and particularly, the clarification of tacit knowledge” (p. 9). Bell and 
Bannister (2004) liken an individual’s personal construct system to “talking about his 
stance towards the world, we are talking about him as a person” (p. 2 of First Edition). 
Goffin, Raja, and Szwejczewski (2012) propose that the use of repertory grid as a 
methodological tool allows for a “quantitative angle to qualitative data” (p. 807). 
Kelly (1963, Chapter 1) starts his discussion of “theory of personal constructs” with 
background of the philosophical roots of constructive alternativism. Jankowicz (2004) 
describes that a repertory grid can be used and defined in a variety of ways. The 
argument behind this is the fundamental assumption of constructive alternativism 
underpinning Kelly’s development of theory and the Role Construct Repertory Test (p. 
15). Under constructive alternativism, different people will construe the same thing 
differently, and individuals will construe the same thing differently on separate 
occasions. Stewart and Stewart and Fonda (1981) summarise the theoretical 
underpinnings of personal construct theory as below: 
 “Perceptions influence expectations, and expectations influence perceptions; 
 The medium through which this happens is known as the construct system; 
 Construct systems are unique to the individual and developed through life.” 
(Stewart et al., 1981, p. 8) 
 
Fransella, Bell and Bannister (2004), based on Kelly’s work, contend that grids are 
about constructs (p. 7). Kelly (1963) sets out a number of “corollaries” to describe the 
process of construing: construction corollary; individuality corollary; organisation 
corollary; dichotomy corollary; choice corollary; range corollary; experience corollary; 
modulation corollary; commonality corollary; and sociality corollary. A summary of 
Kelly’s definition/statement on each corollary, and a further layman’s description 
summarised from Fransella et al. (2004) and Jankowicz (2004), and how these have 
been applied in this research is provided within Appendix 3. 
6.4.2 The repertory grid output  
During the process of a repertory grid session a grid is used to capture data. The 
resulting grids comprise of four parts: 1) The overall topic under review; 2) A set of 
elements (which represents the topic); 3) A set of constructs (which represents how the 
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participant makes sense of, and differentiates between the elements); and 4) A set of 
ratings of elements on constructs (where the elements are positioned between 
extremes of constructs to allow for statistical analysis). The formation of the grid 
emphasises “participation and fostering a sense of inclusion in the production of 
knowledge” for interviewees (Millward, Asumeng and McDowell, 2010).  
An example of the grid template used in during sessions is presented in Figure 17 
where the overall topic under review is compliance, the elements are the range of 
experiences discussed with practioners (ranging from worst to aspirational 
compliance), and the resulting discussions record the personal constructs of individuals 
in the grid itself (see session plan/discussion detailed later within Table 9). 
A sample review of prior business research utilising Repertory Grid Technique was 
performed, which has been included for reference in Appendix 4. It appears that the 
specific use of repertory grid in financial services research is limited. On searching the 
literature in Google Scholar using search terms “repertory grid” and “financial services” 
only 329 records were found (as at 22 October 2014), and only 58 records when the 
search term of “compliance” was added. On further investigation of these records there 
were no direct links between the topics of financial service compliance/risk 
management research (with the reference to financial services often being a tenuous 
link to the specific research purpose which was often leadership, or information 
management related). Therefore, the chosen method of repertory grid for this thesis will 
contribute to the limited literature in this area. 
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Figure 17 Example of the repertory grid template provided to participants within this study 
Your own words to describe scenario: Participant Name:
Example a - 'Ideal/Aspirational' compliance experience
Example b - straightforward/efficient compliance experience Participant Code:
Example c - routine compliance experience with minor issue
Example d - relatively routine compliance  with significant issues
Example e - compliance experience with major issues
Example f - 'worst' compliance experience
Ratings: '1' matches closely with left hand descriptor, '5' matches closely with right hand descriptor, '2,3,4' to rate between extremes.
Note: you do not need to 'rank' you can use same scores for multiple examples if necessary
Examples 
Compared Similar descriptor a b c d e f Dissimilar descriptor
Overall benefit to the organisation Overall cost to the organisation
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There has been a mixture of applications of the repertory grid method within business 
research. Wright (2008, p. 755) summarises the repertory grid literature in the strategy 
field (for supplied and elicited elements), and contends that the grids can be used in a 
variety of ways to suit the individual research agenda. Some researchers fully embrace 
the origins of repertory grid technique in personal construct theory and allow 
participants to fully develop both elements and constructs individually (Alexander, 
2008; Senior, 2004). Some researchers provide elements, and then allow participants 
to prepare construct and rating (Wright, 2012; Goffin, 2012; Thota, 2011; Song, 2008; 
Panagiotou, 2007). And finally, some researchers prefer to provide both elements, and 
constructs allowing participants only to rate within the grid. Only two examples of 
research adopting supplied elements and constructs were provided by Edwards, 
McDonald and Young (2009) in their literature review of repertory grid research 
(referencing examples of Lee and Truex (2000) and Young (2004); Edwards et al., 
2009, p. 787). By providing all elements and constructs, it suggests the grid acts as a 
vehicle to collect ratings only (which was discussed further under Section 6.4.1). 
Edwards et al. (2009) provide a table of impacts of using supplied or elicited elements 
and constructs (see Figure 18).  
The application in this thesis represents a partial repertory grid, as the theming of 
elements across the range of experiences allows for cross comparison between grids. 
Figure 18 Impact of using supplied or elicited elements and constructs (Edwards, McDonald and 
Young, 2009, pp. 797-790) 
 Constructs supplied Constructs Elicited 
Elements 
Supplied 
Fixed Grid 
Easy to Analyse/compare 
Limited understanding of 
individuals perceptions 
Quantitative/Statistical analysis 
possible 
Partial repertory grid 
Some comparisons across 
elements possible 
Richness in individual 
conceptualisation of elements 
Analysis using techniques such 
as cluster analysis, principle 
component analysis 
Elements 
Elicited 
N/A Full repertory grid 
Rich data set 
Direct comparisons difficult 
Analysis by identifying themes 
and coding 
Final approach 
adopted within 
this thesis 
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6.4.3 Outline of method in pilot: 
Honey (1979) provides a clear overview of the steps involved in the application of the 
repertory grid technique. For the purposes of the pilot, the elements were pre-
determined based on the review of compliance literature. The intention was to elicit all 
constructs from participants, as based on a review of the application of repertory grid 
by other researchers (see Appendix 4) as this appeared to be the most commonly 
adopted method in business research applications. This was expected to take no more 
than 1 hour, based on discussion of grid delivery in the literature (Appendix 4) and this 
was indeed the case.The steps for the first iteration of the pilot study were:  
1. An outline explaining the repertory grid method was provided to the participant 
in advance, so they understood the purpose of the technique; 
2. Elements were provided at the top of the grid; 
3. Individuals were provided with cards with numbers on one side of the cards 
which correspond with the elements at the top of the grid; 
4. Cards were turned face down and shuffled, then three cards drawn at random; 
5. Subject marked on the grid which elements were being compared (using 
element numbers); 
6. Always on left side the subject described what aspects the two similar elements 
share, on the right side  express what makes the third element different to other 
two elements; 
7. Finally elements were rated to the constructs (using a 5 point scale), whereby a 
rating of 1 denoted an understanding that the element closely matches the 
description in the left most column, whilst a score of 5 would denote an 
understanding that the element to match more closely with the contrasting 
description in the right hand column. If it was considered that an element could 
not be rated against a construct a zero or N/A was to be inserted. 
6.4.4 Reflections and adaptations following initial pilot of repertory grid 
session 
After preparing the session82 based on review of the literature on repertory grid 
(Appendix 4) and using the basic steps outlined in Section 6.4.3 (proposed by Honey 
(1979)) a practicing compliance officer working within a multinational organisation was 
approached. This individual was chosen as he was an experienced compliance 
manager, responsible for oversight and reporting within a complex worldwide 
                                               
82 The pilot documentation was deliberately called a ‘workshop’ in anticipation of flexibility of group 
interviews, and also to appeal to practitioners in the sense that they would achieve benefit from 
participating in a workshop which would allow them to use the technique of repertory grid in other 
business applications through participation.  
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compliance network. Although this person was not working within the financial service 
sector, the compliance concepts that were being explored within the grid were 
transferable between industries for the purpose of the pilot session. 
The session outline was sent in advance to allow time to absorb the material, and at 
the start of the session the purpose of the research was explained, along with the steps 
involved in completing the grid. A script suggested by Honey (1979) was modified to 
the topic of this thesis, and followed to avoid impact of interview bias on the results 
(see Table 9). 
 
 
 
 
  
141 
 
Table 9 Final Session Plan adapted from Honey (1979) 
What you do What you say 
 The first item to complete is a bit of paperwork – please can you all ensure that you have completed your informed consent 
and demographic information by the end of the session. 
This session has been arranged so I can pick your brains about compliance in the financial service sector. I want to find 
out your views so I can publish empirical research into what is means to run an efficient and effective compliance 
function, and the implications of using compliance consultants or alternatively outsourcing compliance, or 
implementing shared service arrangements. 
In effect I am inviting you to join an extended survey which will assemble opinions from approximately 30 compliance 
managers at different levels in the compliance function, and from different organisations. 
First let me give you some assurances about the process – the whole survey will be conducted anonymously. Although I 
have asked for some demographic information this data will be recoded and anonymised, and will not be published to either 
your employer or other participants. Your ideas will be collected together along with everyone else’s. After I have analysed 
all of the data I will feed back the main findings to everyone who takes part collectively (and if you so wish individually). 
Finally I want to reassure you that this is not an exam or test of any kind – even though I am canvassing your views there 
are no right or wrong ideas or answers. Your opinions are as valuable as all the other participants. 
Before I start taking you through the method I shall be using to collect your views, are there any questions you would like to 
ask about the exercise in general? 
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What you do What you say 
Answer questions 
about the purpose of 
the survey. 
 
 Let’s move onto the survey itself. I hope you will find the survey method interesting, as it is a novel and unusual way of 
collecting views on compliance methods. Rather than a questionnaire style format, you will be completing your responses 
in the form of a grid structure. 
Show them the grid  
 
 
Hold up pencil, pen, 
biro, board marker.  
 
 
 
 
Each grid will be individual as they reflect your individual reflections on the topic of compliance. 
But first we will start with a simple example – which I will use visual tools to demonstrate. 
The topic in this case is writing implements – show them the selected writing implements. 
So write these on the top of the grid. Then you would write these different examples on a card (or a post it). Then I want 
you to pick out three cards at random and group them – which two are similar and which is the one which is dissimilar. 
Answer this question  
can you think of any other ways in which two of these ‘writing implements’ are similar to each other and different 
from the third  
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What you do What you say 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Write down whatever it is that the pair have in common in the left hand side of the repertory grid form and write down 
whatever it is that makes the singleton different in the right hand column. (Please also make a note in the second from left 
column the numbers of the two cards you think are similar and in the second from right column the number of the different 
element). Add as many/or as few descriptors as you wish for these three cards before selecting another three cards. 
Make another selection of three cards and repeat. 
For the purpose of this example I would like you just to come up with 5 or so descriptors and then I want you to ‘rate’ your 
descriptions on a scale of 1 to 5 against the element. So for each element go down the list of descriptions and rate 1 if you 
think it is most like the description on left, and 5 if you think it is most like the descriptor on the right (or a score of 2, 3,or 4 
if you believe the element is between the extremes) 
Finally I want you to review the overall idea I have provided at the bottom of the grid – and rate in similar way to the way 
you have rated your own ideas. 
 
So could you quickly work through this process as a practice grid? 
 
Now I want you to revisit the exercise and complete for compliance. In terms of the elements I asked you to think in 
advance of some different examples of compliance approaches/scenarios (which may be personal to you) with the broad 
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What you do What you say 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Take 20 minutes? 
 
categories in mind of: 
 Example 1 - 'Ideal/Aspirational' compliance approach 
 Example 2 - straightforward/efficient compliance approach 
 Example 3 - routine compliance approach with minor issue 
 Example 4 - relatively routine compliance  with significant issues 
 Example 5 - compliance approach with major issues 
 Example 6 - 'worst' compliance approach 
Name these for you individually so they are meaningful for you and populate the top of the grid. Then repeat the process 
we did for the pens – put your examples on post its and compare listing your descriptors – what makes similar, what makes 
different. 
Answer this question  
can you think of any other ways in which two of these ‘elements’ are similar to each other and different from the 
third in terms of the INPUTS/OUTCOMES you get which influence your decision in your approach to compliance 
Once you feel you have exhausted combinations I would you like you to ‘rate’ your descriptions on a scale of 1 to 5 against 
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What you do What you say 
 the element. So for each element go down the list of descriptions and rate 1 if you think it is most like the description on 
left, and 5 if you think it is most like the descriptor on the right (or a score of 2, 3,or 4 if you believe the element is between 
the extremes) 
Finally I want you to indicate your opinion of how the overall idea I have supplied of ‘benefits to the organisation’ rate 
against your own example of compliance approaches. 
Before you start I just want you to remember I am trying to understand the components of different approaches to 
compliance, but please also broadly consider the impacts of costs in comparison to benefits of different compliance 
approaches, and also how the regulatory approach impacts on these approaches. 
So now this is over to you – if you have any questions during the course of the exercise please just let me know (but 
remember I am interested in your personal views). 
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When the individual started the exercise he immediately encountered problems trying 
to phrase what he saw to be differences between the elements. Unfortunately he got 
into a certain mind-set whereby he was only identifying high level differences of 
internal/external to organisation when he was picking out the different elements and did 
not drill down further – this was not expected. In the end the decision to terminate the 
session was made as he simply stated that the exercise was ‘too hard’. This problem 
was encountered due to a mixture of inexperience of administering the grid, and also 
the individual not being receptive of the technique. 
In order to ensure that these problems were not repeated, feedback was sought from 
the participant on where they thought the session could be improved for future delivery. 
This feedback together with reflections of the author are set out in Figure 19.  
Figure 19 Pilot feedback and reflection of the author 
Feedback from pilot participant Reflections on feedback  
“Need to spell out purpose so participants 
can direct their thoughts in the grid” 
The purpose is already set out in session 
plan, and repeated verbally – so there 
may be element of interviewer bias if we 
set purpose out any more 
Suggested that not only the elements are 
provided in the grid, but constructs are 
also provided – and then the participants 
can simply rate these 
The disadvantage of this would be the 
lack of practitioner input into forming the 
constructs. If this was to be implemented 
the individuals could be asked as an 
additional step to scale the constructs as 
which they think are most important. Also 
spaces could be left in the grid for 
participants to suggest additional 
constructs. 
‘change the descriptions of the elements’ 
– the participant thought these were too 
long (based on Jackman model) 
Adapt to something more meaningful for 
those who are not absorbed in academia 
 
The individual offered to look over the grid again to see if it was more digestible after 
changes were made. After this the literature was reviewed again to form a list of 
supplied constructs (Table 10). However, spaces were made available for additional 
contribution of practitioners to ensure that the individuals’ personal constructs would 
also be included. 
The idea of supplied constructs is supported by Goffin et al. (2012), who discuss the 
idea of ‘hygiene factors’ which relate to constructs which may be frequently mentioned 
by participants during interview, including repertory grid interviews (as the factors are 
often referred to in academic and practitioner literature). These ‘hygiene factors’, 
although frequently cited, may not actually represent the most ‘important’ factor or 
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concept to individual participants. Therefore, this supported the method to provide 
certain constructs to the participants (from the literature), so the participants can 
comment on these ‘hygiene factors’ whilst being allowed to develop their own, more 
meaningful personal constructs. Under this basis a second pilot session was held 
(using supplied constructs in Table 10). 
Table 10 Listing of constructs provided in advance for pilot 2 participant (with links to literature) 
Construct provided Bipolar construct Link to literature 
Compliance benefits perceived 
to outweigh costs – costs 
irrelevant 
Compliance Costs perceived to 
outweigh benefits 
Harvey (2004), Satheye (2008) 
Commitment to Training Minimal Training Taylor (2005), SIA (2005) 
Commitment to ethics and 
culture 
Disregard to ethics and culture Jackman (2001), Edwards and 
Wolfe (2005), Wood (2002) 
Proactive assessment by 
management of reducing 
reputation risk 
Disregard by management of 
reputation risk 
Crump (2007), Calcott (2010), 
Arora and Gangopadhyay 
(1995), Shimshack and Ward 
(2010) 
Seen to be ‘best practice’ by 
peers 
Disregard of peer performance Malloy (2003) 
Compliance officers status 
high 
-skills set, independence, 
authority 
Disregards of compliance officers 
importance in organisation 
Somerville (2010) 
Extensive investment of IT 
compliance resources 
Minimal investment in IT 
compliance resources 
Bamberger (2010), Gable (2005), 
Garcia (2004), Mainelli and 
Yeandle (2006), Hussein and 
Hussan (2008) 
Full awareness of New 
Regulation – e.g. BASEL 
III/FATCA 
Limited knowledge of new 
regulation 
Stoneman (2005), Gebhardt and 
Novotny-Farkas (2011), 
Dizdarevic (2011), Wise and 
Baker (2012) 
Compliance costs easily 
identifiable and monitored 
Compliance costs merged into 
‘admin’ function of business – no 
monitoring 
Alfon and Andrews (1993), Frank 
et. al (1998), Elliehausen (1998), 
Deloitte (2006) 
Compliance knowledge 
nurtured and developed in 
house 
Compliance knowledge limited 
within the business 
Herbert and Seal (2009) 
Internal centre of excellence External centre of excellence McIvor et al. (2011) 
Business relationships, 
communication and interfaces 
essential 
Minimal regard for business 
relationships, communication and 
interfaces 
BASEL (2005), Thomas (1997), 
Wood (2002), Carretta (2010) 
Standardised 
approach/strategy 
Flexible compliance 
approach/strategy 
COSO (2004) 
Continuous development and 
improvement to compliance – 
‘customer’ driven 
improvements 
No calls for improvement to 
compliance – stagnant approach 
Crump (2007) 
 
In the second pilot session, the session plan had been modified based on the feedback 
received (Figure 19) and delivered to a second (recently retired) compliance officer. 
This individual differed from the first pilot participant, as his career revolved around 
legal counsel roles (with some responsibility for compliance), whereas the first 
individual had an accounting focussed background. A mix of demographics was 
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considered important within the pilot stage, as during the live data collection there was 
an expectation for a mix of background experience for participants. 
Again the session plan was sent in advance and the individual offered some feedback 
– with comments to simplify the ‘technical language’ used (such as elements and 
constructs) and just instead to describe the grid process. The overall feedback was that 
the session was well constructed. However, the individual emphasised that participants 
would not understand from individual reading of the session outline instructions, until 
they were led through an example of completing the grid. From this, the instruction 
were adjusted to include a simple grid example as proposed by Tomico, Karapanos, 
Levy, Mitzutani and Yamanaka (2009, see Section 6.4.5). By receiving the session 
outline in advance and looking at the suggested descriptors, the individual had already 
started to think of his own personal constructs which he wanted to be added to the grid. 
The individual considered that a real benefit to participants would be the actual 
completion of the grid, provoking thoughts on self-improvement towards ‘aspirational’ 
levels of compliance. 
6.4.5 Discussions with more experienced researchers utilising repertory 
grid 
During discussions with a couple of more experienced users of repertory grid technique 
from the University, the principles of the technique were revisited. The main advantage 
of repertory grid identified of removal of interviewer biases was ultimately lost in the 
proposed approach adopted in second pilot, by supplying elements and certain 
constructs based on the literature. This view is in contrast to the concepts of hygiene 
constructs discussed under Section 6.4.4. However, this is supported by the review of 
impact of supplying/eliciting elements and constructs performed by Edwards et al. 
(2009, see Figure 18). Supplying constructs was considered to be predetermining the 
focus of the session to a great extent, and thus creating interviewer bias by default. 
Therefore, the session was adapted once more for use during live data collection. The 
piloted adaptation of Honey’s step process was used, with categories provided to 
participants to choose elements of the topic and triadic elicitation of constructs. 
Jankowicz (2004, pp. 169-177) describe Honey’s content analysis technique and the 
adaptation of supplying ‘one overall summary’ construct. Designing the grid in this way 
enables content analysis and comparison of ratings between the elicited construct and 
the supplied overall construct (using similarity values).  
The adapted version included a simple exercise to introduce the participants to using 
the grid format (using writing implements as a topic, and different pens as visual 
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examples – see Figure 20 which shows documents used during the session). This is in 
line with technique performed by Tomico, Karapanos, Levy, Mitzutani and Yamanaka 
(2009), and which provides an easily digestible topic to introduce the workings of the 
grid to inexperienced users. This simple exercise was piloted and refined based on 
feedback from a selection of peers. This was performed in a ‘group context’ as there 
would be a mix of individual and group sessions performed in live data collection. Grids 
can be prepared in group situations with the objective of building shared 
understandings, in as productive a way as possible (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012, p. 
208; Burr, Giliberto and Butt, 2014). Feedback from the group pilot resulted in minimal 
refinement (formatting of grid). A final version of the ‘session’ outline and provided grid 
(including details of element themes and overall supplied construct) is set out in Table 
9. 
6.4.6 Sampling and access 
Due to the research methodology of personal interview/repertory grid selected, 
geographical sampling restrictions were applied to include only UK banking 
organisations. Using the OSIRIS database83 a listing of UK banking organisations was 
produced. A strategy to target certain organisations in order to obtain access to 
individuals was developed. A number of routes to develop access were trialled with no 
success including: 
 Direct approach to a number of (banking) compliance training providers to host 
a session; 
 Direct approach to FSA (prior to restructure) to access both FSA staff and host 
a session (in one of their advertised ‘compliance’ training sessions); 
 Direct approach to author’s own professional institute (ICAEW) to access 
mailing lists; 
 Direct mailings to Chief Compliance officers using the Bank names/address 
developed through internet searches, from listing produced in OSIRIS. 
These routes all developed ‘dead ends’ and so existing contacts from colleagues at the 
University, were approached directly with an abstract of the proposed research 
(convenience sampling). After meeting with personnel in one bank, an individual 
provided another contact within another bank (snowball sampling). In addition, direct 
contact with individuals (under financial/compliance/risk management roles) was 
sought via ‘LinkedIn’ networking. A number of contacts were made during conference 
                                               
83 A database which provides information on listed companies, including both financial and non-financial 
data. 
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attendance (and from hosting a workshop on ‘ethical compliance’ for practitioners84). 
Table 11 summarises the details of repertory grid sessions with participants, and the 
data collected. 
Although this approach to sampling may be subject to criticism, it must be recognised 
that gaining access to these types of individuals and organisations is notoriously 
difficult due to concerns about confidentiality. Arranging access to participants within 
one organisation took nearly 6 months, due to the requirements to complete a non-
disclosure agreement (and getting the compliance teams from the organisation and the 
University aligned). 
Table 11 Details of repertory grid sessions, and data collected 
Date Participant 
demographics 
Method 
employed 
Data collected85 
August 2013 Male, Head of 
Risk Management 
Repertory grid 
session 
Repertory grid completed 
(36 constructs), Transcription 
of 1 ½ hr. interview 
January 2014 Group of five 
customer facing 
employees 
Repertory grid 
session, group 
discussion 
Five repertory grids completed  
(68 constructs), field notes of 2 
hr. discussion 
April 2014 Male, Financial 
Crime 
Management 
Repertory grid 
session 
Repertory grid completed (24 
constructs), Transcription of 1 
hr. interview 
April 2014 Female, 
Compliance 
Officer 
Repertory grid 
session 
Repertory grid completed (20 
constructs), Transcription of 1 
hr. interview 
November 
2014 
Male, Compliance 
Officer 
Repertory grid 
session 
Repertory grid completed (22 
constructs), Transcription of 1 
hr. interview 
November 
2014 
Male, Compliance 
Officer 
Repertory grid 
session 
Repertory grid completed (24 
constructs), Transcription of 1 
hr. interview 
November 
2014 
Male, Compliance/ 
Risk Officer 
Repertory grid 
session 
Repertory grid completed (18 
constructs), Transcription of 1 
hr. interview 
November 
2014 
Male, Regulator 
(former 
Compliance 
Officer) 
Repertory grid 
session 
Repertory grid completed (18 
constructs), Transcription of 1 
hr. interview 
6.4.7 Transcription process 
To complement the data collected within the grid, interviews were recorded to enhance 
the validity and rigour of the data produced (see Table 11 for details of participants and 
                                               
84 Delivery of workshop ‘A Plea for Ethical Compliance’ at 32nd Cambridge International Symposium on 
Economic Crime. 
85 See Section 6.5 for reflections on data collected, with comparison to other studies in Table 12. Note 
that the data from the two pilot studies was used for development of method only (and does not form part 
of data analysed in Chapter 7). 
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data collected). The use of voice recording equipment allows a secondary record of the 
interview between author and participant, allowing reflection and interpretation of the 
written data provided in the grid in a subjective manner. Hammersley (2010) refers to 
reliance on ‘Verstehen’ (subjective interpretivism) within the transcription process. This 
supports the philosophical stance of pragmatism allowing cohesion of objectivism and 
subjectivism, in the methodological approach. 
The elicitation of constructs during repertory grid interview led to an open discussion 
between the author and the interviewee on completion of the grids (the importance of 
data collected during ‘open’ discussion was identified at pilot stage of interviews). Due 
to the ‘complimentary’ nature of the formation of the repertory grid by participants, 
alongside discussions around grid formation between the researcher and the 
participant, it was decided to take a more denaturalised route (Oliver, Serovich and 
Mason, 2005) towards transcription following the principles developed below: 
 A ‘play script’ format to transcription (including line number format for easy 
future reference); 
 No time record denoted in transcription of words said/pauses/interruptions etc.; 
 The transcription does not reflect the entire recording time. For example, large 
periods of interview are spent on grid exercise (and so data is recorded in grid 
itself). These sections are simply denoted as unrecorded in the transcription. 
‘Selectivity’ is discussed further by Hammersley (2010, p. 556); 
 No correction for grammatical errors in speech; 
 There is no recognition of accents, or mispronounced words within the 
transcription (the author as interpreted words, as ‘heard’ from authors 
viewpoint);  
Transcripts were sent to participants, to allow for any correction considered necessary 
by participants: with the ultimate purpose of supporting validity and rigour of data within 
the transcription. 
A different approach was adopted for group sessions. Due to the larger size of groups 
and issues with transcription (i.e. identifying speakers, speakers talking over one 
another), an alternative method was chosen to record via field notes. Following group 
discussions, major discussion items were recorded in note format immediately after the 
session finished. These field notes were sent to the participants for confirmation of 
content (and allowing additional, specific comments from participants to be added), 
which supports validity and rigour of data output. 
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6.5 Reflections on data collated and analysed 
A major hurdle in this thesis has been the arrangement of access with participants. 
Whilst participants may initially have expressed interest in contributing to the research 
there was a large fall out rate. This may be attributed to two factors: the first being 
those of perceived confidentiality issues given the sensitivities of the overall topic of 
compliance; and the second an unwillingness to participate in the specifics of the 
complex grid session. Consequently, the data collection period extended beyond the 
initial timeframe proposed at planning stages. 
6.5.1 Reflections on access 
Despite the difficulties obtaining access with relevant participants86 the volume of data 
from sessions performed is rich, due to the breadth and depth of experiences explored 
during formation of repertory grids. For analysis purposes the data output of sessions 
has taken the form of both the grids themselves, and transcripts and field notes of open 
discussion following completion of the grids. The dominant output of the grid session is 
the constructs themselves, and, therefore, “the unit of analysis is the construct, not the 
individual” (Dick and Jankowicz, 2001, p. 193; Jankowicz, 2004, p. 147). Consequently, 
for saturation of data it is possible to focus on the number of constructs collated rather 
than the number of individual interviews. Glaser and Strauss (1967) in their wider 
discussion of grounded theory contend that during research, judgement is required to 
assess ‘when to stop sampling’ and theoretical saturation is reached, defined as the 
point at which no further data is being uncovered. To stretch saturation the diversity of 
the group of participants can be expanded.  
This concept has been applied in this research by including those impacted by 
compliance, alongside those managing compliance within organisations. Although this 
element of grounded theory has been used within analysis, this study does not claim to 
position itself within grounded theory. Academics have criticised papers which ignore 
the roots of grounded theory set out in Glaser and Strauss 1967 founding work, 
Discovery (Walsh, Holton, Bailyn, Fernandez, Levina and Glaser, 2015). However, the 
basic assumptions of emergence i.e. remaining open, holds true for analysis and 
theory generation in this study. Goffin et al. (2012) suggest that Pareto analysis could 
be used to ascertain that “theoretical saturation” of constructs is reached and suggest 
that “saturation is reached either when no new categories or very few additional ones 
emerge from case studies” (p. 816). This applies within content analysis in this study, 
whereby during first round of categorisation an ‘other’ category was used to categorise 
                                               
86 As discussed earlier in Section 6.4.6, in the end access was obtained for 12 participants as presented in 
Table 111, and Table 133. 
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the minority of constructs which were not easily allocated to the categories of the init ial 
template, which was followed by subsequent rounds of categorisation when no new 
categories emerged (see Section 7.3). 
Some prior research adopting repertory grid is summarised within Table 12, which 
demonstrates a range of constructs collated and analysed from as few as 128 
constructs up to 876 constructs. If the extremes of the number of constructs are 
ignored, it can be argued that a range of 200-400 constructs is sufficient for content 
and thematic analysis. Table 12 also demonstrates how researchers adapt the use of 
the tool to suit their individual research agenda i.e. coding, thematic, content, Honey’s 
content, through to principal component analysis (underlining the pragmatic use of the 
grid within the research domain).  
Table 12 Examples of prior repertory grid research, with details of number of participants and 
construct volumes analysed 
 
Researcher 
Research 
Discipline 
Number of Participants Number of 
Constructs 
(and analysis) 
Wright, et al. 
(2012) 
Strategic 
Management 
research 
46 full time manager 
participating  
455 constructs 
(thematic 
analysis) 
Goffin et al. (2012) Supply chain 
management 
research 
Two case studies:  
Case 1, 39 repertory 
grid; 
Case 2, Ongoing 
411 constructs 
(coding of 
constructs) 
Goffin and Koners 
(2011) 
New product 
development 
research 
30 repertory grid 
interviews 
273 constructs 
(Gridlab and 
categorization of 
constructs) 
Pike, Knott and 
Newton (2011) 
Decision 
Criteria 
12 repertory grid 
interviews  
189 constructs 
(Thematic 
analysis) 
Thota (2011) Information 
Systems 
Research 
Over 2 cycles, 29 
repertory grid 
participants 
112 constructs in 
first action 
research cycle, 
121 constructs in 
second cycle 
(Honey’s content 
analysis 
performed) 
Song and 
Gale(2008) 
Project 
Management 
Research 
18 repertory grid 
interviews 
Completed 
128 constructs  
(content analysis) 
Senior and 
Swailes (2004) 
Performance 
management 
60 repertory grid 
interviews completed 
615 constructs 
(principal 
component 
analysis) 
Dick and Culture Survey 51 repertory grid 380 constructs 
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Researcher 
Research 
Discipline 
Number of Participants Number of 
Constructs 
(and analysis) 
Jankowicz (2001) interviews (“simple” content 
analysis p. 189) 
Honey (1979) Attitude 
Survey, 
Manufacturing 
Business 
73 repertory grid, 
performed in groups of 
approx. 8 
876 constructs 
To ensure that rich descriptions of the compliance officers’ experiences and 
perceptions were explored (to investigate each of the research questions) a qualitative 
interview method of analysing both grid and interview data has been adopted (Burr et 
al., 2014). This allows analysis of both the constructs produced during grid interview 
(which specifically addresses research question 2), and also the interview transcripts 
where discussion of individual issues were discussed openly by the participants (which 
addresses research questions 1 and 3 further). By combining the two outputs from 
interviews with practitioners, a broad set of data has been collated, and includes the 
story telling aspect within grid sessions. 
The data set for this thesis is collated from 12 participants, resulting in a total construct 
pool of 230 (see Table 13).This represents an average of 19.2 constructs elicited from 
each session. However, it should be noted that the number of constructs produced was 
limited by time available for certain participants to be interviewed87, rather than a matter 
of limitations on topics to discuss during the grid formation process.  
The average working experience of participants was 20.1 years, which indicates a rich, 
depth of experience (personal constructs) to draw from whilst undertaking the grid 
session. As the analysis of the data set is broadly qualitative, the concept of saturation 
has been followed (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The concept of saturation was applied 
within elicitation of constructs during individual sessionss themselves using laddering 
technique to explore the importance of each construct (Crudge and Johnson, 2007; 
Jankowicz, 2004); and through eyeball analysis of grids following sessions (see 
Section 7.2). As individual constructs have been collectively analysed under content 
analysis techniques, and open interviews have been coded individually the data set is 
considered to reflect representative views of the sample of practitioners at the time of 
the research. 
                                               
87 As found in other studies (Pérezt and Picard, 2014), access was extremely difficult to arrange and 
negotiate, and so the researcher had to adapt around the need and time constraints of the individual 
participant. This is not considered to impact on the quality of the data, as the number of constructs elicited 
aligns to other studies (see Appendix 4). 
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Table 13 Biographical information of participants 
Participant 
Reference 
Gender Experience 
(years) 
(Self) Considered 
Profession 
Number of 
Constructs 
lmc16 Male 16 Compliance 36 
ymo26 Male 26 Other 18 
ymo12 Male 12 Other 14 
ymo33 Male 33 Other 888 
ymo27 Male 27 Other 16 
yfo0 Female Not given. Other 12 
nmo28 Male 28 Other (Consultant) 24 
efc10 Female 10 Compliance 20 
vmla19 Male 19 Legal 22 
jmc10 Male 10 Compliance 24 
omc20 Male 20 Compliance 18 
rmo20 Male 20 Other 
(Risk/Audit/Compliance) 
18 
Average  20.1  19.2 
6.5.2 Reflections on the data collection exercise 
To assist in the grid session, the documentation provided to participants was made as 
‘friendly’ as possible. This involved preparation of laminated cards for example exercise 
and colourful grids and cardboard to complete the compliance grid itself  (see Figure 
20). 
Figure 20 A photograph of the documents used during sessions - the example pen exercise, the 
grid itself and the cards for triadic elicitation 
 
                                               
88 Participant Grid was revisited and a number of constructs were unusable (i.e. did not reflect usable bi 
polar pair for purposes of analysis. Therefore, only 8 constructs used within analysis). 
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One finding of delivery of grid sessions is that despite pilot studies, meticulous planning 
and following a “script” (Honey, 1979), each interview outcome was very different. The 
majority of participants appeared to enjoy the process of completing the grid, making 
general comments at the end of session such as ‘it’s funny how it makes you think like 
that’ (verbal comment from participant lmc16). This demonstrates the suitability of 
repertory grid during interviews within this thesis, offering an alternative to standard 
interview questions, by promoting a different kind of thinking: ultimately providing a 
means for the exploration of tacit knowledge. One individual found so much value in 
the exercise, that they requested extra information on the technique, as they could see 
the benefit of adapting the repertory grid within their own work in practice (risk 
assessment analysis). 
However, there were a minority of cases (two instances) who really struggled to 
engage with the grid session. In one scenario the participant, appeared to be highly 
fatigued (due to an excessive workload at the time) and although they did provide 
some, they failed to produce a high number of constructs. In the other case, despite 
repeated prompting on how to explore the topic, and how to complete the grid the 
participant simply “did not get it” (verbal quote from participant ymo33). This highlights 
the differences in individuals understanding of knowledge development, and provides a 
disadvantage in the use of this tool – whereby some participants may be unable, or 
unwilling to engage with the grid session.  
An important aspect of the data collection process was to write down the experience 
after each session. This reflexive practice provided an opportunity to re frame the 
research methods and analysis as the project unfolded. The literature on repertory grid 
suggests a range of interview settings are considered acceptable, therefore, both 
individual and group sessions were set up during pilot and final data collection. 
However, following the completion of the grid within the live focus group setting (as 
requested by one organisation for convenience to participants), it was decided that this 
would be the least preferred environment for collection of future data (through 
reflection). It was found that it was difficult to administer laddering techniques in a 
group environment (whereby probing questions ‘why is this/that’ is used to elicit the 
meanings of the constructs fully i.e. to cluster constructs together or gain more detail 
on particular constructs). Following this live focus group, all future sessions were 
arranged on an individual basis. In addition, each grid was analysed on an individual 
basis immediately following the session, so emergent findings could be used to inform 
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future interviewees of similarities in constructs and elements they produced during 
future sessions. 
All data was stored within an excel file and coded for anonymity. For the purposes of 
analysis the constructs were listed on one sheet, along with similarity scores. A drop 
down box was inserted for content analysis, which was populated with categories by 
each of the judges/raters89 during content analysis (see Figure 21 for a screen shot of 
the analysis file in excel including drop down boxes).  
Figure 21 Screen shot of excel data file showing construct listing with drop down for content 
analysis (full and final list of categories/constructs in Appendix 7) 
 
The decision to analyse everything electronically, differs from other researchers’ 
interpretation of printing off constructs and sorting manually. This allowed for flexibility 
and ease of communication between the two judges/raters over email (see Section 
7.3.1 for discussion of inter judge reliability). 
6.6 Analysis of grid 
There are a number of techniques that can be utilised to analyse individual repertory 
grids. Following the completion of data collection, the researcher attended a Northern 
Area Personal Construct Psychology (PCP) Group meeting90, and discussed the issue 
of analysis with some experienced researchers. For the purpose of this thesis, 
generally accepted methods of grid analysis have been adopted (as described in 
Jankowicz, 2004). Eyeball analysis is discussed under Section 6.6.1 which can be 
                                               
89 Content analysis was performed by two independent judges (the researcher and a colleague who carries 
out research in the same field), to increase reliability (see Section 6.6.3, and Section 7.3.1 respectively). 
90 The Personal Construct Psychology Group meets on a regular basis throughout the year, to discuss 
ongoing research interests. This group represents a broad range of academics who kindly offered advice 
on ‘Kelly’ and the direction of this PhD, which assisted completion of this analysis. 
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applied to any individual grid. This was applied after each session to identify if any of 
the grid output required immediate clarification. In addition, specific interrogations of 
‘worst’ and ‘aspirational’ compliance experiences were explored under eyeball analysis 
(in order to review the constructs formed for the two extremes of compliance 
experiences explored). Under Section 6.6.2 Honey’s Content Analysis is discussed. 
This form of content analysis has been chosen to link data output from the different 
sessions, by relying on the provision of an overall construct to all participants. The 
provision of the overall constructs of ‘cost’ and ‘benefit’ to the organisation allowed for 
analysis of the relative importance of each personal constructs to the individual, and 
organisations they serve.  
Through discussion with more experienced members of the PCP group, it was 
understood that a greater understanding of the elements and the constructs elicited 
within the grids can be formed through more extensive analysis of interview transcripts 
(story telling), which enable theorising to be triangulated between data sets. For 
example, Honey’s content analysis (Honey, 1979) was used in this case to develop 
categories and an understanding of the relative importance and dominance of 
categories. However, the results of the content analysis did not always align to the 
findings in the story telling – which allows for rigour in the research process whilst 
theorising. Indeed one of the main benefits of the story telling aspect of the grid was 
gaining insight on the implications that the range of experiences had on the individual 
(and the collective group). This was applied specifically to the eyeball analysis of grids 
when considering the benefits or costs associated with the extremes of their worst and 
aspirational compliance experiences. This was also acknowledged by the participants, 
during the sessions, where a number commented along the lines of “it’s funny how it 
makes you think like that”. This also supports Gray’s (2007) comment with regard to 
the importance on such tooling to enable critical reflection. A summary of the stages of 
analysis is set out in Figure 22. This figure demonstrates the three distinct phases of 
analysis which will now be discussed in turn including; Eyeball analysis (Section 6.6.1), 
Honey’s content analysis (Section 6.6.2), and the interview ‘story telling’ analysis 
(Section 6.6.4). The data findings are also presented under these three distinct 
techniques within Chapter 7. 
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Figure 22 Stages of analysis performed within this study. 
 
6.6.1 Eyeball analysis 
The way in which the repertory grid session is delivered ultimately focuses the analysis 
tools available to the researcher. However, irrespective of the other analysis decisions, 
Jankowicz (2004) recommend eyeball analysis to familiarise oneself with the content of 
the grid as a whole, prior to any other analysis. Eyeball analysis can be broken down 
into distinct stages (Jankowicz, 2004, p. 81): 
 What is the interviewee thinking? – topic of grid, info on qualifying phrases; 
 How has interviewee represented topic? – elements agreed; 
 How does s/he think? – how many constructs/length of interview (more 
constructs indicate interest in topic/expertise/frequent exposure to topic); 
 What does s/he think? – rating of elements (scaling used), anything obvious in 
matrix (although unusual); 
 draw conclusions – summarise main points and observations. 
In certain cases, it was clear using eyeball analysis that the interviewee had ‘gone off 
script’ and completed the grid incorrectly (for example, a problem encountered during 
group sessions due to the one on one feedback on the grid completion being lost in 
group environments). In these cases follow up emails/conversation were held on an 
individual basis to clarify and finalise the data within the grids. 
Eyeball analysis of the grid provided a holistic view of the interviewees thought 
process, and allowed for analysis to explore the individual elements themselves (i.e. 
how interviewees were categorising their experiences from worst to aspirational) 
alongside a measure of how individuals considered experiences as benefits and costs. 
Eyeball Analysis 
(Jankowicz, 2004) 
 
• Analysis of overall supplied 
construct scoring against element 
themes (benefits compared with 
costs, and worst to aspirational 
experiences) 
• Analysis of extremes of experience 
from worst to aspirational 
Honey’s Content Analysis 
(Honey, 1979) 
• Categories formed by two judges 
(based on draft template of 
categories from literature – new 
categories emerging in formed 
constructs) 
• Analysis of dominance and 
importance of construct categories 
Story Telling Analysis 
(Gray, 2007) 
• Thematic Review of transcripts 
• What are the implications of 
experiences? 
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A worked example of how constructs from the grids have been analysed is now 
presented for clarity. As discussed throughout this Section 6.6 and presented in 
Chapter 7, there have been three stages of analysis. The first two forms of analysis 
eyeball analysis, and Honey’s content analysis involved direct interrogation of the grids 
and elicited constructs. 
The construct pair example chosen for illustration originates from grid G1 – lMC16, and 
is “broad range of stakeholders” compared with “relatively narrow range of 
stakeholders” which the participant has expressed to describe and contrast 
experiences for ‘a, b and d’ (see also Figure 17 which outlines full grid where Example 
a represents 'Ideal/Aspirational' compliance experience, Example b represents 
‘straightforward/efficient compliance experience’, and Example d represents ‘relatively 
routine compliance  with significant issues’). See Figure 23 below for extract from the 
grid91. 
Figure 23 Extract from grid LMC16 
 
6.6.1.1 Application of Eyeball Analysis – exploration of aspirational experiences 
in contrast with worst experience (as per analysis in Section 7.2.2) 
The construct pair above represents a comparison of an ‘a’ experience 
(ideal/aspirational compliance experience). Therefore, this construct was listed out 
separately (along with other ‘a’ experiences) for analysis purposes. 
The construct listing of ideal/aspirational experiences was then reviewed manually and 
each of the constructs was allocated to one of the following listings: 
Aspirational Descriptor - Positive connotation 
                                               
91 This represents only one construct formed by participant from the total grid for the participant for 
clarity. This particular grid in the analysis excel file ran to 33 rows, and in final analysis 38 columns 
wide, so it is not feasible to show the entire excel grid in the thesis itself. 
Your own words to describe scenario: Date
Example a - 'Ideal/Aspirational' compliance experience Removing complexity 14/08/2013
Example b - straightforward/efficient compliance experience Improving reporting Participant Code:
Example c - routine compliance experience with minor issue Changing behaviour lMC16
Example d - relatively routine compliance  with significant issues Dealing with the regulators
Example e - compliance experience with major issues Regulatory investigation
Example f - 'worst' compliance experience Legacy issues
Ratings: '1' matches closely with left hand descriptor, '5' matches closely with right hand descriptor, '2,3,4' to rate between extremes.
Note: you do not need to 'rank' you can use same scores for multiple examples if necessary
Examples 
Compared Similar descriptor a b c d e f Dissimilar descriptor
a,b,d broad range of stakeholders 1 5 1 1 1 3
relatively narrow range of 
stakeholders
Construct pair example 
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Aspirational Descriptor - Neutral connotation 
Aspirational Descriptor - Negative connotation 
In this case there did not appear to be either a positive or negative connotation to the 
descriptor of ‘broad range of stakeholders’ and, therefore, the construct was added to 
the neutral connotation listing. 
Once all of the ‘a’ construct descriptors had been allocated to a listing (positive, neutral 
or negative), each of the listings was then reviewed for ‘themes’ in the constructs. The 
themes allocated to the neutral connotation listing were: Process/Procedural (1), 
Relations and culture (2), Stakeholders/Involvement (3), Skills/Specialism (4). In this 
case the construct was allocated to the ‘stakeholder/involvement’ theme. This process 
was repeated for all constructs to form the results summarised in Figure 29 under 
Section 7.2.2. 
6.6.2 Honey’s content analysis 
Content analysis has a long history within academic research (with analysis of symbols 
dating back to ancient Greece). It is a popular technique that has been adapted for use 
across research disciplines, and research philosophies through analysis of “the 
manifest and latent content” of bodies of data (Krippendorff, 2004). In early content 
analysis, there was a concentration of researchers studying the manifest content (literal 
content) of data e.g. quantitative newspaper analysis prior to and early in twentieth 
century concentrated on the frequency of subject matter. Bryman and Bell (2012) focus 
on “quantitative content analysis” based on reference to the work of Berelson (1952) 
and Holsti (1969), where content analysis can be defined as: 
“An approach to the analysis of documents and texts that seeks to quantify 
content in terms of predetermined categories and in a systematic and replicable 
manner” (Bryman and Bell, 2012, p. 291) 
However, during the course of the twentieth century, many researchers have started to 
adapt their research designs towards qualitative analysis of the latent content 
(underlying meaning) of the subject matter. Krippendorff (2004) offer an alternative and 
more flexible definition of content analysis due to fundamental disagreement with the 
quantitative focus of Berelsol’s (1952), and Holsti’s (1969) discussion of content 
analysis, which highlights also the qualitative (inferences) value of content analysis: 
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“Content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid 
inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use” 
(p. 18) 
 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) contend that content analysis is more deductive than 
grounded analysis. The researcher is interrogating the data for “constructs and ideas 
that have been decided in advance” (p. 163). Template analysis (King, 1998; King, 
2012) is considered to be a middle ground between content and grounded analysis, 
whereby the researcher will search for themes and patterns within the data.  
Honey’s content analysis, which has been adopted in this thesis, could be argued to 
focus on the manifest content of the data. However, this is not in fact the case, as 
through the process of categorisation the researcher is required to consider the 
underlying meanings of the constructs in order to prepare and allocate appropriate 
categories for further analysis. 
The principles of mixed methods research were applied within the content analysis of 
grids. As discussed further in Chapter 7, Honey’s content analysis was adapted to 
include an element of template analysis (using the template prepared during the pilots 
of this study for the first iteration of categorisation – see Table 10). The strength of this 
method was to identify hygiene type constructs and streamline the analysis process 
(see Section 7.3). 
6.6.2.1 Similarity Scores  
By supplying an overall construct using Honey’s content analysis technique, it is 
possible to label each elicited constructs and match the ratings to the overall construct, 
using percentage similarity scores. A score of 100% would indicate that ratings on the 
construct are identical to the ratings on the overall constructs, and decreasing 
percentage indicates that the ratings become less similar. 
It is also possible to compare “personal metrics”, whereby each individual will have 
differing similarity scores (Jankowicz, 2004, p. 171). Certain individuals may display 
fairly narrow percentage similarity scores, whilst others may see many different and 
unrelated constructs related to the topic leading to a wider range of percentage 
similarity score. Honey’s technique acknowledges this issue of relative percentage 
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similarity scores, and, therefore, allows ranking of “high, intermediate or low (H-I-L)”92 
values or “top and tail data”93 for each particular individual. 
6.6.2.2 Honey’s Content Analysis Procedure 
Jankowicz (2004) sets out the procedural steps of Honey’s content analysis (pp. 173-
177). These steps are summarised below, with details of the application within this 
thesis using the same construct example (brought forward from Figure 23) for 
illustration purposes. 
1. Obtain ratings on both supplied overall construct and elicited constructs against all 
elements; 
The session grids were transferred into excel (including scoring). An extract of the 
individual participants grid LMC16 is shown in Figure 24, which shows the 
participants construct pair ‘broad range of stakeholders, in contrast with, relatively 
narrow range of stakeholders, and the scoring thereof, alongside the scoring for the 
supplied overall constructs ‘overall benefit to the organisation, in contrast with, 
overall cost to the organisation’. The reversed ratings are also shown in this extract 
highlighted in yellow for clarity when using the grid during analysis. 
Figure 24 Extract from grid LMC16, demonstrating construct 'broad range of stakeholders', and 
overall construct 
 
2. Compute sum of differences (SOD) for each construct against the overall 
construct – comparing relationship of each individual elicited construct to the overall 
construct; 
a. Calculate sum of difference between overall construct and first construct 
                                               
92 During analysis ‘I’ or ‘intermediate’ was replaced by ‘M’ or ‘medium’, simply for ease of reader 
differentiating in tables/excel workings between I and L during analysis – this is a minor adaptation due 
to preference of researcher reading small text throughout analysis process. 
93 As described in Jankowicz (2004, p. 171), the allocation of H/I/L is performed manually for each 
individual grid, quoting Honey who described this as top and tail data (high similarity score to low 
similarity scores). 
Your own words to describe scenario: Date
Example a - 'Ideal/Aspirational' compliance experience Removing complexity 14/08/2013
Example b - straightforward/efficient compliance experience Improving reporting Participant Code:
Example c - routine compliance experience with minor issue Changing behaviour lMC16
Example d - relatively routine compliance  with significant issues Dealing with the regulators
Example e - compliance experience with major issues Regulatory investigation
Example f - 'worst' compliance experience Legacy issues
Ratings: '1' matches closely with left hand descriptor, '5' matches closely with right hand descriptor, '2,3,4' to rate between extremes.
Note: you do not need to 'rank' you can use same scores for multiple examples if necessary
Examples 
Compared Similar descriptor a b c d e f Dissimilar descriptor
a,b,d broad range of stakeholders 1 5 1 1 1 3
relatively narrow range of 
stakeholders
Overall benefits to the 
organisation 1 2 1 3 4 5
Overall cost to the 
organisation
Reversed Ratings Overall 5 4 5 3 2 1  
Overall construct and ratings 
  
164 
 
b. Calculate sum of difference between overall construct (reversed) and first 
construct (unreversed) 
c. Note the smaller of the two sum of differences  
These steps were performed using excel formula set up at pilot analysis stage. 
For the illustrated example, this worked out (in excel) as SOD 10 and Reversed SOD 
as 14. Therefore, SOD of 10 was taken forward in the calculation for similarity score. 
3. Turn the sum of differences into percentage similarity scores, to ensure 
comparability with other grids (again performed using excel formula set up at pilot 
analysis stage using Jankowicz’s (2004, p. 115) formula of 100-((SD/(LR-1)xE))x200), 
where SD is sum of differences, LR is largest possible score, and E is number of 
elements); 
This applied to grids formed in this research as =100-((AK24/((5-1)*6))*200) = 16.6% 
as a similarity score for this construct (where AK24 was the cell calculating SOD as 10 
as per Step 2). 
4. Consider the individual’s personal metric, using the percentage similarity 
scores; 
This involves manual review94 of individual grids overall scoring (which is a range of 
similarity scores). 
5. Label each construct with both indices of percentage similarity score and H-I-L 
(High, Intermediate or Low) transferring each construct onto a separate file card, and 
coding with interviewee detail; 
With a score of 16.6% this construct was allocated as a ‘low’ (L). 
Following calculations of SOD, similarity score and allocation of H-I-L, all construct 
details were then transferred to a separate sheet in excel (the construct log), to detail 
participant code, experiences compared, construct details, SOD, percentage similarity 
and HIL rating (as per  
 
 
                                               
94 See also Footnote 85. The allocations of H/I/L is performed separately for each individual grid, 
depending on the range of similarity scores within each individual’s grid.  
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Figure 25). 
 
 
 
Figure 25 Extract of construct log details 
Participant 
Log 
Experiences 
compared 
Construct Construct 
Pole 
SoD % 
Similarity 
HIL 
Rating 
lmc16 a,b,d broad range 
of 
stakeholders 
relatively 
narrow 
range of 
stakeholders 
10 16.7 L 
6. Identify categories; 
Initial categories were developed from the template designed at the pilot stage from the 
literature. Two judges (the researcher, and a colleague with an interest in the research 
specialism) met and discussed these categories as an appropriate starting point and 
allocated the construct log listing to the categories in excel. An additional category of 
‘other’ was used where the judges did not consider any of the descriptors fell into the 
category template. 
An extract of the judging template which listed out all of the constructs and the options 
of categories is shown in Figure 26, with the illustrative construct highlighted. 
Figure 26 Extract of judging sheet for allocation of categories 
 
7. Allocate constructs to categories; 
The judges met after the first round of judging and clarified categories, and discussed/ 
re-performed steps 8/9/10 for each round of judging until appropriate levels agreement 
were reached. 
8. Tabulate results; 
The full listing (and each round of iteration of judge allocation to categories) was 
recorded in excel. An extract is included in  
Descriptor - Pole 1 Descriptor - Pole 2 Category
Time consuming not time critical, not time consuming Resource - cost vs. benefit, monitoring of resources.
external pressure internal desire to change Reputation/ Best practice consideration/Proactivity of Management
potentially serious consequences consequences are less impactful Regulatory risk
financial impacts little direct financial input Regulatory risk
direct reputational impact some limited impact on reputation Reputation/ Best practice consideration/Proactivity of Management
longer 'term' issue short term Reputation/ Best practice consideration/Proactivity of Management
concerned with organisational culture process/format point Ethics and Culture
emotional element to delivery more factual/straightforward Stakeholder Considerations - Input from external departments/resource/consultants. Inhouse vs. shared services/outsourcing considerations
complexity - many inputs with diversity relatively straightforward Education and Training
organisation wide contained in compliance Stakeholder Considerations - Input from external departments/resource/consultants. Inhouse vs. shared services/outsourcing considerations
complex stakeholders limited local stakeholders Stakeholder Considerations - Input from external departments/resource/consultants. Inhouse vs. shared services/outsourcing considerations
broad range of stakeholders relatively narrow range of stakeholders Stakeholder Considerations - Input from external departments/resource/consultants. Inhouse vs. shared services/outsourcing considerations
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Figure 27. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27 Extract of table of judge allocations 
 
9. Establish the reliability of the category systems (using third party judge, to 
assist with steps 6 to 8); 
See Section 6.6.3 below. 
10. Summarise table by defining the category headings; 
The category table was discussed between judges and defined at each stage (i.e. 
including comments on which types of constructs to include in categories, as discussed 
at each iteration) – see extract below Figure 28. 
Figure 28 Extract of category table (template) including name of category, and the poles of 
constructs from literature review and judges’ comments on inclusions 
 
11. Summarise the table, finding examples of each category heading; 
Judge 1 Judge 2
Descriptor - Pole 1 Descriptor - Pole 2 Category Category
Time consuming not time critical, not time consuming Resource - cost vs. benefit, monitoring of resources.R  - cost vs. benefit, monitoring of resources.
external pressure internal desire to change Reputation/ Best practice consideration/Proactivity of ManagementRepu ation/ Best practice consideration/Proactivity of Management
potentially serious consequences consequences are less impactful Regulatory risk Regulatory risk
financial impacts little direct financial input Regulatory risk Regulatory risk
direct reputational impact some limited impact on reputation Reputation/ Best practice consideration/Proactivity of ManagementRepu ation/ Best practice consideration/Proactivity of Management
longer 'term' issue short term Reputation/ Best practice consideration/Proactivity of ManagementRepu ation/ Best practice consideration/Proactivity of Management
concerned with organisational culture process/format point Ethics and Culture Ethics and Culture
emotional element to delivery more factual/straightforward Stakeholder Considerations - Input from external departments/resource/consultants. Inhouse vs. shared services/outsourcing considerationsStakehol r Considerations - Input from external departments/resource consultants. Inhouse vs. shared services/outsourcing considerations
complexity - many inputs with diversity relatively straightforward Education and Training Education and Training
organisation wide contained in compliance Stakeholder Considerations - Input from external departments/resource/consultants. Inhouse vs. shared services/outsourcing considerationsStakehol r Considerations - Input from external departments/resource consultants. Inhouse vs. shared services/outsourcing considerations
complex stakeholders limited local stakeholders Stakeholder Considerations - Input from external departments/resource/consultants. Inhouse vs. shared services/outsourcing considerationsStakehol r Considerations - Input from external departments/resource consultants. Inhouse vs. shared services/outsourcing considerations
broad range of stakeholders relatively narrow range of stakeholders Stakeholder Considerations - Input from external departments/resource/consultants. Inhouse vs. shared services/outsourcing considerationsStakehol r Considerations - Input from external departments/resource consultants. Inhouse vs. shared services/outsourcing considerations
Positive aspects Negative aspects Link to literature Comments: To include…..
Stakeholder Considerations - Input 
from external 
departments/resource/consultants. 
Inhouse vs. shared 
services/outsourcing considerations
Extens ive investment of IT
compl iance resources
Minimal investment in IT
compl iance resources
Bamberger (2010), Gable (2005),
Garcia (2004), Mainel l i and
Yeandle (2006), Hussein and
Hussan (2008)
 Organisation wide vs . 'in' 
compl iance, s takeholders , 
Emotion?, Consultants , IT/system 
change requirements . 
Internal centre of
excel lence
External  centre of excel lence
McIvor and McCraken and
McHugh (2011)
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a. Within each category order constructs from top to bottom with respect to 
percentage similarity scores (i.e. at top those with near identical scores, and at bottom 
those with lower similarity scores) 
b. Looking at all constructs within a category, identify personally salient constructs 
on which there is group consensus (i.e. where H-I-L indices are high, the construct is 
important to the sample of participants, where H-I-L indices are mixed this shows there 
is no particular consensus indicating ambivalence about the importance/relevance of 
the construct, and if H-I-L is low this indicates that the construct does not relate 
particularly well to the topic in general) 
c. If subthemes are identified within the category, group according to meaning 
being expressed 
This was performed manually in excel, there were no further subthemes identified, 
following the extensive discussions between judges in category formation in steps 6-8) 
12. Summarise table, stating frequency under category heading i.e. how many 
constructs per category/subcategory; 
See Appendix 7 for a full listing on constructs allocated within each category, and a 
summary below in Figure 29. In the full listing in Appendix 7 the percentage similarity 
between the individual construct and the overall construct is stated (from Step 3), and 
the allocation of H-I-L for each construct is stated (from Step 5) above. In the summary 
below the average percentage similarity score for constructs allocated in the category 
is recorded. In addition, a manual review of all constructs allocated to each category 
was performed (as per Step 4, and Step 5) and an allocation of H-I-L has been 
recorded for each category. 
Figure 29 Picture of summary table of constructs formed in excel (full list in Appendix 7) 
  
168 
 
 
13. Complete differential analysis as required for the investigation (in terms of 
demographics of sample); 
Importance and dominance of constructs was assessed for each of the construct 
categories. See Section 7.3.4 and 7.4.5. 
As discussed above, a critical step is identifying and allocating to categories (which is 
effectively steps 6 through to 10 described above), hence the nature of using a third 
party to confirm this process. Categorical distinction allocates the constructs by “their 
membership in a class or category, by their having something in common” 
(Krippendorff, 2004, p. 105). However, this is also similar in definition to thematic 
distinction, albeit this relates to “combinations of categories” (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 
107). Due to the similarities and merge of definitions of allocating to categories by 
judges, the importance of reliability of content analysis is discussed briefly in Section 
6.6.3, and in further depth within the Chapter 7. 
6.6.3 Reliability and validity of content analysis  
Content analysis needs to be reproducible to make sense to other people, and, 
therefore, it is essential that a reliability check is incorporated within the analysis. To be 
clear, this is not in reference to the reliability of the grids themselves as “there are 
many forms of grids with their own unique elements, constructs and scores” (Wright, 
2009, p. 758). Reliability is discussed with reference to the content analysis performed 
on both the collective constructs and interview transcripts. 
“Reliability refers to the consistency and stability of findings that enables 
findings to be replicated” (Burns and Burns, 2008, p. 410) 
Categories
Number of paired 
constructs % Constructs % Similarity HIL Value
Resource - cost vs. benefit, monitoring of 
resources. 15 13 38 M/H
Education and Training 11 10 27 M
Ethics and Culture 6 5 36 M
Reputation/ Best practice 
consideration/Proactivity of Management 15 13 37 M
Skills and Status of Compliance - experience, 
knowledge, education and hierarchy within 
organisation 3 3 11 L
Stakeholder Considerations - Input from 
external departments/resource/consultants. 
Inhouse vs. shared services/outsourcing 
considerations 18 16 33 M
Communication and Knowledge Sharing 4 3 33 M
Regulatory risk 8 7 36 M
Principles vs. Rule Based - spirit vs. letter of 
law (judgement) 9 8 54 H
Barriers to compliance - internal processes 
and procedures issues not addressed in 
above categories (i.e. not ethics/culture, 
skills, resource) 14 12 41 M/H
Nuisance/Inefficiencies 9 8 59 H
Ritualism and Gaming 3 3 33 L
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This takes place during the tabulation phase of analysis. For the purpose of this 
research a colleague was requested to independently identify categories, allocate 
constructs to categories and to tabulate the results. There are three types of reliability 
to consider: stability (the ability to code content in the same way over time); 
reproducibility (the extent to which coding is the same across multiple coders); and 
accuracy (by coding against predetermined standards). (Krippendorff, 2004) It is 
argued within this study, that the concept of stability conflicts somewhat with the 
philosophies of constructive alternativism, which would contend that stability is 
irrelevant in light of both participants and researchers’ worldview adapting to the 
experiences through the passage of time (which ultimately would impact on the ability 
of coding in the same way over time, as new literature and experiences are 
undertaken).  
However, the concepts of reproducibility and accuracy have been considered within 
this study. The extent to which the table of the author and the colleagues table agree 
indicates the reliability of the procedures. When measuring inter observer reliability, we 
are judging the extent to which the two judges agree, and thus we would rate the 
assessment more reliable if the judges are closely agreed (Burns and Burns, 2008, pp. 
424-425). Reliability should not be confused with validity. Reliability is concerned with 
the accuracy and stability of a measure, whereas validity relates to how appropriate a 
measure is to assess the construct under observation (Burns and Burns, 2008, p. 425). 
Validity is concerned with truth and tests claims of the researcher, as opposed to 
evidence obtained independent of the research (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 212). Often in 
qualitative research validation takes the form of triangulation, which endorses credibility 
of the research findings by utilising multiple sources of data or methods (Stemler, 
2001). Within this research, by performing content analysis on the constructs formed in 
the grid, and separate analysis of transcripts of open discussion, triangulation has been 
achieved. However, there is a complex relationship whereby unreliability limits the 
chance of validity, but also reliability does not guarantee validity (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 
213). Assessment of inter judge correlations (including a discussion of measures 
including Cohen’s Kappa and Krippendorff’s Alpha) will be discussed further in the 
Findings and Analysis Chapter under Section 7.3.1. 
6.6.4 Analysis of interview transcripts 
As in Section 6.4.7, each session was recorded and transcribed. In the initial research 
design, the purpose of recording the interview was a failsafe, to ensure the reliability of 
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the data recorded within each grid i.e. to provide a greater understanding of the 
construct elicitation and meaning of constructs.  
However, the importance of the interview transcriptions became clear for analysis early 
on in the process of data collection. The majority of participants found themselves story 
telling whilst constructing the grid, and so valuable data existed with the interview 
transcripts for analysis purposes (Gray, 2007). 
As the interviews were unstructured by nature (due to the personal nature of grid 
formation), analysis was performed in separate stages. As discussed above (Section 
6.4), where possible all of the participants were asked to consider broadly the three 
main themes reviewed during the literature search (new regulation, consulting and 
alternative options).  
• What are the effects of changing regulation? 
• When/How are consultants used? 
• When/How are outsourcing/shared service options considered? 
Codes were set up based on these specific questions within the initial coding of 
interview transcripts, allowing for specific analysis of the interview transcripts prior to 
immersion. This process was performed manually using tables in word (which was the 
preferred tooling due to ease of use and simplicity, compared to some application 
specific tooling such as Nvivo). 
6.6.5 Post analysis feedback 
Following analysis of the grid (as described in Sections 6.6.1 to 6.6.4, and presented in 
Chapter 7), a conceptual model was theorised through triangulation of the existing 
literature base and the data collated within this study (which is presented in Chapter 8). 
The development of the conceptual framework is presented in Figure 50 (at the 
beginning of Chapter 8), to represent the triangulation of the literature against the main 
findings of this study, to support the theoretical rationale for the emergent attributes of 
the model (see Table 22). 
In order to reinforce reliability of data analysis and interpretation, the resulting model 
was sent out to the original participants, alongside a number of new contacts which 
were made following original data collection. It is argued that this aligns to the 
principles of the Delphi Method, whereby the overall purpose is to “develop a technique 
to obtain the most reliable consensus of a group of experts” whilst dealing with a 
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complex problem (Okoli and Pawlowski, 2004). A large majority of Delphi studies focus 
on ranking mechanisms to achieve consensus. However, for the purpose of this study 
the element of ‘construct validity’ has been explored most closely (Okoli and 
Pawlowski, 2004, p. 19), by revisiting the experts and asking them to validate the 
researcher’s interpretation. 
The decision was taken to distribute the conceptual model via email, which represents 
a form of e interview. By seeking feedback the emails represent an asynchronous 
interview technique, resulting in email exchanges between participant and researcher 
(Bampton and Cowton, 2002). The obvious advantage of this technique is the limited 
expenditure involved in furthering the research agenda (rather than revisiting each of 
the participants on site). This also acknowledges research ethics and the respect of 
individuals, as the participants could choose to ignore the email request for further 
feedback. In addition, the use of this technique avoided the data access concerns 
which were discussed earlier within this chapter, allowing participants to work around 
their own work schedules (Morgan and Symon, 2004). 
However, the decision to obtain feedback was not without limitation. Meho (2006, p. 
1292) contends that participants “may lose focus” or “drop out before the interview is 
complete”. Therefore, the email request for feedback was designed carefully, to ensure 
that whilst enough information was provided for clarity, the email was suitably worded 
to capture the participants’ interest. The language used within the email was also 
carefully adapted to avoid academic jargon, as the email was initially directed towards 
the practitioners who had contributed to the original data collection. A copy of the 
feedback email can be viewed in Appendix 2. 
Despite this careful preparation of the feedback email interview, in practice the 
respondents did not always respond and provide feedback as expected, which again 
required the researcher to adapt and allow for flexibility of analysis (following principles 
of constructive alternativism). This is discussed further in Chapter 8, Section 8.3. For 
example, despite an ongoing dialogue with one participant over email to discuss 
feedback, the output of the emails was a telephone conversation for clarity in which 
notes were taken by the researcher. This again reflects the pragmatic nature of this 
research, as participants do not always act in the way that is commonly expected in the 
research process. This informal conversation (which ended up lasting over an hour 
long) resulted in a number of new dimensions that have been considered and 
presented in the final model under Section 8.4. 
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6.7 Reflections on limitations of methodology 
As with any piece of research, there are a number of limitations to this study which are 
identified below. 
Firstly, due to resource limitation of this research, data collection has been restricted to 
the UK banking industry. Therefore, this study does not claim generalisability to other 
regulatory/compliance sectors within the UK, and globally. It is arguable that 
generalisability will always be an issue in qualitative research. However, 
generalisability is restricted by the access constraints and the limited sample selected. 
The preference would have been to also include the financial regulator within the 
research process. Unfortunately this was not possible due to the timing of the research 
coinciding with the restructure of the FSA95 to the PRA/FCA. Generalisability may have 
been furthered through an extended survey technique. This acts as a potential area of 
future research post submission. Reliability of content analysis should be rigorous due 
to use of inter judge/rater reliability (Section 7.3.1). In addition, the output of the 
analysis in the form of the conceptual model has been extended to further practitioners 
and academics for feedback (as discussed in Section 6.6.5), which counters the issues 
of generalisability to a certain extent (discussed further in Chapter 8). 
Secondly, Personal Construct Theory is centred on the fundamental postulate and the 
corollary proposed by Kelly (set out in Appendix 3). The research veered away from the 
principles of the theory by providing certain constructs at pilot stage (and thus 
introducing researcher bias). Therefore, the research design was revisited (see also 
Figure 15) and a methodology applied which aligns to the original theory seeing man 
as the personal scientist with emphasis on individuality of constructs, whilst still 
allowing quantitative analysis through the methods applied by Honey. The same 
criticism could be said by providing general themes for elements to the participants. 
However, this research is not based on grounded theory, and, consequently, a basic 
structure to the grid was considered necessary to allow collective analysis of the 
resulting data (focussing on the commonality corollary and the range corollary). 
In addition ‘all of the answers’ cannot be found through the adopted method of 
repertory grid. This has led to a modification in the research questions during the 
course of the research project. There is no possibility to delve into cost benefit analysis 
further which was desired at the project proposal phase. The largely inductive 
                                               
95 As mentioned earlier the regulator was approached in the early stages of the research, but they declined 
to participate. 
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approach via repertory grid acts as a starting point for further deductive research into 
the topic in the future. 
Finally, it must be acknowledged that the data produced by this methodology 
(alongside the majority of other academic studies) represents “manufactured” data 
(Silverman, 2013, pp. 31-55). However, it is argued that the issue of author bias has 
been considered throughout, and actively avoided through the elicitation of data driven 
by personal construct, and the nature of the open discussions.  
6.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter has introduced and justified the chosen methodological tool of repertory 
grid, as a means of exploring practitioners’ personal constructs. Evidence of the wide 
ranging use of repertory grid has been presented from the broader academic 
community (most notably from its roots in psychology). However, this methodological 
tool has rarely been used specific to regulatory compliance research. The use of the 
methodological tool and analysis thereon has been tailored distinctively for this study, 
and contributes to the regulatory compliance literature by exploring the linear models of 
compliance in comparison with practitioners’ constructs. 
As evidenced in this chapter there have been iterations in the research design from 
pilot stage through to live data collection, to address limitations that were encountered 
on the research journey. Despite the issues with access, the flexibility of research 
design and chosen methodological tool has resulted in a rich data set that is presented 
in the next chapter. The next chapter is structured around the three forms of analysis of 
the grid and interview data, which was presented in Section 6.6. 
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Chapter 7 Findings and analysis 
7.0 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present and analyse data collated through repertory 
grid sessions, and to examine the research questions identified within the methodology 
chapter. Table 14 summarises the research questions and relates these to supposition 
statements explored within this chapter, linking to the analysis performed, and the 
sections discussed. The supposition statements in Table 14 represent pre-supposed 
thoughts of the author from both prior practical knowledge, and the concepts identified 
within the literature reviews, prior to analysis of the data. These suppositions are 
revisited, alongside the main findings of the analysis at the end of this chapter in Table 
21.  
The data set for this thesis is collated from 12 participants (see also Section 6.5, Table 
13). The average working experience of participants was 20.1 years, which indicates a 
rich, depth of experience (personal constructs) to draw from whilst undertaking the grid 
interview. During repertory grid formation, and comparison of participant’s compliance 
experiences a key concern of practitioners’ emerged around barriers to compliance.  
This chapter has been split into a number of sub sections, which follows the distinct 
phases of analysis performed. In Section 7.1, through to Section 7.3, the analysis of 
grid data is presented to explore Research Questions 2a and 2b. The analytical 
framework adopted develops three levels of analysis with initial eyeball analysis of 
individual grids, followed by immersion and the application of Honey’s content analysis 
on grid constructs. In Section 7.4, further analysis of interview transcripts is undertaken 
which enables exploration of Research Questions 1 and 3. In Section 7.5, concluding 
thoughts on the analysis are presented, including a summary of the main findings. 
7.1 Data analysis of personal constructs 
There are a variety of ways in which Personal Construct Theory is applied across 
differing disciplines (in terms of research methodologies and analysis). Indeed this was 
one of the main draws to the theory under a pragmatic logic. In discussion with 
members of the PCP group (see Section 6.6), a theme emerged of focusing on the 
story telling within personal construct theory and utilising repertory grid within an 
interview setting. Therefore, to justify the analysis techniques chosen, the main 
argument is that ‘this naturally makes sense’ (to the researcher) to analyse the story 
telling of the participants, contributing to richness of the data set.  
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Table 14 Linkage between research questions and analysis of suppositions 
Research question (RQ) Supposition statement Underpinning 
literature 
Analysis 
performed 
Analysis 
section 
Research Question 1: To what 
extent does the regulatory cycle 
influence managements’ decision 
making over compliance approach? 
Individual compliance officers prioritise workload around the 
regulatory approach (and the current regulatory risk 
appetite). 
Enforcement Pyramid 
(Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992). 
Section 3.3.1. 
Jackman’s model 
(2001). Section 4.3.1. 
Interview 
transcription 
analysis. 
Section 
7.4 
Research Question 2a: What are the 
key constructs that influence 
managers’ decision of compliance 
function approach? 
No suppositions were made for content analysis of 
constructs. 
 Honey’s content 
analysis. 
Section 
7.3 
Research Question 2a: What are the 
key constructs that influence 
managers’ decision of compliance 
function approach? 
Aspirational compliance experiences may include an 
abundance of positive connotation within the descriptors, 
and that worst compliance experiences may include an 
abundance of negative connotation within the descriptors 
given by participants. 
Compliance model, 
relationship with 
regulator (Jackman, 
2001). Section 4.3.1. 
Eyeball analysis 
of experiences 
(elements) and. 
constructs 
formed. 
Section 
7.2 
Research Question 2b: How do 
compliance officers’ personal 
constructs align to academic models 
of compliance? 
If the scaling of aspirational compliance to worst compliance 
within the repertory grid were aligned to the linear scale of 
Jackman’s model and contention of “an ethos of ethical 
compliance” and “unthinking mechanical compliance”, the 
expectation would be for scoring of 1 for aspirational 
compliance (perceived as a benefit to organisation) and a 
scoring of 5 for worst compliance experience (perceived as 
a cost to the organisation). 
Compliance model, 
relationship with the 
regulator (Jackman, 
2001). 
Section 4.3.1. 
Eyeball analysis 
of scoring of 
constructs 
compared with 
experiences. 
Section 
7.2 
Research Question 3: In cases of 
new regulation, how do compliance 
functions rely on external expertise 
(consultants) or is there proactive 
promotion of in house knowledge 
and expertise? 
The approach to new compliance is highly dependent on the 
resource constraints within the business. 
Consulting (Arnold, 
2009); Gable, 2005). 
Concepts of centres of 
excellence via shared 
service, (Ulbrich 2006; 
Herbert and Seal, 
2012). Chapter 5. 
Interview 
transcription 
analysis. 
Section 
7.4 
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Whilst acknowledging the themes identified through content analysis; the story telling 
and laddering of elements and constructs, by the interviewees recorded within 
transcripts supports the analysis of grid data (Kneiding and Tracey, 2009; Crudge and 
Johnson, 2007). The different forms of data (interview and grid data) have been 
analysed separately during first level analysis, and following immersion a secondary 
review has been undertaken to further identify patterns and themes identified within 
each data sets; relating to each other, and against the existing literature base 
(Waddington, 2005, see Figure 30). 
Figure 30 Analytical framework (developed by Waddington 2005) 
 
Prior to the presentation of findings, it is essential to revisit a fundamental aspect of 
Kelly’s theory to demonstrate why constructs have been analysed within bipolar pairs. 
The meaning and understanding of constructs can only be explored fully in the context 
of the emergent and implicit pole (see dichotomy corollary which is detailed in 
Appendix 3). For example, the construct of ‘good’ could be coupled with a construct of 
‘poor’ (in terms of applications skills to compliance processes), or ‘good’ could be 
coupled with construct of ‘evil’ (in terms of moral judgement over compliance decision 
making) (see also Dick and Jankowicz, 2001, p. 186). This highlights the importance of 
pairing of constructs for analysis purposes, to obtain an understanding of the 
participants construct system (see also discussion around Figure 34 and Figure 35, 
specific to this study). 
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In addition the importance of ‘types of constructs’ must be considered during analysis. 
Song and Gale (2008) summarise different categories of constructs; propositional 
constructs which describe easily observable properties of elements for example 
black/white; sensory constructs which describe how the person feels or perceives the 
elements for example hard/soft; and evaluative constructs which describes how the 
person evaluates the elements for example liked/disliked (adapted from Stewart, et al., 
1981, p. 27). Jankowicz (2004, pp. 83-88) offers an extended and alternative 
categorisation of constructs; core constructs are those which have deep and personal 
(central) significance to the interviewee (what they value in existence), whilst peripheral 
constructs summarise feelings and knowledge of less important items; propositional 
constructs offer basic (often superficial) characteristics of elements, leading to narrow 
and over specific ranges of convenience, whilst constellatory constructs imply an 
overarching position of an element, which then allows you to construe from that 
position (characterised by stereotyping). Other types of constructs described by 
Jankowicz include; affective (expressing emotion/feeling), behavioural (what elements 
do), evaluative (opinion/assessment provided), attributional (includes reason for 
behaviour), and finally, unremarkable (limited implications). The importance of 
characterising/categorising/classifying constructs is most relevant when considering the 
analysis of grids.  
7.2 Eyeball analysis design 
The first step of analysis involved eyeball analysis – simply looking at the grids 
themselves. Figure 31 highlights this first distinct phase of analysis which is presented 
within this section. 
Figure 31 Distinct phase of analysis (Eyeball Analysis) – figure brought forward from Methodology 
Chapter, Section 6.6 
 
Eyeball Analysis 
(Jankowicz, 2004) 
 
• Analysis of overall supplied 
construct scoring against element 
themes (benefits compared with 
costs, and worst to aspirational 
experiences) 
• Analysis of extremes of experience 
from worst to aspirational 
Honey’s Content Analysis 
(Honey, 1979) 
• Categories formed by two judges 
(based on draft template of 
categories from literature – new 
categories emerging in formed 
constructs) 
• Analysis of dominance and 
importance of construct categories 
Story Telling Analysis 
(Gray, 2007) 
• Thematic Review of transcripts 
• What are the implications of 
experiences? 
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Eyeball analysis would usually be restricted to single grids to familiarise oneself “with 
what’s there” (Jankowicz, 2004, p. 80). However, due to the commonality of the overall 
supplied construct (see Methodology Chapter, Section 6.4) within each grid, specific 
focus was given to the scoring by each individuals experience against the concept of 
overall benefit, in contrast with, overall cost to the organisation. Using this common 
feature of each grid, the scoring of the supplied overall benefit, in contrast with, overall 
cost construct was analysed. For this one construct it can be assumed that the scoring 
acts as a rating scale and average (mean) score may be analysed (Jankowicz, 2004, p. 
145). 
Eyeball analysis followed three distinct routes, which are unique in nature due to 
design of the repertory grid explored within this study: 
1. An exploration of benefits and costs scoring (Section 7.2.1); 
2. An exploration of aspirational and worst compliance experience (Section 7.2.2); 
3. And finally a general review of all of the participants experiences – the elements 
(Section 7.2.3). 
The reason analysis has been performed in this manner is to ensure that full 
consideration of individual experiences (elements) are taken into account within the 
findings (as the second stage of content analysis, in Section 7.3, will only consider 
individual constructs). 
However, prior to analysis the following limitations are identified. The concepts of 
benefit and cost are open for interpretation by each individual. In addition, although 
elements are themed from aspirational to worst experience (see grid template outline, 
including element themes in Figure 17), each individual’s experiences are standalone.  
An extended discussion was held with one participant about ‘from who’s viewpoint’ 
benefits and costs should be considered. The argument being that in the case of a 
morally corrupt organisation, then there would be benefits in terms of saved 
resource/personal benefits being achieved for poor compliance behaviour and so the 
interpretation of benefits and costs would be skewed when full disclosure about morally 
corrupt behaviour was not public knowledge. For the purpose of the interview the 
assumption was taken that information would be publically available for assessing 
overall benefit/costs – whilst acknowledging that in ‘real world’ practice this would not 
always be the case with some companies “getting away with murder… under the radar” 
Participant OMC20. 
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“So to them, the benefit is huge…it only becomes a cost when they are 
discovered” Participant OMC20 
7.2.1 Exploration of benefits in contrast to costs  
The following supposition was made prior to analysis (see Table 14 for link to research 
question and underlying literature): 
If the scaling of aspirational compliance to worst compliance within the repertory 
grid were aligned to the linear scale of Jackman’s model (Figure 32) and 
contention of “an ethos of ethical compliance” and “unthinking mechanical 
compliance”, the expectation would be for scoring of 1 for aspirational 
compliance (perceived as a benefit to organisation) and a scoring of 5 for worst 
compliance experience (perceived as a cost to the organisation).  
The average rating scale for overall benefit, in contrast to, overall cost to the 
organisation is summarised in Figure 33. This was derived from collating the ratings 
allocated by each participant against the overall benefit, in contrast to overall cost 
construct in individual grids, and taking an average of the ratings (a mean score). 
Figure 32 Jackman’s model (see also Chapter 4) 
 
Figure 33 Summary of analysis table - mean scores for overall supplied construct (benefit/cost to 
organisation) in comparison to experience themes 
 
Overall 
benefit/cost 
to the 
organisation
Example a - 
'ideal/aspirational' 
compliance experience
Example b - 
straightforward/efficient 
compliance experience
Example c - routine 
compliance experience 
with minor issue
Example d - relatively 
routine compliance  with 
significant issues
Example e - compliance 
experience with major 
issues
Example f - 'worst' 
compliance experience
Average Score 1.42 1.92 2.92 2.92 3.17 4.50
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The mean score represents how closely (on average scoring) the participants consider 
the experiences are aligned to the overall benefit/cost construct. The expectation would 
be for scoring of 1 for aspirational compliance (perceived as a benefit to organisation) 
and a scoring of 5 for worst compliance experience (perceived as a cost to the 
organisation). Under eyeball analysis of the mean scores (see Figure 33) assigned by 
the 12 individuals in this study the supposition does not hold entirely true. The reasons 
for this can be explained by the verbal musings of the participants when scoring the 
grids. Statements were made by individuals, suggesting that whilst worst experiences 
are generally accepted as undesirable, individuals and organisations did gain some 
benefits in the form of learning, and improvements made following events.  
“we learnt something from that as a business […] it meant that people were 
more aware…It was still a cost, but there was learning, and good knowledge 
came out of the experience” Participant JMC10 
In contrast, ideal/aspirational compliance experiences did not always correlate fully to 
benefit the organisations. For example when describing the reasons why an efficient 
compliance experience was seen as more of a cost rather than a benefit, and an 
experience with significant issues was seen more as a benefit than a cost the following 
was stated: 
“albeit it was the hardest and least pleasurable experience…but that was the 
one, had it not been managed correctly, would have been the most 
unfortunate… let’s put it that way shall we…this one made money, but this one 
could have cost a lot more…” Participant VMLA19 
Experiences with minor to significant issues were scored neutrally by the participants 
between 2.92 and 3.17 (see average mean scores of overall supplied construct, 
summarised in Figure 33). This indicates that both benefit and costs were seen to 
result from these experiences in equal/neutral measure. An example of this was 
evidenced when discussing a process viewed as having major issues with one 
participant. They discussed a scenario where processes were changed to meet 
regulatory requirements: 
“it was quite engineered to be honest, so if you had to compare the cost of 
running it, to the benefit of putting it in place then net you are down…over time I 
am sure you would recover it….so let’s put a 3” Participant RM020 
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These results indicated that simple linear scales within academic model cannot easily 
be transferred to practice96. Jackman’s model did not directly incorporate cost and 
benefit considerations to his extremes of the compliance approach, and this is an area 
that needs to be further integrated to understand the outcomes for compliance officers 
when approaching particular compliance issues. This links to the next section where 
the aspirational and worst extremes of compliance officer experiences are explored in 
further detail. 
7.2.2 Exploration of aspirational and worst experience  
The listings of constructs specific to aspirational and worst compliance experience 
were also reviewed under eyeball analysis to contribute to this discussion (by 
extracting constructs formed during comparisons of these two extremes of experience 
from the overall listing97). This phase of analysis reflects Immersion/Crystallisation 
(Borkan, 1999) consisting of engagement and experiencing the constructs to identify 
patterns and themes and relationships (Waddington and Fletcher, 2005).  
The following supposition was made prior to analysis of constructs relating to 
aspirational and worst experiences (see Table 14 for link to research question and 
underlying literature): 
Aspirational compliance experiences may include an abundance of positive 
connotation within the descriptors, and that worst compliance experiences may 
include an abundance of negative connotation within the descriptors given by 
participants. 
However, this was not observed on review of the grid outputs. The constructs formed 
when comparing aspirational and worst compliance experiences were manually 
reviewed and sorted into three categories of positive, neutral and negative connotation. 
Each category (positive/neutral/negative connotation) was then reviewed for themes. 
This was performed prior to any other content analysis of the full construct set. The 
result of this analysis is summarised in Table 15 and  
                                               
96  For example, Jackman’s model is linear in nature from unthinking compliance (or minimal 
compliance) to ethical compliance (i.e. beyond compliance), and Ayres and Braithwaites’ Enforcement 
Pyramid is also linear in design from self-regulation (i.e. fairly hands off by regulator) to command and 
control (i.e. sanctioning and heavy involvement from perspective of regulator). 
97 Within excel, all constructs which had been used to describe ‘aspirational compliance’ and ‘worst 
compliance’ experiences were separately listed for analysis purposes. Aspirational compliance construct 
descriptors were then categorised under ‘positive, neutral and negative’ based on individual descriptions. 
The same process was performed for worst compliance construct descriptors. The ‘positive, neutral and 
negative’ categories were then analysed to consider whether themes existed within the descriptions. See 
worked example in Section 6.6.6.1. 
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Table 16.  
Table 15 Constructs elicited from practitioners to describe aspirational compliance experience, 
interpreted as positive, neutral and negative connotation, and allocated to themes 
Aspirational Descriptor  - 
Positive connotation 
Aspirational Descriptor  - 
Neutral connotation 
Aspirational Descriptor - 
Negative connotation 
organisation wide (1) longer ‘term' issue (4) complexity - many inputs with 
diversity (8) 
skilled judgement and 
expertise required (2) 
concerned with organisational 
culture (5) 
complex stakeholders (8) 
done daily (3) emotional element to delivery 
(5) 
uncertainty of results/delivery 
(9) 
training provided (2) broad range of stakeholders 
(6) 
risk involved in making 
progress (10) 
clear process (3) emotional debate (5) complexity of delivery (8) 
assists (3) seniority of management input 
(6) 
lengthy process (11) 
enhances image of 
organisation (3) 
customer facing process (4) difficult to implement (8) 
common sense approach (3) non lending process (4) too many checks (11) 
efficient (3) info stored on bank systems 
(4) 
major system change required 
(11) 
good to deal with (3) in house (4) vague information (11) 
ease of use (3) procedural (4) commercial necessity (10) 
low risk as no penalties (3) opinion self-regulating (5) manual use (11) 
Compliance experience and 
competence (2) 
change process (4) Risk of legal exposure if it 
goes wrong (10) 
Judgement Required (2) deal with identification of 
customer (5) 
  
Skills (2) one off project (4)   
Saved money/made money 
(3) 
project management required 
(7) 
  
Wholly driven by client (1) engages stakeholders with 
different skill sets (e.g. IT 
customer facing) (7) 
  
Front end development cost 
for later gain (3) 
specialised - starting from 
scratch (no starting point) (7) 
  
Skills required in creating 
system - experience (2) 
event (4)   
Close direct relationship with 
client (1) 
could outsource (7)   
Seen as exciting opportunity, 
positive (3) 
consultancy firm could do this 
(simple tasks, easy to spot 
mistake) (7) 
  
Potential to sell 
products/service (3) 
Bigger impact on non-
compliance resource e.g. IT 
(6) 
  
Allocation of above construct to themes 
Themes: Involvement (1), 
Skills/Specialism (2), 
Perceived benefits - clarity, 
costs etc. (3) 
Themes: Process/Procedural 
(4), Relations and culture (5), 
Stakeholders/Involvement (6), 
Skills/Specialism (7) 
Themes: Complexity (8), 
Uncertainty (9), Risk (10) and 
Process inefficiency (11) 
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When reviewing aspirational experiences constructs, the negative connotation is less 
common, and has been categorised (by the researcher) into the collective themes of: 
complexity; uncertainty; risk; and process inefficiency. Positive connotations are more 
common and have been categorised into themes of: involvement; skills/specialism; and 
perceived benefits - clarity, costs etc. Finally the neutral connotations have been 
reviewed into themes of: process/procedural; relations and culture; 
stakeholders/involvement; and skills/specialism. 
This represents thematic analysis in its most simple form to demonstrate the first 
perceptions of the data output from the grid interviews (prior to more formal process of 
Honey’s content analysis). The categorisation into themes was performed, and is 
subject to the individual researcher’s literal interpretation and biases. However, the 
following observations (from analysis of Table 15) may be summarised from this initial 
analysis of aspirational experiences: 
• Although experiences were perceived as aspirational by participants, negative 
descriptors exist within the constructs formed (third column of Table 15); 
• A greater number of positive or neutral connotations exist (first and second 
column of Table 15) within the descriptors than negative connotation; 
• Positive connotations are dominated by themes of perceived benefits, 
involvement and skills and specialism; 
• Negative connotations are dominated by themes of complexity, uncertainty, and 
risk and process inefficiency. 
At the other end of the scale of experiences, constructs used to describe worst 
compliance experience were also analysed in the same manner. It can be observed (in  
Table 16) that there are fewer positive connotations within the constructs formed on 
worst compliance experience. Nevertheless, those that result have been themed as; 
commitment to change, ease of change, integrity, perceived effectiveness. However, 
one of these themes may also be scaled as a negative connotation depending on the 
literal interpretation. For the individual constructs of ‘personal integrity important factor’ 
and ‘personal integrity’, both a positive and a negative connotation may be inferred 
from the reference to ‘personal integrity’ (see Figure 34, for reference of such 
constructs collated from practitioners). The scenario may have required personal 
integrity by individuals (compliance officers) involved, due to the lack of personal 
integrity demonstrated by others. Therefore, the viewpoint of observation is paramount 
  
184 
 
to how this construct may be interpreted as positive or negative. If a lack of personal 
integrity was evidence this would be viewed in a negative manner. Therefore, the 
constructs were considered compared to the contrast pole to assess whether these 
were to be reviewed in a positive or negative connotation.  
Figure 34 Example of construct pairs relating to 'personal integrity' 
Personal integrity important factor Lower key - face less challenge 
Personal integrity Professional requirement 
Therefore, personal integrity in these construct pairs demonstrate the 
issues/challenged faced by compliance officers during the experiences, in that personal 
integrity was seen as an important personal strength to approaching the experience 
(hence a positive connotation). 
In contrast the negative connotations of the descriptors have been themed as; resource 
impact, perceived cost/inefficiencies i.e. reputation damage, direct costs, (lack of) 
skills/specialism, barriers/unwillingness to change/comply. If some of the descriptors 
underlying these themes are looked at in more detail, it may be seen that the 
compliance officers have little influence to change or impact the personal experience. 
That is to say, in these experiences the descriptors reflect the fact the compliance view 
it as ‘out of their control’ (see example of such a construct in Figure 35). This individual 
construct pair demonstrates a personal feeling that compliance could not have 
addressed the problem, due to circumstances outside of their control i.e. lack of staff 
resource. 
Figure 35 Example of construct relating to resourcing 
Adequate resources in place to 
enable policies and procedures 
to be followed 
Lack of key staff to identify and fix problems 
 
Table 16 Constructs used by practitioners to describe worst compliance experience sorted into 
positive, neutral and negative connotations 
Worst Descriptor - Positive 
Connotation 
Worst Descriptor - 
Neutral Connotation 
Worst Descriptor - 
Negative Connotation 
internal desire to change (1) not time critical, not time 
consuming (5) 
little direct financial input (8) 
wish to do (1) consequences are less 
impactful (5) 
some limited impact on 
reputation (9) 
easy to implement (2) non customer process (6) done infrequently (8) 
fully automated process (2) lending process (6) little training provided (10) 
off shelf compatible software (2) non lending scenario (6) different in each case 
(demographics) (8) 
focussed (4) non product specific (6) unhelpful approach (9) 
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Worst Descriptor - Positive 
Connotation 
Worst Descriptor - 
Neutral Connotation 
Worst Descriptor - 
Negative Connotation 
Personal integrity important 
factor (3) 
no system storage required 
(5) 
inefficient (9) 
Personal integrity (3) similar volumes (5) unhelpful (9) 
Communication skills and 
effectiveness (4) 
security prevention issues 
(6) 
barriers to change (11) 
  wide ranging project teams 
(7) 
bad experience (9) 
  Directly involved regulator 
(7) 
no training (10) 
  Objective is identity data 
collection (6) 
errors occurred (8) 
  Process could be taught (6) major system development (9) 
  Process based on factual 
data (6) 
one off implementation cost 
(9) 
  Contact may be motivated 
by confidentiality (7) 
one off (9) 
    high project cost (9) 
    Senior individuals not wishing 
to follow a compliance agenda 
(11) 
    Significant time expenditure 
(9) 
    Different agendas - conflict 
(11) 
    Morally corrupt (11) 
    Ignoring policies and 
procedures where it suits (11) 
    Lack of key staff to identify 
and fix problems (11) 
    Focus on profit/income without 
any consideration for policies 
and procedures (11) 
    Reports, complaints ignored at 
a senior level (11) 
    No job satisfaction (9) 
    Limited value (9) 
Allocation of above construct to themes 
Themes: Commitment to 
change (1), Ease of Change (2), 
Integrity (3), Perceived 
Effectiveness (4) 
Themes: Resource impacts 
(5) Process/Procedural (6), 
Relationship/Involvement 
(7) 
Theme: Resource impact (8), 
Perceived cost/inefficiencies - 
reputation damage, direct 
costs (9), (Lack of) 
Skills/Specialism (10), 
Barriers/Unwillingness to 
change/comply (11) 
 
The following observations may be summarised from this initial analysis and 
categorisation of worst experiences: 
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 Although experiences were perceived as worst by participants, positive 
descriptors exist within the constructs formed (first column of  
 Table 16); 
 Barriers were identified as a theme within worst experiences, indicating 
circumstances out of control of compliance officers impacting the situation; 
 A greater number of negative or neutral connotations exist within the 
descriptors than positive connotation (second and third column of  
 Table 16); 
 Negative connotations are dominated by themes of resource impact, perceived 
costs and inefficiencies, lack of skills and barriers to change/comply; 
 Positive connotations are dominated by themes of ease of change, integrity and 
perceived effectiveness. 
If the negative connotations of both worst and aspirational experiences are combined 
you may consider that external drivers and uncertainties (perhaps outside the role of 
the compliance officers) are driving the negative aspects of the experiences i.e. Worst 
aligns to; resource impact, perceived costs and inefficiencies, lack of skills and barriers 
to change/comply: and Aspirational aligns to; complexity, uncertainty, risk and process 
inefficiency. 
If the positive connotation both experiences are combined you can consider that 
confidence in own abilities and available external support is driving the positive aspect 
of the experience i.e. Worst = ease of change, integrity and perceived effectiveness; 
Aspirational = perceived benefits, involvement, and skills and specialism. 
These construct themes would, therefore, support Jackman’s model focussing on the 
firm’s ethos, whereby the compliance officer is highly reliant on external support/drivers 
to deal with worst case scenarios. In order for aspirational compliance to be a positive 
experience, confidence in skills, integrity and external support are essential. 
7.2.3 Eyeball analysis of elements formed for comparison of aspirational 
and worst experiences 
Eyeball analysis was also performed on the elements produced by each individual to 
assess whether commonality could be identified. The results of element elicitation are 
set out within Table 17 (with the highlighted extracts discussed in the following section). 
The first observation is that the interpretation of aspirational to worst compliance 
experience is very personal to each participant (demonstrating the individuality 
corollary within Kelly’s personal construct theorem – refer to Appendix 3). In addition it 
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should be noted that the way in which participant recorded elements was also very 
individual. For example, participants VMLA19 and YM033 wrote down significant 
narrative to describe very personal experiences. The majority of the other participants 
only wrote down a short sentence/a few words to prompt themselves to review each 
experience. 
However, in the next stage of analysis (Section 7.3) through content analysis of the 
elicited constructs formed to discuss the range of experiences (and individual 
elements) the commonality corollary will be explored further. 
A second observation is the importance of confidentiality which was witnessed in one 
participant (OMC20). This participant was seen to set out fairly generic descriptions to 
prompt himself to compare experiences. The elements were set out in a less personal 
fashion in contrast to other participants who provided specific named projects, persons, 
training course, pieces of regulation in order to represent their aspirational to worst 
compliance experience. However, participant OMC20 appeared to set out a linear 
scale of compliance approaches, which is similar to the scaling within academic models 
such as Jackman/Ayres and Braithwaite when discussing compliance/regulation. Later 
within the interview, the participant discussed participation within recent training so 
perhaps this had impacted on their current worldview when completing the grid process 
(applying experience corollary to element elicitation, within Kelly’s theorem). 
A final observation on the individual elements produced during interview is that one 
participant simply could not identify a personal experience that they considered as 
aspirational in nature. This participant (YFO0) was directed towards a prompt sheet of 
factors which may be considered as aspirational based on Jackman’s model/definition 
of ethical compliance (in the absence of a personal experience).  
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Table 17 Summary table of elements formed in participants’ grids- aspirational to worst compliance experiences 
Participant 
grid 
reference 
Example a - 
'Ideal/Aspirational' 
compliance 
experience 
Example b - 
straightforward/efficient 
compliance experience 
Example c - 
routine 
compliance 
experience with 
minor issue 
Example d - 
relatively routine 
compliance  with 
significant 
issues 
Example e - 
compliance 
experience with 
major issues 
Example f - 'worst' 
compliance 
experience 
LMC16 Removing complexity Improving reporting Changing 
behaviour 
Dealing with the 
regulators 
Regulatory 
investigation 
Legacy issues 
YMO26 Morning Entry 
Procedures 
Control of personal 
information 
Account opening Control of client 
monies 
Mortgage interview RMC contracts 
YM012 NAMED PERSON - 
knows everything about 
asset finance 
RMC unit 'point in time' 
commitment 
Establishing 
increased facilities 
under guarantee 
(NAMED) 
NAMED - process 
re 'advice' 
CIPL + BLP - making 
our regulatory 
reporting consistent 
Money laundering 
prevention unit exit 
customers 
YM033* Risk procedures aspire 
to be perfect at 
completing 
forms/understanding 
concerns 
Money Laundering unit 
experiences - efficient, 
knowledgeable 
Risk assessment 
forms, taking on 
new clients - 
sourcing identity of 
funds deposited 
etc. 
Credit courses 
significant issues 
if not adhered to 
Introducing and 
financial advice by 
Regulated Advisor - 
complexity 
misinterpretation 
constraints 
Account opening 
for foreign nationals 
YM027 Money laundering 
department 
NAMED compliance officer Notice of 
withdrawal 
CHAPS payment 
call back process 
Risk assessment 
forms - all products 
Trying to change 
process - several 
dept. 
involve/nobody 
taking ownership 
YFO0* No experience to 
imagine! 
account opening current account 
mortgage review 
money laundering 
risk assessments 
financial difficulties 
training 
Mortgage example 
- no security in 
place, limit on a/c 
NMO28* Electronic verification 
system implementation 
Control of personal 
information 
Acceptable 
customer 
identification 
documents 
Transaction 
monitoring 
systems 
Sanctions checks Regulator 4 
Document rule 
introduced 1996 
EFC10* Creating KYC (know 
your customer) risk 
matrix 
Training Yearly DPA review Sanctions 
monitoring 
CDD (customer due 
diligence)  project 
Run on bank 
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Participant 
grid 
reference 
Example a - 
'Ideal/Aspirational' 
compliance 
experience 
Example b - 
straightforward/efficient 
compliance experience 
Example c - 
routine 
compliance 
experience with 
minor issue 
Example d - 
relatively routine 
compliance  with 
significant 
issues 
Example e - 
compliance 
experience with 
major issues 
Example f - 'worst' 
compliance 
experience 
VMLA19* Piece of business which 
carried significant risk 
that was rejected in my 
absences by the 
business. On my return 
I was able to construct a 
risk management and 
mitigation plan that 
meant the business 
could proceed resulting 
in £400K p.a. Fee 
income. 
Transactional deadlines - 
avoiding unnecessary steps 
and CDD. 
Company 
beneficial owners 
problem with due 
diligence 
certification 
standards "true 
likeness" not 
received 
Identification of 
breaches - 
voluminous, relate 
to regulatory 
breach 
Litigation Euro XM – 
Mis-sell, Conspiracy, 
Regulatory Body. 
Being required to 
investigate a 
director and 
colleagues with 
regards to 
suspected insider 
dealings. 
JMC10 Self-service CDD 
collation and automated 
screening 
Identifying individual 
investors and related form 
filling 
Understanding 
complex business 
rationale at time of 
take on 
Change in 
legislation 
surrounding 
reliance on 
another’s CDD 
On-site inspection 
discovered failure to 
report third party 
fraud 
Intermediary 
refusing to allow 
compliance access 
to investor data 
OMC20* A good positive 
compliance culture 
Policies and procedures in 
place and desire to see 
them followed 
Minor failings are 
identified but 
nothing is done to 
correct them 
(focus on 
income/profit) 
Policies and 
procedures 
routinely ignored 
and no effort 
made to address 
failings (by 
management) 
Senior management 
ignore (and possibly 
encourage) 
compliance failings 
on a regular basis 
Anything goes, no 
culture of 
compliance 
(anarchy) 
RM020 Implement fraud 
prevention programme 
Implementing "ICAAP" Risk assessing 
project leading to 
improved controls 
Implementing 
operational risk 
framework 
(BASEL II) 
Re designing 
plausibility limits for 
payments 
Job security threat 
*The elements formed by these individuals are discussed specifically earlier in Section 7.2.3. 
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7.3 Collective construct analysis - content analysis and Honey’s 
content analysis 
The steps for Honey’s Content Analysis are set out within the methodology chapter 
under Section 6.6.2. Figure 36 highlights the second distinct phase of analysis which is 
presented within this section. 
Figure 36 Distinct phase of analysis (Honey’s content analysis) – brought forward from 
Methodology, Section 6.6 
 
Reliability is an important aspect of content analysis. Therefore, a colleague was 
requested to independently identify categories, allocate constructs to categories and to 
tabulate the results. This colleague was chosen due to the nature of their prior practical 
experience, and their ongoing research interest within the regulatory/compliance field. 
The resulting categories, therefore, reflect both practitioner and academic viewpoints. 
The extent to which the table of the researcher and the colleagues (the judges) tables 
agree indicates the reliability of the procedures. Reliability is discussed under Section 
7.3.1. 
For the first round of allocating constructs from the grids, categories were developed 
from constructs found within the initial literature search. These construct categories 
were identified for the purposes of the pilot stage of interviews, when the intention was 
to supply certain constructs to the participants from the literature (see Methodology 
Chapter, Table 10 for listing). These constructs were formed by self-grid interview by 
the researcher following the review of the literature, to identify “hygiene factor” 
constructs which may form from existing literature base (Goffin et al., 2012). The idea 
of supplied constructs is supported by Goffin et al. (2012), where hygiene factors which 
relate to constructs which may be frequently mentioned by participants during interview 
Eyeball Analysis 
(Jankowicz, 2004) 
 
• Analysis of overall supplied 
construct scoring against element 
themes (benefits compared with 
costs, and worst to aspirational 
experiences) 
• Analysis of extremes of experience 
from worst to aspirational 
Honey’s Content Analysis 
(Honey, 1979) 
• Categories formed by two judges 
(based on draft template of 
categories from literature – new 
categories emerging in formed 
constructs) 
• Analysis of dominance and 
importance of construct categories 
Story Telling Analysis 
(Gray, 2007) 
• Thematic Review of transcripts 
• What are the implications of 
experiences? 
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(as the factors are often referred to in academic and practitioner literature). As a 
modification to Goffin’s technique, rather than supplying these hygiene factors in the 
interview itself, the judges used these as the basis of the first round of categorisation. 
The judges used these categories to frame the first round of categorisation with any 
constructs considered not to fall under these areas allocated as other. The reasons for 
using this method was to systematically analyse the constructs formed by individuals 
versus the existing academic literature, and to easily identify any new emerging themes 
from construct elicitation. Using existing literature to review the initial categorisation 
identifies how strongly the constructs formed by the participants aligns to existing 
literature. Through categorisation into a category called other (i.e. constructs which do 
not fall naturally into categories from existing literature) allows for analysis of themes of 
importance to practitioners (to contribute to existing literature). Indeed, the principles 
behind this approach to initial categories may be likened to Template Analysis (King, 
1998; King, 2012). The initial template/categorisation was formed from a priori 
knowledge of the literature (see Table 10, Chapter 6 Methodology). 
Allocating constructs in this manner provided a practical process of analysis of 
categories for both judges. A deliberate choice to analyse categories using excel sheet 
listings (with ‘drop down’ boxes for categorisation of each construct) was made. The 
reason for this technique, rather than more traditional methods of paper on 
floor/printing off cards, was for the ease of the second judge to communicate results 
back to the researcher over e mail (and also the ensure a clean paper trail98 exists of 
analysis). 
7.3.1 Inter judge/rater reliability – tables of level of agreement 
Agreement between judges during content analysis is widely considered to relate to 
reliability. However, this relationship is open to misconceptions. 
“To be clear, agreement is what we measure; reliability is what we wish to infer 
from it” (Krippendorff, 2004a, p. 414) 
Jankowicz (2004) contend that the most commonly used statistic for this context is 
Cohen’s kappa. It is recommended to seek a figure of 0.8 or above to confirm reliability. 
However, there are criticisms of Cohen’s kappa due to the “kappa paradox” whereby a 
low kappa value may be misleading, and so it is recommended to combine other 
statistical methods to confirm inter judge/rater reliability. Another commonly used 
                                               
98 A separate excel sheet was used to record each iteration of the category formation, in the data analysis 
file. 
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statistic is Krippendorff’s alpha in relation to content analysis inter judge/rater reliability. 
Krippendorff (2004, pp. 244-245) discusses the commonly used correlation coefficients 
within content analysis, concluding that their use can be seriously misleading.  
Krippendorff (2004) argues that Cohen’s kappa is concerned with the two individual 
observers rather than the population of data under observation, and hence the focus of 
reliability. Krippendorff (2004) also goes on to dismiss Cronbach’s alpha as unsu itable 
for content analysis as “it was never intended to assess coding efforts” and acts as a 
correlation coefficient rather than an agreement measure. As Krippendorff’s alpha is 
considered a suitable coefficient for measuring agreement within relatively small 
samples (Krippendorff, 2004a, p. 428), this coefficient is considered appropriate for this 
study, alongside the traditionally adopted Cohen’s kappa. 
With all reliability measures it is found that when agreement is observed fully, and 
disagreement is absent then the coefficient would measure 1, indicating perfect 
reliability. The majority of guides on Cohen’s kappa consider that a score of 80% or 
more is required (Stemler, 2001; Jankowicz, 2004). There are three assumptions in 
using Cohen’s kappa: firstly, the units of analysis are independent; secondly, the 
categories are also independent; and thirdly the judges/raters are operating 
independently (Stemler, 2001). 
Krippendorff (2004, pp. 219-250; 2011) explains the use of Krippendorff’s alpha and 
other coefficients in the attempt to endorse the use of alpha. The advantage of 
Krippendorff’s alpha for this research thesis is the ability to expand the formula for “two 
observers” with binary data (Krippendorff, 2004, pp. 227-230; Krippendorff, 2011), via 
distinct executable steps (which were performed in excel manually). However, in order 
to address the arguments for each measure discussed above, both reliability measures 
have been calculated to combine the strengths of Cohen’s kappa, and Krippendorff’s 
alpha. 
7.3.2 Reflections on first and subsequent round of categorisation 
Cohen’s kappa and Krippendorff’s alpha were calculated within excel, as described in 
Section 7.3.1 to review inter judge agreement. The first iteration of categorisation 
yielded poor similarity between the categorisation of the two judges (only 34 (30%) of 
the 115 paired constructs were allocated within the same categories by judges). This 
highlights the importance of assessing inter judge agreement for reliability purposes 
during content analysis (Krippendorff, 2004a). 
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The ‘other’ category was also reviewed within the first iteration of categorisation. The 
judges allocated 29 (25%) of the 115 paired constructs to the other category in the 
absence of a clear link to the hygiene categories developed from the literature. The 
judges then discussed the rationale behind allocation of constructs to the other 
category in order to identify suitable themes for new categories which had not been 
identified via the literature review/formation of hygiene categories. In addition the 
judges discussed the poor similarity achieved within first round of categorisation and 
agreed on appropriate definitions for each category. 
Following each round of categorisation the two judges met to refine the descriptors of 
each category, and to discuss areas of non-agreement within categories. Following 3 
rounds of categorisation (and subsequent discussion and refinement of categories) 
final overall agreement of allocation to categories was achieved with greater than 80% 
agreement across each category, under Cohen’s kappa. Average agreement under 
each coefficient is summarised in Table 18 below: 
Table 18 Summary of agreement coefficients 
 Cohen’s kappa Krippendorff’s 
alpha 
Resource – costs and benefits, monitoring of 
resources. 
96% 96% 
Education and Training 95% 90% 
Ethics and Culture 100% 100% 
Reputation/ Best practice 
consideration/Proactivity of Management 
96% 93% 
Skills and Status of Compliance - experience, 
knowledge, education and hierarchy within 
organization 
80% 66% 
Stakeholder Considerations - Input from external 
departments/resource/consultants. In-house, in 
comparison with shared services/outsourcing 
considerations 
97% 94% 
Communication and Knowledge Sharing 88% 80% 
Regulatory risk 100% 100% 
Principles, as opposed to, rule Based – spirit, as 
opposed to, letter of law (judgement) 
89% 81% 
Barriers to compliance - internal processes and 
procedures issues not addressed in above 
categories (i.e. not ethics/culture, skills, resource) 
91% 85% 
Nuisance/Inefficiencies 83% 71% 
Ritualism and Gaming 85% 75% 
 
It may be noted that lower scores of agreement were recorded in certain categories 
under Krippendorff’s alpha (even in final categorisation). However, this is attributed to 
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the lower numbers of constructs allocated within these categories which impacts on the 
score (see for example, Skills and Status of Compliance category, agreement of 66 per 
cent under Krippendorff’s alpha – overall only 3 constructs allocated (which then 
impacts on the calculation due to the high level of unallocated constructs). To address 
this low level of agreement this category was appraised specifically and as the judges 
disagreed on one construct allocated to this category, this was then reviewed and 
allocated accordingly. 
7.3.3 Final categorisation listing for analysis purposes 
The summary listing of categories and allocation of constructs can be seen in Table 19. 
A full listing of constructs allocated within each category can be seen in Appendix 1. 
Table 19 Summary of final categories listing and allocations (see full listing under Appendix 1) 
Categories Number of 
paired 
constructs 
Allocated 
Constructs
 % 
Similarity 
Score % 
HML 
Value 
Resource – costs and benefits, 
monitoring of resources. 
15 13 38 M/H 
Education and Training 11 10 27 M 
Ethics and Culture 6 5 36 M 
Reputation/ Best practice 
consideration/Proactivity of 
Management 
15 13 37 M 
Skills and Status of Compliance 
- experience, knowledge, 
education and hierarchy within 
organisation 
3 3 11 L 
Stakeholder Considerations - 
Input from external 
departments/resource/consultan
ts. In house compared with 
shared services/outsourcing 
considerations 
18 16 33 M 
Communication and Knowledge 
Sharing 
4 3 33 M 
Regulatory risk 8 7 36 M 
Principles as opposed to Rule 
Based - spirit as opposed to 
letter of law (judgement) 
9 8 54 H 
Barriers to compliance - internal 
processes and procedures 
issues not addressed in other 
categories (i.e. not 
ethics/culture, skills, resource) 
14 12 41 M/H 
Nuisance/Inefficiencies 9 8 59 H 
Ritualism and Gaming 3 3 33 L 
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The benefit of adopting an initial template during analysis allowed for direct links to be 
made back to the literature, and to highlight new emerging categories within the data 
set. If the final listing of categories is compared to the original template (see 
Methodology Chapter 6, Table 10) it is observed that a number of the categories have 
been combined during analysis i.e. reputation/best practice and proactivity of 
management are seen as one category (within Table 19) even though these might be 
considered as separate concepts within the literature. In addition three new categories 
are observed within the data set which were not identified in the literature at point of 
creating the initial template i.e. barriers to compliance, nuisance and inefficiencies, and 
ritualism and gaming. 
7.3.4 Analysis of categories with respect to dominance  
Tomico et al. (2009) analysed personal constructs across the discrete measures of 
“dominance, importance and descriptive richness”. Analysis of dominance and 
importance, involves quantitative analysis, whereas analysis of descriptive richness 
indicates latent meanings of constructs. In this section a quantitative review of 
dominance is presented in order to analyse and discuss the categories which reflect 
the foremost concerns of practitioners (and to consider the reasons why certain 
categories may not be of principal concern). The underlying meanings (and storytelling) 
behind experiences and constructs is explored in Section 7.4 via analysis of interview 
transcripts. Importance is relates to the order in which constructs are elicited within 
each grid interview (Tomico et al., 2009). However, due to the nature of triadic 
elicitation adopted in method, elicitation order is not considered an appropriate 
measure for this analysis (as order of elicitation would be influenced by the order in 
which experiences are selected and compared). Instead, the relative importance is 
considered in relation to “similarity score” and allocation of “HML” indices under 
Honey’s content analysis (Jankowicz, 2004, p. 176), and this is undertaken in Section 
7.3.5, where each category will be discussed in turn. 
A category may be considered to be more dominant when it contains more constructs. 
Therefore, this simple metric has been summarised in Table 20 (in terms of ranking). 
The table indicates that there is a limited spread of constructs between categories 
(ranging from 3-18% of total constructs within each category), which suggests that 
practitioners’ construal systems are relatively broad, and do not offer headline issues 
when considering regulatory compliance. Instead there are a number of factors that are 
considered to be of importance. One significant finding is that the category of ‘barriers 
to compliance’ ranks within the top 5, representing other issues in achieving regulatory 
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compliance (i.e. in addition to issues such as ethics/resource constraints which are well 
documented in the literature). 
Table 20 Ranking of categories by dominance 
Categories Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% of total 
constructs 
Rank99 
Stakeholder Considerations - Input 
from external 
departments/resource/consultants. 
In-house compared with shared 
services/outsourcing 
considerations 
18 16 1 
Resource – costs and benefits, 
monitoring of resources. 
15 13 2= 
Reputation/ Best practice 
consideration/Proactivity of 
Management 
15 13 2= 
Barriers to compliance - internal 
processes and procedures issues 
not addressed in other categories 
(i.e. not ethics/culture, skills, 
resource) 
14 12 4 
Education and Training 11 10 5 
Principles as opposed to Rule 
Based - spirit as opposed to letter 
of law (judgement) 
9 8 6= 
Nuisance/Inefficiencies 9 8 6= 
Regulatory risk 8 7 8 
Ethics and Culture 6 5 9 
Communication and Knowledge 
Sharing 
4 3 10 
Skills and Status of Compliance - 
experience, knowledge, education 
and hierarchy within organization 
3 3 11= 
Ritualism and Gaming 3 3 11= 
7.3.5 Analysis of categories with respect to importance 
As presented in the Methodology Chapter (Section 6.4), an overall construct was 
provided to all participants during the grid exercise of overall benefit to the 
organisation, in comparison with, overall cost to the organisation. This allowed for 
analysis of similarity of scoring in comparison to elicited personal constructs. A score of 
100% indicates that ratings on the construct are identical to the ratings on the overall 
construct, and a decreasing percentage indicates that the ratings become less similar 
(and for analysis purposes, less important) in comparison to the overall provided 
                                               
99 The highest ranking category in terms of dominance has the most constructs allocated within the 
category (with 1 denoted as highest). 
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construct of benefit/cost to the organisation. Jankowicz (2004, p. 176) sets out 
summary procedure for Honey’s content analysis, including the analysis of “mean 
importance scores” for each category. The similarity scores were presented in Table 
19, and they have been ranked in order of importance in Section 7.3.5.1 to Section 
7.3.5.4. During formation of construct categories the judges collated thoughts of 
positive and negative aspects of each category in the excel analysis file (to mimic the 
dichotomous nature of constructs formed by participants in the repertory grid 
interviews). These extracts are displayed in Figure 37 through to Figure 48. Each of 
these categories will now be discussed in turn. 
7.3.5.1 Categories with ‘high’ importance 
There were two categories with high allocations based on similarity score to overall 
construct: nuisance/inefficiencies, and principles, as opposed to rule based. 
Figure 37 Nuisances/Inefficiencies category 
  Positive aspects Negative aspects 
Nuisance/Inefficiencies 
Compliance is viewed as 
business enhancing. 
Enhances business.  
Compliance is viewed as 
business inhibiting. Disrupts 
business.  
 
There were no initial links identified during literature review for categorisation of 
‘nuisances/inefficiencies’ when reviewing models for regulatory compliance. This is 
perhaps because much of the literature is directed from a regulators’ viewpoint rather 
than the compliance officer’s viewpoint. Therefore, this demonstrates the importance of 
this categorisation identified within this study. Significantly, this categorisation also 
represents high importance to practitioners in relation to costs and benefits 
considerations. Examples of constructs allocated to this category include ‘common 
sense’ contrasted with ‘unhelpful’, ‘ignoring policies/procedures to suit’, ‘profits’ 
contrasted with ‘compliance’. The category is seen of significance as during the 
interview process these constructs were seen as outside of the control of compliance 
officers’ in most cases (and, therefore, perhaps of most importance to policy makers in 
their goals for regulatory compliance). It may be assumed that these constructs stem 
from perceptions of the organisations views on compliance being seen as a nuisance 
or business inhibiting. If these issues could become the focus of regulators, and better 
controlled (and tackled) by compliance officers’ working in the organisations, perhaps 
regulatory compliance may become more achievable in practice. 
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Figure 38 Principles, as opposed to, rule based – spirit, as opposed to, letter of law (judgement) 
 
The concept of the principles, as opposed to, rule based category stemmed from both 
prior working experience and the wider knowledge of literature from both 
accounting/corporate governance domains (e.g. compliance and ‘in control’ procedures 
under COSO, 2004). The discussion of principles, as opposed to, rule based is usually 
considered from a jurisdiction/regulatory perspective (i.e. UK in comparison to US 
approaches), however, in this categorisation the constructs were considered from an 
inside organisation perspective. Constructs included in this category represent a range 
of perspectives including: the judgement outlook of the compliance officers, for 
example ‘judgement’ contrasted with ‘black and white’, ‘routine’ contrasted with’ one 
off’; to more process driven aspects for example ‘manual/automated systems’ and ‘too 
many checks’ i.e. tick box attitude. The significance of this categorisation is also 
echoed within the wider literature which discusses implications of spirit, as opposed to, 
letter of law. 
7.3.5.2 Categories with ‘high/medium’ importance 
There were two categories which were seen as bordering between high/medium based 
on similarity score: resource, and barriers to compliance. 
Figure 39 Resource – costs and benefits, monitoring of resources  
  Positive aspects Negative aspects 
Resource - cost vs. benefit, 
monitoring of resources. 
Compliance benefits 
perceived to outweigh costs 
– costs irrelevant 
Compliance Costs perceived to 
outweigh benefits 
  
Compliance costs easily 
identifiable and monitored 
Compliance costs merged into 
‘admin’ function of business – 
no monitoring 
 
The concepts within this categorisation represent a significant part of the regulatory 
literature (Satheye, 2008; Harvey, 2004; Deloitte, 2006; Ellihausen, 1998; Franks et al., 
1998; Alfon and Andrews, 1993), and also feature as high/medium importance within 
the personal constructs of practitioners. Ultimately the running of the compliance and 
risk management functions are a cost base for any organisation. However, these costs 
are finely balanced to the benefits of being seen to be compliant (in its many forms i.e. 
reputation impacts, avoiding sanctions). 
Positive aspects Negative aspects
Principles vs. Rule Based - spirit vs. 
letter of law (judgement)
Standardised 
approach/strategy
Flexible compl iance
approach/strategy
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Examples of constructs allocated to this category include concepts of; time constraints, 
monetary costs, frequencies of processes, and adequacy of resourcing functions. 
The second category that aligns in importance as M/H compared to the overall 
construct is that of ‘barriers to compliance’. This category was also seen as a dominant 
area for construct formation. However, this category was not identified specifically 
during the literature review and the initial formation of the template for analysis. As is 
the case for the category nuisances/inefficiencies this may be attributable to the 
majority of literature being directed from a regulators’ viewpoint rather than the 
compliance officer’s viewpoint. 
Figure 40 Barriers to compliance - internal processes and procedures issues not addressed in 
other categories (i.e. not ethics/culture, skills, resource)  
  Positive aspects Negative aspects 
Barriers to compliance - internal 
processes and procedures issues 
not addressed in above categories 
(i.e. not ethics/culture, skills, 
resource) 
Barriers have been identified 
and addressed within the  
organisation 
Barriers have not been 
addressed leading to 
regulatory action, or 
limitations to business 
 
However, this category is distinct from the ‘nuisances’ category as the constructs 
formed described specific inefficiencies or barriers within process and procedures 
around compliance. Examples included ‘clear process’ contrasted with ‘complex 
(undefined) process’, and ‘manual use’ contrasted with ‘automated’. Therefore, these 
barriers appear to be largely driven from within organisation decision making over 
approaches to compliance. If this assumption is made, then there may be feasible 
solutions to addressing such barriers within organisations. Perhaps, if more effective 
decision making over process/procedures is made by the right people (in an 
independent manner) this may combat these everyday barriers impacting on regulatory 
compliance. This is discussed further in Section 8.2.1. 
7.3.5.3 Categories with ‘medium’ importance 
There were six categories which were allocated as medium importance based on 
scoring compared to overall construct: education and training, ethics and culture, 
reputation/best practice, stakeholder considerations, communication and knowledge 
sharing, and regulatory risk. 
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Figure 41 Education and training category 
 
Education and training was ranked as 5th within dominance and also represent medium 
importance to practitioners when scoring constructs compared to overall construct. 
Discussion of education and training also exists within the literature (Taylor, 2005; SIA, 
2005) but it should be noted that the literature is more often written from a practitioner’s 
perspective. The types of constructs that were formed in this area included the 
concepts of provision of training, in comparison to lack of training provision, and also 
concepts of complexities and skill requirements. 
Figure 42 Ethics and culture category 
  Positive aspects Negative aspects 
Ethics and Culture 
Commitment to ethics and 
culture 
Disregard to ethics and culture 
 
Ethics and culture ranked in the lower third with respect to dominance, and is 
considered of medium importance to practitioners. Given the significant media 
coverage of cultural issues this is a fairly surprising finding, as an initial assumption 
was made that this would be an area of prominent concern for practitioners. This also 
does not align to the academic literature which focusses heavily on ethics and culture 
within models (Jackman, 2002; Edwards and Wolfe, 2005; Wood, 2002). Examples of 
constructs allocated to this category include ‘positive behaviour and desire to get it 
right’ contrasted with ‘morally corrupt’, and ‘no significant culpability’ contrasted with 
‘consider changes at senior management level’. 
Figure 43 Reputation/best practice consideration/proactivity of management 
  Positive aspects Negative aspects 
Reputation/ Best practice 
consideration/Proactivity of 
Management 
Proactive assessment by 
management of reducing 
reputation risk 
Disregard by management of 
reputation risk 
  
Seen to be ‘best practice’ by 
peers 
Disregard of peer performance 
  
Continuous development 
and improvement to 
compliance – ‘customer’ 
driven improvements 
No calls for improvement to 
compliance – stagnant 
approach 
Positive aspects Negative aspects
Education and Training
Commitment to Training Minimal  Training
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In the initial template for analysis, this category actually formed three distinct concepts 
within the literature i.e. reputation (Crump, 2007; Calcott, 2010; Arora and 
Gangopadhyay, 1995; Shimshack and Ward, 2010), best practice (Malloy, 2003) and 
proactivity of management (Crump, 2007). There is also overlap to the literature 
developed by Parker (2002, p. 63) where she discussed common seminar topics aimed 
at compliance professionals in Australia including “how to sell compliance to the board” 
and “the business case for compliance”. However, during the allocation of constructs it 
was found that there was a level of crossover when practitioners elicited constructs 
around this area. Therefore, these concepts from the literature were combined in one 
overall category. 
Figure 44 Stakeholder considerations - input from external departments/resource/consultants. In-
house, in comparison with shared services/outsourcing considerations 
  Positive aspects Negative aspects 
Stakeholder Considerations - Input 
from external 
departments/resource/consultants. 
In-house vs. shared 
services/outsourcing 
considerations 
Extensive investment of IT 
compliance resources 
Minimal investment in IT 
compliance resources 
  
Internal centre of excellence External centre of excellence 
 
The types of constructs which were included in this category included concepts of: 
‘commercial necessity’ compared with ‘nice to have’, and ‘must do’ contrasted with 
‘wish to do’; short term/long termism; seniority of management input and active support 
of management; and protecting customer/client driven. These constructs may be 
considered in conjunction to the categories formed relating to nuisances and barriers, 
in an attempt to remedy issues within compliance approaches.  
In the initial template for analysis, this category actually formed two distinct concepts 
within the literature i.e. resources and inputs from external providers such as 
IT/consultants (Bamberger, 2010; Gable, 2005; Garcia, 2004; Mainelli and Yeandle, 
2006; Hussein and Hussan, 2008), and outsourcing or use of shared services (McIvor 
et al., 2011). Again, the constructs elicited from practitioners did not appear to form 
distinction between the two concepts, and instead focused on wider stakeholder 
considerations. This was the most dominant of categories for construct elicitation. 
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Parker (2002, p. 112) also widened this discussion whereby compliance manager 
consider best practice, or ideal compliance as a “harmonising role”, or a bridge 
between “the values of wider society, including regulators, governments and public 
interest groups, and the pursuit of business”.  
Constructs allocated included references of: ‘many stakeholders’, or organisation wide 
and project teams, in comparison with, containment within compliance; consulting 
involvement (or working with experts) and outsourcing considerations; and system 
development considerations.  
This category was again initially set up in the analysis template as two separate 
concepts, but during categorisation overlap in construct elicitation was seen so the 
concepts were combined. This joins two distinct areas of the literature i.e. concepts of 
share services/outsourcing, in comparison with, in house considerations (Herbert and 
Seal, 2009), and the concepts of partnership and relationships with regulators (Wood, 
2002; Carretta, 2005). 
Figure 45 Communication and knowledge sharing 
  Positive aspects Negative aspects 
Communication and Knowledge 
Sharing 
Compliance knowledge 
nurtured and developed in 
house 
Compliance knowledge limited 
within the business 
  
Business relationships, 
communication and 
interfaces essential 
Minimal regard for business 
relationships, communication 
and interfaces 
 
During analysis the communication/knowledge sharing category did appear to overlap 
with the stakeholders category. However, the key distinction in this category is the 
focus on communication mechanism i.e. liaison with other firms/communication skills, 
and the knowledge elements i.e. selling skills/service. The constructs elicited within this 
category were of fairly low dominance, signifying that this area is not an area of focus 
for most practitioners.  
This appears to be an unusual observation, as inherently in the literature based it may 
be assumed that communication and knowledge sharing are often seen as areas 
demonstrating best practice, or of benefit organisations. This may then suggest 
underlying trust issues between organisations within the sector. Another concern may 
surround the issue of having “a foot in each camp” where the compliance officers must 
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balance their responsibility to the firm versus the organisations they serve (Parker, 
2002, p. 174).  
Figure 46 Regulatory risk category 
  Positive aspects Negative aspects 
Regulatory risk 
Full awareness of New 
Regulation – e.g. BASEL 
III/FATCA 
Limited knowledge of new 
regulation 
 
The regulatory risk category was developed from the wider literature on regulatory 
approaches, and the discussion of new regulation following the financial crisis 
(Stoneman, 2005; Gebhardt and Novotny-Farkas, 2011; Dizdarevic, 2011; Wise and 
Baker, 2012; Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). This category was included in the template 
to collate constructs referencing how compliance officers might approach new 
regulation and their relationship with the regulator. 
This category is fairly low in dominance but still of medium importance in terms of 
considerations of overall cost and benefit to the organisation. The constructs that were 
formed were mainly focussed on ‘consequences’, and ‘risk’ assessment, and ‘impacts’ 
which suggests reactionary constructs rather than proactivity in this category. 
7.3.5.4 Categories with ‘low’ importance 
There were two categories which were allocated as low importance based on similarity 
scoring. These were skills and status of compliance, and ritualism and gaming. 
Figure 47 Skills and status of compliance - experience, knowledge, education and hierarchy within 
organisation 
  Positive aspects Negative aspects 
Skills and Status of Compliance - 
experience, knowledge, education 
and hierarchy within organisation 
Compliance officers status 
high 
Disregards of compliance 
officers importance in 
organisation 
  
-skills set, independence, 
authority 
  
 
The status of this category as of low importance is a significant finding. This directly 
contrasted to the literature which discusses the importance of the role of 
compliance/risk management within organisations (see literature in Section 4.1 to 4.2). 
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However, the low importance of constructs within this category is also supported by the 
lower dominance of this category with few constructs (only 3) being allocated. 
Perhaps the reason this category does not dominate the constructs of the individuals, 
is due to the worldview that the compliance officers assume during interview, projecting 
constructs onto external factors. Self-reference to personal skills set and independence 
perhaps is an assumed given by participants when discussing personal experiences. 
However, the constructs that were elicited did align to the literature and included 
‘personal integrity important factor’, ‘compliance experience and competence’ 
compared with ‘specialist knowledge not required’, and ‘skilled judgement and 
expertise required’. 
Ritualism and gaming (Braithwaite, Makkai and Braithwaite, 2007) as a category was 
seen as low importance when comparing to the overall construct of benefits, in 
comparison with, cost considerations. This category was the least dominant of the 
categories in terms of number of constructs allocated. This seems to be in direct 
contrast to the high ranking of the category of stakeholder considerations (if the 
regulator was considered as a stakeholder). This can be explained by the inherent 
differences within these categorisations. The stakeholder category is focused on 
communication and working in partnership with external parties outside the regulatory 
relationship, whereas ritualism and gaming category is specifically considering the 
complexities of interactions between the compliance officers and the regulators. 
Figure 48 Ritualism and gaming category 
 
This may also be viewed as a significant and positive finding, if it is assumed that the 
concept of ‘playing games’ with the regulator does not factor highly within the 
compliance officers’ construal systems. Examples of the constructs that were formed 
included ‘no obligation to report as long as actions taking place to fix’ and ‘liaison with 
regulator’ contrasted with ‘no liaison’. These types of constructs indicate concerns over 
the communication mechanisms between practitioners and the regulators. So despite 
these being of low importance and dominance within the compliance officer’s 
worldview, these may be seen as more important from a regulators viewpoint. 
Positive aspects Negative aspects
Ritualism and Gaming
Good working relationship
with regulator. Enforcement 
within fi rm. Decis ions are
thought from a 'extended'
compl iance view.
Compl iance officers  game the 
regulator. Letting things go
within fi rm. Decis ion revolve
on 'going as  far as  needed'.
  
205 
 
7.3.6 Summary of Honey’s content analysis 
There were no suppositions made in respect to constructs elicited from practitioners 
within the grid100. As a result of performing Honey’s content analysis on the grid 
constructs the following main findings have emerged.  
The 230 constructs formed by practitioners to describe their personal experiences have 
been allocated within 12 categories: resource; education and training; ethics and 
culture; reputation implications; skills and status of compliance officers; stakeholder 
considerations; communication and knowledge sharing; regulatory risk issues; principle 
versus rule based concerns; barriers to compliance; nuisances and inefficiencies; and 
ritualism and gaming. 
Of these three new distinct categories have been observed, which were not identified in 
earlier literature review by the researcher: barriers to compliance, nuisance and 
inefficiencies, and ritualism and gaming. These issues are revisited in the discussion 
and triangulation with the literature in Section 8.1.2. There is an attempt to address the 
barriers to compliance within the conceptual model presented in Chapter 8.  
With respect to dominance, there are three distinct splits of category allocation i.e. the 
top third show 14 to 18 paired constructs allocated, mid third show 6 to 11 paired 
constructs allocated, and bottom third show only 3 to 4 constructs allocated (see Table 
20). The most dominant category was ‘stakeholder considerations’. In addition, 
‘barriers to compliance’ was observed within the top third in terms of dominance of 
construct formation. 
With respect to importance, the categories with similarity scores most closely aligned to 
benefit and cost considerations included ‘nuisances/inefficiencies’ and ‘principles, as 
opposed to, rule based/spirit, as opposed to, letter of law’. As these reflect the major 
concerns of compliance officers, these categories may be of significance to regulators 
and policy makers, in order to respond to issues seen within regulatory compliance in 
the financial service sector. 
One surprising finding in review of importance of construct categories was the low 
allocation of ‘skills and status of compliance’. A presumption was made by the 
researcher that this would be a key category in comparison to benefits and cost 
                                               
100 Following the principles of Kelly’s individuality corollary (see also Appendix 3) the constructs elicited 
were considered to be personal to each individual based on their own experiences, therefore, no pre 
supposed assumptions were made in respect to construct elicitation prior to analysis. 
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concerns. However, this was not observed in the sample of participants completing grid 
interviews. 
7.4 Analysis of interview transcripts 
The initial analysis, in Section 7.2 and 7.3, involving eyeball analysis of grids, and 
content analysis of constructs does not fully explore RQ1 and RQ3. The purpose of this 
section is to review the story telling aspect of the interview transcripts to explore RQ1 
and RQ3. 
Research Question 1: To what extent does the regulatory cycle influence 
managements’ decision making over compliance approach? 
Research Question 3: In cases of new regulation, how do compliance functions 
rely on external expertise (consultants) or is there proactive promotion of in 
house knowledge and expertise? 
Figure 49 highlights the final distinct phase of analysis which is presented within this 
section. 
Figure 49 Distinct phase of analysis (story telling) - figure brought forward from Methodology, 
Section 6.6 
 
As per the two step process, set out within Figure 30, the interview transcripts101 were 
initially analysed under a systematic process of template coding and then immersion 
within the data to allow for interpretation. A major limitation within the grid interview is 
the time available for each individual to participate within story telling. This restriction 
was ultimately controlled by the nature of the individuals being interviewed i.e. senior 
personnel within organisations, who were only able to participate for 1-2 hours. 
                                               
101 Refer to Table 11, Section 6.4.6 for details of interview data recorded and analysed. 
Eyeball Analysis 
(Jankowicz, 2004) 
 
• Analysis of overall supplied 
construct scoring against element 
themes (benefits compared with 
costs, and worst to aspirational 
experiences) 
• Analysis of extremes of experience 
from worst to aspirational 
Honey’s Content Analysis 
(Honey, 1979) 
• Categories formed by two judges 
(based on draft template of 
categories from literature – new 
categories emerging in formed 
constructs) 
• Analysis of dominance and 
importance of construct categories 
Story Telling Analysis 
(Gray, 2007) 
• Thematic Review of transcripts 
• What are the implications of 
experiences?  
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Therefore, RQ 1 and 3 were not fully explored with all participants due to time 
constraints for certain participants. The interviews were unstructured in nature due to 
the preparation of the repertory grid element, and construct elicitation. However, where 
possible the interviewees were probed further under the following open question 
themes (as described within the methodology chapter): 
1. What are the effects of changing regulation? 
2. When/How are consultants used? 
3. When/How are outsourcing/shared services options considered? 
Codes were set up based on the specific research questions within the initial coding 
template. This allowed for specific analysis of the interview transcripts prior to 
immersion. This process was performed manually using tables in word. Nvivo was 
considered for use, however, due to ease of access and the systematic organisation 
employed within word file, this analysis method was seen as preferable for the 
individual researcher. 
7.4.1 Discussion of supposition statements 
With reference to RQ1 the following supposition was made (see Table 14 for link to 
research question and underlying literature): 
Individual compliance officers prioritise workload around the regulatory 
approach (and the current regulatory risk appetite). 
This supposition has direct links to both Ayres and Braithwaite’s responsive regulation 
and Jackman’s model. Under responsive regulations the regulators are reactive to the 
firms approach to regulatory demands. Under Jackman’s model, both the compliance 
approach and the regulators’ approach are interlinked. 
With reference to RQ3 the following supposition was made analysis (see Table 14 for 
link to research question and underlying literature): 
The approach to new compliance is highly dependent on the resource 
constraints within the business. 
This supposition has direct links to alternatives to traditional in house compliance 
models i.e. outsourcing, shared services and consulting considerations. 
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7.4.2 The regulatory approach 
Due to the nature of their roles, and direct links to regulatory compliance all of the 
participants discussed the relationship with the regulators to some extent. Analysis via 
immersion within the interview texts reveals a number of sub themes within discussions 
with practitioners.  
7.4.2.1 Dealing with the regulator 
The first of these sub themes were issues of dealing with the regulator (or relationship 
with regulator). 
“As the banks’ don't wish to fall foul of any requirements, we tend to over-
regulate in some areas, which then has an adverse effect on customer service 
and engagement” Participant YMO26 
This quote reflects respect for the regulator and fear of adverse reaction from the 
regulator. This of course has directs links to responsive regulation, and the 
enforcement pyramid. By keeping the regulator on side there is lower risk of sanctions 
or regulatory actions. However, the cost of over complying within the financial service 
organisations may result in adverse effects on the consumer i.e. additional over 
regulation of processes. 
“Inspection by the regulator had come up with findings […] so there was lots of 
pain to go through within the business” Participant JMC10 
This quote portrays negative emotions of dealing with the regulator. Through non-
compliance and the resulting regulatory response the business suffered. This is again 
directly linked to the enforcement pyramid, whereby non-compliance results in 
increasing severity of sanction or pain for the business. 
However, there was push back on the concept of regulation from practitioner in the 
quote below. The concept of increasing regulation was seen as an inhibitor, rather than 
an encouragement for greater compliance. This would directly contrast with the 
dynamics of the enforcement pyramid. However, this is aligned to Jackman’s model 
whereby firms are encouraged to follow spirit rather than letter of the law. 
“Regulation doesn’t solve the problem. In some ways they make it 
worse…because all that you do is create this tick box mentality, when everyone 
is struggling to meet this book of regulations, which is about a foot thick” 
Participant OMC20 
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The importance of the regulator as a stakeholder is encompassed in the quote below. 
“You were actually dealing with the regulator and you had to get them to buy 
into it because you had to get a really good, fair, understanding of what they 
want” Participant EFC10 
This is supportive of the concept of the enforcement pyramid whereby the regulator is 
reactive to the actions of the firm. Clear communication between both parties is 
essential to achieve regulatory compliance. This also has links to Wood’s 2002 
Partnership model (see Section 4.4.1). This model was also linked to Jackman’s model 
by Edward’s and Wolfe (2004). 
This argument is also supported by Smith (2011) who argued that: 
“Responsive regulation is most successful where human agency is personal 
central and regular in creating regulatory relationships” (p. 733) 
Therefore, the resourcing of this human relationship, at both the regulator and the 
regulated, is of vital importance to move regulatory compliance forward. 
7.4.2.2 Motivations and difficulties of regulatory compliance 
The second of the subthemes was motivations and difficulties of regulatory compliance. 
“So yes we do need to be one step ahead of the game really, we need to 
be…..In some cases we work with them, in some cases it is released to 
everyone at the same time” Participant NMO28 
“they are not black and white, there’s judgement and shades of grey…making 
sure you are doing things properly, but nevertheless allowing yourself to take 
into account factors which they won’t have thought about” Participant VMLA19 
These two quotes demonstrate the inherent difficulties in responding to regulatory 
change. The idea of ‘being ahead of the game’ indicates a desire to demonstrate 
proactivity and best practice to the regulator and peers. The importance of the ‘work 
with them’ indicates the importance the reactive relationship between both regulator 
and firms. However, there are negative aspects of this relationship. The first quote 
portrays a sense of pressure to achieve to expectations, by being ahead and proactive, 
which will inevitably put strain on the relationships of the professionals involved. 
The second comment indicates the complexities and ‘shades of grey’ within the 
relationship. This has direct links to the findings within the personal construct analysis 
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linking to the category of ‘principles, as opposed to, rule based/spirit, as opposed to, 
letter’ (see Section 7.3.5.1). This shows the interrelationship between communication 
with the regulator and application of professional judgement. This is also reflected in 
Jackman’s model as well, in a mature relationship. Although not highlighted directly 
within the model itself, the concept of trust is inferred within this relationship (Harvey 
and Bosworth, 2013).  
One participant considered the relationship with the regulator in some depth and 
seemed to be justifying the importance of the role of compliance in an organisation. 
The quote below reflects the ‘compliance as inhibitor’ concept in a positive manner. 
This links to the findings of high importance, of the nuisance category, within content 
analysis of constructs (Section 7.3.5.1). Compliance is an essential intervention (or 
perhaps a necessary nuisance) for businesses in terms of risk, and the relationship 
with the regulator. 
 “So compliance is a form of risk management, it’s regulatory risk management, 
and it is also a form of ensuring we abide by the laws and regulations […] it was 
where compliance was an intervention” Participant VMLA19 
The same participant went on the consider relationships with regulator with links to 
culture (in the quote below). Again, the intervention of compliance is essential for the 
regulatory relationship to ensure that misdemeanours are reported and dealt with 
appropriately. The significance of this quote is the complexity of this statement as it 
relies: firstly, on an ethical compliance officer; secondly, on an appropriate culture in 
the organisation (i.e. the compliance officer is allowed to perform his duties); and 
finally, on a good relationship with the regulator to deal with issues identified. 
“cultural issues yes, absolutely….and the other side of it, where it is significant 
is any regulatory breach, because that as you are probably aware, and 
regulatory breach of any significance needs to be reported to the regulator and 
that creates a tension within the business because that … because obviously 
the business does not automatically want to notify the regulator of any problem” 
Participant VMLA19 
Providing a contradictory viewpoint, again with links to culture and ethics of individuals 
involved, the quote below highlights the inevitable barriers to the compliance function 
and the relationship with the regulator. Even if both the regulator and the compliance 
officers are aligned in goals of achieving regulatory compliance, rogue individuals will 
succeed in unethical behaviours. 
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“If someone is determined… because if you think about this, every one of these 
banks had the correct policies and procedures in place. The regulator had been 
in, and the policies and procedures were spot on” Participant OMC20 
This theme of barriers to compliance was also highlighted in the review of personal 
constructs in Section 7.3. 
7.4.2.3 Dealing with new regulation 
The final subtheme included discussions of dealing with new regulations. 
“So the way we look at this then is very much, supply and demand… at the 
highest level, we have a schedule of regulatory change, that will come down the 
pipe” Participant LMC20 
“The regulations don’t change significantly they kind of just get tweaked here 
and there […] identifies if there’s a gap between the old and new and that’s how 
you know where to update” Participant EFC10 
The two quotes above link directly to concepts of resourcing of skills towards new 
regulations. The first one demonstrates a proactivity of compliance professionals of 
knowing what is coming and resourcing how they will deal with the issues. The second 
quote indicates a pragmatic approach to dealing with new regulations via assessing 
gaps and effectively getting on with it. 
However, in instances of significant change it is not simply a matter of resourcing from 
within organisations. Participants highlighted the importance, and necessity of working 
with others. In the quote below there are two key points illustrated. The first is the 
importance of interactions with other organisations/compliance professionals through 
organisations such as the BBA. This demonstrates a willingness for knowledge sharing 
and trust with other organisations. The second is the inevitability in certain cases to 
include consultants in dealing with new regulations.  
“to a degree through things like the BBA, so on big topics of compliance, for 
example, we will talk to other banks about its… so on legacy issues, SME 
derivatives for example or mis-selling of interest rate derivatives, there’s a pretty 
common industry standard there, but we still use consultants there” Participant 
LMC16 
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A second participant (from a different sector of the industry) makes a similar point in 
the quote below. This underscores the importance of knowledge sharing and trust of 
other organisations in the sector, in order to meet regulatory changes.  
“it enables all the trade bodies to get together, and discuss which bits of these 
particular elements of these recommendations, are well, um I suppose valid, 
are possible to implement, and the costs involved in it all” Participant NMO28 
The inevitable use of consultants is also validated in the quote below. 
“Need external expertise to understand/cope with new regulation” Participant 
YMO26 
The issues and costs of dealing with new regulations were also discussed by some 
participants. The frustrations of complying with regulatory demands are encompassed 
in the quote below. The participant highlighted that this was an experience from some 
years ago – but the fact that this was still forming part of his personal worldview 
evidences the importance of this aspect of the regulatory relationship. The significance 
of communication (and the pitfalls of miscommunication) between regulator and 
compliance professionals is important in cost benefit considerations whilst dealing with 
new regulation. 
“setting up systems based on two documents and then turning around and 
changing, so we had to change all the systems again…cost us a fortune, and a 
nightmare in time…training, everything” Participant NMO28 
Conversely, an alternative view is also presented in the quote below. Despite the 
inconvenience and costs of implementing new regulations, the importance of 
adherence to regulatory demands is demonstrated in the experience below. Despite 
misgivings about implementing this particular compliance update, overall the 
experience was seen in a positive light, and a benefit to the organisation. 
“It had to be done, so if we hadn’t we would have lost […]. Did we learn 
anything on the way?....actually, yes, I think it is a bit of a tenuous link, but we 
probably saved ourselves hundreds of thousands, even millions of pounds” 
Participant RMO20 
This is an important finding, whereby, compliance officers can benefit and learn from 
compliance experiences which they may initially view as problematic i.e. worst 
compliance experiences. 
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7.4.3 Alternatives 
The discussion of alternative routes for regulatory compliance reflects individual 
experiences. This exposes inherent difference in the organisations and jurisdictions in 
which the compliance officers had worked. Some organisations are able to (and willing 
to) highly resource the compliance function, whereas some organisations have 
limitations on resources towards compliance. The quote below reflects the specialised 
skills required in certain scenarios. If the compliance function is adequately resourced 
they may choose to employ consultants in this instance. 
 “you might use advisors all the time for this type of stuff… and then for 
regulatory investigations for example, you would use specialists, legal firms, big 
4 accountancy (type) firms would provide specialist know how to deliver narrow 
parts of your program” Participant LMC16 
However, the use of external consultants appeared a completely alien (and 
unnecessary) concept to other individuals, as per quote below. If funding resource is 
limited it is a matter a compliance professionals getting on with it themselves. 
Therefore, this suggests that alternatives are heavily influenced by the individual 
organisations resource structure. 
“I can’t think that we have ever used consultants on anything to do with money 
laundering compliance” Participant NMO28 
It should be noted that this viewpoint was limited to only 1 of the 12 participants. Other 
participants were supportive of use of consultants. Consultants were seen as a 
mechanism to add credibility to the claims or recommendations of the compliance 
officers i.e. ‘if a multinational consultant has okayed this, then we must be going about 
this in the right way’. Consultants were seen as a mechanism to get support of all 
stakeholders, as per the quote below. 
“You had to get the key stakeholders on board, because you weren’t just 
dealing with in that situation I went to ask a consultant to do that” Participant 
EFC10 
Nevertheless, the use of consultants is not always adopted. There are certain 
circumstances when use of consultants is seen as appropriate and certain situations 
where their use may be seen as frivolous. As per the quote below, compliance 
consultants were seen as a benefit to support the approach to new regulation, to avoid 
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‘scraping through’. The concept of balancing resources is also introduced – consultants 
being seen as a temporary workforce to meet a short term need. 
“Some firms did most of it in house, and achieved a minimum level of 
compliance... but absolutely scraped through…those paying the minimum tend 
to be the smaller organisations, with minimal use of external consultants, and 
tend to be simpler businesses and might have spent £10 million …. On the 
other end we spent £120 million, probably £80 million was with consultants, to 
develop models, to produce documentation, to run programmes, that’s purely 
because we did not want to gear up with ermm…. 200 people, and put them on 
our cost base” Participant LMC16 
The same participant reinforces the balancing of resource in the next quote. The 
concept of maintaining steady employee numbers of resource via use of external 
contractors (consultants). So despite the large costs involved in using consultants, this 
is seen as a preferable alternative to increasing the underlying base costs of the 
business (which from an accounting viewpoint seems counter intuitive). 
 “so at each point you consider what best blend of internal and external 
contracting of resource, outsourcing some stuff to third parties completely […] 
because what you don’t want to do is to increase our base level of costs” 
Participant LMC16 
Ultimately, we return to the idea that the use of consultants is highly dependent on the 
organisation structure. When discussing outsourcing (rather than use of consultants) 
the concept of organisation dynamics is seen as key. Consultants and outsourcing 
serve an essential purpose within the sector of financial service regulatory compliance 
from a cost/benefits viewpoint, as per the quote below. 
“there is a diversity of scale that creates a market for such a function, that is to 
say that larger companies tend to operate these functions in-house, but the 
smaller firms find it cost effective to outsource” Participant YMO26 
However, there are a number of risks involved in use of consultants or outsourcing. 
From the perspective of a function providing outsourcing services (to other 
organisations), risks remain from a reputational point of view. While the risk of 
regulatory compliance remains with the individual organisation who outsource, the 
firms offering outsourcing services suffer also from reputational damage in instance of 
non-compliance/regulatory breach. A regulatory breach indicates that their processes 
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are not working effectively to meet their client’s needs, as per the quote below, and risk 
by association applies. 
“All they’re doing is outsourcing to us, so we have to make sure we manage it 
properly. Ermm. So our risk becomes reputational. If one of our clients does 
something terribly wrong, and we just go along with it, then our risk is by 
association” Participant NMO28 
There were also a number of barriers, or costs presented when considering use of 
these alternatives. The first unsurprisingly is the cost of such services. The quote which 
follows highlights that costs of such services are not commensurate with the benefits 
received.  
“Now whilst we have got some value from that in terms of better models built, 
slightly better documentation, have they got a billion of value from it? No 
chance…. And majority of that’s gone to consultants” Participant LMC16 
Also, irrespective of the use of such alternatives, stakeholders buy in is seen as a 
much greater force in terms of compliance effectiveness. Without buy in from the top, 
compliance functions will inevitably fail, as per the quote below. 
“If the board don’t accept this need […] and are simply saying ‘ok thanks 
compliance, yes fine, yes noted thank you very much, yes but we have to make 
X amount of income this month, this year or whatever’ it’s not going to work. 
Compliance will never succeed” Participant OMC20 
Finally, all of the issues around alternatives are dwarfed by the underlying issues of 
spirit, as opposed to, letter of the law. Ultimately the consulting and outsourcing 
industries are providing a service to compliance functions. However, if the underlying 
approach is not geared towards an ethical, and judgement based rationale, then 
compliance again will fail, as per the quote below. 
“No I don’t think it is rule based, and that is where I think there again is a 
mistake ….Report it, investigate it, ask questions…because the trouble is you 
are creating a huge industry around compliance and too much of it is ticking 
boxes, and not enough is about thinking about what we are doing… what is the 
purpose of what we are doing….which is what the risk based approach (is…) 
should be about” Participant OMC20 
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In summary, these discussions consider the concept that many organisations have 
widespread use of consultants or outsourced services to deal with regulatory demands. 
Some organisations may employ consultants to meet short term resource demands. 
Some organisations may employ consultants for technical expertise. And finally, some 
organisations would consider consultants as a form of outsourcing compliance.  
Although not formally recorded in data, whilst presenting a workshop at a conference102 
to a range of consultants, practitioners and academics the issue of ‘consultants’ was 
raised. In this small group opinion was divided between ‘why pay for consultants when 
we are capable ourselves’ to the (consultants’ viewpoint) of the specialism that are 
offered by such services – spend money, to save money. The idea of consultants 
adding credibility to recommendations/processes adopted by compliance was also 
discussed in this workshop, which demonstrates the dominance of this construct in 
discussions with a number of practitioners. 
7.4.4 Summary of conclusions on suppositions 1 and 4 from interview 
data analysis 
At the start of this section, two separate suppositions were presented which were 
aligned to RQ1 and RQ3 in Table 14. 
7.4.4.1 Discussion of Supposition 1 
Individual compliance officers prioritise workload around the regulatory 
approach (and the current regulatory risk appetite). 
From the analysis above, it may be concluded that compliance officers are highly 
aware of the regulatory cycle and plan resources carefully around regulatory changes. 
This suggests a level of proactivity which is seen as desirable from a regulatory 
viewpoint. The findings overview resulting from the analysis of quotes by participants 
when discussing the regulatory relationship, now follows: 
 Compliance officers are respectful of their relationship with the regulator; 
 However, there are negative emotions associated with dealings with the 
regulator; 
 There is push back from practitioners regarding over-regulation; 
 There is an expectation for regulators to be reactive to actions taken by the 
organisations; 
                                               
102 Delivery of workshop ‘A Plea for Ethical Compliance’ at 32nd Cambridge International Symposium 
on Economic Crime 
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 There are inherent difficulties in responding to regulatory change: resource, 
judgement, and relationships are seen as important drivers (and sources of 
difficulty); 
 Despite best intentions of compliance functions/regulators, culture (and 
unethical behaviours) still act as barriers to compliance; 
 Resourcing change is seen as a key barrier for dealing with new regulation; 
 Knowledge sharing is considered essential to drive regulatory change; 
 Communication is also considered essential for the regulatory change to be 
successful. 
From these points, we can see that compliance officers are focused on maintenance of 
strong relationships with the regulator, and do indeed prioritise workloads around the 
regulatory approach. Significant attributes to the relationship include respect, clear 
communication, and knowledge sharing. However, barriers of culture, resource, and 
miscommunication may inhibit the relationship between compliance officers and the 
regulator. 
7.4.4.2 Discussion of Supposition 4 
The approach to new compliance is highly dependent on the resource 
constraints within the business. 
From the discussion on alternative approaches above it may be concluded that use of 
alternatives varies depending on the dynamics within the organisation (which is often 
outside the control of the compliance officers themselves). The following reflects a 
summary of analysis of quotes by participants when discussing alternatives: 
 Subject to resource restraints, the majority of organisation would use 
consultants to affect regulatory change; 
 Consultants involvement may provide credibility to the compliance function 
recommendations; 
 Consultants are seen as a short term/temporary resource; 
 Costs of consultants are not always seen as commensurate with benefits 
received; 
 Risks are associated with alternatives, and include high costs and reputational 
risks; 
 Irrespective of alternatives adopted, internal barriers within the organisation will 
inhibit the compliance function (management buy in, and spirit, as opposed to 
letter of the law considerations). 
 
  
218 
 
The subjects of resource/costs were of high importance during discussions of 
alternatives. However, this is balanced with the concepts of credibility and smoothing of 
resource. Moreover, the barriers to compliance were also highlighted by practitioners 
with recurring theme of culture (management buy in) and also judgement (spirit/letter of 
the law). 
7.5 Concluding thoughts 
This chapter has presented the analysis of data collated during interviews with 
practitioners. As discussed in the methodology chapter (Chapter 6), and also revisited 
within this chapter, repertory grid allows flexibility for researchers to tailor use of grids, 
and resulting analysis to their own research agenda. This has been capitalised within 
this analysis to allow story telling from interview data to be triangulated with content 
analysis of constructs. The original research questions and suppositions which were 
used as a framework in order to analyse data (Table 14) have been explored with main 
findings summarised in Table 21. 
 
The next chapter will synthesise these key findings against the existing literature base, 
and present an alternative conceptual model for the compliance function. 
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Table 21 A summary of the research questions, the suppositions explored, and the main findings presented in Chapter 7 
Research question Supposition Main findings (and section discussed) 
Research Question 1: To 
what extent does the 
regulatory cycle influence 
managements’ decision 
making over compliance 
approach? 
Individual compliance officers prioritise 
workload around the regulatory 
approach (and the current regulatory 
risk appetite). 
Compliance officers are highly aware of the importance of relationships with 
the regulator, and remain proactive in prioritising workload around the 
regulatory approach. Key barriers to the relationship include poor culture, 
inadequate resourcing and miscommunication. (Section 7.4, Section 7.4.4) 
Research Question 2a: 
What are the key 
constructs that influence 
managers’ decision of 
compliance function 
approach? 
No suppositions were made for content 
analysis of constructs. 
Compliance officers’ personal constructs have been classified into 12 
categories from the 230 pooled constructs. The following categories were 
identified during analysis: resource; education and training; ethics and culture; 
reputation implications; skills and status of compliance officers; stakeholder 
considerations; communication and knowledge sharing; regulatory risk issues; 
principle vs rule based concerns; barriers to compliance; nuisances and 
inefficiencies; and ritualism and gaming. 
Three new categories of personal constructs are observed within the data set 
which were not identified in the literature at point of creating the initial template 
i.e. barriers to compliance, nuisance and inefficiencies and ritualism and 
gaming. Of these new categories ‘barriers to compliance’ was seen to be of 
medium/high in terms of both dominance and importance. The most dominant 
category was ‘stakeholder considerations’. With respect to importance, the 
categories with similarity scores most closely aligned to benefit and cost 
considerations included ‘nuisances/inefficiencies’ and ‘principles, as opposed 
to, rule based/spirit, as opposed to, letter of law’ 
The results of the category formations will be taken forward into the next 
chapter and synthesised against the existing literature, to consider whether 
any steps may be taken by regulators or practitioners to overcome these 
issues surrounding regulatory compliance. (Section 7.3, Section 7.3.6) 
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Research question Supposition Main findings (and section discussed) 
Research Question 2a: 
What are the key 
constructs that influence 
managers’ decision of 
compliance function 
approach? 
Aspirational compliance experiences 
may include an abundance of positive 
connotation within the descriptors, and 
that worst compliance experiences may 
include an abundance of negative 
connotation within the descriptors given 
by participants. 
When practitioners describe negative connotations of their experience the key 
drivers appear to be external factors and uncertainties (often outside control of 
compliance office). (Section 7.2, Section 7.2.2) 
Research Question 2b: 
How do compliance 
officers’ personal 
constructs align to 
academic models of 
compliance? 
If the scaling of aspirational compliance 
to worst compliance within the repertory 
grid were aligned to the linear scale of 
Jackman’s model and contention of “an 
ethos of ethical compliance” and 
“unthinking mechanical compliance”, 
the expectation would be for scoring of 
1 for aspirational compliance (perceived 
as a benefit to organisation) and a 
scoring of 5 for worst compliance 
experience (perceived as a cost to the 
organisation). 
Practitioners do not align perceptions of benefits and costs in a linear fashion, 
when comparing worst and aspirational compliance experience. Benefits are 
often achieved within difficult situations, and costs are often apparent in 
otherwise ideal scenarios. This challenges the traditional models presented 
within academic literature. (Section 7.2, Section 7.2.1) 
Research Question 3: In 
cases of new regulation, 
how do compliance 
functions rely on external 
expertise (consultants) or 
is there proactive 
promotion of in house 
knowledge and expertise? 
The approach to new compliance is 
highly dependent on the resource 
constraints within the business. 
Themes of resource/costs of consultants and alternatives were dominant 
influences for decision making over use. However, credibility added in using 
consultants was also seen to be a dominant factor for decision making in use 
of alternatives. Barriers were again highlighted, when exploring this 
supposition with recurring theme of culture (management buy in) and also 
judgement (spirit/letter of law).(Section 7.4, Section 7.4.4) 
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Chapter 8 Discussion – The compliance trust 
“Rationalists regime and bargaining theorists and, more surprisingly, constructivists 
have largely ignored the influence of social interaction on compliance decisions” 
(Checkel, 2001, p. 554) 
8.0 Introduction 
The quote above reflects the importance of understanding the compliance officers’ 
worldview when considering theories around compliance. Therefore, the purpose of 
this chapter will be to consider the existing literature base, in combination with the 
analysis of the data from this thesis. The intention is to triangulate and synthesise the 
personal constructs of the participants against existing models from the literature, and 
provide an alternative model for compliance. A practical approach has been adopted to 
present the conceptual model in response to research objective 3 (which, in reaction to 
the quote above, emphasises the importance of social interactions with a number of 
stakeholders). However, given the sample sizes involved and qualitative nature of 
analysis, the findings cannot be generalised. This chapter offers tentative suggestions 
of interpretation from the main findings identified during analysis. 
Figure 50 summarises the development of the conceptual model within this chapter (to 
expand upon the research design, which is set out in Figure 2). This chapter has been 
split into three main sections, which follows the course of development of the 
conceptual model (Figure 50). Section 8.1 considers each of the research objectives in 
turn and triangulates the existing literature in comparison to the data presented within 
this study, providing a theoretical rationale for the conceptual model. Section 8.2 
presents the theoretical rationale for the emergent model attributes, with the overall 
model designed to offer an alternative solution to current models adopted within 
financial service practice and the literature. This model blends key concepts from 
literature and the findings from this study. Through development of this model, 
Objective 3 has been explored specifically within this section. Discussion and feedback 
from practitioners relating to the model is set out within Section 8.3, in order to 
strengthen the interpretation of the findings of this study, and prior to the presentation 
of the final model in Section 8.4. This section also addresses the central argument of 
this thesis of ‘why compliance is viewed as business inhibiting’ by providing an 
alternative solution towards regulatory compliance. 
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Figure 50 Development of the conceptual model 
  
8.1 Research objectives 
The following research objectives (and underlying research questions) were presented 
in the introduction to this study: 
Objective 1. To understand the motives for regulatory compliance by banks. 
RQ1 To what extent does the regulatory cycle influence managements’ decision 
making over compliance approach? 
Objective 2. To explore the different structures of regulatory compliance in operation. 
RQ2a What are the key constructs that influence managers’ decision over the 
compliance function approach? 
RQ2b How do compliance officers’ personal constructs align to academic 
models of compliance? 
Objective 3. To investigate the circumstances under which different approaches 
would be adopted.  
RQ3 In cases of new regulation, how do compliance functions rely on external 
expertise (consultants) or is there proactive promotion of in house knowledge 
and expertise? 
Section 8.1 
Section 8.2 
Section 8.3 
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Each of these research objectives, and the underlying research questions and findings 
will be summarised in turn. For each research objective a distinct review of the 
literature was performed. This was then followed by the data collection involving 
practitioners. Triangulation of both literature and key findings synthesises the 
conceptual model presented within Section 8.2. However, it is acknowledged that the 
wider literature and findings from this study are inevitably interlinked. Whilst it has been 
argued that the methodology employed explores personal constructs to provide rich 
and deep interview data, ultimately (as with many forms of qualitative and subject 
driven research data), the participants’ views have emerged to an extent from their own 
review of literature/training and professional documents around the topic. Quoting 
Silverman’s arguments against “our cultural love affair with the real”: 
“Most qualitative research who champion the subject’s point of view or privilege 
experience simply do not question where the subject’s ‘viewpoint’ comes from 
or how ‘experience’ gets defined the way it does by those very individuals 
whose experience they seek to document” (Silverman, 2013, p. 130)  
Therefore, it is important to ensure that synthesis between the literature and the data 
collected within this study is performed, to identify any gaps within the respective 
sources. This synthesis (structured around research objectives) is presented in 
Sections 8.1.1 to 8.1.3.  
8.1.1 Research objective 1: To understand the motives for regulatory 
compliance by banks 
8.1.1.1 Key points from the regulation literature 
In order to understand the motives for regulatory compliance, a thorough review of the 
regulatory literature was completed prior to development of methodology and 
interaction with practitioners. The purpose of the regulation literature review was to 
understand ‘what compliance officers are complying with’. As evidenced in Chapter 3, a 
broad range of scholars contribute to the regulatory literature base. A direct (and 
practical) impact of the most recent financial crisis has been increased regulatory focus 
at a national (i.e. UK) and a global level. This ultimately does not explain the motives 
for regulatory compliance, but it does provide context to the pressures faced within the 
industry.  
Responsive regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992) embodies a founding piece of 
regulatory literature, and the enforcement pyramid has been used as a key model to 
frame the analysis of the data presented in this study. Although the model does not 
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provide direct understanding of the motives for regulatory compliance, it does provide 
an indication of the complex relationship between the regulator and the regulated. This 
model provides an expectation of actions from the regulator via the enforcement 
pyramid, which may influence decision making of compliance officers when adopting 
approaches to regulatory compliance. Key principles within this model are the 
maintenance of appropriate relationships between the regulator, and the regulated. 
These attributes include clear communication and evidence of responsiveness in 
behaviours by the regulator. The overlap between relationships and culture was 
introduced earlier by Meidinger (1987), who discussed the concepts (and issues) of 
regulatory communities. The work on regulatory communities aligns to the concept of 
compliance communities which acts as a feature of the model presented in Section 8.2.  
However, the enforcement pyramid faces barriers of the “deterrence trap” if penalties 
are not seen to be sufficient to deter misconduct (Parker, 2006), and this may indeed 
be seen to be a practical issue within the financial service sector. Despite significant 
fines and sanction from regulators, the highly profitably nature of the financial service 
industry may result in inappropriate behaviour for short term gains (connecting also to 
Barraquier’s 2011 compliance model linking ethical behaviours, decision making and 
associated emotions). This also indicates barriers in the form of micro view whereby 
compliance officers and individuals within the firm may not fully appreciate the macro 
impact they have on the wider firm and sector. The literature has discussed the 
concept of macro view from a regulatory perspective (IMF, 2010; Galati and Moessner, 
2010; Baker, 2010) but this is not linked to the compliance officers themselves, or 
coherently linked to the motivations for regulatory compliance. 
This lack of macro view at compliance officer level within organisations also highlights 
issues with self-regulation. A number of authors discuss the self-regulatory approach 
both pre, and post crisis (Stefanadis, 2003; Coglianese and Lazer, 2003; Ford, 2008 
and 2011; Gilad, 2010; Calcott, 2010, Rossi, 2010). Whilst the principles are sound in 
theory, these appear to have failed to work in practice within the financial service 
industry – perhaps directly related to the concept that the compliance officers are not in 
a position to understand the macro view impacts of their actions. Again a global view 
may motivate individual compliance officers to achieve regulatory compliance. The 
global view is discussed by Moshirian (2011, 2012) from a regulatory perspective, but 
not from a compliance perspective within organisations. Fuller and Sharma (2012) 
endorse the concept of regulatory academies model (again from a regulatory 
perspective), and this concept would also benefit compliance officers by providing 
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macro and global view of the regulatory and compliance issues (and required 
response). 
Regulatory capture must also be brought into this discussion of barriers to regulatory 
compliance, and has clear links with the objective to review the motivations for 
regulatory compliance. Various academics have studied this issue, and discussed the 
implications for regulatory failure (Baker, 2010; Young, 2012; Harvey and Bosworth, 
2013). In its simplest form, a fundamental concept behind regulatory capture is a lack 
of independence between parties. Therefore, this forms a key principle in the 
conceptual model presented in Section 8.2. This is also supported by Smith (2011), 
who contended that there is a need for regulatory staff to act with scepticism and with 
independence, and should not “be placed in a position where it is easier to adopt the 
values and purposes of the regulated entities” (p. 740). Whilst this is written from a 
regulatory perspective the same principles should apply for the compliance officers 
within each organisation. 
Underpinning the regulatory literature is the debate of theoretical principles of public 
interest (Pigou, 1932) and public choice theories developed in the 1970s. At the time of 
this thesis the public interest arguments (see Section 3.3) have been evidenced by a 
period of re-regulation following the most recent financial crisis. Therefore, the interests 
of the ‘public’ must be acknowledged within a conceptual model which would bear any 
relevance to financial service practice at this time. The concepts of public interest 
groups (PIGS) have been discussed by numerous authors in various conceptual forms 
(Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Omarova – public interest council, 2012; Levine - the 
Sentinel, 2012). Consequently, appropriate stakeholders in the form of transnational 
groups and informal industry leadership103 have been included as major stakeholders 
with direct communication channels within the compliance trust conceptual model.  
More recently Braithwaite and Hong (2015) suggested the concept of “regulatory 
ambassadors”. It may also be argued that the formation of the compliance trust, would 
acts as an alternate form of regulatory ambassador within the organisations they would 
serve (in acknowledgement of the stakeholder relationship between regulator and the 
compliance trust). However, this takes a slightly different form than that described by 
Braithwaite and Hong (2015), as in this instance the compliance officers, whilst acting 
as ambassadors, would also be expected to hold expertise (whereas Braithwaite and 
                                               
103 Some other authors have already considered informal industry leadership. Arora (2010) examines the 
role and work of the existing international regulatory bodies. Abbott and Snidal (2013), Helleiner and 
Pagliari (2011) discuss transnational regulation and issues. 
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Hong (2015) acknowledge the “trade-off between solving the problem of thin 
relationships and the technical competence problem” p. 20) 
In conclusion, it can be seen that a number of barriers to effective regulation (and 
regulatory compliance) are offered within the existing literature. However, these are 
written from the perspective of the regulators and the policy makers, rather than the 
perspective of the regulated (the compliance officers and the organisations they 
represent). Therefore, in an attempt to address these issues an alternative conceptual 
model of the compliance trust is presented (Section 8.2). This is modelled from the 
perspective of the compliance personnel working within the financial service industry, 
with the regulator as one of the stakeholders. Emergent attributes are described within 
the model in Table 22, which links directly back to the literature and issues discussed 
above. 
8.1.1.2 Key findings from the data – Research Question 1 
Within the data presented in Analysis and Findings Chapter, the following main findings 
were summarised with reference to research question 1 (extracted from Table 21). 
Research Question 1: To what extent does the regulatory cycle influence 
managements’ decision making over compliance approach? 
Supposition 1: Individual compliance officers prioritise workload around the regulatory 
approach (and the current regulatory risk appetite). 
Key Findings: Compliance officers are highly aware of the importance of relationships 
with the regulator, and remain proactive in prioritising workload around the regulatory 
approach. Barriers to the relationship between regulator and the compliance officers 
include; poor culture, inadequate resourcing, and miscommunication. 
Existing regulatory literature, and more specifically the responsive regulation model 
(Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992), is focused on the reactivity and actions of the regulator 
and policy makers. The data collated in this study contributes instead to the discussion 
of the ‘reactivity of the regulated’. Proactivity (and motivation to comply) was 
demonstrated during discussions with practitioners interviewed within this study. 
However, the barriers to compliance were highlighted as significant considerations in 
approaches to regulatory compliance. 
Barriers to regulatory compliance are already discussed within the literature. However, 
the focus has been more specifically directed on the regulators and/or policymakers’ 
viewpoint. Therefore, a divide exists between the barriers identified within the 
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regulatory literature, and the perceptions of those trying to comply with the regulation, 
as found from this study. Irrespective of regulatory approaches adopted by regulators 
(i.e. re-regulation/de-regulation) there are inherent difficulties in supporting individual 
compliance officers facing barriers of culture, resourcing and miscommunication. 
However, this does reinforce the concepts that relationships between the regulator and 
the regulated are vital to overcoming such barriers faced within the sector. 
In addition, the reality exists that despite both academic and practitioner literature 
endorsing best practice models, these issues/barriers to regulatory compliance still 
feature within the personal constructs of practitioners. This also reinforces that the 
current literature is ineffective in bridging the academia/theory/practice gap. 
This study did not seek to specifically address the issue of culture within financial 
service organisations. However, there has been inevitable overlap into cultural 
concerns. Historically, and more recently it has been proven that culture issues still 
exist within the sector104. Haynes (2005) highlighted the importance of the 
independence of the function, whilst commenting on the personal attributes, including 
strength of “personality to withstand pressures”, which aligns to the findings of this 
study in relation to the issues posed by barriers to compliance. Therefore, the attribute 
of independence of compliance/risk professionals from the organisations that they 
serve, supported within the conceptual model, will mitigate some of the barriers that 
culture issues within financial service firms may present to regulatory compliance. In 
addition, the issue of inadequate resourcing and miscommunication is addressed within 
the conceptual model presented in Section 8.2, by ensuring these factors also form 
emergent attributes within the model.  
A significant contribution achieved within this research objective, has been the 
exploration of grid data and interview data within Chapter 7, from the compliance 
officers’ viewpoint (as discussed above) as opposed to the wider debates in the 
literature from the regulators’ viewpoint. 
8.1.2 Research objective 2: To explore the different structures of 
regulatory compliance in operation 
8.1.2.1 Key points from the compliance literature 
There is limited, recent academic literature which discusses structures/models of 
regulatory compliance from a financial service compliance viewpoint. A possible 
                                               
104 See FCA website for numerous examples of scandals, and regulatory actions relating to inadequacies 
in culture, including a 2015 example http://www.fca.org.uk/news/two-former-senior-executives-of-
martin-brokers-fined-and-banned accessed February 2015. 
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reason, evidenced within this thesis, is compliance and risk professional may be 
unwilling to engage with academics due to time and confidentiality constraints. 
However, a literature base does exist albeit written largely from a practitioner’s 
perspective rather than academic viewpoints. Despite the existence of this best 
practice literature (as complimented by the regulatory literature), compliance 
professionals continue to face barriers within the financial service sector. 
During the initial literature review, Jackman’s model was identified as a practical model 
(given its publication in FSA DP18, 2002, p. 9). Although Jackman’s model has limited 
citations, the rationale for use in this thesis is the relevance and specific focus of the 
model in the financial service sector, coupled with clear and inverse link to the widely 
cited enforcement model of Ayres and Braithwaite. The model was used to outline the 
pilot study; and ultimately, the linear nature of the model (‘unthinking/mechanical 
compliance’ to ‘internalised ethos of statutory approach’) influenced the methodological 
design of the experiences discussed with practitioners during repertory grid interviews 
(worst to aspirational compliance experiences). Other academics have developed 
Jackman’s model further with focus on the partnership and relationships with the 
regulator (Woods, 2002; Edwards and Wolfe, 2005). The underlying links to ethical 
approaches to regulatory compliance are echoed in more recent publications and the 
media (Duska, 2011; Harvey and Bosworth-Davies, 2013; Llewellyn et al., 2014; BBC, 
2014a). 
A fundamental limitation within Jackman’s model is the willingness and ability to 
comply, coupled with normative behaviours, in contrast to compliance cost 
considerations (Malloy, 2003; May, 2004). Compliance literature widely identifies 
economic, social and normative motivations for compliance (Parker, 2012). By creating 
a ‘compliance trust’ the network of compliance officers will share and balance the 
social, economic and normative attributes, across the financial service organisations 
they serve. Inclusion of the major stakeholders of the regulators, the organisations 
(financial service firms), and transnational groups will allow compliance officers to 
create a network which balances the needs of all stakeholders.  
These discussions are underpinned by a number of theories depending on which 
viewpoint that the current models of compliance and the proposed conceptual model 
(Section 8.4) are considered from. Institutional theory is of importance from an 
individual organisation’s point of view, in the current models in practice (i.e. individual 
financial organisations employing in-house/outsourced compliance professionals). 
However, within the compliance trust model institutional theory would apply in a 
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different way; with emphasis on the relationships between the stakeholders and the 
compliance trust (most specifically from the coercive perspective within these 
relationships). However, it may also be argued that Kohlberg’s model (see Table 2) is 
more applicable within the compliance trust itself (and the professionals that would be 
employed within the trust). If the assumption that most business professionals are 
acting at the conventional level when reasoning i.e. doing what is expected by others, 
then the compliance trust and the interactions with the variety of stakeholders will lead 
to appropriate decision making within the trust. Through involvement of informal 
industry leadership in HR/policy making within the trust, then appropriate individuals 
with higher levels of moral reasoning may be identified to promote the overall morality 
within the trust. 
In conclusion, the (majority) of existing literature regarding compliance models focuses 
on motivations for compliance (see Section 4.4), without really addressing the issues 
and barriers faced in practice. The literature is valid and promotes concepts for best 
(and ethical) practice from a range of academics and practitioners, but fails to fully 
consider the issues faced by compliance professionals, in their relationships within the 
organisation they serve, and when dealing with the regulatory demands. This may 
simply be due to the sheer diversity of firms within the sector. Kenny (2014) also 
identify with these issues with the concepts of “dependence corruption”. Therefore, the 
introduction of the conceptual model in Section 3 supersedes this issue by providing 
rotation of independent compliance resource across all firms. Knowledge sharing and 
best practice are implied within this model – if individuals face barriers to compliance in 
the organisations they serve, ultimately they can obtain support initially via the 
compliance trust network, and then through the other stakeholders in the relationship 
(regulators and public interest groups). 
8.1.2.2 Key findings from personal constructs data– research question 2 
This study provides a contribution to the literature by exploring practitioners’ personal 
constructs relating to compliance. The benefit of the methodology adopted in this study, 
is the ability to explore tacit knowledge of the practitioners whilst avoiding interviewer 
bias. Through construct elicitation this has allowed for analysis of the major issues that 
compliance officers face when considering their approach to compliance decision 
making. 
Within the data presented in Analysis and Findings (Chapter 7), the following main 
findings were summarised with reference to research question 2a and 2b (extracted 
from Table 21). 
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Research Question 2a: What are the key constructs that influence managers’ decision 
of compliance function approach? 
Content Analysis of constructs – no supposition 
Key Findings 
Compliance officers’ personal constructs have been classified into 12 categories from 
the 230 pooled constructs. The following categories were identified during analysis: 
resource; education and training; ethics and culture; reputation implications; skills and 
status of compliance officers; stakeholder considerations; communication and 
knowledge sharing; regulatory risk issues; principle as opposed to rule based 
concerns; barriers to compliance; nuisances and inefficiencies; and ritualism and 
gaming. 
Three new categories of personal constructs are observed within the data set, which 
were not identified in the literature at point of creating the initial template i.e. barriers to 
compliance, nuisance and inefficiencies, and ritualism and gaming. Of these new 
categories ‘barriers to compliance’ was seen to be of medium/high in terms of both 
dominance and importance. The most dominant category was ‘stakeholder 
considerations’. With respect to importance, the categories with similarity scores most 
closely aligned to benefit and cost considerations included ‘nuisances/inefficiencies’ 
and ‘principle as opposed to rule based/spirit as opposed to letter of the law’. 
The main themes identified within practitioners’ constructs overlap with culture issues, 
where categories of ‘barriers to compliance’ and ‘nuisance and inefficiencies’ were 
highlighted. This signals that compliance officers’ experiences are affected depending 
on the culture of the firm in which they operate. An indication of the status of these 
issues is the alignment of these constructs in respect to importance ranking, in 
comparison to the concepts of cost and benefit considerations to the organisations (see 
Section 7.2.1). By positioning the operational management of compliance resource 
outside of the organisation they serve (as presented in the theoretical model in Section 
8.2), this may address some of these cultural issues and nuisances that compliance 
officers face in their daily quest for regulatory compliance.  
In addition, the most dominant of construct categories related to ‘stakeholder 
considerations’ (see Section 7.3.4). This has been embedded within the theoretical 
model presented in Section 8.2 in the form of communication channels which are 
opened up (see Section 8.2.5). Instead of being directly employed by one of the major 
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stakeholders (the firm they operate within), and hence reliant from a personal 
perspective (i.e. job security), then compliance officers would be in a better position to 
act with complete independence and allocate a more equitable consideration of all 
stakeholders when considering compliance decision making. The implication would be 
to reduce the barriers facing regulatory compliance, from an individual compliance 
officer’s viewpoint, as they would not face dependence barriers of being employed by 
the firms that they would serve. 
Research Question 2a: What are the key constructs that influence managers’ decision 
of compliance function approach? 
Supposition 2 - Aspirational compliance experiences may include an abundance of 
positive connotation within the descriptors, and that worst compliance experiences may 
include an abundance of negative connotation within the descriptors given by 
participants. 
Key Findings 
When practitioners describe negative connotations of their experience the main drivers 
appear to be external factors and uncertainties (often outside control of compliance 
office). 
Research Question 2b: How do compliance officers’ personal constructs align to 
academic models of compliance? 
Supposition 3 - If the scaling of aspirational compliance to worst compliance within the 
repertory grid were aligned to the linear scale of Jackman’s model and contention of 
‘an ethos of ethical compliance’ and ‘unthinking mechanical compliance’, the 
expectation would be for scoring of 1 for aspirational compliance (perceived as a 
benefit to organisation) and a scoring of 5 for worst compliance experience (perceived 
as a cost to the organisation). 
Key Findings 
Practitioners do not align perceptions of benefits and costs in a linear fashion, when 
comparing worst and aspirational compliance experience. Benefits are often achieved 
within difficult situations, and costs are often apparent in otherwise ideal scenarios. 
This challenges the traditional models presented within academic literature. 
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By purposely reviewing constructs surrounding both the worst and aspirational 
experiences of the compliance officers, a comparison to existing compliance models is 
possible. A significant finding of this study is that perceived benefits and cost (or 
positive and negative connotation) do not align fully with the linear scales presented in 
academic models (specifically Jackman’s model and Ayres and Braithwaite’s 
enforcement pyramid for regulatory compliance). There are costs associated with 
aspirational compliance, and there are benefits of worst compliance experiences. For 
example, when exploring benefits relating to worst compliance experience positive 
themes (albeit a minority) have emerged from review of these constructs indicating the 
benefits of practitioners sharing such experiences; through knowledge sharing these 
benefits can also be capitalised within other organisations. This notion is transferred to 
the conceptual model below by the inclusion of attributes of macro view and knowledge 
rotation. Even the worst experiences can then be used in future decision making in 
other organisations given the macro view aspect of the compliance trust. By rotating 
compliance officers between organisations, prior learning from experiences can impact 
and benefit other organisations within the trust.  
8.1.3 Research objective 3: To investigate the circumstances under which 
different approaches would be adopted. 
8.1.3.1 Key points from the alternatives literature – shared services and 
consulting 
The central purpose of reviewing the regulatory and compliance literature was to obtain 
an understanding of models that are currently in place and to consider limitations in 
their use (i.e. questions of why, what and how, in response to objectives 1 and 2). 
However, the third research objective is more difficult to address as it is not a matter of 
theory building, but rather, unpicking of existing models and considering remoulding of 
concepts that are applicable to current regulatory compliance practice. 
Therefore, alternative models of meeting regulatory compliance were reviewed within 
the literature search. Author bias from prior work experience, promoted the initial 
interest in consulting literature. Current practitioners also consider outsourcing and 
shared services options as valid routes to regulatory compliance. Arnold (2009) 
highlighted the associated costs within the “thriving consultancy industry”. However, 
there is limited empirical evidence presented in the literature related specifically to the 
use of compliance consultants105. Given the reported spend on consulting in the 
                                               
105 Google Scholar search on “compliance consultant” and “financial service” yields 12 results, March 
2015. 
  
233 
 
financial service industry106 this seems to be an oversight by the academic community. 
Considering the focus on cost benefit studies for regulatory compliance, the additional 
costs associated with consultants would be seen as a quick win for practitioners to try 
to minimise. Therefore, this has been addressed in the compliance trust model 
presented in Section 8.2 (whereby consulting knowledge and costs would be spread 
across all stakeholders within the trust).  
It is acknowledged that “competing organisations” already form “network, alliances and 
strategic partnerships” (Filatochev and Nakajima, 2010, p. 601) in order to collaborate 
in challenging environments107. However, there is much more focus in the literature on 
models for shared services and outsourcing. Economies of scale are discussed via 
transaction cost economics (Spekle et al., 2007; Widener and Selto, 1999, Lindvall, 
2011). Concepts of centres of excellence are discussed by other authors (Ulbrich 2006; 
Herbert and Seal, 2012). These concepts are transferable to the proposed conceptual 
model within Section 8.2. The identified benefits of knowledge sharing, centres of 
excellence and economies of scale will apply within the network of the compliance 
trust. This will not run as a profit making endeavour as traditional consulting models 
and outsourcing options are arranged. However, the complexities of managing costs 
while delivering suitable services will mirror the problems currently encountered in 
practice in shared service/outsourcing models. Therefore, development of suitable 
performance indicators for each of the stakeholders would need to be balanced and 
assessed on a continuous basis, in the same way that shared service arrangements 
function. 
8.1.3.2 Key findings from the data – Research Question 3 
Within the data presented in Analysis and Findings Chapter, the following main findings 
were summarised with reference to research question 3 (extracted from Table 21). 
Research Question 3: In cases of new regulation, how do compliance functions rely on 
external expertise (consultants) or is there proactive promotion of in house knowledge 
and expertise? 
Supposition 4: The approach to new compliance is highly dependent on the resource 
constraints within the business. 
                                               
106 The Economist reported global spend of $49 billion in 2012 by financial-services consulting business 
(one fifth of consulting industry total revenues) http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-
economics/21586827-advisory-industry-has-shown-remarkable-resilience-crisis-advice-squad accessed 
March 2015. 
107 An example in this case would be the British Banking Association. 
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Key Findings 
Themes of resource/costs of consultants and alternatives were dominant influences for 
decision making over use. However, credibility added in using consultants was also 
seen to be a dominant factor for decision making in use of alternatives. Barriers were 
again highlighted, when exploring this supposition with recurring theme of culture 
(management buy in) and also judgement (spirit/letter of the law) 
Inherent differences into approaches to compliance were identified in discussions with 
practitioners. An emerging theme was the inevitable use of consultants and the 
credibility that this would add to ensure management buy in. This concept has been 
embedded within the conceptual model, with the advantage of combining use of 
consultants (when necessary) with knowledge sharing (thus, resulting in cost savings 
across the compliance trust).  
8.2 Introduction of ‘The Compliance Trust’ conceptual model – 
theoretical rationale 
Earlier chapters exploring the research objectives have considered the motivations 
behind regulatory compliance (via the literature review), and how compliance officers 
deal with their compliance issues on a day to day basis (through engagement with 
practitioners during the data collection process). However, the earlier discussions 
which triangulate the literature and the analysis of data set (under Section 8.1) do not 
fully address the final research objective. 
Objective 3: To investigate the circumstances under which different approaches 
would be adopted. 
The importance of this research objective is evidenced through the literature review, 
which indicates that academics (and practitioners) have been unable to develop fully 
functioning regulatory compliance models which overcome the complexities of practice 
within financial services, and avoid regulatory misconduct. The literature (and media) 
widely explores motivations behind regulatory misconduct due to the nature of public 
interest in the financial markets. However, solutions to the issues are yet to be 
identified and implemented. The data presented in earlier chapter also contributes to 
an understanding of the practical difficulties in achieving regulatory compliance. In 
order to meet Objective 3 a conceptual framework was developed through triangulation 
of literature and findings, as presented in Table 22. 
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Grounded within the summary of the literature and the results of data analysis 
discussed in the previous section, it is proposed that an alternative model for a 
centralised trust of compliance may address some of the issues faced by compliance 
teams within financial service organisations (an updated version is presented in Figure 
51). There appears to be an unanswered question in both academic literature and 
practice based knowledge, as to whether compliance could be centralised to the 
degree of a shared service arrangement between multiple banks, under a model of 
‘The Compliance Trust’.  
This model differs from traditional commercial consultancy or outsourcing. Costs would 
be controlled through the interaction between the shared service function, with the 
multiple banks controlling the budgets through a trust structure. The trust would follow 
the principles of a cost controlled service centre serving all of its stakeholders, rather 
than a profit making entity. This model will also differ from banking forum groups which 
are already in existence (such as the BBA) as the compliance officers working within 
the trust would be separated (independent) from the banking organisation that they 
would serve, promoting independence (and hence issues surrounding trust would exist 
within the resulting compliance community, rather than the individual banking 
organisations).  
To be effective it is considered that five emergent attributes of; independence, a 
macroview, rotation and knowledge sharing, funding independence, and clear 
communication, are essential to overcome the barriers to regulatory compliance 
identified in the discussion in Section 8.1 (from the literature and the main findings of 
this study). The development of the five emergent attributes from triangulation of the 
supporting literature, and main findings from this study is summarised in Table 22. The 
theoretical rationale for each attribute (as evidenced in the review of literature and data 
in Section 8.1) is discussed in Section 8.2.1 to 8.2.5. 
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Table 22 Summary of development of conceptual model, triangulation of existing literature and findings from this study, to formulate theoretical rationale and emergent 
attributes of the model 
Supporting literature Link to findings Theoretical rationale Emergent 
attribute of model 
Ayres and Braithwaite – public interest 
groups (1992 onwards), Omarova – 
public interest council (2012), Levine  - 
the Sentinel (2012)  
Kenny – dependence corruption (2014) 
Haynes – independence (2005) 
Culture barriers exist within 
organisation, which inhibit compliance. 
(Section 7.4, Section 7.4.4) 
Compliance is viewed as a nuisance or 
business inhibiting.(Section 7.3) 
Avoidance of business inhibiting concepts, 
as trust would act as a discrete entity. 
Avoidance of intimidation threats. 
Clear route to ethical compliance. 
Avoidance of culture issues of in house 
employment. 
Independence 
Moshiran – global view (2011); Arnold – 
thriving consultancy trade (2009) 
Concept of self-regulation (Stefanadis, 
2003; Coglianese and Lazer, 2003; Ford, 
2008 and 2011; Gilad, 2010; Calcott, 
2010, Rossi, 2010) 
Macro prudential focus/policy (IMF, 
2010; Galati and Moessner, 2010, 
Baker, 2010) 
Compliance professional actually 
benefit from worst compliance 
experiences, allowing continuous 
learning for future experiences. 
(Section 7.2.1, Section 7.2.2, Section 
8.1.2.2) 
Use of consultants is often inevitable. 
(Section 7.4). 
Appreciation of the wider implications of 
regulatory compliance issues across 
industry (rather than an in house or 
business focused view). 
Communication mechanisms in trust allow 
a macro view of regulatory compliance 
issues. 
Meets the needs of the global financial 
institutions promoting cross border 
exchange of information. 
Allows for collective use of consultants 
(when necessary only) to achieve greater 
good. 
Strength of group allows for clear 
contribution to both businesses and 
regulatory bodies. 
Macro view 
Fuller and Sharma - regulatory 
academies model (2012), Concept of 
regulatory capture (Baker, 2010; Young, 
2012; Harvey and Bosworth, 2013). 
Resource issues remain a major 
concern for practitioners. Despite 
expanded compliance industry 
expertise in recent decades, there 
Avoid issues of regulatory capture (or 
compliance trap) – lobbying could be 
strengthened from a compliance 
perspective. 
Rotation – 
knowledge 
sharing 
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Supporting literature Link to findings Theoretical rationale Emergent 
attribute of model 
Concepts of centres of excellence via 
shared service, (Ulbrich 2006; Herbert 
and Seal, 2012) 
Knowledge studies (Nonaka) and 
information asymmetries (Brennan et al., 
2015) 
remains issues balancing resources 
across different jurisdictions and 
organisations depending on regulatory 
demands. Use of consultants is often 
inevitable. (Section 7.4) 
Benefit from shared knowledge –allows for 
best practice (and self-regulation) amongst 
businesses within community via rotation 
(benefits of consulting without the cost) 
Gap in Literature regarding equitable 
cost sharing and independence 
(however, implied by Public Interest 
Groups?) 
Implications of normative behaviours in 
contrast to compliance costs (Malloy, 
2003; May 2004) 
Economies of scale  concepts (Spekle et 
al., 2007;  Widener and Selto, 1999, 
Lindvall, 2011) 
Culture barriers exist within 
organisation, which inhibit compliance. 
(Section 7.4) 
Resourcing issues are impacted by 
culture of firm. (Section 7.4) 
Equitable cost sharing across sector.  
Allow for economies of scale (transaction 
cost economics). 
Salaries of compliance officers unlinked to 
businesses (and performance of 
businesses) they are serving. 
Funding 
independence 
Jackman – firms value and culture role 
with regulator (2002); Woods partnership 
model (2002),;Edwards and Wolfe – 
compliance competence (2005) 
Kenny – dependence corruption (2014) 
Mitchell et al. (1997) – stakeholder 
salience 
Braithwaite and Hong (2015) – 
Regulatory Ambassadors 
Stakeholder issues form a dominant 
aspect of the participants construct 
formation during interview. (Section 7.3) 
Compliance professional actually 
benefit from worst compliance 
experiences, allowing continuous 
learning for future experiences.(Section 
7.2.1, Section 7.2.2) 
Accountability amongst all parties.  
Direct and unfettered communication 
channels with all stakeholder groups. 
Equitable responsibility to all stakeholders. 
Clear 
communication 
channels 
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8.2.1 Independence – theoretical rationale 
The findings from this study indicate that significant barriers to compliance may exist 
when compliance officers are embedded within the businesses they serve, due to the 
common perceptions that compliance is business inhibiting. The literature has already 
called for independent public interest groups; therefore, the contention of this study 
would be to create a model of independence which would avoid any “dependence 
corruption” (Kenny, 2014) issues for the individual compliance officers. 
Therefore, in the conceptual model independence of compliance officers from financial 
service firms would result in: 
 Avoidance of business inhibiting concepts, as trust would act as a discrete 
entity, independent from the firms that the compliance officers would serve, 
focusing instead on public interests (Section 7.3). 
 Avoidance of intimidation threats to individual compliance officers, due to 
independence from the banks they serve (which would minimise barriers to 
compliance, Section 7.3). 
 A clear route to ethical compliance with minimised barriers to compliance 
(supporting Jackman’s model for ‘aspirational’ compliance), linked to public 
interests. 
 Avoidance of culture issues of in-house employment at individual banking 
institutions – the compliance culture would be directed from the trust (Section 
7.4 and 7.4.4). 
8.2.2 Macro view – theoretical rationale 
Note by stating macro view, it is considered that the trust operates at a macro level 
across the sector, rather than only the micro level within individual firms. The macro 
view concept also has some overlap with communication of knowledge (introduced in 
Section 1.3) and knowledge sharing (discussed in Sections 8.2.3). As argued within 
Section 8.1.1 the concept of macro view has been considered from a regulatory 
perspective (IMF, 2010; Galati and Moessner, 2010; Baker, 2010) but this has not been 
linked to the compliance officers’ perspective who are trying to maintain regulatory 
compliance. 
By having a macro view community from a compliance officers’ perspective, this would 
allow the trust to benefit from the principles of self-regulation across the sector. As 
discussed in the data findings the compliance professionals benefit from their worst 
experiences, which allows for continuous learning at a macro view level within the trust. 
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Through self-regulation principles, the trust can learn and benefit from undesirable 
regulatory compliance experiences (Section 8.1.2), and benefit at the macro level 
across the industry. In addition, when consulting experience is required, again this can 
be considered at a macro level, with ultimate cost savings due to the global view that 
the compliance trust can adopt. 
Therefore, in the conceptual model, the compliance trust community would benefit 
from: 
 Appreciation of the wider implications of regulatory compliance issues across 
industry (rather than an ‘in house’ or business focused view, Section 8.1.1.1). 
 Communication mechanisms in ‘trust’ allow a macro view of regulatory 
compliance issues (combined with learning from individual experiences, Section 
7.2.1 and 7.2.2). 
 Meets the needs of the global financial institutions promoting cross border 
exchange of information (Section 8.1.1.1). 
 The trust structure allows for collective use of consultants (when necessary 
only) to achieve greater good, with dissemination of macro view knowledge 
across all individuals participating in the trust (Section 8.1.3). 
 Strength of group allows for clear contribution to both businesses and 
regulatory bodies. 
8.2.3 Rotation/Knowledge sharing – theoretical rationale 
The benefits of such a model would include a centralised hub of compliance expertise 
which could be rotated on periodic basis across financial institutions to ensure 
knowledge sharing. This model has indirect links to Nonaka’s work on tacit/implicit 
knowledge and knowledge sharing (see Section 1.3), and also Brennan et al. (2015, p. 
28) conceptual model of manager/non-executive directors information asymmetry. The 
macro view compliance community would provide a direct information link to the 
multiple stakeholder groups. Individuals’ tacit knowledge would be expected to convert 
to a collective explicit knowledge which could be shared to address issues of the black 
box of financial service regulation and compliance. 
Therefore, in the conceptual model, the compliance trust community would benefit 
through rotation of resource and ultimately: 
 Avoid issues of regulatory capture (or compliance trap) – lobbying could be 
strengthened from a compliance perspective (Section 8.1.1). 
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 Benefit from shared knowledge –allows for best practice (and self-regulation) 
amongst businesses within community via rotation (benefits of consulting 
without the cost, Section 7.4) 
Another indirect benefit of rotation will be to address any compliance culture issues that 
may arise. In Meidinger’s (1987, p. 372) discussion of regulatory communities, it is 
stressed that to affect “collective action”, a way of incorporating this is through 
systematic “change of membership”. This was written from the regulatory community 
perspective. However, the same principles may be applied to a corresponding 
compliance community such as the compliance trust. 
8.2.4 Funding Independence – theoretical rationale 
Funding could be provided on a fee basis from the banks they serve, with 
independence maintained by rotation of compliance teams servicing the individual 
banks (whilst benefiting from growth in central knowledge and expertise). Globalisation 
of standards and practice could be monitored and developed through interaction with 
the transnational groups, and the national regulators. The major advantage of such a 
shared approach to compliance would be seen to be cost and efficiency saving of 
sharing knowledge (for example, sharing of consultants and tooling). 
Therefore, in the conceptual model, the compliance trust community would benefit 
from: 
 Equitable cost sharing108 across sector (Section 8.1.3).  
 Allow for economies of scale (transaction cost economics). 
 Salaries of compliance officers decoupled from the financial service 
organisations (and performance of organisations) they are serving, which would 
minimise barriers to compliance (dependence corruption, Section 8.1.2.1). 
8.2.5 Clear communication channels – theoretical rationale 
The service organisation could be made accountable to multiple stakeholder groups 
including not only the banks funding the enterprise, but also the country specific 
regulators and other transnational organisation interested in macro financial regulation, 
embracing the partnership model set out by Woods (2002), and also the latest direction 
of some regulators towards macro prudential regulation following the latest financial 
crisis. Resourcing this human relationship between the regulators (and other 
                                               
108 A charging mechanism is not identified within this thesis, as neither the literature nor the findings 
provide an overall answer to this question. However, this is an important consideration to develop the 
model further in future research, as the trust would enable economies of scale (especially when resourcing 
for new pieces of regulation), and some sort of charging mechanism would need to be devised based on 
the relationship with firms they serve. 
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stakeholders) will be an issue, as previous findings in studies of financial service 
comment that where a lack of “human agency” exists then regulatory compliance will 
suffer (Smith, 2011). 
Therefore, the benefits of the compliance trust model would include: 
 Accountability amongst all parties through clear communication (and avoidance 
of miscommunication (Section 8.1.1.2).  
 Direct and unfettered communication channels with all stakeholder groups 
(Section 8.1.1.1). 
 Equitable responsibility to all stakeholders (8.1.2.2). 
By positioning the compliance community as a central hub, accountable to numerous 
stakeholders whilst maintain independence this should counter the issues identified in 
the latest financial crisis of regulatory capture. Arora (2010) examined the work of the 
existing international regulatory bodies (e.g. IMF, BIS, BASEL Committee, FATF, FSB) 
– the compliance communities HR function could be monitored directly by these global 
public interest authorities.  
However, the inevitable stumbling block to such an approach is trust – the banks have 
maintained in-house legal, risk and compliance functions for obvious reasons of 
confidentiality and trust, and, it is debatable as to whether these issues can be 
overcome in the proposed model. This will be discussed further under Section 8.3, 
when feedback from practitioners is considered. 
8.3 Feedback from practitioners 
As discussed in Section 6.6.5, feedback on the Compliance Trust conceptual model 
was sought from practitioners (see Table 23). The purpose of this was to add rigour to 
the analysis and interpretation of practitioners’ constructs, performed within this 
chapter, and the Findings and Analysis, Chapter 7. This aligns to the methodological 
rationale of the Delphi method, via the systematic process of attempting to obtain group 
consensus with new aspects researched in the “post research” phase (Saizarbitoria, 
2006). Along with summarised findings of the data collection process, practitioners 
were requested to consider the emergent attributes of the model and the theoretical 
rationale behind the model, and to comment on whether the model was feasible in 
practice. Practitioners were asked to consider the following questions specifically: 
1. Do you agree that the stated attribute benefits compliance/risk management 
officers in pursuit of regulatory compliance?  
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2. Are there remaining barriers to regulatory compliance in the presented 
model/attributes?  
3. Are the theoretical attributes of the model feasible in practice? 
 
This also demonstrates a further iteration of the research design (see Figure 2), again 
reflecting the underlying philosophy of constructive alternativism. Feedback was 
obtained from existing participants, and also those who had expressed an interest in 
the research following data collection (through contacts made at conferences). In 
addition, whilst respondents were asked to provide feedback in a set format within reply 
emails (in response to the specified questions above), all respondents ignored this 
request and sent responses either through free format email or during extended 
discussions over the phone. This reflects an underlying issue in the majority of 
research: the researcher must be adaptable to the needs of the participants. Ultimately 
some excellent discussions ensued with participants which are presented below in 
Sections 8.3.1 to Section 8.3.5. A summary of the format of responses is set out in 
Table 23 below. 
Table 23 Summary of feedback providers, and format of feedback 
Respondent Reference Assessment of Expertise Format of feedback 
provided 
Feedback Participant 1 
(FP1) 
Participated in original 
study 
Email – written 
Feedback Participant 2 
(FP2) 
Participated in original 
study 
Email – written 
Feedback Participant 3 
(FP3) 
New participant – 
Director/Compliance 
Consultant 
Email/Telephone – written 
and verbal (notes taken) 
Feedback Participant 4 
(FP4) 
New Participant – Head of 
Risk and Regulation at 
Organisation X 
Email/Telephone – written 
and verbal (notes taken) 
Academic Feedback 
Participant 1 (AF1) 
Regulatory and 
Compliance Literature 
Email – written 
 
Whilst acknowledging that the theoretical attributes were valid ‘in theory’, practitioners 
were not always fully supportive of the model. The quote below demonstrates the 
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continued divide between theory and practice, in terms of concerns of theoretical 
standpoints and the ‘real world’: 
“Whilst I can appreciate the potential attraction of your proposed ‘Compliance 
Community’ model from a conceptual/theoretical standpoint I have some 
serious concerns as to how this could possibly work in the real world” FP 1 
8.3.1 It’s all about culture – the need to ensure a “Voice” 
One of the concerns with the model was the issues of how culture is addressed. 
“This is an issue on both sides; compliance taking a rigid uncommercial stance 
and, therefore, seen as a barrier to business whilst the business fails to 
appreciate the need to meet regulatory obligations. The good compliance 
officer/function is ‘commercial’ and works with the business to find solutions 
that, where possible, meets both needs; accepting that sometimes the answer 
has to be no. I struggle to see how this could work within your proposals” FP1 
In response to this critique of the model, these cultural issues already exist within 
current frameworks. Although the model does not address these issues specifically it is 
inherent within the attribute of independence and communication that existing barriers 
(in the form of cultural issues) are minimised i.e. compliance officers in the trust will 
operate in a cultural environment which is set by the trust rather than the individual 
firms they serve, and through clear communication and accountability to all 
stakeholders, this will allow for a more desirable culture to develop across the entire 
sector. 
Another participant (FP3) had also reflected on this from a personal viewpoint. Whilst 
considering her own experiences, and some of her ‘less fortunate’ colleagues, she 
stated that the reason she had had success in her role and avoided scandals was 
through her open access to the CEO. In order to ensure the right culture the 
compliance representative must have an appropriate ‘voice’. This was not identified in 
the initial draft of the compliance trust but is a vital consideration point. This could 
easily be remedied in the form of corporate governance codes, whereby the 
compliance trusts could act as Non-Executive Directors on the boards of firms that they 
represent (again on a rotation basis). This has been added within an outlying 
mechanism within the compliance trust model in Figure 51. 
Another respondent (FP4) highlighted the issues around risk control frameworks across 
different jurisdictions (as a limitation to the model). He discussed the issues that 
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different regulatory jurisdictions apply varying methods of regulations, and due to the 
importance of relationships in the model, this may result in practical issues for 
implementation across jurisdictions. The respondent had experience of working in 
different sectors and countries and highlighted the inherent differences in the ‘role of 
compliance’ across jurisdictions. This then widens the culture related issue which was 
discussed at an organisational level by other feedback participants. He used the 
example of France to describe the interpretation of ‘compliance’ as more of an ‘internal 
control/internal audit’ function as opposed to the wider ‘risk’ definitions that are applied 
to compliance officers in countries such as the UK. This piece of feedback highlights 
issues of generalisability within the model in terms of how labels of compliance are 
viewed differently across jurisdictions. However, in defence of the model, and in 
response to this specific piece of feedback, these differences between jurisdictions 
have been overcome by the larger, global banking groups, and therefore, this would 
suggest that these barriers across jurisdictions are indeed surmountable in practice. 
8.3.2 Consideration of the practicalities – resourcing and pay structures 
and regulatory permissions? 
A second concern is that of resourcing: 
“Resourcing is an issue for some companies but effectively pooling the 
resource in the way you suggest begs serious questions as to the size of the 
team, who gets priority, how would cost share be established, limits on time 
available etc. I am aware of recent examples where huge resources have been 
brought in to address regulatory failings; HSBC for example hired thousands of 
people on short term contracts to resolve some of their customer due diligence 
issues.” FP 1 
In response to this criticism of the model, again these resourcing issues already exist 
within current frameworks (as evidenced in the analysis chapter). Resourcing is already 
seen as an issue as the micro level of individual firms (and are currently managed 
within firms), therefore, this may be adapted in this model that resourcing can also be 
managed at the macro level of the compliance trust. That is not to say that resourcing 
does not remain an area of concern within the model, however, it may be argued that 
these are manageable risks within the model. 
Another practical concern is how would the firms fund this, and how would the 
compliance trust salaries remain ‘competitive’ (FP 3). Ultimately the employees of the 
trust would have personal economic motivations, and career trajectory concerns when 
working under such a model. Again this would come back to corporate governance 
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considerations (i.e. in terms of remuneration committee roles), ensuring the right 
people in the right job for the right pay. The participant acknowledged, however, that 
the motivations of salary might be superseded by the protection that the trust would 
offer, whereby, ‘shoot the messenger’ concerns of working in the profession would be 
minimised (see discussion in Section 8.3.4). 
A final concern in the model is that of regulatory permissions: 
“there may still be inhibitors that prevent it working effectively….the lack of 
regulatory permission to allow for compliance responsibility to be 
outsourced….every firm would still need to have an expert to demonstrate their 
risk stance to the regulator” FP2 
This perhaps is a misconception in the model. The only way that the compliance trust 
would ever be possible if there was a real shift in the current norms. This model does 
not represent outsourcing; there would remain a responsible expert. However, this 
would be collectively the trust, and the individual allocated to represent the trust in the 
firm at the point in time. Accountability to the regulator would remain at a firm level, with 
assurances and direct communication through the trust, and the nominated 
representatives of the trust. In an ideal world this would move back to trust and self-
regulation with the sector. 
8.3.3 A cynical view of consultants 
Other practitioners considered that there were similarities in rationale to prior 
organisations which were set up for the purpose of smaller financial institutions to 
share knowledge: 
“Mutual One provided compliance management for smaller institutions that 
struggled to afford appropriately qualified staff” FP 2 
The motivation for such a structure was to allow for knowledge sharing and pooling of 
resources (which is part of emergent attributes of the compliance trust). However, 
ultimately Mutual One was swallowed up by RSM Tenon, evolving into Baker Tilley. 
“More cynically, could it end up another income stream for PWC, or KPMG etc.” 
FP2 
This concern was shared by another respondent (FP3) who stressed that to avoid 
falling into the consulting worldview, the compliance trust would have to position itself 
through the motivations of ‘integrity’ rather than ‘economic’ pursuits. A potential solution 
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they identified would be to position the trust alongside a ‘recommending institute’ or 
body with membership indoctrinated with the belief of social purpose rather than 
economic gain (with strict professional recognition and CPD criteria). This also 
resonates with the attribute of independence – to be truly independent the trust needs 
to strongly advertise the integrity and social purpose of the trust, to avoid the issues 
such as the expectation gap that has developed within the audit profession.  
The audit expectation gap has been widely explored over the last century. Quoting 
Limpberg (1932): 
“The audit function is rooted in the confidence that society places in the 
effectiveness of the audit and in the opinion of the accountant….if the 
confidence is betrayed, the function, too, is destroyed” (Porter, Simon and 
Hatherly, 2011, p. 197) 
The issues of the audit expectation gap could so easily be transferred to a model such 
as the compliance trust, whereby the stakeholders (including the public) would need to 
be constantly reassured in the capabilities, independence and adequacy of 
communication mechanisms to maintain confidence. Therefore, the overriding attribute 
of integrity has been added as an overarching function of the model in Figure 51. 
The attribute of independence was discussed further with FP4. He was very supportive 
of the concept of independence ‘in theory’, but highlighted that a number of practical 
issues existed. The first discussion raised the issue, of how involved the compliance 
personnel need to be. Ultimately to understand and promote effective compliance (in a 
truly advisory fashion) they need to be working at ‘front line’ within organisation. This of 
course was viewed as a barrier to independence. The second discussion with the same 
participant surrounded the issue of ‘reward structures’ for compliance. He argued that 
an impossible problem exists in practice of how to reward compliance with questions 
over how to assess ‘good compliance’, when you can often see compliance costs 
clearly, but cannot always quantify benefits of compliance (this links back to the 
literature in Section 3.5). In this scenario, how can compliance officers be seen to be 
acting independently when inappropriate reward structures exist, and where good 
compliance is so difficult to measure. In response to this specific feedback, the 
elements of the relationship of knowledge rotation within the compliance trust must be 
revisited.  
Therefore, this is a practical problem, which needs to be addressed. However, there is 
a fine balance between familiarity and gaining appropriate knowledge about the firms 
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the compliance trust will serve. In response to the second issues of independence in 
contrast to reward structure – again this is a wider issue, and included within the 
overarching elements of integrity and culture within the trust. The relationship with 
industry leadership will be essential here, to ensure that appropriate mechanisms are in 
place to identify and measure good compliance. 
8.3.4 A real benefit – don’t shoot the messenger 
A final discussion was held with participants about the potential of the model to protect 
compliance officers within their roles. This discussion also links to recent updates from 
the FCA, with reference to accountability. 
The participant (FP3) discussed the ‘furore’ in the industry regarding the treatment of 
compliance personnel involved in Bahrain Bank109, whereby compliance was implicated 
and blamed, ultimately destroying the individual’s career. The participant expanded and 
comments on the ‘shoot the messenger’ mentality, which results in a vicious circle 
between regulators and the firms.  
“The regulators require more disclosure, the messengers don’t want to admit to 
misdemeanours due to the sanctions (and personal implications) and so keep 
quiet.” FP 3 (paraphrased from telephone interview notes). 
This represents a direct conflict of ethical compliance when the risks exceed the 
rewards at a personal level, which then ultimately may lead to undesirable societal 
consequences. Indeed the risks at a corporate level are also clear whereby the FCA 
have issued significant fines in recent years, with comments from the industry to the 
stick rather than the carrot approach110. For example a recent press release in the FCA 
(discussing a sanction of £227 million) stated: 
“Deutsche Bank’s failings were compounded by them repeatedly misleading us.  
The bank took far too long to produce vital documents and it moved far too 
slowly to fix relevant systems and controls.” (FCA, 2015)  
This appears to implicate the compliance officers in terms of their actions (or inactions) 
which ultimately resulted in significant sanctions. Of course there are other examples of 
scandals where compliance officers have been implicated or scapegoated within the 
                                               
109 More details can be seen within media sites such as http://compliancex.com/the-american-banker-at-
the-heart-of-the-middle-easts-biggest-financial-scandal-says-he-was-treated-like-a-slave/ accessed June 
2015. 
110 See media articles, commenting on the fines in excess of £2bn issues to industry since the FCA’s 
incorporation. http://www.bankingtech.com/273262/regulation-why-it-must-be-seen-as-the-carrot-rather-
than-the-stick/ accessed June 2015. 
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media, and under this worldview the compliance officers form personal constructs and 
act accordingly depending on personal circumstance.  
This is not a desirable situation from a societal viewpoint, and this relies heavily on the 
personal integrity of the individual compliance officers. The benefit of the compliance 
trust is the mechanism of employing compliance personnel as a collective, and 
representation as a collective. The fear of negative personal consequence for ethical 
action will be overcome, and clear communication between all parties is embedded 
within the compliance trust model.  
The regulator has issued more recent guidance in July 2014 which partially addresses 
this issue of scapegoating of compliance professionals. Under the ‘Senior Manager’s 
Regime’ accountability will apply at more senior levels. The effect is highlighted in a 
recent industry publication: 
“This replaces the significant influence function element of the current Approved 
Persons Regime for those firms within the scope of the consultation, and is 
intended to focus accountability on a smaller number of the most senior 
individuals in a firm” (Ernst and Young, 2014) 
Following final consultation the final version of the ‘Fair and Effective Market Report’ 
has been released jointly by HM Treasury, Bank of England and the FCA, on 10 June 
2015. Whilst highlighting some progress in the financial markets, the report stresses 
that some gaps remain (specifically discussing the Fixed Income, Currency and 
Commodities (FICC) markets): 
“First, the professionalism and accountability of individuals in FICC markets 
remains too low and variable. Second, key FICC markets lack effective 
mechanisms for agreeing, promulgating and adhering to common standards of 
market practice. Third, gaps remain in the coverage of regulation. And, fourth, 
there is more to do to raise standards in global markets, including those for spot 
FX.” (HM Treasury, Bank of England, FCA, 2015, p. 11) 
From this quote it is accepted within the industry that there are remaining issues in the 
standards within the financial market. The report goes on to discuss issues such as 
accountability and governance. This resonates with the findings of this study, and 
shows that steps are being taken to avoid the issues of ‘shoot the messenger’.  
Therefore, the concept of the voice (discussed under Section 8.3.1) should be 
reconsidered here, given the latest movement of the regulatory bodies with regards to 
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accountability. The matrix of decision making becomes very complex, when trying to 
balance independence, voice and accountability. As presented in Section 8.3.1, some 
practitioners contend that there needs to be appropriate respect for the compliance 
functions within the organisations they serve. In order to achieve voice, respect and 
appropriate accountability, compliance personnel need to be embedded within the firms 
themselves, which then contradicts with the independence concept. Another participant 
raised the issue of governance structures again arguing: 
“If compliance was recruited and reported to audit committee chair (like 
outsourced internal audit) this would be different to say, where dominant CEO 
…..Interestingly shift in thinking this year from a couple of US regulators to the 
core UK model. US model, traditionally dominated by Legal. Best approach 
these days is direct to CEO with dotted line to independent NED Chair or Audit 
Chair” FP4 
This participant strengthened the discussion on voice; however, the reporting lines 
were debated. FP3 contended that the reporting line should be direct to CEO, whereas 
FP4 contended that reporting lines should be via independent non-executives. 
Irrespective of these differences, which would no doubt vary across different 
jurisdictions and complexities of organisational structure, the concept of voice is an 
important feature for inclusion in the compliance trust model. 
8.3.5 Academic feedback 
A number of academics were also approached for feedback on the model (who had 
influenced the direction of the literature review, and identified within the emergent 
theoretical attributes in the model). Unfortunately, limited replies were received due to 
conflicting workload demands of those approached, or those that did respond provided 
only brief comments about the research being ‘an interesting approach’. Despite a lack 
of time to respond fully, a number of the academics directed towards suitable literature 
to add to analysis process.  
One respondent echoed the issues in implementing such models in practice: 
“I suppose the difficulty is always about practical implementation. It is not the 
idea is impractical. I think it could work very well in practice. The difficulty is that 
the politics of getting people to agree to setting it up in the first place.”AF1 
So although limited feedback has been obtained from academics to date, this 
statement discusses the real issues in taking such a model forward. It is debatable 
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whether organisation and compliance officers are suitably motivated (whether 
economically, politically or normatively driven) to adopt change in the sector unless 
another crisis occurs. Therefore, from a pragmatic (and practical) perspective the 
intention will be to present this model to the wider academic community (alongside 
practitioners) to refine and develop the model for potential future adoption. 
8.4 The ‘Compliance Trust V2.0’ 
To conclude, the feedback discussion above reflects that there were a number of gaps 
identified by practitioners in the initial model summarised in Table 22 (where the 
emergent attributes were theorised from the findings of this study, and existing 
literature as per Figure 50).  
The purpose of the initial summarisation in tabular format was to “describe clearly how 
the data were interpreted” (Sinkovies, Penz and Ghauri, 2008). A second version of the 
model which incorporates the feedback discussed in Section 8.3 is presented pictorially 
in Figure 51. This model incorporates the five emergent attributes discussed in Section 
8.2 (and summarised in Table 22): independence, macroview, rotation, funding 
independence and clear communication channels. The additional overarching 
principles of voice (in terms of governance, see discussion Section 8.3.4), culture (see 
discussion Section 8.3.1), and integrity (see discussion Section 8.3.3) have been 
incorporated as a result of feedback discussions with participants. 
As discussed with Feedback Participant 4, this model will not be ideally suited across 
all financial service organisations, as it is almost impossible to integrate a model which 
deals with the differentials in size, complexity and internationlisation of all 
organisations. However, the intention is to take this model and present to a wider forum 
of both academics, and practitioners to consider whether the model has some merit in 
future for a majority of organisations in the ever expanding and internationalising 
financial service industry. It is acknowledged inherently, that one size does not fit all. 
This model is presented as an original contribution to the literature. Feedback from 
academic expert (AF1) indicated the importance of producing a conceptual model 
which are accessible to practioners (alongside academics) in order to bridge the 
academic/practitioner divide. 
“I always think that it is good to have these ideas put forward in as practical a 
way as possible - so that when a crisis happens, and it becomes politically 
possible to make change, the model is there ready to be picked up and 
implemented.” AF1 
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Figure 51 Author developed model of shared service outsourced compliance community – ‘The 
Compliance Trust' 
 
However, the contention would be that this model should be considered proactively 
ahead of any future crisis (rather than reactively in response to future crises). 
Therefore, this model has been developed from the worldview of the compliance 
practitioners, as opposed to the more frequently critiqued worldviews of regulators and 
policy makers, representing a contribution to the literature. The contribution to theory is 
revisited in Section 8.5. 
The centralised structure of the trust would benefit jurisdictions where compliance 
officer/risk managers skills are in short supply, due to the inherent consolidation of 
knowledge, skills and experience within the trust structure. In addition, there has been 
recent media discussion of the ‘transient’ and ‘fluid’ nature of the workforce, whereby 
professionals are moving between organisations to gain experience, which is impacting 
on compliance risk111. However, the nature of the compliance trust would allow for this 
fluidity and career development within the trust itself (through rotation of roles), without 
the loss of expertise within the overall structure. This would provide a contribution to 
practice, to address this issue of transiency, and resourcing within the compliance 
profession. The implications on practice is revisited in Section 8.5. 
                                               
111 A 2015 article discussing this issue, and the impacts of ‘loyalty and commitment’ on compliance can 
be seen at http://pwc.blogs.com/fraud_academy/2015/07/transient-nature-of-workforces-and-the-impact-
on-compliance-programmes.html 
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One of the main findings of this research has been the continued issue of barriers to 
regulatory compliance. The suggestion of this study is that these barriers to compliance 
must be removed piece by piece, in order for future scandals to be avoided and for 
trust to be restored in the sector. By raising awareness across professionals in the 
sector of the issues, then organisations can work with stakeholders to effectively 
remove these ‘in firm’ barriers. 
Via feedback, the compliance trust model is considered by practitioners as ‘sound in 
theory’ but not necessarily in practice. However, through raising awareness of potential 
alternatives and focusing practitioners on the real issues of barriers to regulatory 
compliance, this may enable the industry to raise responsiveness within individual firms 
and move closer to the goals of regulatory compliance. The central arguments of this 
thesis, whereby, ‘compliance is a nuisance’ are addressed within this model, by forcing 
the independent operation of the trust structure outside the direct control of the 
financial institutions that they serve (and instead focusing on the relationships with a 
range of other stakeholders). Initial steps could be taken by the profession in use of this 
model as an alternative to the existing mechanisms, as this model addresses some of 
the fundamental barriers to regulatory compliance within the sector. 
8.5 Concluding this research thesis 
“Research that uncovers, evaluates, explains, and critiques the workings of 
regulatory capitalism is, therefore, important for pragmatic, policy–orientated 
reasons, and also for more fundamental theory building reasons” (Parker and 
Nielson, 2009, p. 50 
The purpose of this section is to summarise the research journey taken within 
completion of this thesis. The original contributions of this study are presented in 
Section 8.5.1, including the implications on theory and practice (Sections 8.5.1.1 and 
8.5.1.2). Limitations and future research direction are then considered in Section 8.5.2 
and 8.5.3.  
8.5.1 Original contributions and findings 
There are four categories of original contribution identified in this study: 
1. Contribution to method within this field of compliance study (introduced within 
Chapter 6); 
2. Contribution to understanding of personal constructs of practicing financial 
service professionals (through analysis of grid and interview data in Chapter 7); 
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3. Unique findings emerging from this study to update the existing literature base 
from a compliance viewpoint (as opposed to a regulators viewpoint), to develop 
the compliance trust model (developed in Sections 8.2, with final model 
presented in Section 8.4); 
4. Feedback from practitioners on theoretical model developed in this study 
(presented in Section 8.3). 
 
The use of repertory grid in this study offers a contribution to method. Repertory grid 
has been widely used since the introduction of the technique by Kelly, in clinical 
psychology practice. The tool is considered a “powerful cognitive mapping tool” 
(Wright, 2008) allowing participants to interpret their experiences. As evidenced in a 
review of social science, and specifically business related studies the application has 
been widened by researchers to investigate diverse areas of the business literature, 
with wide use by marketing researchers (Rogers and Ryals, 2007), information 
systems (Thota, 2011; Alexander et al., 2008; Oppenheim et al., 2003; Lee and Truex, 
2000), strategic management research (Wright, 2008; Wright et al., 2013; Panagiotou, 
2007), and, project and performance management research (Song and Gale, 2008; 
Senior and Swailes, 2004; Duberley et al., 2000). However, there appears to be limited 
application of this technique in the regulatory compliance or financial service 
literature112. On interrogation of the literature that is available relating to financial 
services, the majority of the studies are actually unrelated to the compliance or risk 
management field113.Therefore, the first contribution is the use of methodological tool 
repertory grid in the specific research field of regulatory compliance. None of the 
practitioners interviewed were aware of this technique, although the majority saw 
benefits to being interviewed in this way to explore their experiences at deeper levels 
(rather than surface skimming in standard interview question and answer style). 
Therefore, it is argued that the data collated in this study represents tacit, explicit and 
implicit knowledge of practitioners.  
The second contribution is represented in the empirical data set offered in the form of 
personal constructs. There are limited, recent studies within this field which contribute 
data representing the experiences of compliance officers in a period of regulatory flux. 
                                               
112 Using the search terms "content analysis" and "repertory grid" and "financial services", Google 
Scholar yield only 80 results (as at May 2015), and only 5 results if the search term “compliance” is 
added, which indicates the limited application of this method within the literature in this field. 
113 For example Robertson, Gratton and Rout (1990) was found in the search to relate to financial services 
sector, but the method was directed towards situational interview assessment and job performance which 
is unrelated to compliance. 
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The particular strength of the adopted tool of repertory grid is the access to the 
“underlying reality” of practitioners (Rogers and Ryals, 2007). However, it must be 
acknowledged that there are limitations in this data set in terms of generalisability (as is 
the case for the majority of qualitative research). The data set, whilst rich in terms of 
the experiences of those interviewed, represents only a small sample of individuals 
working in the sector. Nevertheless, it is argued that the way in which data has been 
analysed and then presented back to the original participants (and indeed to new 
participants in the form of contacts made at conferences, and sought through 
academia) counters the issue of generalisability somewhat. The intention will be to take 
this model forward to both the academic and practice based community in future 
presentation and publications. 
Thirdly, this study has been written from an unusual viewpoint, representing the 
worldview of the compliance practitioners rather than the more frequently argued views 
of the regulators and policy makers. By using this view, and combining with the existing 
literature, a conceptual model has been presented in order to address the barriers to 
compliance highlighted during data collection. Overcoming barriers to regulatory 
compliance has benefits for a number of stakeholders impacted by regulatory 
compliance. The model will be of particular use to jurisdictions where compliance 
officer/risk managers are in short supply, as a centralised trust will act as a 
consolidation point for knowledge, skill and experience.  
Finally, and most importantly for research impact, the compliance trust model theorised 
from the review of the literature and the main findings of this study, has been presented 
back to practitioners for feedback (as discussed earlier in Chapter 8). The purpose of 
obtaining feedback on the theoretical model was an attempt to bridge the 
theoretical/practice gap (along with addressing concerns over generalisability). The 
feedback has been considered, and further arguments have been presented to 
underpin the strength of the theoretical model. 
8.5.1.1 Implications on practice 
The review of the literature highlighted the increasing status of compliance and risk 
management within the financial service sector. However, despite the increasing 
resources within the function the data collated from practitioners emphasised that 
barriers to compliance are impeding regulatory compliance, which ultimately impacts 
society in a negative manner (as evidenced in the on-going scandals plaguing the 
sector, discussed in Section 1.0). 
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To restore trust in the sector following the global financial crisis, increased regulatory 
pressures have been applied by policy makers across the world. However, these 
regulatory pressures have not fully addressed issues of non-compliance in the sector 
(again evidenced by on-going scandals within the sector).  
Therefore, this study offers a potential alternative approach for practitioners and policy 
makers (presented in Section 8.4). Whilst traditional models of compliance have their 
own relative merits and drawbacks, perhaps a fresh perspective is required to force 
organisations to face the barriers to regulatory compliance. This study has involved 
discussions with practitioners who are striving to achieve regulatory compliance, but 
face barriers in their day to day business where compliance is seen as business 
inhibiting. 
However, it must also be noted at this point that the contribution to practice is often lost 
through the publication mechanisms within academia. Pfeffer (2007) critiques the 
disconnect between business research within academia and practice, blaming the 
mechanisms of unreliable peer review and structure of career progression within 
business schools for the lack of impact within practice, and on public policy. The lack of 
academic input in contemporary management ideas is highlighted by a number of 
publications and reviews of “management innovations” (Pfeffer, 2007), which is in 
contrast to other fields of research such as medicine and engineering. 
8.5.1.2 Implications for theory 
“Academic colleagues expect new knowledge and theoretical insight. 
Organization managers anticipate practical recommendations” (Buchanan and 
Bryman, 2007, p. 494) 
As a result of general discussions with practitioners within this study, it may be argued 
that practitioners rarely consider theory during practice. This is not a new phenomenon 
(as evidenced in quote above). However, one of the main conclusion drawn from this 
study is that there needs to be more interaction between practitioners and academics 
to resolve the remaining practical issues that remain within theories and models 
presented by academics. Indeed, the complexities within the subject matter of 
compliance do not facilitate easy application to one specific theory. 
Perhaps the real problem with theory creation (and inclusion of practitioners) lies within 
the categorisation of theories by researcher to frame their research in terms of grand 
theories, middle range or mini theories, and emergent theories/concept development. 
Ultimately practitioners are uninterested in grand theories for their day to day issue, 
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due to their inherent ambiguity – so they would be most interested in emergent theories 
based on current research, whereas ambitious academics are always be striving for 
contribution towards mini and grand theories. 
Indeed to summarise this research, the framework for the methods employed of 
repertory grid evolved from the cognitive theories of Kelly, to align to constructive 
alternativism within epistemology, which in turn aligns to the pragmatic ontology (see 
methodology, Chapter 6, Figure 14). Therefore, this study has used grand theory to 
frame the research, in order to contribute a model which influences emergent theory, 
which may in turn impact practice. 
The compliance trust model developed from this research draws most notably from 
institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), whilst also considering the somewhat 
conflicting economic, social and normative motivations for compliance (Parker, 2012). 
However, as discussed in Section 8.2, within the compliance trust model institutional 
theory would apply in a different way to traditional models of compliance; with 
emphasis on the relationships between the stakeholders and the compliance trust 
(most specifically from the coercive perspective within these relationships). Mitchell et 
al. (1997) also argue that many grand theories are used to explain the underlying 
stakeholder relationships: 
“Agency, resource dependence, and transaction cost theories are particularly 
helpful in explaining why power plays such an important role in the attention 
managers give to stakeholders” (p. 863) 
Therefore, the compliance model is ultimately underpinned by these grand theories 
which help to explain the conflicting relationships that will emerge in the compliance 
trust structure. The major development, as argued in Section 8.2 and 8.3 is that in 
order for the sector to move forward barriers to compliance need to be removed for 
compliance officers who currently sit within the financial service industry. Ultimately, the 
arguments presented for the compliance trust, indicate that some barriers (albeit, not 
all) will be removed by creating the attributes of independence (and funding 
independence), knowledge sharing, macro view, and clear communication channels 
(See Figure 51).  
The network of compliance officers will need to balance the conflicting social, economic 
and normative attributes, across the financial service organisations they serve, but in 
an equitable manner to meet the needs of all stakeholders. Links to Kohlberg’s moral 
development are also made with implication on the professionals that would be 
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employed within the compliance trust. Through involvement of informal industry 
leadership in Human Resources114/policy making within the trust then appropriate 
individuals with higher levels of moral reasoning may be identified to promote the 
overall morality within the trust. 
In summary, in order for a shift in compliance culture to be fully realised the combined 
contribution to both practice and academic theory need to be coherently combined and 
progressed. Practice need to acknowledge and remove existing barriers to regulatory 
compliance, and the conceptual framework within this study needs to be communicated 
within the academic community for discussion against higher levels of theory. 
8.5.2 Limitations of this study 
As acknowledged already within Chapter 6, limitations exist within the chosen 
methodology. However, it is also argued in order to align to personal philosophy, that 
the methodological choices made were inevitable. In addition, not all of the initial 
questions identified at proposal stage (specifically, from an accounting background 
focussing on cost benefit concerns) have been addressed. However, under the 
advisement of supervision team, the only way to move forward through the research 
process was to focus on achievable objectives and research questions. 
As for the majority of research undertaken, the resulting data has been manufactured 
(Silverman, 2013). However, the usual issues around manufactured data (i.e. 
researcher bias and influence) have been minimised to an extent due to the open 
exploration of personal constructs of the participants. 
Many would also argue that the lack of generalisability of this research due to the 
qualitative design is also a weakness. However, again due to exploratory nature of this 
research the possibility of a quantitative approach was simply not suitable to answer 
the research questions which resulted from the review of the literature. Indeed there 
has been recent quantitative research performed in this area (funded by commercial 
means) to explore the issues faced by the financial service industry. However, this 
simply does not provide the depth required to fully interpret the issues faced by 
compliance professionals. Despite the inherent differences in research design, the 
conclusions of the quantitative research compliments the findings of this thesis 
                                               
114 An expectation would be that the informal industry leadership would play a role in recruitment, 
selection and oversight of management within the trust to ensure that the right people (i.e. in terms of 
morality and ethical concerns) are retained to ensure the principles and motivations of the trust are 
maintained (i.e. societal benefit as opposed to a profit making entity – see Section 8.3.3). 
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whereby the issue of communications and transparency is seen as a major concern 
(and required for remedy): 
“Without an aggressive plan to stamp out misconduct, we are simply sitting and 
waiting for another financial disaster to strike. We needn’t be so powerless. We 
can formulate and initiate such a recovery plan, but it must start with an implicit 
partnership between employees and employers to speak up about possible 
wrongdoing in the workplace.” (Tenbrunsel and Thomas, 2015, p. 9) 
Therefore, it is reasoned that whilst the findings of this study may not be generalisable, 
they provide a complimentary exploratory depth to other more generalisable 
quantitative studies around the same issues facing the sector. 
The final acknowledgement of limitations must be around the issue of compliance 
culture. Although there has been overlap and discussion throughout this thesis, the 
issue of compliance culture is not fully resolved or theorised within this study. Whilst 
specific discussion has been made with respect to compliance culture (see Section 
8.3.1) the model that has been presented in this study does not address culture 
explicitly. Although the presented model removes some of the barriers created and 
impacting on compliance culture, the issues is seen as entirely too complex to be 
embodied or solved within a theoretical model. Meidinger (1987) criticises research in 
which culture is presented in a “diffuse, inconsistent, and often simplistic ways”, 
consequently, this thesis does not claim to add to the range of the culture literature 
which is already in existence around the topic of regulatory compliance. More recently 
academics have discussed culture from the perspective of the regulator (O’Brien et al., 
2014; Ring et al., 2014). Ultimately, further (more specific) research is required to 
explore compliance culture more fully (from the perspective of the compliance officer). 
There may also be scope for further research with regards to accountability which has 
been mentioned briefly in Section 8.3.4, given the most recent publications by the FCA 
(on accountability allocations of responsibility). Within a separate consultation paper 
examples of allocating senior management responsibility are provided (FCA, 2015b, 
pp. 24-25), including: 
“Responsibilities for overseeing the adoption of the firm’s culture in the day to 
day management of the firm” (FCA, 2015b, p. 24, Figure 5) 
This seems an extremely wide area of responsibility, and it seems a little simplistic for 
this to be allocated to a responsible person given the complexity of culture in practice. 
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This is outside the scope of this study, given the timing of these consultations (in 2015), 
so can be considered an area for future research. 
8.5.3 Future research 
In order to capitalise on the evident interest in the topic of regulatory compliance (as 
evidenced by the number of events and conference organised for practitioners) the 
intention will be to move forward with the theoretical model presented in this study, and 
to consider whether this model may be adopted in practice across other jurisdictions. 
In addition, areas that have not been investigated in this study (due to limitations 
identified in the methodology chapter and also above in Section 8.5.2) will be further 
explored and incorporated more fully in the theoretical model presented i.e. specifically 
culture and cost benefit implications. 
The complexity of the issue of regulatory compliance necessitates further research, as 
the boundaries of compliance are so wide within the financial service arena. ‘One size’ 
is unlikely to fit all, and a greater understanding of the issues facing practitioners in the 
rapidly changing regulatory environment is essential from both the regulators viewpoint, 
and from a wider societal viewpoint (in terms of the impacts seen in instance of non-
compliance). 
In addition, a number of potential research avenue identified within the literature review 
have not been fully explored in the thesis. As identified at the end of the review of 
literature there are a number of outstanding gaps in the literature including the following 
research question: 
Future RQ: To what extent do compliance officers monitor cost of compliance? 
The literature in the area of costs of compliance is fairly aged, or written from a 
consulting viewpoint (i.e. specific reports via consulting bodies such as Deloitte/Oxera). 
The intention will be to take this forward and combine the risk management and 
accounting literature (with regard to functional costing) to provide a more updated and 
theory driven study around the issues of compliance costs, given the increasing burden 
of regulatory demands. 
Future RQ: What are the educational and career attributes of financial service 
chief compliance/risk managers? 
Again the literature in this area seems to be more practitioner driven, rather than 
academic. However, there are important links to this topic in terms of connections 
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between academic ethical theories, linking to the professional concerns of practitioners. 
Indeed during discussion with one feedback participant, they specifically comments on 
the diversity of backgrounds in the sector, and seemed to have taken personal insult, 
as to why many of the profession were from a Chartered Accountant background, when 
she considered the persons best suited to the role need to have been involved in the 
‘business’ before moving to compliance. Therefore, this future research question will 
again bridge the academic/practice divide in that the field of study will provide insight to 
both academic theory and the profession. 
8.6 Final Conclusion 
Personal motivations behind exploring this topic area have evolved alongside the 
continuing interest in regulatory compliance within both the academic community and 
the wider media. An initial (and naïve) assumption was that an answer would exist to 
solving the regulatory compliance issues plaguing the financial sector. However, via 
interaction with practitioners a more realistic and sympathetic tone has been adopted 
within this study. Through contact with compliance professionals, the sheer diversity of 
issues facing professionals in their day to day operations appears to provide an 
insurmountable hurdle to full regulatory compliance. During discussion with 
practitioners this point was very clearly highlighted in feedback which reflects the 
continued divide between theory and practice: 
“There are many companies where the compliance function works very 
effectively with the business, adding value and achieving the objectives the 
regulations are there to encourage. The fact that there are companies failing the 
compliance test is due to a wide variety of factors, some of which you have 
identified, but sadly I do not think your proposals present a viable practical 
solution to address them” FP 1 
Therefore, it must be acknowledged that this study merely highlights operational issues 
faced by professions, and does not adequately offer a full solution to the problem. 
However, it may be argued by taking small steps to remove some (if not all) of the 
obstacles presented in practice, then further exploration of this complex topic will be 
possible. Indeed, this topic is of such importance from a societal viewpoint that we 
cannot simply ignore the obstacles and carry on regardless. To revisit a second piece 
of the feedback on the model: 
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 “I suppose the difficulty is always about practical implementation. It is not that 
the idea is impractical. I think it could work very well in practice. The difficulty is 
that the politics of getting people to agree to setting it up in the first place.”AF1 
Therefore, the future objective for research in this area is one of persuasion. 
Persuasion that the model is viable to practitioners in an imperfect world, and, 
persuasion, that small steps are required to overcome the obstacles facing 
practitioners. 
To conclude, the only way to create a path forward towards the goal of regulatory 
compliance is through greater collaboration between academics (who have time to 
think) and practitioners (who have to live it). This study infers that the 
academic/practitioner divide appears to be inhibiting progress towards regulatory 
compliance. Ultimately benefits are to be gained from a societal viewpoint, if the goals 
of academics and professionals are aligned to study these obstacles more fully (and in 
partnership).
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Appendix 1 Construct listing/categorisation 
Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
Resource – costs and benefits, 
monitoring of resources. 
    15 13 38 M/H 
  Adequate 
resources in 
place to enable 
policies and 
procedures to be 
followed 
Lack of key staff to 
identify and fix 
problems 
    75 h 
  effective no added benefit     67 h  
  Costs with no 
tangible benefit 
Front end 
development cost for 
later gain 
    67 h 
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
  Time consuming not time critical, not 
time consuming 
    58 h 
  done daily done infrequently     50 h 
   lengthy process quick process     42 m 
  regular one off     42 m  
  Significant time 
expenditure 
Fairly light on 
resource 
requirements 
    42 m 
  more resource 
required to drive 
forward 
only need one 
person to complete 
    33 m  
  more time 
consuming 
less time needed     33 m 
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
  high project cost low project cost     25 l 
  routine one off project     17 l 
  similar volumes inconsistent/irregular     8 l  
  Saved 
money/made 
money 
Costs money     8 l 
  one off 
implementation 
cost 
ongoing (e.g. 
license) costs 
    0 l 
Education and Training     11 10 27 M 
  training provided little training 
provided 
    50 h 
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
  no training training provided     50 h 
  self-learning structured training 
provided 
    42 m  
  Process could be 
taught 
Understanding "why" 
requires experience 
and judgement 
    42 m 
  difficult to 
implement 
easy to implement     33 m 
  ease of use specialist training     33  m 
  uncertainty of 
results/delivery 
results should be 
certain/straightforwar
d 
    25 m 
  Skills Dumbed down     17 l 
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
process 
  complexity - 
many inputs with 
diversity 
relatively 
straightforward 
    8 l 
  complexity of 
delivery 
lacks complexity     0 l 
  Complex, 
challenging 
project 
One off, 1 hour 
workshop 
    0 l 
Ethics and Culture     6 5 36 M 
  Positive 
behaviour, desire 
to get it right 
Morally corrupt     75 h 
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
  Should be 
identified and 
fixed by 
management and 
compliance 
Need to consider 
whistleblowing 
    50 m 
  Minor issues - 
volume/frequency 
being the 
difference  
More serious 
omission, message 
from the top (wrong 
tone) 
    42 m 
  No significant 
culpability 
Consider changes at 
senior management 
level 
    25 l 
  concerned with 
organisational 
culture 
process/format point     17 l 
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
  Personal integrity Professional 
requirement 
    8 l 
Reputation/ Best practice 
consideration/Proactivity of 
Management 
    15 13 37 M 
  Viewed 
negatively at a 
management 
level 
Seen as exciting 
opportunity, positive 
    75 h 
  Senior 
management 
actively support 
corrective 
measures 
Reports, complaints 
ignored at a senior 
level 
    75 h 
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
  external pressure internal desire to 
change 
    58 h 
  direct 
reputational 
impact 
some limited impact 
on reputation 
    50 h 
  Focused on 
internal process 
Wholly driven by 
client 
    42 m 
  protects 
customer 
reduces cost 
(capital) 
    33 m 
  damages 
reputation to 
stakeholders 
enhances image of 
organisation 
    33 m 
  must do wish to do     33 m  
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
  Senior individuals 
not wishing to 
follow a 
compliance 
agenda 
Senior management 
vest control in 
compliance 
    33 m 
  Different agendas 
- conflict 
Business wishes 
compliance to effect 
this function 
    33 m 
  longer 'term' 
issue 
short term     25 m 
  protects 
customer 
protects bank     25 m 
  commercial 
necessity 
commercial 'nice to 
have' 
    25 l 
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
  seniority of 
management 
input 
limited senior 
engagement 
required 
    17 l 
  deal with 
identification of 
customer 
monitors customer 
activity 
    0 l 
Skills and Status of Compliance 
- experience, knowledge, 
education and hierarchy within 
organisation 
    3 3 11 L 
  Personal integrity 
important factor 
Lower key - face 
less challenge 
    17 l 
  Compliance 
experience and 
Specialist knowledge 
not required 
    17 l 
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
competence 
  skilled judgement 
and expertise 
required 
more process based 
- standardised 
    0 l 
Stakeholder Considerations - 
Input from external 
departments/resource/consultan
ts. In-house, in comparison with 
shared services/outsourcing 
considerations 
    18 16 33 M 
  Looking outwards 
to third parties 
(not client) 
Close direct 
relationship with 
client 
    75 h 
  emotional more     67 h 
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
element to 
delivery 
factual/straightforwar
d 
  Compliance only 
involved in 
activity 
Bigger impact on 
non compliance 
resource e.g. IT 
    50 h 
  Involved many 
stakeholders 
Involved 5-6 
stakeholders only 
    50 m 
  in house consultant led     42 m  
  Working with 
experts 
Yes - but business 
take on team only 
    42 m 
  major system 
development 
single aspect IT 
development 
    33 m 
  could outsource in house     33 m 
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
  consultancy firm 
could do this 
(simple tasks, 
easy to spot 
mistake) 
complex, need to 
keep focus 
    33 m 
  organisation wide contained in 
compliance 
    25 m 
   emotional 
debate 
little emotion     25 m 
  procedures to 
follow 
project management 
required 
    25 l 
  procedures to 
follow 
engages 
stakeholders with 
different skill sets 
    25 l 
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
(e.g. IT customer 
facing) 
  complex 
stakeholders 
limited local 
stakeholders 
    17 l 
  broad range of 
stakeholders 
relatively narrow 
range of 
stakeholders 
    17 l 
  info stored on 
bank systems 
no system storage 
required 
    17 l 
  wide ranging 
project teams 
focussed project 
development 
    17 l 
  major system 
change required 
off shelf compatible 
software 
    0 l 
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
Communication and Knowledge 
Sharing 
    4 3 33 M 
  No opportunity to 
sell skills/services 
Potential to sell 
products/service 
    50 h 
  Process based 
on factual data 
Rationale may 
require outside 
advice 
    33 m 
  Communication 
skills and 
effectiveness 
Question of 
knowledge 
    25 l 
  Liaison with other 
firms 
No liaison     25 l 
Regulatory risk     8 7 36 M 
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
  potentially 
serious 
consequences 
consequences are 
less impactful 
    50 h 
  event regulatory 
requirement, 
procedure 
    42 h 
  low risk as no 
penalties 
if outsource, to high 
risk (serious 
regulatory fines if get 
wrong) 
    42 h 
  Safer activity as 
following explicit 
instructions 
Risk of legal 
exposure if it goes 
wrong 
    42 m 
  financial impacts little direct financial     33 m 
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
input 
  risk involved in 
making progress 
little risk involved     33 m 
  Directly involved 
regulator 
didn't involve 
regulator 
    33 m 
  Same regulation Commercially driven, 
not regulation 
specific 
    17 l 
Principles, as opposed to rule 
based – spirit, as opposed to, 
letter of law (judgement) 
    9 8 54 H 
  common sense 
approach 
unhelpful approach     83 h  
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
  formal structure not formalised     83 h  
  exhibits lack of 
foresight 
based on sound 
principles 
    67 h 
  vague 
information 
Focussed     67 h 
  Required to 
follow 
law/instructions 
without own 
thought 
Skills required in 
creating system – 
experience 
    58 h 
  Contact may be 
motivated by 
confidentiality 
Rationale is never 
confidentiality itself 
    42 m 
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
  Judgement 
Required 
Black and white     33 m  
  procedural No two procedures 
the same 
    25 l  
  use past editions 
(procedures) to 
update to now 
specialised - starting 
from scratch (no 
starting point) 
    25 l 
Barriers to compliance - internal 
processes and procedures 
issues not addressed in above 
categories (i.e. not 
ethics/culture, skills, resource) 
    14 12 41 M/H 
  change process barriers to change     92 h  
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
  No job 
satisfaction  
Major achievement     83 h 
  Limited value Compliance, 
Governance 
improvements 
    83 h 
  money 
laundering 
prevention 
security prevention 
issues 
    58 h  
  process errors occurred     50 h 
  lending scenarios non lending scenario     33 m 
  clear process complex (undefined) 
process 
    33 m  
  process to return overview     33 m  
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
funds 
  Objective is 
identity data 
collection 
Client is not relevant. 
Objective is 
understanding "why" 
    33 m 
  non lending 
process 
lending process     25 m  
  customer facing 
process 
non customer 
process 
    17 l  
  specific process generic process     17 l 
  related to 
products 
non product specific     8 l 
  manual use automated     8 l 
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
Nuisance/Inefficiencies     9 8 59 H 
  efficient inefficient     92 h  
  bad experience good experience     92 h  
  good to deal with unhelpful       83 h  
  Clear 
understanding 
and desire to 
follow policies 
and procedures 
Ignoring policies and 
procedures where it 
suits 
    83 h 
  Appropriate 
balance between 
performance 
targets and 
Focus on 
profit/income without 
any consideration for 
policies and 
    83 h 
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
getting it right procedures 
  different in each 
case 
(demographics) 
personal to each 
individual  
    42 m 
  disrupts assists     25 l  
  too many checks fully automated 
process 
    25 l 
  Demonstrable 
outputs 
(policy/document
s) 
None - assisted 
decision making 
    8 l 
Ritualism and Gaming     3 3 33 L 
  opinion self- Responsible     42 m  
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Categories Construct Pairs   Number of 
paired 
constructs 
% Constructs % Similarity HIL Value 
regulating 
  No obligation to 
report as long as 
action taking 
place to fix 
Report to risk and 
audit committee 
    33 l 
  Liaison with 
regulators 
No liaison     25 l 
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Appendix 2 Content of feedback email 
From: Wendy Mason Burdon  
Sent: 14 April 2015 14:44 
Subject: Regulatory Compliance Research - The compliance trust model 
Dear All, 
You have all kindly contributed your time to consider my research into models of 
regulatory compliance. In order to finalise my project I would like to share some of the 
key findings that have arisen from my work. I would also like to present a proposed 
conceptual model, and would appreciate your views on whether this model would work 
in practice. 
The traditional models of regulatory compliance within financial services include in-
house compliance (or risk management functions), using consultants, shared service 
arrangements or outsourcing. The results of this study, which has collated the views of 
financial service professionals, show that ‘barriers to compliance’ exist within the 
sector.   
The proposed alternative model results in a ‘compliance community’ which would 
operate independently from the financial service firms that they serve. This model 
differs from traditional commercial consultancy or outsourcing. Budgets would be 
controlled through a ‘trust’ structure, following the principles of a cost controlled 
service centre serving all of its stakeholders, rather than a ‘profit’ making entity. 
Decision making on operations and appointments would remain within the ‘trust’ 
structure based on open communication and dialogue with a range of stakeholder 
including regulators and international industry leadership i.e. G30, and the multiple 
financial service firms that the trust would serve. This model will also differ from 
banking forum groups which are already in existence (such as the BBA) as the 
compliance officers community would be fully independent from the banking 
organisation that they would serve (and hence issues surrounding confidentiality/trust 
would exist within the resulting compliance community, rather than the individual 
banking organisations). The compliance trust would also benefit organisations they 
serve, via rotation of experience and knowledge sharing between organisations. 
The key attributes (arising from this research) and underpinning theoretical rationale are 
summarised in the table below. Please could you add your comment to the final column 
of the table in response to the following questions for each attribute: 
 Do you agree that the stated attribute benefits compliance/risk management 
officers in pursuit of regulatory compliance?  
 Are there remaining barriers to regulatory compliance in the presented 
model/attributes?  
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 Are the theoretical attributes of the model feasible in practice? (i.e. when 
considering the bullet points/comments in blue in the second column of the table 
below) 
NOTE A TABLE OF KEY ATTRIBUTES AND SUMMARY OF DATA 
COLLECTION WAS INSERTED HERE (for brevity of this appendix, please 
refer to Table 22 in Chapter 8) 
Of course this email provides a summary only of the data collected and analysis thereon 
(which actually runs to around 15,000 word or so), so if you would like to receive any 
clarification, or indeed view the expanded and collective results of the study please let 
me know. Also feel free to give me a call if any of the above is unclear (see details 
below). I am going to try to draw together my results by mid-May so I would appreciate 
if you could try to reply before May 12
th
. 
I appreciate the time you have taken to read and reply with comments! 
Kind regards, 
Wendy 
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Appendix 3 Summary of personal construct theory corollaries, from Kelly (1963, pp. 103-104), interpretation 
of corollaries by Fransella, Bell and Bannister (2004, pp. 9-12) and Jankowicz (2004, Appendix 6), and 
application in this thesis 
Personal 
Construct 
Theory 
Corollaries 
Kelly’s statement Summary of Fransella, Bell and 
Bannister/Jankowicz interpretations  
 
Application in this thesis 
Fundamental 
Postulate 
“A person’s processes are psychologically 
channelized by the way he anticipates 
events” 
People operate based on in built 
representations of phenomena they 
experience, in order to actively predict what 
happens – “man as scientist”. 
Compliance officers learn (and adapt 
behaviours) in response to regulatory and 
business needs. 
Construction 
Corollary 
“A person anticipates events by construing 
their replications” 
By recognition of regularities/recurring 
patterns in their experience, people develop 
internal representations (constructs) 
Personal compliance experiences discussed 
with constructs elicited during repertory grid 
interview. 
Individuality 
Corollary 
“Person’s differ from each other in their 
construction of events” 
Individuals develop their own meanings for 
the same event. Aim to “get beyond the 
words”. 
Compliance officers’ interpret and adapt to 
their personal experiences. Grids have been 
analysed both individually and collectively 
(see commonality corollary). 
Organisation 
Corollary 
“Each person characteristically evolves, for 
his convenience in anticipating events, a 
construction system embracing ordinal 
relationships between constructs” 
Constructs are hierarchical (subordinate 
and superordinate relationship). 
Constructs should be viewed as pyramidal 
in relation to each other (laddering). 
Some constructs carry more importance than 
others (see also Honey’s Content Analysis 
applied Section 7.3). 
Dichotomy 
Corollary 
“A person’s construction system is composed 
of a finite number of dichotomous constructs” 
Constructs are reference axes – to 
understand a person’s meaning fully, you 
need to know ‘both ends’. 
See Figure 16 – participants asked to 
describe construct in terms of 
similarity/differences. 
Choice 
Corollary 
“A person chooses for himself that alternative 
in a dichotomised constructs through which 
he anticipates the greater possibility for 
extension and definition of his system” 
The main motivational corollary of personal 
construct theory. The choice (conscious or 
unconscious) to choose a pole of a 
construct. Helps explain why individuals 
may provide lopsided ratings. 
Participants were asked to rate constructs 
against an overall provided construct (See 
also Section 6.6 for analysis thereon). 
Range 
Corollary 
“A construct is convenient for the anticipation 
of a finite range of events only” 
With reference to “range of convenience” - 
a construct is not used for all things in all 
In instances when constructs could not 
adequately relate to all experiences, then 
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Personal 
Construct 
Theory 
Corollaries 
Kelly’s statement Summary of Fransella, Bell and 
Bannister/Jankowicz interpretations  
 
Application in this thesis 
circumstances. rating was nil (and no further analysis 
performed). 
Experience 
Corollary 
“A person’s construction system varies as he 
successively construes the replication of 
events” 
Constructs are open to amendments based 
on experience of person (in light of events). 
The average experience of participants (20.1 
years) indicates the depth and quality of 
personal construct data in this thesis (see 
Section 6.5). 
Modulation 
Corollary 
“A variation in a person’s construction system 
is limited by the permeability of the constructs 
within whose range of convenience the 
variants lie” 
Some constructs can accommodate a 
greater range of events (e.g. good/bad), 
whereas others are less permeable 
covering a limited range of convenience 
e.g. fluorescent/incandescent). 
In instances when constructs could not 
adequately relate to all experiences, then 
‘rating’ was nil (and no analysis performed). 
Fragmentation 
Corollary 
“A person may successively employ a variety 
of construction subsystems which are 
inferentially incompatible with each other” 
Although there is tendency towards 
consistency within construct system 
(especially core constructs (personal 
values) and their subordinate constructs) – 
this may vary due to circumstances/events. 
Initial Eyeball analysis of grid is 
recommended to identify inconsistencies in 
constructs. See Section 6.6 for analysis of 
grids data. 
Commonality 
Corollary 
“To the extent that one person employs a 
construction of experience which is similar to 
that employed by another, his psychological 
processes are similar to those of the other 
person” 
Contrast to the individuality corollary.  
Corollary has direct relevance for research 
conducted with groups of people using the 
same grid (i.e. this research thesis on 
compliance). 
Honey’s Content Analysis is applied to grid 
data (See Section 6.6.2) to identify themes 
within elicited constructs. 
Sociality 
Corollary 
“To the extent that one person construes the 
construction processes of another, he may 
play a role in a social process involving the 
other person” 
Describes how we try to understand others, 
and relationship of interaction with others. 
The relational aspect of constructs has been 
interrogated during repertory grid interview 
with participants, by exploring a range of 
experiences. 
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Appendix 4 Examples of prior use of repertory grid in business research 
Researcher Research discipline Number of participants Overview of 
repertory grid 
method 
Overview of analysis Other modifications 
Girard (2013) Sustainability issues  Four working groups, 
involving range of 5-10 
participants 
Iterative process of 
categorisation of 
stakeholders. 
Mapping stakeholder 
practice by 2 step 
process, to build 
collective perception. 
Semi directive 
interviews, participation 
in group by 
researchers 
(considered innovative 
adaptation of repertory 
grid  to practice 
mapping) 
Wright et al. (2012) Strategic Management 
research 
46 full time managers (cross 
industry) enrolled on 
Strategic Management 
Masters course 
Elements supplied to 
participants. 
Constructs formed 
and scoring by 
participants. 
Excel data collection and 
thematic analysis. Further 
analysis in REPGRID 
program. Listing of key 
findings side by side. 
Overall “preferred” 
element to be 
envisioned by 
participants 
Goffin et al. (2012) Supply chain management 
research 
Two case studies:  
Case 1, 39 repertory grids; 
Case 2, Ongoing 
Elements supplied to 
participants. 
Constructs formed 
and scoring by 
participants. 
Case 1: Grouping of 
constructs by coding. 
Average normalized 
variability (ANV) 
compared. Case 2: 
Pareto analysis to ensure 
theoretical saturation 
reached. 
 
Thota (2011) Information Systems 
Research 
Over 2 cycles, 29 repertory 
grid participants 
Elements supplied to 
participants. 
Constructs formed 
and scoring by 
participants. 
Use of REPIV program. 
Content analysis of grids 
(based on Honey 
technique). 
Quantitative analysis 
using SPSS 
(Krippendorff’s Alpha). 
Constructs 
categorised, mean 
percentage similarity 
scores computed to 
estimate relative 
importance of each 
category. 
Kneiding and Tracey 
(2009) 
Community development 
finance/stakeholder 
Research 
18 repertory grid participants Elements developed 
from literature. Three 
overall constructs 
Analysis of interview 
transcription. Content 
analysis. Multidimensional 
Two part interview: 
Interviews recorded 
and data analysed in 
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Researcher Research discipline Number of participants Overview of 
repertory grid 
method 
Overview of analysis Other modifications 
provided. Scaling (MDS) for grid 
analysis, and cluster 
analysis. 
combination with 
constructs from grids 
Alexander, 
Loggerenberg, Lotriet 
and Phalamohohlaka 
(2008) 
 
Information Systems 
Research 
Workshop of 4 researchers Eliciting both 
elements and 
constructs from 
participants. 
Goal to reach a shared 
understanding – used 
communication to 
compare individual grids. 
New application of grid 
– Reflection and 
Construction of Shared 
Meaning 
Song and Gale (2008) Project Management 
Research 
18 repertory grid interviews Elements supplied to 
participants. 
Constructs formed 
and scoring by 
participants. 
Content analysis.  
Crudge and Johnson 
(2007) 
Search Engine User 
Perspective Research 
10 repertory grid interviews Elements supplied in 
form of search 
engines. Constructs 
formed and scored 
by participants. 
Qualitative 
content/thematic analysis. 
 
Panagiotou (2007) Strategic Management 
Research 
24 participants (20 completed 
repertory grid – dyadic 
approach to compare 
competitor companies). 
Elements (companies chosen 
by researcher –constructs 
elicited by participants. 
Elements (competitor 
companies), chosen 
by researcher. 
Constructs formed 
and scoring by 
participants. 
Varied between each 
hypothesis. 
Qualitative data analysed 
by content analysis. 
Quantitative data 
analysed using 
SPSS/Manova. 
Interviews, followed up 
by questionnaire 
Senior and Swailes 
(2004) 
Performance management 60 repertory grids Elements formed in 
conjunction with 
participants. 
Constructs formed 
by participants. 
Factor analysis (principal 
component analysis, 
using specialized GAP 
(Grid analysis 
programme). Formation of 
group constructs 
(construct clusters). 
Team cognitive maps 
prepared during 
analysis 
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Researcher Research discipline Number of participants Overview of 
repertory grid 
method 
Overview of analysis Other modifications 
Oppenheim, Stenson 
and Wilson (2003) 
Information management 5 repertory grid interviews Element categories 
(nine) supplied in 
advance. Constructs 
formed by 
participants. 
Cluster analysis and 
content analysis using 
WebGrid II programme. 
 
Lee and Truex (2000) Information systems 74 grids completed 11 “critical” elements 
and 10 constructs 
supplied from 
literature for scoring. 
Statistical analysis of 
construct ratings. 
 
Duberley et al. (2000) 
 
Performance evaluation 
and control systems 
29 repertory grid interviews Not clearly stated in 
paper. 
Not clearly stated in 
paper. 
Combining technique 
of case study and 
repertory grid 
technique 
Langan-Fox and Tan 
(1997) 
Culture survey 13 repertory grid interviews, 
with follow up survey 
Elements provide, 
constructs formed by 
participants. 
Content Analysis.  
Honey (1979) Attitude Survey, 
Manufacturing Business 
73 repertory grid, performed 
in groups of approx. 8 
Elements type 
specified. Constructs 
formed by 
participants. 
Manual Review – seven 
stage process. 
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